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PREFACE 
This study is the product of an empirical research which was conducted at the 
Department of Empirical Theology of Nijmegen University in the Netherlands. 
The research was financed by Nijmegen University. It lasted from 1 February 
1986 to 1 January 1990. 
Although the results of empirical research are mostly published under the 
name of one or a few authors, they are always the product of a joined effort of 
many hands. I owe thanks to many people for their support of the inquiry 
which led to this book. 
My promotores, dr. J.A. van der Ven, professor of Empirical Theology at 
Nijmegen University, and dr. A.J.A. Felling, professor of Methodology at 
Nijmegen University, taught me the craft of empirical-theological research. 
They taught me what high standards of scientific quality are and how they can 
be achieved, although sometimes with pain. Dr. Fred Nieman's outstanding 
methodological expertise and challenging opinions on peace issues put a mark 
on the conceptualisation and theoretical model of this study. I thank Fred in 
particular for his remarkable taste of humour, which helped to surmount the 
inevitable obstacles and setbacks we sometimes had to face. It is largely due to 
the admirable meticulousness and tenacity of Berdine Biemans' data analyses, 
that this research has produced the empirical results which made it a very 
worthwhile effort. Student-assistant Cees Campfens kept full control over the 
complicated data-collection. My friend Sjef de Rouw did the data-entry with 
almost super-human speed and accuracy, while enjoying his walkman. 
The colleagues of the Department of Empirical Theology at Nijmegen 
University supported this study through their creation of a stimulating, critical 
and internationally orientated scientific environment, of which the series of 
'English' staff-meetings were certainly a culminating point. I feel lucky to have 
experienced the unique combination of collégial cordiality and sharp scientific 
criticism at the Nijmegen Empirical Theology Department. It is only through 
the combination of both that a scientific community can maintain high quality. 
I also feel very much obliged to the Department of Philosophy of Tilburg 
University, for enabling me to spend more of my working hours than expected 
on the completion of this study. 
Several people and organizations contributed to this study, through their 
theoretical advice and practical support. Discussions with R. Aspeslagh, J.G. 
Siccama and S. Rozemond, all of the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations 'ClingendaeP at The Hague, deepened my understanding of interna-
tional peace and security issues. B. Schennink of the Nijmegen University 
Peace Research Institute shared his great knowledge of the Dutch peace 
movements with me, in his comments on the first chapter. Ph.P. Everts, 
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director of the Institute for International Studies of Leiden University, helped 
me to improve the study by his critical comments on the text. The Secretariats 
of the Interchurch Committee for Bilateral Disarmament, the Interchurch 
Peace Council and Pax Christi the Netherlands kindly gave their support to the 
sampling and the data-collection. I thank Annebeth Mackie-Gunning from St. 
Andrews, Scotland, Pieter Nieuwint of Tilburg University and my friend Rob 
Borst for their great help in translating the text into English. 
Like most production processes, the production of this dissertation has had 
its external costs. Much of this was carried by my wife Renée and our little 
Carmen and Sofia, in forms ranging from the neglect of simple bicycle main-
tenance, to occasional severe disagreeableness. I thank Renée for her support 
and admire her endurance. An unintended empirical result of this study is the 
insight that one needs the help of parents most not only in the first years of 
life, but also between the ages of about thirty and thirty five. I thank my 
parents and in-laws for their substantial support of this study. 
My parents gave me Justice and Love. I dedicate this book to them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this study is the relationship between religion and the question 
of peace. What is the religious dimension of peace? How do the churches and 
the church peace movements view the problems connected with peace? Does 
religion influence what people think and do about peace? The issue of peace 
has undergone dramatic changes in the last few years, due to the turbulent 
developments in Eastern Europe. Europe has witnessed the end of the com-
munist era, as well as the end, at least for the time being, of the era of nuclear 
deterrence. In the euphoria over these events of global historic importance, the 
political scientist Fukuyama announced the end of history, in the definitive 
victory of the Western democratic capitalist form of society (Fukuyama 
1989)". The expectation that Europe would enter a period of reconciliation 
and peace after the removal of the Iron Curtain was soon disturbed by new 
forms of violence: ethnic conflicts in politically and economically disintegrating 
former communist states; large numbers of war refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia seeking access to Western European countries; the reemergence of 
racist and xenophobic attitudes in Europe; violence against asylum seekers and 
"foreigners". In the era of nuclear deterrence, the problem of war and peace 
was relatively simple and surveyable form a Western point of view. The 
ideological conflict between East and West was controlled by the dangerous 
instrument of nuclear deterrence and the main political concern was to keep 
the ghost of nuclear warfare inside the bottle of nuclear deterrence. In the 
post-deterrence era the problem of war and peace has become complex and 
obscure. Security in East and West is now dependent on the adequate reaction 
of political decision-makers on complicated and interrelated economic, political 
and cultural processes, which are difficult to control and predict. 
This study is based on empirical research conducted early in 1988, almost 
two years before the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989. At that time, 
1) In this study references are set out as follows. Between brackets the name of the 
author or the first word of the title of the text is given. Next comes the year of publica-
tion and possibly the page number. All the titles mentioned are given in the bibliography. 
Where more than one work of an author in the same year is referred to, these are distin-
guished by a letter after the date (1988, 1988a, 1988b). 
Tables and figures are indicated by a combination of two numbers, separated by a full 
stop. The first number refers to the number of the chapter in which the table or the 
figure belongs. The second number refers to the sequence within the chapter. Thus table 
3.12 is the twelfth table in chapter 3. 
Unless references to male persons are made, the words 'he' and 'his' should in this study 
be read as short for 'she/he' and 'her/his'. 
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Europe was still captured in the division between East and West and in the 
system of nuclear deterrence, although signs of the end of the deterrence area 
were visible, among other things in the form of long awaited successes in 
disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 
Europe at the time, the problem of peace was still largely considered as a 
problem of (nuclear) armament. The research focused on the motivational 
effect of religious peace attitudes on peace action. For this purpose, members 
of church-related peace movements in the Netherlands were interviewed. The 
research into the motivation to peace action carries the marks of the period in 
which it was conducted: there is a strong focus on the arms problem. This 
limits the topicality of the research, from the point of view of the new prob-
lems of peace that Europe is faced with today. At the time of the research, 
however, a focus on the arms problem was sound and necessary. In order to 
investigate the motivation to peace action in 1988, the research had to be 
concentrated on the core of the peace problem as experienced by Dutch peace 
activists at the time, which was the problem of (nuclear) armament. 
The broader political context of the arms problem, in particular the ideo-
logical conflict between Eastern communism and Western capitalism, has also 
been kept out of the research to a large extent. This was not done because this 
context was considered irrelevant to the motivation to peace action. The 
decision stemmed from the aim of the research, which was not to describe the 
full range of attitudes which influence peace action, but to develop and test a 
model of the motivational effect of religious peace attitudes on peace action. 
In order not to overload the model with variables, the research focused on 
attitudes directly related to armament. This does not mean that the broader 
context of the armament problem is totally absent. The research pays attention 
to, among other things, attitudes towards the NATO membership of the 
Netherlands, the importance of development aid to the promotion of peace, 
the importance of civil East-West contacts for peace, the relative importance 
of the armament problem in comparison with other "world problems" and the 
attainability of world peace. Also, a large number of religious attitudes 
pertaining to the hamartiological, soteriological and ecclesiological dimensions 
of peace have been included. 
This study is part of the research programme Religious Communication in an 
Empirical Theology (RECOMET) of the Department of Empirical Theology at 
Nijmegen University. Empirical-theological research into religious communica-
tion forms a central part of the RECOMET programme (RECOMET 1987, 2). 
In this programme religious communication is placed within an action-theoreti-
cal framework. Religious communication is viewed as a hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis. The communicative aspect of this praxis refers to the 
striving for inter-subjective agreement in relation to the content of the Chris-
tian faith, in its significance for the individual and for society (Van der Ven 
1990, 57-58). The hermeneutical aspect situates religious communication within 
the timespan between the basic texts of the Christian faith and the horizon of 
contemporary understanding. Hermeneutical praxis strives to bridge the 
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timespan which separates the past in which the texts have their origin from the 
present day. This connection is made by illuminating the meaning which is 
contained within the text in the perspective of the present day (Gadamer 1966; 
Ricoeur 1986a). Hermeneutical praxis can be considered as an 'intergenerative 
communication'. In that way, not just the text from the past, but the present 
day situation too, constitute a 'locus theologicus'. Treating the current situation 
as the horizon of understanding of the texts from the past demands a 'theologi-
cal hermeneutics of experience' (Schillebeeckx 1972, 58). 
It must be emphasised that hermeneutical-communicative praxis is to be 
considered an aspiration. The success of the hermeneutical-communicative 
spanning of time and the inter-subjective agreement can never be guaranteed. 
Often it fails, and it may never be completely successful. The hermeneutical 
process is a constant dialogue with tradition, from an ever-changing current 
situation, which will never lead to a complete and final understanding of the 
past (Pannenberg 1977; Schillebeeckx 1972). Completely successful agreement 
is a Utopian ideal which serves, however, as a guiding principle which directs 
communication (Apel 1973; Habermas 1983). Hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis has its limits. These lie in the pluralism and conflict of interpretation 
which are connected with the hermeneutical bridging of the timespan. The 
pluralism can be understood in terms of the diversity of contemporary situ-
ations, to which the texts from the past must be related through interpretation. 
The conflict results from the possible oppositional character of the situation 
(Van der Ven 1990, 56). 
Empirical-theological evaluation research aims to describe, to explain and to 
transform the hermeneutical-communicative praxis in the way in which it is 
actually carried out. The description seeks to establish characteristic features 
of this praxis, as well as possible differences and relationships between these 
features. The explanation seeks to establish a direction in the relationship 
between the features of the hermeneutical-communicative praxis. The main 
point here is to establish causal relationships. The evaluative character of the 
description and explanation relates to the confrontation of the theological 
hypotheses concerning hermeneutical-communicative praxis and the actual 
praxis. Are the descriptive and explanatory hypotheses empirically supported 
or contradicted, and how should these results be interpreted in relation to 
theological theory and religious praxis? The descriptive and explanatory 
function of empirical-theological research can be seen as a contribution to the 
'hermeneutics of experience', as was advocated by Schillebeeckx. 
The aim to transform hermeneutical-communicative praxis should not be 
seen as an attempt to establish manipulative control on the basis of criteria 
alien to the hermeneutical-communicative praxis. Hermeneutical-communicat-
ive praxis itself is directed towards the transformation of its own boundaries, 
and so to change. To this end it contains a number of internal criteria which 
have communication-theoretical, as well as theological foundations. From the 
point of view of communication theory they are based on the normative 
principles which are implicit in the structure of all communication (Habermas 
1981; Van Doorne 1982). From the theological point of view they are based on 
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the eschatological expectation of the fulfilment of the human and material 
world in the kingdom of God (Peukert 1976). With Van der Ven these 
normative principles can be defined as: freedom, equality, universality and 
solidarity (Ven der Ven 1990, 69-88). As regards the aim of transformation, 
empirical-theological evaluation research is concerned with the assessment of 
empirical descriptions and explanations of religious hermeneutical-communi-
cative praxis in the light of the normative and eschatological principles which 
form the basis of this praxis (id., 103). 
In the preceding paragraphs the words 'empirical' and 'theological' have 
been associated several times. This connection is sometimes criticized on the 
grounds of the prejudice that theological matters cannot be approached in 
empirical terms. Indeed, God cannot be measured. But God is not the direct 
object of theology. God is the direct object of faith, and the direct object of 
theology is the faith in God. Faith in God, as a collection of attitudes and 
connected behaviour patterns, can in principle be described and explained with 
empirical methods in the same way as all other attitudes and behaviour 
patters. Empirical theology should be understood as the interdisciplinary 
application in theology of concepts, methods and techniques from empirical 
science, in particular from empirical social sciences. The theological character 
of empirical theology - where it differs from other empirical studies of relig-
ious phenomena, such as the psychology and sociology of religion - is found in 
the theological definition of the problem and the theological objective of the 
empirical research. The definition of the problem is formulated in theological 
terms, starting from theological theories, and is answered in the light of these 
theological theories (Hermans 1986, 9-10). The objective is the advancement of 
faith, viewed as a hermeneutical-communicative praxis, in the light of its 
inherent principles of freedom, equality, universality and solidarity (Van der 
Ven 1990, 139). 
This study is concerned with an essential aspect of religious hermeneutical-
communicative praxis, namely religious motivation. The hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis of faith is not pure theory. Faith is not just about discovering 
meaning in texts of the religious tradition and about communicating about this. 
Its primary concern is the search for pointers for action in a communication 
about the meaning of the religious tradition. Christian faith is not merely 
hermeneutical clarification of existence, but genuine renewal of existence 
(SchiUebeeckx 1972, 109; Van der Ven 1990, 56). On the basis of this conside-
ration, theologians put orthopraxis forward as the central criterion of the 
Christian faith (Metz 1977; Moltmann 1984, Schillebeeckx 1972; 1989). The 
concept of orthopraxis refers to the transforming function of the religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis, on the basis of its inherent normative 
principles. 
How does the transformative function of the hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis come into being? How does orthopraxis come into being, and how can it 
be fostered? Orthopraxis is only possible when faith possesses a motivational 
function. Religious motivation has to do with the function, within 
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hermeneutical-communicative praxis, of religious meaning for action. Thus, 
religious motivation can be seen as a condition to orthopraxis. Without 
religious motivation, the normative 'orthos' of the Christian faith has no 
effective relation to praxis. 
Only a limited amount of theological theory has been put forward concern-
ing the working of the transformative, motivational function of faith. The 
motivational function is referred to in rather vague and evocative terms such 
as 'Christian intentionality' (Fuchs 1970); 'integration', 'stimulation' and 
'criticism' (Auer 1971); 'inspiration' and 'orientation' (Schillebeeckx 1977, 36). 
For a scientific description and explanation of religious motivation these 
indications lack the necessary conceptual precision. It remains unclear how 
faith functions in relation to motivation, nor is it explained what consequences 
this motivational function has for action. These questions indicate the theologi-
cal definition of the problem with which this study is concerned. The problem 
can be formulated as follows: 
what is the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis? 
The theological objective of the study follows from the transformative intention 
of hermeneutical-communicative praxis itself, according to its internal norma-
tive principles. The objective is: 
the clarification of the promotion of the motivational function of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis, with a view to its transformation in accor-
dance with the normative principles of freedom, equality, universality and solidar-
ity. 
In relation with the theological definition of the problem and objective, the 
empirical-theological research of this study has been arranged according to the 
structure of the empirical-theological cycle (Van der Ven 1990, 132). Here one 
can distinguish, apart from the formulation of the problem and the objective, 
four phases: theological induction, theological deduction, theological testing 
and theological evaluation. 
Theological induction 
In this phase, a more specific and condensed research question is derived from 
the initial definition of the problem, on the basis of theological observation 
and reflection. From a practical point of view it is impossible to consider 
motivational processes in every field of hermeneutical-communicative praxis in 
one study. But that is not necessary. Motivational processes can also be 
studied with the help of one isolated field of hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis, after which the hermeneutical-communicative praxis as a whole can be 
clarified, with the necessary precautions. 
On the basis of theological observation and reflection, this study will 
concentrate on peace action, as part of the field of hermeneutical-communi-
cative action. From the angle of theological reflection, peace action can be 
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seen as an exemplary manifestation of the transformative power of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis. In its wider, religious meaning, peace as 
'shalom' and 'eiréne' is in the Jewish-Christian tradition the collective term for 
the normative principles of the faith. Starting with the early Christian pacifists, 
right through to contemporary Christian peace activists, the eschatological 
expectation of peace has motivated believers to transform their actions 
according to the principles of freedom, equality, universality and solidarity. 
Moreover, the striving for peace has always been closely linked with the 
striving for justice: 'opus iustitiae pax' (De Blois & Bredero 1980; Jeurissen 
1987; United States Bishops' Conference 1983). 
In the years which lie behind us there has been a great flowering of peace 
action, both within and outside the churches. The causes of this lay, among 
other things, in the growing concern over the development of nuclear arma-
ment, in anxiety over the growing militarisation of the world and in the 
growing awareness of the negative connection between armament and develop-
ment (Everts 1983; 1984; 1985; 1985a). Peace actions took many forms, such as 
large anti-nuclear demonstrations, public petitions, as well as numerous actions 
and discussions at the local level. In the Netherlands, churches and church 
peace movements played an important part in promoting peace action. 
Churches, church peace movements, and theologians explored the 
transformative power of the religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis, 
with a view to promoting peace action. If ever there was theological reflection 
on the motivational function of the Christian faith, this took place in recent 
years in 'peace theology', even though this reflection was mostly of an implicit 
nature. The lengthy and penetrating education of the faithful by churches, 
church peace movements and theologians about the relationship between the 
Christian faith and peace action, justifies the assumption that awareness of 
such relationships also exists among the faithful. Thus, we have a unique 
opportunity to study the transformative power of the religious hermeneutical-
communicative praxis concretely in an empirical-theological manner. Concen-
trating on the hermeneutical-communicative praxis of peace action, the 
theological question which this research addresses can be formulated as 
follows: 
what is the motivational function of the religious hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis in relation to peace action? 
The research question determines the choice of the research design. In order 
to make an empirical-theological study of this question, the model of a survey-
research has been chosen. The aim of a survey-research is to obtain a descrip-
tive and explanatory stock-taking record of a carefully defined population, by 
means of a number of questions (Albinski 1967). In the survey of this study, 
the description is aimed particularly at religious attitudes and peace action, 
whereas the explanation focuses on the motivational relationship between both 
these characteristics. 
In this survey-research, the description and explanation both have an 
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exploratory character. The research is exploratory because of the large gaps 
which still exist in the empirical-theological formulation of a theory concerning 
the motivational function of religion. The intention is not to test existing 
theological hypotheses, but to arrive in the first place at empirically corrobor-
ated theological hypotheses, which, in turn, can serve as a starting point for 
subsequent empirical research. 
Theological deduction 
The phase of theological deduction can be divided into three aspects: theologi-
cal conceptualisation, the designing of a theological explanatory model and 
theological operationalisation. 
Theological conceptualisation consists in the accurate description and 
definition of the characteristics which are being examined. One important rule 
is that of conceptual parsimony. A minimal number of concepts should be 
aimed at, with a maximum number of relations between the concepts (De 
Groot 1968, 73). However, in an exploratory research, striving for conceptual 
economy is not without scientific risk. The researcher must cross the field of 
his research in every direction, in order to prevent him overlooking important 
empirical data. He cannot know beforehand where his conceptualisation will 
make a fruitful contact with empiricism. In exploratory research a broad and 
partly tentative conceptualisation is unavoidable. 
This study opens with a broad conceptual plan describing the peace goals of 
Dutch churches and church peace movements (chapter one). The function of 
this description is to gain some orientation concerning the various meanings 
which are attached in the field of the research to the concepts of peace, peace 
action and religious attitudes towards peace. The description of peace goals 
directs the theological conceptualisation and provides a framework for the 
evaluation of the results of the research. 
In chapter two a conceptualisation is worked out for four theoretical 
spheres: peace action, the motivation to peace action, religious attitudes 
towards peace and the social location of peace action. The conceptualisation 
will be on the basis of theological, sociological, polemological and motivation-
theoretical literature. At the close of the second chapter, in section 2.8, three 
empirical questions will be formulated. These have a bearing on the empirical 
differentiation of the theological conceptualisation, the differences between 
subpopulations with regard to empirical characteristics and the causal relations 
between empirical characteristics, in particular the relation between religious 
peace attitudes and peace action. The last empirical question will be specified 
in a theological explanatory model concerning the motivational effect of 
religious peace attitudes on peace action. 
Operationalisation comprises the translation of theoretical concepts into 
terms of measuring operations. Operationalisation furnishes an instruction 
which indicates how the concepts will be registered in concrete reality (Segers 
1983, 38). Operationalisation results in a number of instruments with which 
empirical measurements of theoretical concepts are carried out. The measur-
ing instruments are presented in Appendix E. 
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Theological testing 
In the testing phase, empirical answers are given to the empirical questions. 
This process consists of two parts: the collection of the data, and the analysis 
of these data. 
The data have been collected by a verbal inquiry, carried out on the basis of 
a multi-level stratified sampling procedure (Moser & Kalton 1979). The 
research sample is divided into six strata: on the one hand the members of 
three Dutch church peace movements; on the other hand the members of 
three denominations in the Netherlands, in so far as they are not members of 
any peace movement. The church peace movements which are studied are the 
Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Interchurch Peace Council, hereafter referred to 
as IKV), the Interkerkelijk Comité Tweezijdige Ontwapening (Interchurch 
Committee for Bilateral Disarmament, referred to as ICTO) and the Werk-
groepen voor Missie, Ontwikkeling en Vrede (Working Groups for Mission, 
Development and Peace, referred to as MOV). The denominations which were 
studied are the Roman Catholic Church, the Netherlands Reformed Church 
and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. The data collection is 
described in Appendix A. 
The data analysis is subdivided according to the three empirical questions, 
formulated in chapter two. In chapter three, the empirical differentiation of 
the conceptualisation is mapped out. Chapter four describes the differences 
between the sub-populations with regard to the empirically distinguishable 
characteristics. Chapter five contains the results of the testing of the explana-
tory model concerning the motivational effect of religious peace attitudes on 
peace action. The tables for these three chapters can be found in Appendices 
B-D. 
Theological evaluation 
In the theological evaluation, the results of the research are fed back into the 
definition of the problem, the objective and the research question of the study. 
Two phases can be distinguished in this connection: theological interpretation 
and theological reflection (Van der Ven 1990, 175-179). 
In the theological interpretation, the results of the empirical testing are 
summarised and interpreted in the light of the theological research question 
which the study seeks to answer. Particular points of discussion here are the 
theological conceptualisation and the theological explanatory model of peace 
action. The phase of theological reflection completes the empirical-theological 
cycle of the study. The results of the study are fed back into the initial theo-
logical reflection from which the definition of the problem and the objective of 
the research originated. Here the discussion concentrates in particular on 
theological theories concerning the transformative power of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis and the motivational function of the 
Christian faith. The theological evaluation is given in chapter six. 
1 PEACE GOALS OF DUTCH CHURCHES AND CHURCH 
PEACE MOVEMENTS 
This chapter describes the peace goals of three Dutch churches and three 
Dutch church peace movements, whose members form the population of the 
empirical research part of this study: the Dutch Roman Catholic Church, the 
Netherlands Reformed Church, the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, 
the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), Pax Christi the Netherlands and the 
Interchurch Committee for Bilateral Disarmament (ICTO). It will be accepted 
without further discussion that peace can be considered as a goal. Like all 
goals, peace is something that can be desired and worked for in specific ways. 
The relationship between peace goals and peace action is equally clear. Peace 
action is considered here as a form of human action, purposely directed at the 
realization of certain goals in the realm of peace. Peace goals are related to 
the motivation to peace action by the fact that the conception of action goals is 
an essential element of action motivation (this will be worked out in greater 
detail in section 2.2). 
The conception and pursuit of goals is not only an essential element of 
motivation, it is also one of the main characteristics of organizations. One can 
define organizations as "social units (or human groupings) deliberately con-
structed and reconstructed to seek specific goals" (Etzioni 1964, 3). This defini-
tion applies to both churches and peace movements: they pursue goals in the 
same way as other organizations do. Most of the goals of the peace move-
ments, and some of the goals of the churches, explicitly concern the promotion 
of peace. So it is through examining the organizational goals of the churches 
and peace movements in the field of peace promotion, that the relationship 
between peace on the one hand and the churches and peace movements on 
the other is established here. 
The goal of peace is not a state of affairs that the churches and peace 
movements can themselves directly and completely bring into being. They 
cannot 'make' peace, the way other organizations make cars or clothing, con-
trolling a production process from beginning to end. The realization of peace 
takes place mainly in the political, social, economic and cultural sphere, where 
the churches and peace movements only have a limited influence. Moreover, 
peace is not a single and clearly definable state of affairs, the coming of which 
can be planned or predicted at a certain future moment. Instead, peace is a 
multifaceted and open-ended process, a continuing struggle against violence, 
hostility, oppression and injustice, in which progress and adversity alternate, 
and of which the end can only be projected in some indefinite future (Liedke 
1978). Peace, says Pax Christi, is "being indefatigably and watchfully on the 
way in a constantly changing human world" (Pax Christi 1965, 18). For all 
these reasons, peace is best considered as an ultimate goal of the churches and 
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peace movements: an ultimate point of orientation, to which they direct 
actions, but which nevertheless continuously transcends all the results these 
actions may produce (Schillebeeckx 1972, 161; 1973, 509). 
In their documents, the churches and church peace movements mostly 
speak of peace as a macro-social, political concept. This is understandable 
because these documents were mostly written in response to political develop-
ments, in particular developments in the field of armament. The concept of 
peace also has a micro-social dimension, pertaining to primary social relation-
ships, and an individual dimension, pertaining to inner harmony and well-
being. The latter dimensions of peace are not absent from the documents of 
churches and church peace movements (Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 
14; John XXIII 1963, 165; IKV 1981, 37;). The focus in the documents is clear-
ly on the macro-social dimension of peace, however. In this chapter, attention 
will be limited to macro-social peace. A discussion of the other dimensions of 
peace can be found in section 2.6.4. 
The churches and church peace movements bear witness to the transcen-
dent character of the ultimate goal of peace by depicting it, in Christian relig-
ious language, as an eschatological gift of God, which should however not be 
awaited passively, but anticipated in human action here and now. The Dutch 
Roman Catholic bishops expressed their awareness of the eschatological reality 
of peace in the following words: 
Hope and confidence have an important part in the Christian attitude towards 
history but they go together with a sober and realistic frame of mind. For Chris-
tians peace on earth will always be a task that on account of human sinfulness 
requires continuous effort. The hope with which a Christian exists in history is 
rooted in faith in God as the creator and upholder of existence and in the belief 
that in Christ the Kingdom of God has begun. It is in our midst, although incom-
plete, because sin, human weakness and human failure will remain part of our 
history until our hope will find its fulfilment in the revelation of the glory of our 
great God and Saviour Jesus Christ (Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983, 7; cf. Neth-
erlands Reformed Church 1981, 31; World Council of Churches 1983, 72-73; Pax 
Christi 1965, 10-11; 1980, 61; IKV 1977a, 8). 
Subordinate to the ultimate goal of peace, the churches and peace movements 
have set a number of more specific political, social, economic and cultural 
goals in the realm of peace promotion. These specific peace goals stand in a 
hierarchical means-end relationship to the ultimate goal of peace, in the sense 
that the realization of these goals is seen as contributing towards progress in 
the process of peace. The specific peace goals of the churches and peace 
movements will be dealt with in section 1.1. Finally, the churches and peace 
movements have set a number of instrumental peace goals, indicating the means 
by which they themselves attempt to contribute to the promotion of peace. 
These instrumental peace goals will be discussed in section 1.2. 
For the description of the specific peace goals of the Dutch churches in section 
1.1, the positions of the Vatican and the World Council of Churches on issues 
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of war and peace will be taken into account as well. This is done in order to 
allow for the fact that the Dutch churches are closely related to these interna-
tional church organizations, whose standpoint on war and peace issues have an 
important bearing upon their own thinking. 
Formally, the Vatican is the highest teaching authority of the Roman Cath-
olic Church. This leading role provides its statements on the issues of war and 
peace with the status of basic documents for Roman Catholic thinking on war 
and peace in general. In the writings of the Dutch bishops this authoritative 
status of the Vatican standpoints is taken into due account. Vatican documents 
are those most frequently quoted and referred to, always in an assenting way, 
and often with an implicit appeal to their authority. The bishops' pastoral let-
ter Peace and Justice valued the speeches and documents of recent Popes on 
the subject of nuclear weapons as "important guidelines to follow" (Dutch 
Bishops' Conference 1983, 6). Sometimes the Vatican also directly interferes in 
the public position-taking of the bishops, as was the case with the drafting of 
the pastoral letters on peace by several Bishops' Conferences, in 1982 and 
1983. On two occasions the Vatican took action to influence the content of 
these pastoral letters on a very delicate topic: the moral assessment of nuclear 
deterrence. The first action was the famous passage in Pope John Paul IPs 
message to the United Nations' General Assembly in June 1982, where he 
judged the policy of deterrence to be "still morally acceptable", under certain 
conditions (John Paul II, 1982). The second action took place in January 1983, 
when Bishops' Conferences preparing pastoral letters on the issue of nuclear 
weapons were invited to the Vatican for an 'informal consultation' on the 
problems of nuclear deterrence. All participants to the consultation expressed 
their determination to take guidance in this matter from the Pope's message to 
the United Nations (Origins 12, 1982-1983, 43, 694). As a result of both Vati-
can initiatives, a striking consensus on the morality of nuclear deterrence 
emerged in the pastoral letters of the bishops of the United States, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France and the Netherlands. In all these letters, the 
conditional acceptance of deterrence, as put forward by the Pope, was taken as 
a fundamental point of departure (Solms & Reuver 1985, 55-64; Baadte et al. 
1984). 
The Vatican interference in the drafting of the bishops' pastoral letters on 
peace shows the need to examine its position, when studying the opinions of 
local bishops on the issues of war and peace. This, however, does not mean 
that official documents of national Bishops' Conferences should in general be 
considered as mere reflections of Vatican teaching. It is not a declared Vatican 
goal that such be the case, as was clearly pointed out by the Second Vatican 
Council (1965, 91) and by Pope Paul VI (1971, 3-4, 50). The pastoral letters on 
war and peace are a good example in this respect. Each of the documents has 
its own identity, reflecting the different attitudes of the different episcopates, 
within the framework of the authoritative Vatican guidelines. The bishops of 
the United States were very critical of their nation's nuclear deterrence strat-
egy, whereas their colleagues in France tended to legitimize the French 'force 
de frappe'; the bishops of the German Federal Republic took a middle posi-
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tion and the Dutch bishops distinguished themselves by a positive attitude 
towards unilateral disarmament steps (Roekaerts Savat 1985; Solms & Reuver 
1985, 52-64). 
The thinking of the World Council of Churches on the subject of war and 
peace is taken into account here, in order to provide a background for the 
interpretation of the positions of the Synods of the Netherlands Reformed 
Church and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, which are both offi-
cial members of the World Council (the Roman Catholic Church is not a 
member). The relationship between the World Council and its associated 
churches is fundamentally different from the relationship between the Vatican 
and local Catholic churches. The World Council does not possess any constitu-
tional authority over its members. It is not a 'superchurch', but rather a 'fel-
lowship' of autonomous churches. The members are not bound by the state-
ments of the World Council (World Council of Churches 1983, 324, 338). 
The World Council's lack of any formal authority over its members does 
not prevent its opinions from influencing the thinking of the associated 
churches. One instance of this is the close connection between the entry of the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands into the World Council, in 1971, and 
the growing attention of its Synod to the great world problems of war and 
peace, racism, hunger and underdevelopment (Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands 1972, 5; Plomp 1987, 35). Another instance is the Conciliar Pro-
cess for Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation, launched by the World 
Council in 1983, which had a considerable influence on the social thinking and 
action of the Dutch churches, including the Catholic Church, as well as of the 
Dutch church peace movements (Council of Churches in the Netherlands 1988; 
IKV 1988a). 
Owing to its democratic structure, the World Council of Churches itself is 
also very susceptible to influences from the member churches. The relationship 
between the World Council of Churches and the Netherlands Reformed 
Church gives an example of the two-sidedness of processes of influence 
between the Council and its members. From the middle of the 1950s onward, 
the World Council had repeatedly expressed its concern about the nuclear 
arms race and the ongoing testing of atomic weapons. The 1961 General As-
sembly of New Delhi incorporated these concerns in an appeal to all nations, 
to take "reasonable risks for peace" and to consider the taking of a decisive 
first step towards disarmament, such as the verified cessation of nuclear tests 
(World Council of Churches 1962, 281). The Synod of the Netherlands 
Reformed Church endorsed the World Council's plea for a unilateral stop to 
nuclear testing and took over the concept of "reasonable risks", in a document 
on nuclear weapons, issued in 1962. In that document the Synod also went a 
step ahead of the World Council of Churches, by pronouncing a "radical no" to 
the use of nuclear weapons, by insisting that Christians should not be expected 
to take part in a war with nuclear weapons, and by pleading for the unilateral 
abandonment of tactical nuclear arms (Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 
44, 49). In 1980, the Synod extended this "radical no" to the possession of 
nuclear weapons as well. With this provocative stance in the deterrence debate, 
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the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church placed itself in the forefront 
of ecumenical resistance against nuclear weapons and stimulated churches in 
other countries, notably in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, to accentuate their standpoints on the issue of 
nuclear deterrence. As a result of this radicalization of several churches, the 
World Council of Churches adopted a nuclear pacifist position at the General 
Assembly of Vancouver, in 1983. The Synod of the Netherlands Reformed 
Church, once awakened to greater awareness of nuclear matters by the World 
Council, had now itself become a guide for the Council's thinking on the prob-
lem of nuclear weapons. 
The Dutch peace movements also have their international contacts. Pax 
Christi the Netherlands is an independent association which participates in Pax 
Christi International. Part of the work of Pax Christi the Netherlands is 
executed under the name of the international Pax Christi movement. Together 
with the IKV, Pax Christi also participates in several international networks in 
which peace movements from East and West cooperate: the International 
Peace Communication and Coordination Centre; European Nuclear Disarma-
ment and the European Network for East-West Dialogue. The promotion of 
detente between East and West has always been one of the main goals of both 
Pax Christi and the IKV. This aspiration has resulted in a large number of 
bilateral contacts with churches and peace organizations in Eastern Europe, 
which cannot all be mentioned here (see: Everts & Walraven 1987, 99-117). 
ICTO does not participate in the international peace networks just mentioned, 
but it does have contacts with several like-minded independent peace move-
ments in Western Europe (ICTO 1985b, 18). 
Of the organizations selected, only official documents on the issues of war 
and peace will be used as primary sources here. As 'official' will be considered 
all those documents containing statements of the policy making bodies of the 
organizations. This category includes: documents of the Vatican and of Cath-
olic bishops; documents of the General Assembly and the Central Committee 
of the World Countil of Churches; documents of the General Synods of the 
Netherlands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Nether-
lands; documents of the ruling bodies and the secretariats of the peace move-
ments IKV, Pax Christi and ICTO. 
The historical scope of this literature study is also restricted. As every 
period is a time of transition it is always somewhat arbitrary to assign exact 
dates to historical periods, but for the Netherlands the year 1959 certainly 
marked the beginning of a new epoch in matters of peace and security. In 
1959, the first tactical nuclear weapons of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) were stationed in the country (Everts & Walraven 1984, 
41). This was one of the reasons for the appearance of the first critical church 
document on the issue of nuclear weapons: the 1962 report of the Synod of the 
Netherlands Reformed Church (Van Rinsum 1988, 87). The report advocated 
the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from NATO forces (Netherlands 
Reformed Church 1962, 48-50). Taking the presence of nuclear weapons as a 
criterion, the period from the 1960s onward may be considered as a new era in 
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the peace and security situation of the Netherlands. This literature study takes 
the 1962 document of the Netherlands Reformed Church as its historical start­
ing point. The year 1987 will be taken as the close of the examined period. On 
December 8th of that year, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 
a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range 
nuclear missiles, the INF Treaty. This treaty put an end to a wide and some­
times hectic public debate in the Netherlands about the deployment or non-
deployment of forty-eight cruise missiles, in the context of NATO nuclear force 
modernizations. The churches and notably the church peace movements were 
strongly involved in this debate. The fieldwork of our own research was 
executed a few months after the signing of this treaty. 
As a result of the above demarcations, the organizations selected are not 
equally represented in terms of the number of documents that will be taken 
into account. The Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches 
have both issued a great number of official documents and statements on war 
and peace issues: encyclicals and other papal documents, episcopal writings, 
reports of the World Council's General Assembly and Central Committee 
(World Council of Churches 1982). The Netherlands Reformed Church has 
devoted several pastoral writings to the issue of war and peace since 1960. But 
the harvest is very small on the side of the Reformed Churches in the Nether­
lands. Over the years since 1960, the issue of war and peace has been very 
intensively discussed by the General Synod of the Reformed Churches, but 
only rarely has a sufficient consensus, required for an official statement by the 
Synod, been achieved. As regards the peace movements, the IKV and Pax 
Christi have both produced several official documents on subjects in the realm 
of war and peace. In contrast, the ІСГО association has been very sparing in 
the publishing of official documents in this field. This can partly be explained 
by the simple fact that ICTO is by far the youngest of the three peace move­
ments: Pax Christi was established in 1948, IKV in 1967 and ICTO in 1980. 
1.1 Specific peace goals of the churches and church peace movements 
The churches and the church peace movements conceive of peace as an 
ongoing process, of necessity always piecemeal, aimed at the reduction and 
prevention of violence, in the light of the ultimate goal of peace. In this con­
ception, peace "is never attained once and for all, but must be built up cease­
lessly" (Roman Catholic Church 1965, 78). The process of peace is seen as a 
twofold process, directed at the goals of the prevention of war and the promo­
tion of social justice, which are considered as distinct though narrowly interre­
lated objectives. 
The distinction, within the process of peace, between the prevention of war 
and the promotion of justice is expressed by the pronouncement of the Second 
Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church that "peace is not merely the 
absence of war", but is instead "an enterprise of justice" (id., 78). The same 
distinction has been made by the Vancouver Assembly of the World Council of 
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Churches, which stated: The peoples of the world stand in need of peace and 
justice. Peace is not just the absence of war. Peace cannot be built on founda-
tions of injustice. (...) Peace, as the Prophet Isaiah taught us, is the effect of 
righteousness" (World Council of Churches 1983, 132). Similar statements can 
be found in the documents of church peace movements (Pax Christi 1978, 2; 
IKV 1972, 3; 1977, 8). By distinguishing between these two aspects of peace, 
the churches and church peace movements transcend the traditional narrow 
definition of peace as the absence of war, which restricts the scope of peace 
issues mainly to the level of international political relationships. This limited 
conception of peace betrays a Western bias, reflecting the experience of two 
world wars and one 'cold war', which made the prevention of armed conflict a 
dominant concern of Western nations (H. Schmid 1968). But however import-
ant the prevention of war may be, more violence is done to people than 
through warfare alone. This is particularly the experience of the Third World, 
where people and nations suffer not only from war, but also from hunger, 
oppression and exploitation, as a result of the unequal distribution of resources 
and power, both nationally and internationally (Galtung 1969; Röling 1981, 20-
27). These situations are no less violent than war and, no less than in wars, 
people in these situations are in need of peace. It is this aspect of peace that 
the churches and peace movements have in mind when they speak of peace as 
the effect of justice. This broad concept of peace is solidly based on the Bibli-
cal concept of peace as "shalom", which implies more than the mere absence of 
war and refers to the wholeness of individual and social life (Westermann 
1969; Schmidt 1969; Stuhlmacher 1970; Schneider 1983). 
Although the churches and peace movements made a distinction between 
peace as the prevention of war and peace as the promotion of justice, they 
nevertheless considered these two goals as narrowly related. On the one hand, 
the promotion of justice was seen as a precondition of the prevention of war 
and other violent conflicts. Pope Paul VI stressed this in his encyclical Popu-
lorum Progressio, where he stated that "extreme economic, social and cultural 
inequalities among peoples arouse tensions and conflicts, and are a danger to 
peace" (Paul VI 1967, 76). On the other hand, the prevention of war was con-
sidered a precondition of the promotion of justice as well. In this respect, the 
churches and peace movements particularly stressed the many forms of econ-
omic and political injustice which arose from the build-up and trade of arms in 
the world. The extravagance of the arms race had to be stopped, as a precon-
dition to the promotion of justice. 
The distinction between the two goals of the prevention of war and the 
promotion of justice has been developed to a higher level of theoretical preci-
sion by the peace researcher Galtung, in a by now classic article of peace 
research. Galtung defines peace in a negative way, as "the absence of violence". 
Violence is present "when human beings are being influenced so that their 
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" 
(Galtung 1969, 168). The most important distinction in a classification of forms 
of violence, made by Galtung, is that between personal violence and structural 
violence (id., 173). Personal violence can always be related directly to concrete 
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persons as actors. The various practices of war nearly all belong to this type of 
violence. Structural violence cannot, or only indirectly, be related to acting 
persons as its cause. The violence is built into the social structure and shows 
up as unequal distribution of resources, unequal power and consequently 
unequal life chances. 
Having defined peace as the absence of violence, the distinction between 
two forms of violence results in a distinction between two forms of peace. 
Peace as the absence of personal violence is termed negative peace by Galtung, 
peace as the absence of structural violence he calls positive peace, or social 
justice. The absence of personal violence is called negative peace because the 
absence of violence is not in itself a positively defined outcome; whereas the 
absence of structural violence does lead to a positively defined situation (id., 
183). 
One can see that Galtung's distinction between negative and positive peace 
is nearly identical to the churches' and church peace movements' distinction 
between peace as the absence of war (negative peace) and peace as the pro-
motion of justice (positive peace). For the sake of clarity, the positive term 
social justice and the negative term absence of war will be used here, as labels 
of the two dimensions of the churches' and church peace movements' concept 
of peace. In 1.1.1, the ideas of the churches and church peace movements on 
the promotion of social justice will be dealt with. Section 1.1.2 deals with their 
views on the prevention of war. Within the issue of the prevention of war, the 
prevention of nuclear war has received particular attention from the side of 
churches and church peace movements since 1960. Because nuclear weapons 
are in a class of their own and because the problems related to these weapons 
are very complex, the manner in which the churches and church peace move-
ments have dealt with the problem of nuclear weapons will be treated separ-
ately here, in section 1.1.3. 
1.1.1 The promotion of social justice 
Galtung defines social justice as the fair distribution of power and resources. 
He follows here the common usage of moral philosophers in considering fair 
distribution as a main operation through which social justice is realized (Rawls 
1972, 7; Hoffmann 1981, 141-150; Phillips 1986, 407). The churches and church 
peace movements employ the same concept of social justice. Although they 
mostly use just the plain word 'justice' in their documents, it is clear from the 
context that this word nearly always refers to the concept of social justice, 
defined as the fair distribution of power and resources in society. 
Explicit use of the term 'social justice' is made in the social teaching of the 
Catholic Church. There, the concept was introduced by Pope Pius XI, in his 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, as a principle for the reordering of social and 
economic life. There also, social justice is principally considered as a matter of 
fair distribution: 
To each must be given that share of the goods that he is entitled to: the aim must 
16 
be to bring the distribution of earthly goods into line again with the norms of gene 
ral well-being or social justice (Pius XI 1931, 58). 
Gaudium et Spes interpreted social justice as the elimination of social and econ-
omic inequality (Roman Catholic Church 1965, 29). Applying this to the prob-
lem of development, Pope Paul VI interpreted social justice as "the rectifica-
tion of inequitable trade relations between powerful nations and weak nations" 
(1967, 44). 
The churches' and church peace movements' thinking about social justice is 
nowadays characterized by a global orientation. This has not always been the 
case. At the end of the nineteenth century, the churches' social concern was 
mainly focused on the plight of the proletarian masses in the Western indus-
trialized countries. The just wage was the main socio-ethical issue the churches 
dealt with at that time. In the period between the two world wars, at the time 
of the great confrontations between liberal, socialist and fascist ideologies in 
Europe, the wider problem of the just social order dominated the churches' 
moral agenda. In the Roman Catholic Church this problem was known as the 
"questio socialis"; in the Ecumenical Movement it was taken up in the search 
for a "Responsible Society". The problem of the just social order was however 
still limited to the situation of the Western industrialized world. It was not 
until the 1950s and 1960s, as a result of the process of decolonization and the 
emancipation of Third World churches, that the churches of the West began to 
see the issue of social justice in its global dimension (Dejung 1973; Bock 1974; 
Rudersdorf 1975; Dorr 1983). At the Evanston Assembly of the World Council 
of Churches in 1954, the concept of the responsible society was widened to the 
"Responsible WorW-Society" (World Council of Churches 1954, 112-126). In his 
encyclical Mater et Magistra, Pope John XXIII declared that the norms of jus-
tice and charity should not only be applied to the relationships between 
workers and management in productive enterprises, but also between nations 
within the world-wide human community (John XXIII 1962, 122). On this, 
Pope Paul VI stated that "today the principal fact that we must all recognize is 
that the social question has become world-wide" (Paul VI 1967, 3). 
Approaches to the global problem of social justice can roughly be divided 
into two types, dependent of whether they depart from the perspective of 
states or of people. From the perspective of states, the issue of social justice 
consists of three different sets of problems. Firstly, there is the problem of the 
inequality of rights, conferred on states by international law. There is a con-
trast between the formal recognition of the sovereignty of all states and the 
fact that the effective rights of some states are inferior to those of others. This 
is, among other things, the problem of unequal treaties. Secondly, there is the 
problem of the material inequality between states, which would not be solved 
even if all states had equal rights. States do not just require equal rights, but 
also equal possibilities of development. To this problem pertain the demands 
for a "New International Economic Order", which have been made by countries 
of the Third World in the context of the United Nations. Finally, even if all 
states had equal rights and equal possibilities of development, there would still 
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be the problem of the grossly unequal distribution of power in the present 
international system. This problem is at the root of the demands of Third 
World states for power-sharing in the international organizations (Hoffmann 
1981, 141-147). 
From the perspective of people, a different light is shed on the global prob-
lem of social justice. The main difference is that individual people are not only 
faced with the problem of the inequality between states, but also within states. 
Even if all states had equal rights, development opportunities and power, there 
would still be the problem of the unequal distribution of these goods inside 
each state. The situation of the individual within the state is analogous to the 
situation of the state within the international system. Frequently, rights are not 
conferred equally on people within a state, and even if they were, there would 
still be the problem of the unequal opportunities of development and the in-
equalities in power between people within a state, which often empties equality 
of rights of any meaning (id. 147-150). The human rights principles, as laid 
down in the United Nations' Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, 
express the aspirations of people everywhere in the world to equal rights. 
These human rights are based on the fundamental affirmation, as expressed in 
the first article of the UN Declaration, that "all men are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights" (United Nations 1979, 412). The people's perspective on 
the global problem of social justice is both more encompassing and more rad-
ical than the state's perspective on the issue. For people, both the national and 
international level of social justice are relevant, and changes are required at 
both these levels. 
The churches and church peace movements make a clear choice for the 
perspective of people on the global issues of social justice. This choice is 
grounded in the pre-eminence of the human person over social institutions in 
Christian social ethics. Pope John XXIII stated as the cardinal point of Cath-
olic social thought "that individual men are necessarily the foundation, cause 
and end of all social institutions" (John XXIII 1962, 219). The World Council 
of Churches considered it as one of the key principles of a responsible society 
that "men must never be made a mere means for political or economic ends. 
Man is not made for the state but the state for men" (World Council of 
Churches 1948, 79). The option for a people's perspective on social justice 
issues implies that human rights are the primary focal point of social concern 
(a). The emphasis on human rights, however, does not make it impossible, but 
rather implies, that global issues of justice are taken up from the perspective 
of states as well. In this perspective, the problem of development forms a cen-
tral issue (b). 
(a) Human rights 
Human rights are commonly divided into two categories: civil rights, pertaining 
to what people should be permitted to do by others, and socio-economic rights, 
pertaining to what people should be provided with by others. Because civil 
rights impose restrictions on others, they are also called negative rights; 
because socio-economic rights impose obligations on others, they are also 
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called positive rights (Velasquez 1988). Civil rights include, among other 
things, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, to peaceful assembly 
and association, to freedom of religion and the right to change one's national-
ity. These rights demand restraint of the state's control over society: the state 
should not interfere too much in the life of its citizens. Socio-economic rights 
include, among other things, the right to education, to work and to an 
adequate standard of living, including the right to food, clothing, housing and 
medical care. These rights demand a controlling effort of the state: the state 
should not leave it citizens to their own devices (Van Asperen 1986, 67-69; 
Hoffmann 1981, 100-104). 
The churches strongly supported the codification of a catalogue of human 
rights by the United Nations, on 10 December 1948. The World Council of 
Churches was closely involved in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. As a consultative body to the United Nations, the Commission 
of the Churches on International Affairs strongly influenced the provisions of 
the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Nolde 1970, 271). Ever since that time, 
human rights have been high on the agenda of the World Council, not only in 
the field of religious liberty, but increasingly also in the context of the interre-
lated problems of poverty, oppression, racism and sexism. The Nairobi Assem-
bly of the World Council of Churches related the problem of human rights to 
the problem of social justice, by taking "unjust social structures" as the root 
cause of human rights violations: 
While we must work for the abolition of specific denials of human rights, such as t 
orture, we must remember that unjust social structures, expressed through, for 
example, economic exploitation, political manipulation, military power, class domi-
nation, psychological conditioning, create the conditions under which human rights 
are denied. To work for human rights, therefore, also means to work at the most 
basic level towards a society without unjust structures (World Council of Churches 
1976, 102). 
The Vancouver Assembly issued a "Statement on Human Rights", which 
stressed the complexity of the human rights issue, and its connection with the 
issue of peace: 
We are increasingly aware of the fact that human rights cannot be dealt with in iso 
lation from the larger issues of peace, justice, militarism, disarmament and develo 
pment. The fuller the rights that every person enjoys in society, the more stable th 
at society is likely to be; the fuller the implementation of human rights globally, th 
e more stable international relations are likely to be (World Council of Churches 
1983, 140). 
The World Council has in the past tended to underexpose the human rights 
situation in the socialist world. This bias was mainly due to the influential posi-
tion of the Eastern Orthodox churches in the World Council. Because most 
Orthodox churches from socialist countries did not accept ecumenical criticism 
of their governments, and also in order not to bring these churches into 
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trouble at home, the World Council as a rule kept silent about human rights 
violations in socialist countries. On the other hand, because human rights prob­
lems in the 'capitalist dominated' parts of the world were often denounced 
with great vigour, the World Council has sometimes been accused of selective 
indignation about human rights (Hebly 1986). 
In the social teaching of the Catholic Church, human rights were first dealt 
with systematically in the encyclical Pacem in Terns of Pope John XXIII (Punt 
1987). He considered the implementation of human rights to be the foundation 
of the social order: 
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay down as a f 
oundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person, that is, his η 
ature is endowed with intelligence and free will. By virtue of this, he has rights and 
duties of his own, flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature. These 
rights are therefore universal, inviolable and inalienable (John XXIII 1963, 9). 
According to Pope John, peace can only be built on a just national and inter­
national order, undergirded by the respect for human rights (id., 167). 
The interrelatedness of the national and international dimensions of the 
human rights problem has been particularly emphasized by Pope John Paul II. 
He has stressed that the "rights of nations and peoples" must be included in 
the human rights catalogue (John Paul II 1987, 33). He has also introduced the 
idea of the "right of economic initiative", with an implicit though unmistakable 
reference to the economic order in the socialist world at that time. 
In the context of the promotion of human rights, the Synods of the Nether­
lands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands have 
been strongly concerned with the problem of racism, particularly in South Afri­
ca. When the World Council of Churches started its Programme to Combat 
Racism, in 1969, and decided to make grants, for humanitarian purposes only, 
to armed resistance movements in Southern Africa, it received full support 
from the Netherlands Reformed Churches and the Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands, as well as from the Dutch Bishops' Conference and Pax Christi 
(Archief van de Kerken 26, 1971, 922-923; World Council of Churches 1980). 
In 1982, the Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands endorsed the 
position taken by the Council of Churches in the Netherlands on South Afri­
can racism, which included a condemnation of capital investments in South 
Africa and a call to withdraw existing investments. In 1984, the Synod 
endorsed a declaration of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, in which 
the theological and moral justification of apartheid was condemned as hereti­
cal and considered a matter of 'status confessionis': a matter crucial to the 
common confession of the Reformed Churches (Plomp 1987, 136-139). 
To Pax Christi, guaranteed human rights are a necessary condition for 
stable world peace. Within the problem of human rights, Pax Christi disting­
uishes between human rights in the North-South context and those in the East-
West context (Pax Christi 1978, 26-30). In both fields, activities were set up by 
Pax Christi the Netherlands, often in cooperation with the International Pax 
Christi Movement and with other organizations active on the issues of devel-
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opment and human rights. 
Within the North-South context, Pax Christi highlighted the problem of 
racism. Its actions against racism focused on the economic aspects of the 
South African apartheid system. From 1984 to 1986, Pax Christi participated in 
a national ecumenical campaign against apartheid, under the name "Does 
Your Money Support Apartheid?". The aim was to undermine the economic 
profitability of apartheid for South Africa, by economic sanctions. In the con-
text of these actions, Pax Christi addressed itself in particular to the trans-
nationals Shell and Philips, because of their involvement in South Africa (Pax 
Christi 1986, 37-39). 
Pax Christi's human rights activities in the context of East-West relation-
ships are carried out in close cooperation with the IKV. Both organizations see 
it as their task to help promote the development of basic political rights in 
Eastern European countries. Although the IKV does not consider itself a 
human rights organization specifically, it recognizes that the issues of peace 
and human rights cannot and should not be separated (IKV 1984a, 46). Pax 
Christi and the IKV gave support to and cooperated with East European 
movements and organizations which stood up for basic political rights. An 
example of this cooperation is the memorandum Giving Real Life to the Helsinki 
Accords, signed before the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, by mem-
bers of independent labour movements, peace movements and human rights 
movements in Eastern and Western Europe, including Charta '77, Solidarity, 
IKV and Pax Christi. The memorandum stressed that citizens in both East and 
West had an important role to play in the realization of a new Europe, which 
would surmount its internal division and would adopt a policy of peace and 
justice vis-à-vis the rest of the world, in particular the poor countries (Euro-
pean Network for East-West Dialogue 1986). According to the IKV, churches 
and religious organizations can play a pioneering role in the development of a 
civil society in Europe. Through their mutual international relations, they are 
able to bridge politico-geographic differences. Moreover, it is the churches to 
which people can turn for the moral values that will form the cultural basis of 
the future Europe. Finally, as international organizations, the churches can 
accommodate civil contacts between East and West. The strengthening of the 
role of the churches in civil society requires both the advancement of local 
religious life, and the tightening of ecumenical relations among the churches 
(IKV 1986; 1986a; 1987; 1987a; Pax Christi International 1985). 
ICTO also considered the promotion of human rights in Eastern Europe 
essential to detente and, thus, to a more favourable climate for arms control. 
But it did not, like IKV and Pax Christi, conceive of the promotion of human 
rights in Eastern Europe primarily as functional to detente 'from below', but 
rather as functional to detente 'from above', by reducing the ideological threat 
of the East to the West. 
(b) Development 
As regards development, the churches and church peace movements have ad-
vocated a great number of measures: the abolition of protectionist measures by 
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the industrialized countries, easier access of Third World countries to Western 
markets, stabilization of the prices of raw materials, a solution to the debt 
problem of the Third World, more effective financial and technical aid to de-
veloping countries, and greater effectiveness of international organizations, 
particularly the United Nations (Rudersdorf 1975; Dorr 1983; Jeurissen 1986). 
In general, the propositions of the churches and church peace movements with 
regard to development and the restructuring of the international order are 
identical to the demands of the Third World countries in this respect, as they 
were recognized by the United Nations in their Declaration on the New Interna-
tional Economic Order and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(Van de Meerssche 1981). 
In the thinking about development in the period considered, four positions 
can be distinguished: a "capitalist approach", a "United Nations approach", a 
"change-political-structures approach" and a "conscientization approach". The 
positions overlapp in some aspects, and in reality they often appear in mixed 
forms. However, the typology may be instructive in providing a general contour 
of the terrain (Dickenson 1975, 61-67). 
The capitalist approach proposes generating development primarily through 
the free market forces of supply and demand, with a minimum of governmen-
tal and intergovernmental control of the economic system. The essential as-
sumption of this approach is that the free operation of the market will, in the 
long run, automatically bring prosperity for all. Centres of economic strength 
will, over time, 'spill over' into less developed areas, eventually pulling weaker 
individuals and groups into the orbit of prosperity. 
The United Nations approach conceives of development primarily as a 
planned effort towards structural improvement of society (infrastructure, 
schooling, medical care, agricultural technology, reform of international econ-
omic relationships). Governments are the primary agents of change in this 
view. Basic assumptions about the primacy of economic growth are comparable 
to the capitalist development model. The concept of international development 
aid is essential to the United Nations approach. Development aid is not just an 
act of charity by the richer countries. In an increasingly interdependent world, 
development of the poor countries is in the long run advantageous to all 
nations. 
The change-political-structures approach is based on the assumption that 
governments are incapable of genuine development and social justice. The 
basic inspiration of this approach is marxist. Revolutionary political change is 
required to stop the systemic violence on the part of the governments in 
power. Attempts to reform existing structures cannot succeed, because the 
basic world view which prompted these structures remain. That is why a politi-
cal revolution needs to be accompanied by a cultural revolution as well. 
The conscientization approach stresses the people's participation from the 
local level upwards. New political structures must arise from a new conscious-
ness of the people themselves, rooted in deepened awareness of their own 
capacities and rights. Development is primarily an effort of the poor and 
oppressed themselves. Little faith is placed in development initiatives of the 
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political leadership, irrespective of their political signature. 
In the middle of the 1960s, the churches' thinking on development focused 
on the United Nations approach. The emphasis on planned government inter-
vention and international cooperation for development is dominant in both the 
Report of the World Council's World Conference on Church and Society, of 
1966, and in the encyclical Popidorum Progressio of pope Paul VI. The capital-
ist approach was strongly rejected, for example in pope Paul's fulmination 
against "the international imperialism of capital" (Paul VI 1967, 26). The 
change-political-structures approach was equally rejected, particulary for its 
association with the use of revolutionary violence to achieve development ob-
jectives. The theory behind the conscientization approach was only weakly 
developed at that time. 
In subsequent decades, the thinking of the churches shifted towards a re-
appraisal of the change-political-structures approach, although the use of revol-
utionary violence remained problematic, and towards an increasing emphasis 
on the conscientization approach. The reappraisal of the change-political-struc-
tures approach manifests itself in a politisation of the churches' attitude 
towards development. The problem of development is seen increasingly as the 
problem of a lack of control over economic power. The abuse of power 
becomes a focal point of church criticism. As a consequence, the problem of 
development is raised more and more from the perspective of liberation 
(Gutiérrez 1969; Paul VI 1971; World Council of Churches 1976). The chur-
ches' emphasis on the conscientization approach, to which Paulo Freiré has 
made an important theoretical contribution (Freiré 1970), manifests itself in a 
growing appreciation of development initiatives from the grassroots level of 
society. The churches' commitment to the conscientization approach is 
expressed by the concepts of "the church of the poor" and the "preferential 
option for the poor" (World Council of churches 1980a, United States Bishops' 
Conference 1986). 
The peace movements IKV and Pax Christi focused on the military aspects 
of the development problem. Their view on the relationship between arma-
ment and development bears resemblance to the change-political-structures 
approach. Armament is considered as an integral part of an oppressive politi-
cal structure, supported by arms suppliers in the rich countries, which holds 
people captured in a situation of exploitation and underdevelopment (Pax 
Christi 1978; IKV 1985b, 1985c). The description of the church peace move-
ments' view on development issues has to be brief, because these movements 
do not have a strong tradition in thinking about development. This is partly 
due to a division of labour with the third world movement. As far as could be 
ascertained, development issues are not dealt with in ICTO-documents. 
The shift in the churches' thinking about development from a United 
Nations approach to a change-political-structures approach and a conscienti-
zation approach can be interpreted as a shift from a state-perspective on de-
velopment to a people's perspective. This does not imply that the problem of 
development as seen from the perspective of states, in particular the problem 
of international economic relationships, is neglected. Criticism of the prevailing 
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international economic order is a leitmotiv in the churches' and church peace 
movements' thinking about development. The criticism concentrates on the 
domination and manipulation of international markets by the rich countries 
and by transnational corporations, at the expense of the poor countries (John 
Paul II 1981, 892; World Council of Churches 1986, 131; Pax Christi 1978, 19). 
In recent years, the thinking on development has moved to a revaluation of 
the capitalist approach. This is partly due to the historical deficit of commu-
nism as an alternative to the capitalist economic order. Third World countries 
understood that no help was to be expected any longer from the collapsing 
economies of former communist countries in the Second World. They turned 
to the First World for help and embraced the principles of the free market 
economy, or accepted them as inevitable. Characteristic of the revaluation of 
the capitalist model in development thinking is the recognition that Third 
World countries have often suffered from their own bad economic policies and 
that they must promote their development by rectifying their own economies 
failures in the first place. This opinion was expressed, in careful wording, in a 
document of the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission on the international 
debt question. The document stated that "especially for the leaders of a coun-
try in economic and financial difficulty, it is often tempting to shift full respon-
sibility to other countries in order to avoid having to explain their own actions, 
errors and even abuses, as well as to avoid having to propose any changes 
which would affect them directly" (Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission 
1987, 607). 
1.1.2 The prevention of war 
The conviction that war is an evil which must be prevented can be counted 
among the oldest and most central elements of the Christian tradition in social 
and political thought. Almost equally old and central is the debate about the 
way this goal is to be pursued. On the one hand, there is the radical tradition 
of Christian pacifism, strongly represented in the early church, which considers 
all warfare to be irreconcilable with the Christian faith (Heering 1953; De 
Blois 1980; De Tavernier 1991). On the other hand, there is the tradition of 
the 'just war', which aims at the control of war by putting restraints on both 
the ends and the means of warfare, without banning war altogether. It con-
siders war as an evil, which may however sometimes be necessary for the pro-
tection of the good (Hoffman 1981, 47). In the course of Western history, the 
just war tradition has developed as a broad cultural consensus on appropriate 
limits to force. These limits are set down in the criteria of the 'jus ad bellum', 
pertaining to the conditions under which the resort to war can be legitimate, 
and the 'jus in bello', dealing with what is right and wrong in war. 
The jus ad bellum includes, among other things, the following criteria: 
- war should only be waged by a legitimate authority; 
- war should only be waged for a just cause; 
- war should be the last resort in the solution of a conflict; 
- there should be a reasonable chance that the goals of the war will be 
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attained. 
The jus in bello includes, among other things, the following criteria: 
- the means of war should be proportional to the goals of war; 
- noncombatants should be protected in wartime (Johnson 1984, 18; Van der 
Bruggen 1986, 230-250). 
All churches and church peace movements which are taken into account in this 
study commit themselves to a greater or lesser extent to the just war tradition; 
none of them has taken a genuine pacifist stance. The Second Vatican Council 
stated as its conviction that in the present situation, where there is no compet-
ent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, "governments 
cannot be denied the right to legitimate defence, once every means of peaceful 
settlement has been exhausted" (Roman Catholic Church 1965, 79). In a sys-
tematic overview of the Vatican thinking on war and peace, cardinal Casaroli, 
Vatican Secretary of State, made it clear that the Roman Catholic teaching 
authority still adheres to the Council's adoption of the just war theory (Casa-
roli 1983, 437). Agreement to the principles of the just war tradition is also 
expressed by the World Council of Churches and the Dutch churches of the 
Reformed tradition (Derr 1983, 52; Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 28-
34; Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 1980, 6). There are pacifist peace 
movements in the Netherlands, the most important of which is the association 
Kerk en Vrede (Church and Peace), but the peace movements studied here 
are not pacifist, although there is a pacifist stream in the IKV. Of the majority 
of members of the IKV it can be said "that everyone of them in some form 
supports the just war theory" (IKV 1985c, 13). 
Their endorsement of the just war tradition notwithstanding, the churches 
and church peace movements have in the last decades shown a growing appre-
ciation of pacifist principles. Conscientious objection, for example, could not 
meet with any approval of either the Roman Catholic Church, the Netherlands 
Reformed Church or Pax Christi, until the late 1950s. Nowadays, the right to 
reject military service for conscientious reasons is generally recognized and 
supported by the churches and church peace movements. In recent years the 
growing concern about the threats of the ongoing arms race, particularly in the 
field of nuclear weapons, has elicited pronouncements from churches and 
church peace movements that come very close to the pacifist rejection of war. 
One could call this a 'nuclear-era-pacifism': in the nuclear era, the risk of esca-
lation is so great as to render even conventional war illegitimate (Ceadel 1987, 
144). The anti-militarist stance of the World Council of Churches led the Gen-
eral Assembly of Nairobi to adopt the pacifist statement that "the churches 
should emphasize their readiness to live without the protection of armaments" 
(World Council of Churches 1975, 182). In a comment by the Synod of the 
Netherlands Reformed Church on its own pastoral letter on nuclear weapons, 
a strong tension between the just war theory and the ethics of pacifism can be 
observed. On the one hand, the Synod recognized that the resort to armed 
resistance cannot and may not be completely excluded in the present violent 
and unjust world (Netherlands Reformed Church 1981, 27-28). On the other 
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hand, the Synod denounced the orientation towards self-preservation in our 
culture as one of the main barriers to a solution of the problem of deterrence, 
and stated as a matter of confession of faith that "our confidence is ultimately 
not based on weapons, but on the Lord" (id., 19, 23). These examples show 
that the old debate between the traditions of the just war and pacifism is still 
continuing (Jeurissen 1991). 
The churches' and the church peace movements' 'realistic' adherence to the 
just war tradition has not precluded their increasing criticism of new develop-
ments in the defence policies of East and West during the last decades. This 
criticism was particularly directed against developments in the technology and 
strategy of mass destruction warfare. The same just war tradition which pre-
vented the churches and church peace movements from adopting a pacifist 
stance also provided the arguments for their strong rejection of military strat-
egies based on mass destruction. A war with weapons of mass destruction 
would exceed the limits of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. There 
can be no just cause for total destruction; it is not a discriminate instrument of 
war and it is not proportional to any goal. Considering the terrible destructive 
powers of modern weapons, Pope John XXIII concluded that "it is hardly 
possible to imagine that in the atomic era war could be used as an instrument 
of justice" (1963, 127; cf. Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983, 33; Pax Christi 
1965, 30; IKV 1977, 3). With the same argument the Netherlands Reformed 
Church refused to consider nuclear weapons as "weapons" any longer, "for 
there is no way to make clear that these absolute means of destruction could 
still be acknowledged as "weapons" which could be used as means of violence 
against any kind of injustice" (1962, 25). To the Synod of the Reformed 
Churches in the Netherlands, "weapons and methods of mass destruction are 
in opposition to the salvation God has prepared for this world, and as such 
from the devil" (1980, 47). In the 'century of total war', the churches and 
church peace movements share the profound conviction that war may no 
longer be used as an instrument of politics, and that it should be prevented 
(Von Weizsäcker 1986). 
To prevent war, the churches and church peace movements have unceasing-
ly advocated the implementation of two types of political measures: the devel-
opment of means for a peaceful solution of international conflicts (a) and the 
achievement of arms control and disarmament (b). These two appro 
fâches to the prevention of war can already be found in a document on dis-
armament and peaceful change, issued by the World Council's Commission of 
the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) in 1955. To the CCIA, disarma-
ment and the development of means of peaceful conflict settlement are inter-
related in a twofold way: on the one hand, disarmament can only be successful 
if the effort to remove the occasion or justification for military activities keeps 
pace with it; on the other hand, each disarmament agreement adds to the 
building of the mutual confidence needed for the acceptance of methods for 
peaceful settlement and change (World Council of Churches 1982, 25-28). 
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(a) Peaceful solution of conflicts 
The World Council of Churches sees the United Nations as the appropriate 
organization for the development and implementation of methods for peaceful 
conflict solution. The Assembly of New Delhi declared: 
To substitute reason for force and undergird the will to disarm, institutions of 
peace and orderly methods to effect change and to settle disputes are essential. 
This imposes a duty to strengthen the United Nations within the framework and 
spirit of the Charter (World Council of Churches 1962, 280). 
The other churches shared the same hopes and expectations about the 
peacekeeping role of the United Nations. The Synod of the Netherlands 
Reformed Church endorsed the New Delhi call for the strengthening of the 
United Nations and stated that peace should be organized through the estab-
lishment of a "world organization of nations" and through the further develop-
ment of international law (Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 59). The Sec-
ond Vatican Council considered that in order to outlaw war it is necessary to 
establish "some universal public authority acknowledged as such by all, and 
endowed with effective power to safeguard, on behalf of all, security, regard 
for justice and respect for rights" (Roman Catholic Church 1965, 82). Pax 
Christi considered the United Nations to be "an indispensable element for the 
prevention of war and the organization of a peaceful world" (Pax Christi 1965, 
74). Pax Christi charged itself with the task "to promote the development of 
the UN into the political organization of the worldwide human society which 
ensures justice and peace" (Pax Christi 1978, 43). It is also clear to the IKV 
that the problem of war can only be solved through international organization 
and cooperation. In this respect, IKV's first point of concern has always been 
the political, economic and cultural rapprochement between the nations of 
Europe. The division of Europe should gradually be abolished. Only a new 
Europe, where peace and security are no longer based on the system of 
nuclear deterrence, can contribute to the promotion of peace in the world 
(IKV 1972, 4-5). 
(b) Arms control and disarmament 
To prevent war, the churches and church peace movements also argued for 
arms control and disarmament. Disarmament is the process of reducing levels 
of military force. In the 1950s, the churches endorsed the call of the United 
Nations, to achieve "general and complete disarmament", by which was meant 
the abolition of all weapons ('complete') by all nations ('general'). Without 
ever having officially abandoned this Utopian ideal, the churches nowadays 
have come to adopt more modest and realistic disarmament goals, aiming at 
the reduction or elimination of certain types of weapons, either globally or 
regionally. Arms control is "the collective name for all measures that restrict 
the possession of arms, without forbidding it altogether" (Siccama 1987, 35). 
These measures do not always imply a reduction of arms levels. Arms control 
can be realised without disarmament. An example of this was the agreement of 
Vladivostock between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in 1974, in the 
27 
context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. This agreement pertained to strategic nuclear missiles con-
taining several nuclear warheads (so-called Multiple Independently Retarget-
able Vehicles, or MIRVs). The agreement set a ceiling of 1320 to the number 
of these missiles on both sides. At that time, the United States had 800 
MIRVed missiles, while the Soviet Union had none. The Vladivostock agree-
ment contributed to a control of the race in MIRVed missiles, but did not con-
tribute to their reduction (Freedman 1981, 357; Netherlands Reformed Church 
1979, 46). 
Over the last decades, the churches and church peace movements have 
come up with a great number of proposals for arms control and disarmament, 
both in the realm of conventional and of nuclear weapons. As regards conven-
tional weapons, they were particularly concerned about the spectacular 
increase of arms production and the arms trade, especially to the Third World. 
On several occasions they made pleas to reduce military expenditures, to halt 
the international arms trade and to reallocate the resources made available in 
that way to development (Paul VI 1967, 51; Roman Catholic Church 1976; 
Dutch Bishops' Conference 1976; World Council of Churches 1978; 1978a). 
Pax Christi and IKV called for a legal prohibition of Dutch arms exports to 
developing countries and to all countries that systematically violate political, 
cultural and economic human rights (Pax Christi 1978, 21-24; 1982; IKV 1985, 
44). In the context of arms control, IKV also promoted the idea of the 
demilitarization of Europe and the freezing of European defence budgets, as a 
way of fostering the detente between East and West. The belief in military 
security, it said, must be replaced by the concept of "common security", based 
on the insight that international security is better served by cooperation in the 
promotion of peace and justice than by the competitive raising of arms levels 
(IKV 1985, 24). IKV and Pax Christi also warned against developments in the 
field of advanced conventional weapons-systems, designed to accomplish deep-
strike missions against enemy forces, which could replace nuclear weapons in 
certain functions, but which would also imply a shift towards more offensive 
military strategies (IKV & Pax Christi 1987). 
Their concern about conventional weapons notwithstanding, the Dutch 
churches and church peace movements devoted most of their attention to the 
problem of nuclear armament and disarmament. The majority of documents of 
the Dutch churches on the issues of war and peace focus on that particular 
problem. Recurrent issues in the churches' and the church peace movements' 
proposals for nuclear arms control and disarmament are the termination of 
nuclear testing and of the production of nuclear weapons, the prevention of 
their further proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arms levels through 
negotiations and through one-sided initiatives. In the successive statements on 
these issues, two main developments can be discerned. Firstly, in accordance 
with the increasing complexity of nuclear weapons issues, there has been a 
tendency for the statements of the churches and church peace movements to 
evolve from rather general recommendations to quite specific proposals, which 
sometimes directly interfered with ongoing political decision making processes 
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(Everts 1983, 130). Secondly, a growing appreciation of unilateral disarmament 
measures has evolved in some of the churches and church peace movements. 
In the 1980s, the debate in the Dutch churches on nuclear disarmament 
focused on the arguments for and against unilateral nuclear disarmament 
steps. The different positions in this debate will be examined in the next sec-
tion. 
1.1.3 Nuclear deterrence and -disarmament 
Concern about nuclear weapons increased strongly among the churches and 
church peace movements towards the end of the 1970s. At that time, impor-
tant changes took place in the field of nuclear strategy. These changes 
amounted to an increasing orientation towards the actual use of nuclear 
weapons in a military conflict. To understand these changes, and the reactions 
they provoked from the side of the churches and church peace movements, a 
short excursion into the history of nuclear strategy is required. 
The main function of nuclear weapons is to serve as instruments in the 
hands of states, for the purpose of deterrence. Deterrence is a military and 
political strategy, aimed at the protection of the security (territorial integrity, 
political autonomy and cultural identity) of a state against foreign aggression, 
by threatening the use of force. The functioning of nuclear deterrence in rela-
tion to this purpose is based on a very simple, almost primitive principle. 
Nuclear weapons are capable of large-scale destruction, over great distances, 
against which defence is nearly impossible. Confronting potential enemies with 
the threat of nuclear destruction in case of aggression may be expected to pre-
vent such aggression effectively. This simple concept of nuclear deterrence was 
the cornerstone of the nuclear policy of the United States of America during 
the 1950s and the early 1960s, when they still possessed nuclear supremacy. In 
the words of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States 
would deter Soviet aggression by the possession of "a great capacity to retaliate 
instantly, by means and at places of our choosing" (Dulles 1954). This 
approach to nuclear deterrence came to be known as the strategy of "massive 
retaliation" (Freedman 1981, 83-88). 
Thinking about nuclear deterrence becomes more complex if one considers 
a situation of mutual deterrence. In such a bipolar relationship, nuclear retali-
ation against aggression committed by the other side may provoke a nuclear 
counter-retaliation, and elicit an escalation of nuclear strikes to the level of all-
out nuclear war. Neither partner wants such a disastrous outcome of its 
deterrence policy. Therefore, in a mutual nuclear deterrence relationship, the 
prevention of nuclear war is a second main function of nuclear deterrence, 
after the function of protecting national security. A bipolar relationship of 
nuclear deterrence arose in the 1960s, when the Soviet Union started to build 
up its nuclear arsenal and gradually acquired nuclear parity with the United 
States. 
From its two functions, two requirements which nuclear deterrence should 
meet can be derived. In order to protect national security, nuclear deterrence 
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must be effective in preventing aggression; in order to prevent a nuclear war, 
nuclear deterrence must be stable in times of a crisis between nuclear powers. 
One of the most intractable problems of nuclear strategy is the near impossi-
bility of meeting these two requirements simultaneously: effective deterrence 
tends to be unstable, whereas stable deterrence tends to be ineffective. 
The stability of nuclear deterrence in a bipolar relationship can be 
expressed in terms of the probability that nuclear weapons will be used in a 
conflict between the deterrence partners. The smaller this chance is, the more 
stable is the deterrence relationship. In order to enhance the stability of 
deterrence, nuclear weapons must be made as invulnerable as possible, so that 
their actual use at a time of crisis can be postponed. Enough weapons should 
survive an attack, in order to ensure the attacker the prospect of a retaliatory 
strike, causing unacceptable damage. This quality of the nuclear force is called 
a "second strike capability". If the deterrent is not capable of a second strike, a 
"launch-or-lose-situation" might occur in a crisis, which seriously undermines 
the stability of deterrence. For mutual deterrence to be stable, it is of course 
necessary that both partners are capable of a second nuclear strike. A 
deterrence strategy based on this principle is called "mutual assured destruc-
tion" (MAD): both deterrence partners assure each other large scale destruc-
tion in case of a nuclear attack (Freedman 1981, 245-249). 
Deterrence based on MAD requires the availability of nuclear weapons with 
a relatively heavy yield, the use of which can be credibly threatened only as an 
ultimate deterrent, at a decisive stage of a conflict. Also, the weapons should 
not be too accurate, so that the opponent need not be afraid of precision 
strikes against his own protected nuclear systems. 
The stability of bipolar nuclear deterrence based on MAD is dependent on 
the mutual assent and the cooperation of the deterrence partners. They must 
allow each other a second strike capability, which implies that they must con-
trol their own aspirations towards nuclear superiority. Such mutual self-control 
can only be achieved by arms-control agreements, on the basis of a mutual 
understanding of the common interest in a stable deterrence relationship 
(Schelling & Halperin 1961, 1-6). An example of such an agreement is the 
SALT I treaty, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
1972. In this treaty the two states allowed each other a limited but still very 
large arsenal of nuclear delivery vehicles. Through the SALT I agreement, the 
United States and the Soviet Union more or less institutionalized their 
deterrence relationship based on the principle of mutual assured destruction 
(Van der Bruggen 1986, 50). 
Although deterrence based on MAD may be stable in times of crisis, it is 
questionable whether it is also effective in deterring aggression by the 
deterrence partner, especially aggression at a relatively low level. Threatening 
the use of heavy nuclear weapons may not be a credible response to limited 
aggression, for nuclear retaliation in kind must be taken into account, which 
most probably will cause greater damage and suffering than would have been 
the case, had the initial aggression been tolerated. The gain in stability of 
deterrence based on MAD therefore seems to be bought at the price of a loss 
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of effectiveness in protecting national security interests (Gray 1979). 
The effectiveness of deterrence depends on the capability of preventing 
aggressive military acts by the deterrence partner. Military aggression may take 
place at various levels of intensity, ranging from affecting national interests in 
other countries to a direct attack on an ally or on the homeland. In order to 
prevent aggression at various possible levels, the deterrent must be a flexible 
instrument, providing a wide variety of military answering options. If nuclear 
forces are to play a role here, they must be equally diversified. The nuclear 
deterrent must not only provide an ultimate threat of massive retaliation, as in 
the MAD strategy, it must also include options for the early and limited use of 
nuclear weapons, directed at the enemy's forces, in order to deny him victory 
in war. To suit this purpose, nuclear weapons must be made fit for war-fight-
ing: they must be accurate and their destructive power must be controllable, in 
order to provide a proportionate, and therefore credible answer to various 
possible levels of aggression (De Lange 1983, 153-164; Kaplan 1983, 356-384). 
The NATO strategy of "flexible response" is an example of deterrence based 
on this principle. Next to extensive conventional forces, NATO possessed a 
variety of nuclear weapons for its defence, ranging from relatively small 
nuclear battlefield weapons to heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1989, 
NATO gave the following description of its flexible response strategy: 
Flexibility of response means that conventional and nuclear forces must be 
deployed in adequate numbers and locations, prepared to respond effectively and 
ready for use at short notice. NATO's readiness posture, and its capacity to 
mobilise, reinforce and deploy in times of tension and crisis, are critical elements 
of this policy, the purpose of which is to meet any level of aggression with a 
response designed to restore peace and deter further aggression (NATO 1989, 
218). 
It is possible (although hard to prove) that a nuclear strategy based on war-
fighting capabilities is more effective in deterring potential attackers than the 
strategy of massive retaliation. Compared with a massive retaliation strategy, 
the deterrent is more credible, because a choice can be made from various 
nuclear options, depending on the requirements of the situation. Unfortunately 
however, there is a price to be paid for this benefit. The more effective a de-
terrent is in times of peace, the more unstable it tends to be in times of crisis. 
For the more nuclear deterrence is based on the capability and preparedness 
to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the greater is the chance that they 
will indeed be used when deterrence should fail. In other words, the orienta-
tion towards nuclear war-fighting tends to lower the nuclear threshold. One 
can only speculate on what will happen once this threshold has been crossed. 
Many strategic theorists are very sceptical about the possibility of controlling a 
nuclear war. They fear that it may easily escalate into an all-out nuclear 
slaughter (Ball 1981; Knorr 1985; McNamara 1986). Others are less pessimistic 
and have designed scenarios for waging and eventually winning wars with 
nuclear weapons; not, actually, in order to start such a perilous adventure, but 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence (Gray 1979; Kahn 
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1984). 
In the history of nuclear strategy, the orientation towards the requirements 
of the effectiveness of deterrence has unmistakably prevailed over the orienta-
tion towards stability. In fact, a stable deterrence based on MAD only existed 
for a short period before and after the conclusion of the SALT-I agreements 
in 1972, and even then it was mainly effective at the level of declaratory policy, 
while behind this front research and deployment went in the opposite direction 
(Van der Bruggen 1985, 50-51). It is only with the recent collapse of the War-
saw Pact and the Soviet Union, which ended the power struggle between East 
and West, that nuclear strategy revalued the MAD-situation, in which nuclear 
weapons only function as an ultimate deterrent. There are several reasons why 
MAD did not perform well against war-fighting strategies for a long time. A 
certain autonomy of technological development seems to have played a crucial 
role. The accuracy of nuclear weapons has tremendously improved, thus mak-
ing nuclear precision strikes, in the context of war-fighting doctrines, ever 
more possible. The nuclear powers have not succeeded in restraining this tech-
nological perfection of nuclear weapons, partly because of an unreflecting as-
sumption that what was technologically more advanced was also 'better', partly 
because of the fear of falling behind in technological capability, and partly 
because of their aspiration to gain superiority over the adversary by acquiring 
a lead in military technology. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the nuclear strategies of both the United States and 
the Soviet Union steadily developed in the direction of deterrence based on 
the capability of nuclear war-fighting. New, highly accurate nuclear missiles 
were developed on both sides: the Pershing II and the cruise missile by the 
United States, the intermediate range SS 20 missile by the Soviet Union. Most 
of the SS 20s were targeted against Western Europe. With its three indepen-
dently targetable nuclear warheads, it looked like a weapon that could make a 
limited nuclear war in Europe possible (Van Eenennaam 1988, 15). NATO did 
not have comparable intermediate range nuclear weapons at its disposal to 
counter the perceived threat. This created fears of Soviet superiority on the 
European continent. To counter the threat, NATO decided in 1979 on a rad-
ical modernization of its European land based nuclear force, by planning for 
the deployment of 464 ground launched cruise missiles and for the replace-
ment of 108 short-range Pershing I missiles, stationed in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, by an equal number of new intermediate-range Pershings II. 
Forty eight cruise missiles were to be stationed in the Netherlands. The mod-
ernization was however only partly carried out, and finally completely 
cancelled, as a result of the historic treaty about the elimination of intermedi-
ate-range nuclear weapons (INF treaty) between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, in 1987. 
The modernization of Nato's nuclear force was announced in a period of 
increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, after a 
period of relative detente in the 1970s. In the United States, fears of Soviet 
nuclear superiority gave rise to an energetic military build-up ("rearming 
America") under president Reagan, which was accompanied by harsh anti-
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Soviet rhetoric and by wild speculations among nuclear strategists and govern-
ment officials about how to wage and win a nuclear war against the Soviet 
Union (Scheer 1982). A nuclear-war scenario that would cost twenty million 
US casualties was presented as a realistic option by Colin Gray, a leading 
American nuclear strategist and a top adviser on nuclear disarmament to the 
Reagan government (Gray & Paine 1980). The modernization of NATO's 
nuclear force in the context of a growing orientation in nuclear strategy 
towards war-fighting capabilities and increasing tensions between the super-
powers led many Europeans to believe that a nuclear war in Europe was be-
coming increasingly more likely. The profound concern about nuclear 
deterrence of the Dutch churches and church peace movements which devel-
oped in the late 1970s must be seen against this background. 
The Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands called the develop-
ments in the arms race "very disquieting, as they bring the possibility that a 
conflict will be fought with nuclear weapons ever closer" (Reformed Churches 
in the Netherlands 1984). The Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church, 
the IKV and Pax Christi all pointed to the new dimension in the danger of 
deterrence, which had been created by the orientation towards "'limited" 
nuclear warfare (Netherlands Reformed Church 1981, 7; IKV 1984, 22; Pax 
Christi 1980, 39). The Dutch bishops explicitly rejected the option of nuclear 
war-fighting and in general rejected any nuclear posture that transcended the 
minimum level of nuclear weapons needed for deterrence (Dutch Bishops' 
Conference 1983, 16). Only in the documents of ICTO can no critical evalu-
ation of the new developments in nuclear strategy be found. ICTO's primary 
concern was not a critical scrutiny of nuclear armament but the criticism of 
other peace movements' nuclear disarmament proposals. 
The rejection of the war-fighting orientation in nuclear deterrence strategy 
did not bring all the churches and church peace movements to the more far 
reaching conclusion that all forms of nuclear deterrence should be rejected. In 
the judgements about nuclear deterrence, two different positions can be dis-
cerned. The first position is a conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence. This 
is the official Roman Catholic point of view, advanced by the Vatican and 
adopted by the Dutch bishops, while also endorsed by ICTO. The second posi-
tion is a rejection of nuclear deterrence. This is the position of the World Coun-
cil of Churches, the Synods of the Netherlands Reformed Church and the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, as well as of IKV and Pax Christi. 
Both approaches to nuclear deterrence agree on the impossibility of accepting 
nuclear deterrence unconditionally. The difference between them pertains only 
to the question whether there are any conditions under which deterrence can 
still be accepted. Adherents of the first position answer this question affirm-
atively; adherents of the second position answer it in the negative. 
The two different positions regarding the acceptability of nuclear deterrence 
are related to different opinions about the way nuclear disarmament is to be 
pursued. The conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence is connected to a 
gradual bilateralist approach to nuclear disarmament, which conceives of 
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nuclear disarmament as a process of step by step nuclear arms reduction, 
through negotiated, bilateral measures. The rejection of nuclear deterrence is 
connected to a gradual unilateralist approach to nuclear disarmament, which 
conceives of nuclear disarmament as a process of step by step nuclear arms 
reduction, initiated by a non-negotiated, unilateral disarmament step. 
Both approaches to nuclear disarmament agree on the desirability of a gra-
dual reduction in nuclear arms. The only difference between them concerns 
the way the gradual process of disarmament is to be initiated and carried 
through. In gradual unilateralism, the taking of unilateral steps is seen as a 
necessary condition to break through the deadlock of the deterrence equilib-
rium. In gradual bilateralism, the emphasis is on the symmetry of the disarma-
ment process and on the preservation of the delicate balance of power. One 
sided steps are not excluded, but they are not seen as a prerequisite for 
achieving disarmament. The conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence and 
the related option for gradual bilateralism (a), and the position which couples 
a rejection of nuclear deterrence to gradual unilateralism (b) will be examined 
hereafter in greater detail. 
(a) Conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence and gradual bilateralism 
The Roman Catholic Church's conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence 
was put into words by Pope John Paul II, in his message to the United 
Nations' Second Special Session on Disarmament, in 1982. In this message the 
Pope said: 
Under present conditions, dissuasion based on equilibrium - certainly not as an 
end in itself but as a stage on the way to progressive disarmament - can still be 
judged to be morally acceptable. However, to ensure peace it is indispensable not 
to be content with a minimum which is always fraught with a real danger of 
explosion (John Paul II 1982, 85). 
The Dutch bishops endorsed the Pope's conditional acceptance of deterrence, 
on the grounds of the following argument: 
Nations ought to do away with deterrence but this cannot be done all at once or 
one-sidedly because such a hasty breakup would entail danger. Sudden interven-
tion in the system of deterrence must also be considered for its moral admissi-
bility. Disarmament, dismantling the system of deterrence will have to be carefully 
performed processes requiring that armed conflict is precluded by other means, 
through mutual understanding and justice on a truly international level. (...) The 
acceptance of the possession of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence cannot 
but be temporary and provisional, one stage in a process of progressive disarma-
ment towards authentic peace (Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983, 16). 
Implicit in the bishops' argument is the proposition that the system of 
deterrence prevents armed conflict and therefore cannot be dispensed with, as 
long as there is no international legal order which effectively guarantees peace 
and security for all nations. This proposition was made somewhat more explicit 
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by Cardinal Secretary Casaroli, in an address at the University of San 
Francisco, in which he said: 
The Popes and the church are of course in favour of a mode of life based upon a 
mutual commitment to sincere respect for law and justice. But in view of a reality 
that unfortunately seems a long way from being capable of change, they recognize 
that one cannot condemn recourse to a not indiscriminate deterrence as a means 
for trying to defend one's own security and to resist unjust aggression, and in the 
meantime to prepare to change the situation which for the moment justifies the 
use of deterrence (Casaroli 1983, 439). 
In Casaroli's account of the Vatican viewpoint, deterrence has "an essentially 
provisional nature and, so to speak, an instrumental one". Deterrence is instru-
mental in two ways: "As well as serving in the meantime to avoid the worst, it 
also has to serve to give time for seeking agreement and understanding". Casa-
roli's view on the instrumental function of deterrence for disarmament holds a 
key to the understanding of the Vatican's provisional acceptance of deterrence 
in the 1980s. Deterrence was, for the moment, considered to be an indispens-
able instrument to maintain a stable international order, which is a prerequi-
site for a smooth transition to ever lower levels of nuclear armament. 
The most explicit account of the necessity to maintain nuclear deterrence as 
a provisional surrogate for an effective international legal order has been put 
forward by ICTO, with reference to the statement by John Paul II: 
ICTO considers the deterrence equilibrium to be morally acceptable in the present 
situation, not as an end in itself, but in order to be able to pursue a balanced, 
simultaneous and internationally controlled reduction of weapons, through negoti-
ations, in an imperfect international legal order (ICTO 1982, 2). 
The Catholic Church's conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence may 
however not be taken as a legitimation of each and any form of nuclear strat-
egy and deployment policy. The Bishops' Conferences of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United States have, in their pas-
toral letters on war and peace, formulated criteria which a morally acceptable 
nuclear deterrence should meet. The Dutch bishops noted the following points 
in this respect: 
- the acceptance of deterrence does not extend to the further development 
and expansion of the means of deterrence, but is restricted to the level of 
arms that suffices for deterrence purposes; 
- functions of nuclear arms that exceed deterrence, such as the function of 
preparing for war or of a means of political pressure, which tend to acceler-
ate the arms race, must be rejected; 
- the 'respite' - the delay of nuclear war - that deterrence creates, must be 
utilized for precluding such a war through steps towards a more effective 
system of international law and disarmament; 
- nuclear weapons may not be included in a defence system in such a manner 
that their employment in case of war would be unavoidable and lead to 
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total war (Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983 12, 16). 
In the documents of ICTO no restrictive criteria for an acceptable nuclear 
deterrence are mentioned. Somewhat vaguely, ICTO opted for "a responsible 
further development of the present security policy" (ICTO 1982, 3). 
The conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence by the Roman Catholic 
Church and ICTO was related to their repudiation of two radical approaches 
to nuclear disarmament: immediate and complete bilateral disarmament, which 
they considered most dangerous to the stability of the international political 
system; and immediate and complete unilateral disarmament, which was dis-
carded because of its risks to national security. The Catholic Church stressed 
both dangers, from a universal point of view, whereas ICTO mainly focused on 
the dangers of unilateralism, from the viewpoint of the Netherlands and other 
democratic countries. These countries should not venture upon unilateral steps 
which would undermine the protection of the constitutional state against a 
"marxist-leninist dictatorship" (ICTO 1983, 2; 1985c, 6). 
The rejection of immediate and complete unilateral disarmament does not 
imply the rejection of limited unilateral disarmament steps. ICTO was not 
opposed to unilateral steps, as long as these did not undermine the credibility 
of deterrence. (ICTO 1983, 2). But the proposal, made by the IKV in 1977, for 
the denuclearization of the Netherlands did not fall in the category of unilat-
eral steps that ICTO could agree with (ICTO 1982a, 3). In the Dutch bishops* 
pastoral letter on nuclear weapons, the rejection of complete unilateral dis-
armament was accompanied by a plea for the "active exploration of the possi-
bilities of first disarmament steps", which "may have to be taken by either side, 
to create trust and to show each other that the aim is disarmament rather than 
weakening the opponent". The bishops did not, however, consider themselves 
competent to assess concrete first step proposals; this should be left to the 
politicians (Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983, 19). 
The Dutch bishops' approval of first steps has brought them quite close to 
the position of gradual unilateralism. Even so, one decisive mark of gradual 
unilateralism was lacking in the bishops' view on nuclear disarmament: they 
did not see unilateral steps as a precondition to successful disarmament. Uni-
lateral steps "may have to be taken", but they are not imperative. In fact the 
Dutch bishops showed great confidence in disarmament negotiations: 
We cannot afford to be sceptical of negotiations and to expect little from them. 
(...) If faith in negotiations should be lost, it must again be revived. For indeed 
negotiations may lead to arms control, arms reduction and disarmament (id., 17). 
This expression of confidence in negotiations is typical of the gradual bilatera-
list approach to disarmament. In his message to the United Nations of 1982, 
Pope John Paul II stated: 
Today once more I reaffirm before you my confidence in the power of honest 
negotiation for reaching just and equitable solutions. Such negotiations demand 
patience and constancy and ought to be aimed notably at achieving balanced, sim-
ultaneous and internationally controlled arms reduction. (John Paul II 1982, 85). 
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ICTO went beyond the Vatican's confidence in negotiations for disarmament, 
by adding the clause that "effective results can only be achieved through nego-
tiations from a position of sufficient strength" (ICTO 1984; 1985d, 13) 
(b) Rejection of nuclear deterrence and gradual unilateralism 
Nuclear deterrence was criticised mainly on two points: it is based on attitudes 
and intentions that are intrinsically wrong and it has not been used as a start-
ing point for nuclear disarmament through negotiations. From both these argu-
ments the option for gradual unilateralism immediately follows. The proposi-
tion to make a one-sided nuclear disarmament step has the expressive function 
of showing one's aversion to nuclear deterrence and has the strategic function 
of breaking through the stalemate in negotiations. 
In 1972, the IKV concluded that "the deterrence system must be rejected". 
Among the reasons for this stance, the moral argument prevailed. Nuclear 
deterrence is based on the readiness to destroy whole populations in retalia-
tion: "No one should put their trust in such an immoral system" (IKV 1972, 9). 
The moral argument was again in the forefront in the Manifest against Nuclear 
Weapons of 1977, which introduced the IKV-proposal for the unilateral 
denuclearization of the Netherlands, as a first step towards two-sided disarma-
ment. One of the functions of this proposal was to express a "radical rejection" 
of nuclear deterrence (Ter Veer 1983, 19). According to the Manifest, 
deterrence rests on massive mutual hostage-holding, which is "so thoroughly 
corrupt that we are deeply ashamed of it" (IKV 1977, 3). Similar denunciations 
of nuclear deterrence can be found in documents of the churches. To the 
World Council's Assembly of Vancouver, nuclear deterrence is "morally unac-
ceptable because it relies on the credibility of the intention to use nuclear 
weapons" (1983, 75). The Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 
stated that "all trusting upon and threatening with weapons that cause massive 
destruction of the population is hostile to a life in the imitation of Christ, who 
till the end did not destroy, but loved" (1984). 
Nuclear deterrence is also rejected because it has not led to negotiated 
nuclear disarmament. This argument cuts across the conviction, held by those 
who advocate a conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence, that deterrence 
provides an interim assurance of peace and stability on the way to disarma-
ment, sometimes referred to in theological terms as a "period of grace". To the 
churches and church peace movements rejecting nuclear deterrence, this argu-
ment was rendered obsolete by the actual developments in the field of nuclear 
deterrence in the 1970s and 1980s, which made nuclear war increasingly more 
likely. To the World Council of Churches, nuclear deterrence was "the contra-
diction of disarmament: it escalates the arms race in a vain pursuit of stability, 
it exalts the threat of force and rationalizes the development of new weapons 
of mass destruction" (1983, 76). The usual approach to nuclear disarmament, 
of simultaneously negotiating and arming further, had produced totally insuffi-
cient results and had merely led to an increase in the number of weapons (Pax 
Christi 1980, 12; IKV 1984a, 22; Netherlands Reformed Church 1981, 15-16). 
The churches and church peace movements rejecting nuclear deterrence 
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agreed on the necessity of one-sided disarmament steps, as a means of break-
ing through the stalemate in disarmament negotiations. This was one of the 
core arguments of the IKV campaign for the unilateral denuclearization of the 
Netherlands, which was supported by Pax Christi and the Synod of the Nether-
lands Reformed Church (IKV 1979, 3; Pax Christi 1980, 41; Netherlands 
Reformed Church 1981, 7). The Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Neth-
erlands did not officially endorse IKV's denuclearization initiative. However, it 
did make a plea for a concrete unilateral disarmament step, by urging the 
Dutch government in 1984 to cancel the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in 
the Netherlands (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 1984). 
IKV and Pax Christi never made the complete unilateral denuclearization 
of the Atlantic Alliance their goal. They have often been misunderstood on 
this point, although they have never left any uncertainty about their views in 
this respect. In an account of its proposal for a unilateral nuclear disarmament 
step, the IKV stated: 
IKV does not consider that it is desirable to work for a situation of complete 
unilateral disarmament. Moreover, it is not an approach which is advocated by 
anyone concerned, though for differing reasons. The chance that the opponent will 
make military use of his weapons in certain situations has been neglected too 
much. Outbreak of war could be encouraged in this way. A country or a group of 
countries which has disarmed in this manner runs too much risk of being black-
mailed politically on the basis of the opponents' weapons (IKV 1984a, 24-25; Pax 
Christi 1980, 43-46). 
In summary, the following observations can be made about the specific peace 
goals of the churches and church peace movements in the period considered. 
Peace is seen as a twofold process, aimed at the goals of the promotion of 
social justice and the prevention of war. 
The issue of social justice refers to the just distribution of power and 
resources in national and international society. In dealing with social justice 
issues, the churches and church peace movement opt for a people's perspec-
tive, in contrast to a state perspective. In the context of the promotion of 
social justice, the churches and church peace movements focus on two issues: 
human rights and development. 
The churches and church peace movements endorse the catalogue of human 
rights as laid down in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Man, 
but with a few differences of emphasis. The World Council of Churches has in 
the past tended to underexpose human rights problems in socialist countries. 
The Dutch Protestant churches, the World Council of Churches and Pax 
Christi have been strongly occupied with the problem of racism, particularly in 
South Africa. IKV and Pax Christi stressed the importance of civil East-West 
contacts, for the promotion of civil rights in Europe. ICTO has particulary 
stressed the problem of civil rights violations in socialist countries, but paid 
little attention to the socio-economic dimension of human rights. 
The churches' and church peace movements' view of development in the 
period considered can be characterized as a combination of a change-political-
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structures approach and a conscientization approach. This implies a strong 
emphasis on a people's perspective on development. At the international level, 
the injustice of the prevailing international economic order was criticised. 
Statements about development from the peace movements are relatively 
scarce. No statements about development could be found in ICTO-documents. 
With respect to the goal of the prevention of war, the main principle of the 
churches and church peace movements is the tradition of the "just war", which 
implies that under certain conditions war can be morally justified. An increas-
ingly positive appraisal of pacifist principles can, however, be observed, notably 
in the World Council of Churches. To prevent war, the churches and peace 
movements have urged two kinds of measures: the development of means for 
the peaceful solution of international conflicts and the pursuit of arms control 
and disarmament. The issues of nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament 
have held churches and peace movements divided. The Vatican and ICTO 
supported the position of a conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence, 
coupled to a plea for gradual nuclear disarmament through bilateral negoti-
ations. The World Council of Churches, the Protestant Churches and the 
peace movements IKV and Pax Christi rejected nuclear deterrence and argued 
for unilateral disarmament steps. The Dutch Bishops, while tied to the Vati-
can's conditional acceptance of deterrence, went far in their support of unilat-
eral disarmament steps. 
12 Instrumental peace goals of the Dutch churches 
and church peace movements 
In order to attain their specific peace goals, the Dutch churches and church 
peace movements have set a number of instrumental peace goals, which indi-
cate the tasks that they have set for themselves, as a contribution to the pro-
motion of peace. Common to these instrumental peace goals is the aim to 
exert communicative influence on sectors of society which are considered rel-
evant in the context of peace promotion. The influence is communicative, in 
the sense that it is exerted though persuasion and conviction, and not through 
coercive forms of influence, such as the use of force or the application of 
sanctions (Everts 1983, 98). 
There are in particular two sectors of society which the churches and 
church peace movements attempt to influence with regard to peace: the politi-
cal leadership and the general public. Both are relevant target groups because 
each in its own way determines the peace policy of the Netherlands. Whereas 
the political leadership is in direct control of this policy, the general public has 
an indirect influence on it, through Parliament and through its internal consen-
sus or dissent on peace issues, which politicians cannot disregard with impun-
ity. 
The political leadership (government and civil service, parliament and 
political parties) is influenced through direct contacts, either regular or occa-
sional, mostly of a consultative nature. In the period considered, both churches 
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and church peace movements had such political contacts. A delegation of the 
Catholic Church met on a regular basis with the Christian Democratic Party 
(CDA) and also, irregularly, with the Labour Party (PvdA). In the early 1980s, 
the issue of nuclear weapons was discussed during these contacts, partly as a 
result of the bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear weapons. In 1982, delegates of 
the Netherlands Reformed Church discussed problems of nuclear weapons 
with politicians and with civil servants of the Ministry of Defence, in relation 
to the Synod's pastoral letter of 1980 (Netherlands Reformed Church 1984). 
The Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands has had few contacts 
with political parties about nuclear weapons. This was due to the conviction, 
on the part of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, that politics is not 
an affair for the church as "institution" (the church in the strict sense of the 
word), but only for the church as "organism": the social and political organiz-
ations, established by the members of the church (Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands 1986). The peace movements IKV and Pax Christi both had 
regular contacts with PvdA, CDA and other parties. ICTO maintained contacts 
with CDA and with the Conservative Liberal Party ( W D ) . In addition, the 
peace movements all had their personal contacts with individual politicians. 
IKV and Pax Christi also held regular meetings with civil servants of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, where the technicalities of 
topical peace and security issues were discussed. 
In recent Dutch parliamentary history there are two cases in which political 
decision makers were effectively influenced by the peace movements. The first 
case occurred during the political struggle about the introduction of the neu-
tron weapon in NATO forces. In 1977, the communist-oriented action group 
Stop the Neutron Bomb started a successful mobilization campaign, which 
resulted in 1,2 million signatures under a petition against the production and 
deployment of the new weapon. After initial hesitation, IKV and Pax Christi 
supported the action. Urged by the church peace movements, the Council of 
Churches in the Netherlands took a clear stance against the neutron weapon 
and against "any progressive development and expansion of nuclear arms" 
(Council of Churches in the Netherlands 1978). This position was confirmed by 
most of the individual member churches of the Council, including the Roman 
Catholic Church. The clear statement of the churches against the neutron 
bomb strengthened Secretary of Defence Kruisinga in his opposition to the 
weapon in the government. Ultimately, he resigned on the issue (Maessen 
1985). The second case occurred in 1979, when a number of members of the 
parliamentary group of the CDA decided to resist the deployment of cruise 
missiles in the Netherlands, against the CDA party line. These "dissidents", as 
they were called, contributed much to the successive delays and postponements 
of government decisions on deployment. According to Van Staden, the dis-
agreement within the Christian Democratic parliamentary group was very 
much the result of successful attempts by the church peace movement to make 
inroads on the CDA party organization, by gaining the support of the churches 
and by mobilizing a large group of religious voters (Van Staden 1985, 142). 
The focus of this research is not on the relations between churches, church 
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peace movements and the political system of society. Its focus is on peace 
action, which is fundamentally the action of individuals, acting together. There-
fore, attention will be concentrated on the relations between churches and 
church peace movements to the general public on the one hand and to their 
members on the other. In this respect, the strategy of influence of the churches 
and church peace movements can be divided into two types: consensus mobiliz-
ation and action mobilization (Klandermans 1984; 1985). The goal of consensus 
mobilization is to raise public awareness on peace issues. This goal can be 
directed at short-term, as well as long-term aims. Short-term consensus mobi-
lization aims at changing public attitudes on very specific political issues. As a 
rule, short-term consensus mobilization intends to shape public readiness for 
political actions. Examples of this are the information campaigns of the Dutch 
peace movements against the neutron weapon and the cruise missiles. Long-
term consensus mobilization seeks to influence people's fundamental value 
systems and opinion patterns. Such long-term changes do not immediately 
affect public readiness for concrete political action; rather, the goal is to 
change the cultural climate in general (Schreuder 1981, 228). 
Action mobilization aims at persuading people to engage in certain collec-
tive actions, directed at the realization of social or political goals. Action 
mobilization strategies generally imply consensus mobilization as a preparatory 
activity, because people cannot be made to participate voluntarily in an activity 
unless they are first convinced of the necessity and Tightness of its goals. 
Dependent of the time perspective of the actions intended, action mobilization 
can be divided into short-term and long-term action mobilization. Short-term 
action mobilization pertains to the mobilization of people in order to express 
collective protest against a concrete political decision. It can therefore be 
considered as an attempt to exert indirect influence on the political leadership, 
via the power of public opinion. Long-term action mobilization is the counter-
part of long-term consensus mobilization. Often, the goal of changing people's 
fundamental value systems and opinion patterns is accompanied by an appeal 
to redirect one's ways of acting, on a long-term agenda. An example is the 
appeal of environmentalist groups to citizens not only to adopt a more ecologi-
cal attitude, but also to accommodate their way of acting to the limits of 
nature. 
Section 1.2.1 deals with the ways in which Dutch churches and church peace 
movements engaged in consensus- and action mobilization in relation to the 
general public. Section 1.2.2 deals with the consensus- and action mobilization 
of the Dutch churches and church peace movements in relation to their mem-
bers. 
1.2.1 The influence on the general public 
Over the last decades, churches and church peace movements have shown a 
consistently positive appraisal of the role public opinion can play in the promo-
tion of peace. The definition of this role has however undergone considerable 
changes, which reflect changes in the churches' and church peace movements' 
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instrumental peace goals. Initially, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the emphasis 
was on long-term consensus- and action mobilization. It was then believed that 
a change of people's attitudes and basic values could, in the long-term, create a 
climate more favourable to peace in the world. 
Long-term consensus mobilization in the context of peace promotion is 
characterized by a Utopian conception of peace goals, aiming at a fundamental 
change in national and international society, rather than at changes in day-to-
day political decision making. This was the point of view of, for example, G. 
Ruygers, one of the leading intellectuals of Pax Christi during the 1960s, who 
said: "what we need at this time is a peace movement which is prepared to set 
aside a whole generation as it were, in order to lay - finally and for the first 
time in human history - the foundations of a real and lasting peace" (Ruygers 
1965, 20). 
Long-term consensus mobilization is directed at the promotion of attitudes 
which favour peace in the long-term. People are encouraged to take a greater 
interest in peace issues, to be more concerned about the state of the world, to 
make up their minds about world problems and to discuss them (Pax Christi 
1965, 92). A plea is made for more adequate education of the young people 
(John XXIII 1963, 153; Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 64). People are 
also urged to develop moral and religious virtues which have a positive influ-
ence on their individual and collective actions, in the perspective of peace. The 
virtue of love is mentioned most frequently, next to solidarity, internationalism, 
respect for the human person and obedience to God. 
Long-term action mobilization in the context of peace promotion is charac-
terized by highly general expectations of the peace action of people. Frequent-
ly in the documents of churches and church peace movements at this time 
there is an appeal, to Christians and non-Christians alike, to base their actions 
on their personal responsibility for peace (John XXIII 1963, 150; Pax Christi 
1965, 92; Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 65). What this taking of respon-
sibility means in concrete term is mostly left vague, however. The Synod of the 
Netherlands Reformed Church admitted that "general rules for personal be-
haviour are difficult to give" (Netherlands Reformed Church 1962, 66). The 
public is not urged to take a stand on concrete political issues, nor is it called 
upon to participate in certain actions. In the early 1960s, several public actions 
against nuclear weapons and against the war in Vietnam were held in the 
Netherlands, but neither Pax Christi and IKV, nor the churches had any great 
part in them (Everts & Walraven 1984, 41-44). 
From 1967 onward, IKV focused its long-term consensus- and action mobi-
lization of the annual "Peace Week", organized in cooperation with Pax Christi 
and the associated churches. The aim of the Peace Week was to strengthen 
and broaden the basis of the peace work inside and outside the churches. The 
Peace Week covered a wide range of peace issues, both in the realm of the 
prevention of war and the promotion of justice. The Peace Week aimed at 
establishing connections between the great world problems and the local 
situation of people in the Netherlands. The purpose was to translate structural 
problems into possible changes in personal behaviour (IKV 1977, 18). In its 
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annual Vredeskrant (Peace Week Journal), IKV provided a platform for actions 
of other organizations in the field of peace and justice. IKV intentionally 
selected those actions which implied a conscientization process and which 
stimulated the making of personal choices. At this time, no actions were 
organized by IKV itself, nor did it take a stand on specific political issues 
(Schennink 1988, 251-253). Since 1970, IKV has also paid serious attention to 
peace education in schools, as an important opportunity for the conscientiza-
tion of young people. Between 1970 and 1987, it produced no less than twenty 
publications in the field of peace education (Everts & Walraven 1987, 161). 
At the end of the 1970s, IKV reoriented its strategy of public influence, which 
implied a shift from the long-term consensus- and action mobilization of the 
Peace Week model, to short-term consensus- and action mobilization. The 
reason for the change was a growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of 
the Peace Week as an instrument for influencing public opinion. After 1972, 
participation in the Peace Week, as well as the attention it received from the 
media, had declined. Besides, several survey-studies of the participants of the 
Peace Week revealed that only a fraction of the Dutch public was really influ-
enced by the Peace Weeks (Schennink 1988). This was attributed among other 
things to the vague and general aims of the Peace Week, and to the 
noncommittal nature of the actions organized. In order to strengthen its influ-
ence on public opinion, IKV decided to start with concrete political actions 
(IKV 1977, 18-19). This change in approach was put into practice the Cam-
paign Against Nuclear Armament, started during the Peace Week of 1977. The 
campaign was aimed at gaining the support of the Dutch population for the 
denuclearization of the Netherlands and, at a later stage, for the prevention of 
the deployment of new nuclear weapons in the Netherlands and in Europe. It 
was hoped that the pressure of mobilized public opinion could ultimately make 
the Dutch government change its nuclear policy in the desired direction. The 
campaign had a medium to long time perspective. IKV had planned it to last 
for about ten years. During the campaign, the time perspective would become 
even shorter, when political developments forced IKV to concentrate its efforts 
on the prevention of the deployment of cruise missiles, a drawn-out affair in 
which important political decisions never lay more than one or two years 
ahead. 
With respect to public opinion, the IKV campaign can be considered as a 
short-term consensus- and action mobilization strategy. IKV's short-term 
consensus mobilization of the late 1970s aimed at influencing people's opinions 
on very concrete political issues. From the building up of a "climate of peace", 
the goal of the influencing process turned to the dissemination of the concrete 
political goals of the IKV campaign. Characteristic of IKV's short-term action 
mobilization was that the expectations regarding the peace action of people 
were highly specific. People were asked to perform clearly defined tasks, within 
fixed time limits, or at fixed times and places. This required a high degree of 
organization of the public, which was absent from the strategy of long-term 
consensus mobilization. The IKV and other organizations organized several 
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opportunities for public action against nuclear weapons, such as two mass 
demonstrations, in 1981 and 1983, and a petition campaign in 1985. Before the 
national elections of 1982, the IKV and other peace movements also tried to 
influence the voting behaviour of the Dutch public, by publicly expressing 
concern that a coalition government of Christian democrats and conservative 
liberals might decide in favour of the deployment of cruise missiles (Ten Berge 
1983, 10). This is a clear example of short-term consensus mobilization. The 
action mobilization for the demonstrations was mainly directed at members 
and sympathizers of IKV and members of left wing organizations, but the 
petition aimed at mobilizing the whole Dutch population. Millions of petition 
forms were distributed nationwide and later collected door to door, which 
produced a result of 3.75 million signatures (out of a total of 14 million inhab-
itants and 10.7 million registered voters) on a request to the Dutch govern-
ment to refrain from the deployment of cruise missiles. 
With its instrumental peace goals of short-term consensus- and action mobiliz-
ation against nuclear weapons, IKV took the initiative in the nuclear debate 
within the Dutch churches and determined much of its content. The churches' 
and other peace movements' approach to the promotion of peace in the late 
1970s and early 1980s can therefore be well described by their reaction to the 
IKV-strategy. These reactions can be analyzed along two dimensions: evalu-
ation of the mobilization strategy of the campaign, which can be either positive, 
negative or neutral, and adaptation to the strategy, which pertains to the ques-
tion whether, and to what extent, the churches and other peace movement* 
redirected their own peace activities, as a result of the IKV strategy. Contrary 
to what one might expect, approval of IKV's mobilization strategy did not 
always imply adaptation to it, nor did disapproval exclude adaptation, as the 
following survey of reactions shows. 
Of the organizations examined here, only Pax Christi reacted entirely 
positively to the short-term consensus- and action mobilization of the IKV 
campaign, both in terms of evaluation and adaptation. Pax Christi supported 
the gradual unilateral denuclearization of the Netherlands and cooperated with 
IKV and other peace movements in the organization of protest actions, some-
thing it had done only rarely in earlier years. A striking form of adaptation to 
the IKV-campaign was the launching of its own campaign, by Pax Christi, 
which focused on the problem of the production of, and trade in, conventional 
weapons; a problem of particular relevance for the Third World. The campaign 
was started in 1982, under the slogan "Stop the arms trade, begin with Conver-
sion", and lasted till about 1987 (Pax Christi 1982). The goals of the Pax 
Christi campaign were the conversion of the Dutch arms industry to civil 
production and the tightening of statutory regulations concerning arms exports. 
Following the example of IKV, local groups were formed and a campaign 
magazine was published. By starting a parallel campaign on conventional 
weapons, Pax Christi wanted both to prevent conventional weapons being 
considered as relatively harmless in comparison with nuclear weapons, and to 
maintain its own identity, relative to IKV. The Pax Christi campaign was not a 
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great success however, because it was completely overshadowed by the IKV 
campaign against nuclear weapons, whose goal was much more obvious to the 
Dutch public. 
Straightforward disapproval of IKV's mobilization campaign came only from 
the side of ICTO. In fact, opposition to the IKV campaign was one of main 
reasons for the establishment of ICTO, in 1980 (ICTO 1985). ICTO not only 
opposed IKV's specific peace goal of gradual unilateralism, in response to 
which it advocated gradual bilateralism; it also criticized the way IKV applied 
the method of short-term consensus- and action mobilization. As regards the 
short-term mobilization of consensus, ICTO considered the information 
offered by IKV on nuclear issues to be simplistic, one-sided, too much con-
cerned with topical political issues and with arousing negative emotions about 
nuclear weapons. In this respect, ICTO was particularly trenchant in its criti-
cism of IKV materials for peace education in schools (ICTO 1984a). By con-
trast, ICTO wanted to inform the public through "balanced publications", which 
not only focused on current political matters, but also analyzed the hidden 
structures and long-term developments of peace issues (ICTO 1985b). ICTO 
opposed short-term action mobilization, because it considered that political 
decisions on security issues should only be made in parliament. The proper 
way for citizens to influence these decisions was through the political parties of 
their choosing. Therefore, "in our parliamentary democracy, ICTO rejects for 
itself the formation of political power, outside the political parties" (ICTO 
1983). Accordingly, ICTO also opposed mass activities against nuclear 
weapons. The petition of 1985 was repudiated as a "violation of our parliamen-
tary system" (ICTO 1985a). In accordance with its rejection of short-term 
action mobilization, ICTO's expectations regarding the peace action of Dutch 
citizens were low and not very specific. 
In its attempt to counterbalance the activities of IKV at all levels, ICTO in 
fact adopted many of IKV's strategies, such as commenting on topical political 
issues through interviews, press releases, big advertisements in newspapers, 
and even the publication, since 1986, of a Peace Week Journal of its own. 
Thus, ICTO's activities took the form of what might be called a 'counter-
consensus mobilization campaign', directed at keeping the Dutch public from 
supporting gradual unilateralism (ICTO 1987, 1). One could say, therefore, 
that ICTO formally adapted its instrumental goals to the goals of the IKV 
campaign, although it had a strongly negative evaluation of the campaign itself. 
The 'choice of the weapons' had been made by IKV. 
The churches did not react identically to IKV's short-term consensus- and 
action mobilization. Common to the churches' reaction was their abstention of 
direct support for the peace movement's short-term action mobilization. 
Although IKV urgently called upon the churches to share in the responsibility 
for the big public actions against nuclear weapons, none of the larger Dutch 
churches complied with this request. The churches considered participation in 
short-term action mobilization as too direct an interference with the political 
decision-making. The Council of Churches in the Netherlands was officially 
represented at the 1983 demonstration in The Hague, but this cannot be seen 
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as an official representation of the constituent churches. With respect to short-
term consensus mobilization, the churches differed. The Protestant Synods 
supported IKV's short-term consensus mobilization against nuclear weapons. 
The Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church publicly advocated the unilat-
eral denuclearization of the Netherlands. The Synod of the Reformed 
Churches urged the Dutch government not to deploy cruise missiles. Through 
the media, these standpoints were brought to the attention of a wide public. 
The Catholic bishops did not follow the Synods' short-term consensus mobiliz-
ation. They only supported unilateral disarmament steps in a general way, as a 
possibility which deserved more consideration. 
Apart from the few concrete political statements of the Synods, the empha-
sis of the churches during the IKV campaign remained on long-term consen-
sus- and action mobilization. The churches considered this form of exerting 
public influence an essential part of their public role. In all their documents on 
nuclear weapons issues, the church maintained an emphasis on the long-term 
dimensions of the peace issue. They advocated the personal and collective 
taking of responsibility in matters of war and peace and the cultivation of 
'peace virtues'. The 1985 Study Report of the Reformed Churches connected 
the short- and long-term approach to peace issues. It is fruitful to study the 
short-term problem of nuclear deterrence in the perspective of its long-term 
cultural, political and economic causes. But the long-term perspective should 
not draw away the attention from the seriousness of the short-term problems. 
Arms of mass destruction are a fever which betrays the presence of a disease. 
The (long-term) disease must be cured. But in the meantime, the (short-term) 
fever can be so high, that antibiotics have to be administered (Reformed 
Churches in the Netherlands 1985, 47-48). 
The Dutch bishops clearly favoured long-term consensus mobilization. In 
their Pastoral Letter, the bishops stated that they wanted to penetrate to the 
deepest causes of the absence of peace in our world. They traced these causes 
partly to the imperfect organization of the world community and partly to 
defects in attitudes. The two causes are interconnected, in the sense that a 
change in attitude, both of states and individuals, is essential to building justice 
and peace in the world. Therefore, the bishops called for a profound change, a 
"conversion", in our attitudes: from "the pursuit of more and still more" and 
from "anxiety and worries over one's safety", to love, solidarity and respect for 
life. In a section on "The Force of a Moral and Religious Conviction", the 
bishops gave an explicit account of their emphasis on long-term consensus 
mobilization in the promotion of peace. In the long-term, the bishops argued, 
moral clarity and conviction can guide the political decision process to the 
essential interests, even if this is not effective in the short-term. Therefore, "a 
world-wide refusal to consider the use of nuclear weapons morally acceptable 
might be an enormous stimulus to the disarmament process. Such a refusal 
might also lead to extrication from the ideology of deterrence" (Dutch Bishops' 
Conference 1983, 8, 21-23). Related to their long-term consensus mobilization, 
the bishops opt for long-term action mobilization. Their expectations regarding 
the peace actions of people were not very specific. People were called on to 
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inform themselves critically about peace and security issues, and to create a 
spirit of solidarity with the poor and of resistance to the arms race, especially 
in education, in the media and in discussion groups. Everyone should contrib-
ute towards the development of world-wide efforts for peace and justice by 
making careful daily choices (id., 24-25). 
In summary, it can be said that during the years of the IKV campaign against 
nuclear weapons, IKV and Pax Christi opted for the instrumental peace goals 
of short-term consensus- and action mobilization, directed at short-term politi-
cal goals. ICTO opposed these instrumental peace goals, but in fact imitated 
them, in a counter-mobilization campaign. The churches almost completely 
refrained from short-term action mobilization. In issuing a number of concrete 
political statements against nuclear weapons, the Synods of the Netherlands 
Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands adopted the 
instrumental goal of short-term consensus mobilization. The Catholic bishops 
did not engage in short-term consensus mobilization. During the campaign 
years, all churches maintained the instrumental goal of long-term consensus-
and action mobilization. However, these conclusions must be qualified by two 
remarks. 
Firstly, all the churches related to IKV may be considered to be implicitly 
supportive of its short-term consensus- and action mobilization, by the very 
fact of their sustained participation and financial support. But this argument 
should not be pressed too far. From the outset, the formula for IKV has been: 
"Not on behalf of the churches, but nevertheless of the churches" (Everts & 
Walraven 1987, 25). In this formula, the churches bear no direct responsibility 
for the actions of IKV, nor are they bound by its statements, while IKV is 
allowed great autonomy in determining its course of action. These organiz-
ational demarcations give room to differences in the instrumental peace goals 
between IKV and the churches. These differences do not necessarily betray 
disagreement, but may well be interpreted in terms of a division of labour. The 
church peace movement takes the responsibility for strategies of influence 
which the churches approve, but do not find it appropriate to adopt. 
Secondly, the overall picture of churches committed to long-term consensus-
and action mobilization and of peace movements committed to short-term 
consensus- and action mobilization describes the situation as it existed during 
the IKV campaign for the unilateral denuclearization of the Netherlands. 
Before, IKV and Pax Christi were more inclined towards long-term consensus-
and action mobilization, and when the campaign began to lose momentum, 
after 1985, the time had come for a reappraisal of long-term consensus- and 
action mobilization by the peace movements. The IKV and Pax Christi put a 
new emphasis on detente in Europe as a specific peace goal. They attempted 
to promote these goals by fostering the view that European security cannot be 
based on military defence and nuclear deterrence, but must instead be based 
on economic, political and cultural cooperation and integration. IKV particu-
larly stressed the cultural unity of Europe and wanted to promote mutual 
understanding between East and West through contacts between churches and 
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peace movements, through partnerships between municipalities and through 
cultural exchange programmes. These goals are much more oriented towards 
long-term consensus- and action mobilization and they are also much more in 
line with Dutch government policies, than was the case with the anti-nuclear 
campaign. This explains why strategies of short-term consensus- and action 
mobilization were put aside by IKV and Pax Christi, when they adopted these 
new peace goals. The formation of a multinational military force against Iraq 
in 1990, however, elicited a new short-term consensus mobilization of IKV and 
Pax Christi. In big newspaper advertisements, they declared themselves against 
a possible military intervention of the international forces against Iraq. 
Of the peace movements, ICTO has in fact been the most constant in the 
definition of its instrumental peace goals. Established as a reaction against 
IKV's short-term consensus- and action mobilization for gradual unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, ICTO adopted a consistent counter-strategy of short-
term consensus- and action mobilization, aimed at neutralizing the mobiliz­
ation by IKV. As a defender of the official Western security policy, ICTO 
never felt the need to develop long-term perspectives of change in the realm of 
war and peace. Therefore, the goal of long-term consensus- and action mobiliz­
ation is nearly absent in ICTO's set of instrumental peace goals. 
In conclusion to this section, the instrumental peace goals of the Dutch 
churches and church peace movements in relation to the general public, in 
period from 1977 to 1987, are schematically represented in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Instrumental peace goals of Dutch churches and church peace 
movements, in relation to the general public (1977 - 1987) 
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1.2.2 The influence on church members and members of the church peace 
movements 
In addition to the general public, the constituencies of the churches and church 
peace movements also form an important target group of influencing processes 
of the churches and church peace movements. These processes take place 
within a complex constellation of formal and informal relationships between 
churches and church peace movements. A short elucidation of these relation-
ships will be helpful to gain a better understanding of the influencing processes 
which are to be considered here. 
The relationships between churches and church peace movements are com-
plex as the result of an interplay of mutually attractive and repulsive forces. 
The churches attach great importance to the renewing impulses which the 
peace movement can give to thinking about peace in the religious community, 
but they are anxious not to be associated with actions and policies of the peace 
movement which are controversial within the church community; the peace 
movements seek a legitimation of their actions and policy by an official or 
inofficial mandate of the churches, but they are also keen on maintaining their 
autonomy as much as possible. 
- Pax Christi the Netherlands is formally an autonomous association, but it is 
closely linked to the Roman Catholic Church, among other things by the fact 
that it is chaired by a bishop. Pax Christi is a movement within the Catholic 
Church, but forms no part of its formal organisation. From the viewpoint of 
the leadership of the Catholic Church, Pax Christi is acknowledged as an 
"agent of change" within the church, but the movement is also given to under-
stand that it should not move away too far, through its actions and policy, from 
the opinions on war and peace in the church (Ter Laak 1976; Van Munster 
1988, 163-164). 
- The IKV was established by nine Dutch churches. Part of the assets of IKV 
come from church contributions. The decision of the churches to participate in 
the IKV implied a certain mandate, but the content and limits of this mandate 
have never been arranged in a formal statutory way and have been subject of 
dispute over the years. A formula often used to describe the relationship of 
IKV to the churches is that it acts "at the command of the churches, but with a 
responsibility of its own" (Everts & Walraven 1987, 31; IKV 1982, 4). This 
rather vague formula reflects the intricate constellation of attractive and repul-
sive forces between church and peace movement mentioned above. The rela-
tionship between the IKV and the churches was sorely tried during IKV's 
political campaign for the removal of all nuclear weapons from the Nether-
lands. The IKV requested official support from the churches for its campaign, 
but the churches reacted hesitantly and reservedly. Nevertheless IKV strongly 
determined the image of the churches in public opinion (Everts & Walraven 
1987, 53-54). 
- ICTO originated from the grass-roots level of the churches, in particular in 
circles within the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands which were alarmed 
by the IKV-campaign and by tendencies towards politicisation of the church in 
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the nuclear arms debate. The ruling bodies of the churches have always tried 
to keep ICTO at a distance, and have never given it anything of a mandate, 
although ICTO constantly urged a closer and more official relationship to the 
churches, comparable to that of IKV. Because of the considerable support for 
ICTO among church members, however, the Synod of the Reformed Churches 
could not afford to neglect ICTO completely. ICTO-members were thus invited 
to participate in advisory commissions to the Synod, and occasional small 
grants to ICTO were made (ICTO 1986, 90; Reformed Churches in the Neth-
erlands 1985, 153-209). 
The complicated matter of the relationships between churches and church 
peace movements will not be gone into more deeply here. Attention will be 
concentrated on the relationships between the leadership of the churches and 
church peace movements on the one hand, and their members on the other. 
Theoretically, there are four possible lines of influence from the leadership of 
the churches and church peace movements to their members: influence of the 
church leadership on church members and on members of the church peace 
movements; influence of the leadership of the church peace movements on 
church members and on their own members. In practice, however, the second 
line of influence hardly occurs. To influence the members of church peace 
movements is not a common element of church policy. The remaining three 
lines of influence will be examined next. 
(a) The influence of church leadership on church members 
The importance of the commitment of church members to the cause of peace 
is a constant element in official church documents on war and peace. In the 
Second Vatican Council's conception of the church as the "people of God", 
great value is attached to the active participation of Roman Catholics in the 
promotion of justice and peace. The Council called on Catholic lay people to 
take a positive attitude to the establishment of a true world community, to 
volunteer for the work of development aid and the work of international 
organizations, and to seek the cooperation of other Christians and non-Chris-
tians in the field of peace and justice (Roman Catholic Church 1965, 88-90). 
The Dutch bishops stated that "for Christians peace on earth will always be a 
task that on account of human sinfulness requires continuous effort". There-
fore, "Christians must do all that is within their ability, to prevent or terminate 
war". The vigour with which Christians strive for peace and justice and oppose 
the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, is linked to their faith 
in Jesus Christ. In a Christian attitude, there is a permanent link between 
believing in peace, as a gift of God, and making peace (Dutch Bishops' Con-
ference 1983, 7). Seeking for the right attitude and conduct with respect to the 
problem of nuclear arms, the bishops rejected the attitude of "apocalyptic 
fatalism" and expressed the view that "the truly Christian response to the 
threat of nuclear weapons consists in the acceptance of the calling to be assist-
ants of Christ in delivering the world from evil" (id., 23). Writing on nuclear 
weapons in 1964, the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church stated that 
Christians should not cling to a tenacious opposition to the world, but should 
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cooperate in the life of society and the nation, without losing their critical 
alertness, and should promote the building of the international community of 
peoples (Netherlands Reformed Church 1964, 44). The Synod's pastoral letter 
on nuclear weapons of 1980 strongly underlined the critical role of the faithful, 
by calling on church members to confess their disobedience to God which 
manifests itself in the arms race, and by stressing that the church of Christ can 
resist the forces which operate behind the threat of mass destruction (id. 1980, 
250). The Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands also stressed 
the particular commitment of church members to the cause of peace. The 
Synod of Dordrecht (1971/1972) stated: 
Our churches have the task, through the proclamation of the liberating Gospel of 
Christ, to call on both the individual and the community as a whole, to be con-
verted and by the same token to unmask and fight against 'the root causes of 
bloodshed' such as hatred, malice, ambition, imperialism, unjust social contrasts, 
discrimination, racism and everything which destroys or hinders justice in interna-
tional relations (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 1980, 34). 
The Synod of Zwolle (1977/1979) added to this: 
All Christians can be expected to undertake steps which lead away from the fatal 
road of nuclear armament, and which bring us all closer to the way and the truth 
of Jesus Christ (id. 47). 
Typical of all these exhortations to focus on peace is the emphasis on a 
profound change in attitudes, which is characteristic of the instrumental peace 
goal of long-term consensus mobilization. This is accompanied by long-term 
action mobilization, which demands a lot of church members and which is 
urged in religious language, relating the task of peace making to the Christian 
kerygma. In spite of their penetrating formulation, however, the expectations 
of the church leadership regarding the peace actions of church members are 
not very specific. The implementation of calls to action is entirely left to the 
personal responsibility of church members. 
In relation to church members, the church leadership did not engage in 
short-term action mobilization. No concrete political action possibilities were 
offered to the church members, nor was there an explicit call to participate in 
protest actions organized by the peace movements. Empirical research shows 
the effect of this abstention from short-term action mobilization by the church 
leadership. There has been a recurring significant underrepresentation of 
church members in protest actions against nuclear weapons in the early 1980s. 
At the time of these actions, rather more than 50 percent of the adult Dutch 
population considered itself church members. Of the demonstrators in 1981 
and 1983, no more than 20 and 23 percent respectively were church members, 
whereas of those who signed the 1985 petition, only 36 percent were church 
members (Schennink et al. 1982, 24; Schennink 1988, 265). Schennink's con-
clusion from these data, that "church teaching made it especially difficult to 
mobilize church members for protest activities" (1988, 266), can be confirmed 
51 
from the evidence of church documents, which indicate that the church leader-
ship refrained from short-term action mobilization, in relation to church mem-
bers. 
What the churches did offer to their members was the opportunity to par-
ticipate in church discussions on war and peace issues, particularly in relation 
to nuclear deterrence. In the early 1980s, the churches organized discussion 
forums in parishes and congregations. In preparation for their pastoral letter 
of 1983, the Dutch bishops organized a consultation about nuclear weapons in 
the Catholic community (KASKI 1982). In the Netherlands Reformed Church 
a wide discussion about nuclear weapons was held in 1979 and 1980. The 
Synod stimulated discussion in the congregations, by publishing a highly critical 
discussion report on nuclear weapons (Netherlands Reformed Church 1979). 
However, the report did not express an official standpoint of the Synod. In 
both discussions, some tens of thousands of church members participated. The 
evaluation of these discussions by the leadership of the churches reveals some-
thing about the aims of the education of church members. The bishops con-
sidered it a positive result of the discussion in the parishes that "awareness of 
the exceptional significance of the problem has certainly grown" (Dutch 
Bishops' Conference 1983, 33). To Laurens J. Hogebrink, the Synod's staff 
member who had drafted the study document of the Netherlands Reformed 
Church, the most important result of the discussion in the congregations was 
that "the process of consultation has involved many church members for whom 
the issue was new and whose interest has become permanent" (Hogebrink 
1981, 253). 
The Synod of the Reformed Churches started a discussion in the churches 
about nuclear weapons in 1982. In 400 of the 850 churches, so-called "discus-
sion forums" were held. Several study documents served to stimulate these 
discussions (Van Alphen 1983; 1985; Van Alphen & Brandsma 1986). The 
Synod's objective, however, was not primarily to create greater awareness of 
nuclear problems among the faithful, but to counter the alarming polarisation 
on the nuclear issue in the churches, by starting a communication process that 
could promote consensus (IKV 1984, 12; Van Alphen 1986). 
As regards short-term consensus mobilization, the church leadership's 
approach to church members was identical to its approach to the general pub-
lic. The Protestant Synods engaged in short-term consensus mobilization, 
through concrete political statements against nuclear deterrence, which were 
directed at church members in the first place, but also at the general public. 
The Dutch Bishops' Conference refrained from short-term consensus mobiliz-
ation, in relation to Catholic believers as well as in relation to the general pub-
lic. 
A unique characteristic of the church leadership's influence on church mem-
bers was the use of religious symbols. Religious symbols applied in church 
documents on peace were, among other things: the victory of Christ over the 
powers of the world, the obedience to God, the Kingdom of God as a gift and 
as a demand, reconciliation and the imitation of Christ (Dutch Bishops' Con-
ference 1983; Netherlands Reformed Church 1981; Reformed Churches in the 
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Netherlands 1985). These religious symbols play a role in both long-term and 
short-term mobilization, but their functioning in the long-term and short-term 
perspective is different. In long-term consensus- and action mobilization, relig-
ious symbols are directly related to the intended changes of value patterns and 
action tendencies. Religious symbols provide vigour to the call for a profound 
conversion of basic attitudes and styles of life, in relation to peace. In short-
term consensus mobilization, religious symbols are indirectly related to 
concrete political goals. Religious symbols form no part of the specifically pol-
itical argumentation itself, but serve as a background of meaning, which 
enhances the plausibility of political argumentation from a religious perspec-
tive. There is no distinction between types of religious symbols as regards 
these roles. Dependent on the context, the same symbol can be applied in 
long-term mobilization, or as a background of meaning for short-term mobiliz-
ation. 
(b) The influence of the leadership of the church peace movements on 
church members 
Like the church leadership, the leadership of the church peace movements 
considered church members a primary target group of their influence. IKV's 
goal is to provide information and to stimulate a process of conscientization in 
the churches about the problems of war and peace (IKV 1984, 8). One of 
ICTO's main objectives is the promotion of "education and real deliberation in 
the churches, in so far as the churches consider this necessary" (ICTO 1983, 3). 
Pax Christi aims at "exerting influence on institutions and organizations in 
church and society" (Pax Christi 1986, 1), which may be taken to include the 
exertion of influence on the members of these organizations as well. 
Compared with the approach of the church leadership to the influence on 
their members, that of the church peace movements is partly the same, partly 
different. There is similarity in the approach to long-term consensus- and 
action mobilization. Both the church leadership and the church peace move-
ments make use of religious symbols in influencing processes aimed at chang-
ing fundamental values and action tendencies regarding peace. The most im-
portant instrument at the disposal of the church peace movements to exert this 
influence is the annual Peace Week, about which something has already been 
said in section 1.2.1. In the organization of the Peace Week, IKV and Pax 
Christi operated with a mandate and with the support of the churches. In the 
Roman Catholic Church, for example, the bishops announced the Peace Week 
to the parishes and asked their priests to focus on the theme during that week. 
Thus, the Peace Week received official authorization. 
In the Peace Week, religious language plays an important role. Particularly 
in the "services for peace", held during this week, peace issues are highlighted 
in the liturgy, through sermons, prayers and songs. Suggestions for the liturgi-
cal incorporation of the theme of peace are provided by IKV and Pax Christi 
in their Peace Week materials. IKV considered the liturgical peace activities 
during this week a unique opportunity to involve a large section of the church 
membership in the problems of war and peace (IKV 1978, 3). In its Peace 
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Week Journal, IKV usually included several articles on religious aspects of 
peace. The 1979 issue of the Peace Week journal, for example, contained an 
article by bishop Ernst of Breda, about the role of faith and conscience in 
relation to nuclear weapons, an article by IKV itself about the apocalyptic 
character of our time and an article about the expectation of Jesus Messiah. 
Articles in other editions dealt with the Lord's Supper (1980), the Sermon on 
the Mount (1982) and the Covenant (1986). In these articles, as well as in 
other theological materials related to the Peace Week (IKV 1978; 1981; 
1981a), elements of the Christian kerygma are interpreted from the perspec-
tive of war and peace. 
IKV and Pax Christi also approached church members with specific political 
proposals and specific demands regarding peace actions, in the context of their 
short-term consensus- and action mobilization against nuclear weapons. As 
these specific demands were not exclusively directed at church members, but 
also at the general public, they were not expressed in religious language, but in 
the form of political arguments, acceptable to both church and non-church 
people. ICTO opposed the other peace movements' short-term consensus- and 
action mobilization directed at church members, particulary for its concern 
about political polarisation in the church (ICTO 1983; 1983b; 1987a). In spite 
of its opposition to short-term consensus- and action mobilization among 
church members, ICTO adopted the same strategy in its counter mobilization 
campaign against the gradual unilateralist disarmament goals of IKV. 
IKV and ICTO have both clearly argued their rejection of the use of relig-
ious language in political statements on war and peace issues. IKV thinks that 
the Bible should not be used for the legitimation of political standpoints and 
holds that political proposals should only be judged on political quality. Their 
political merit is not enhanced by the fact that they are inspired by the Gospel 
(IKV 1984a, 20). ICTO pointed to the plurality of theological traditions among 
its members as a reason for not basing its standpoints on a purely theological 
foundation (ICTO 1983). 
Although religious symbols are not directly applied as political arguments by 
the church peace movements, they are applied in an indirect manner, as a 
background of meaning which enhances the plausibility of the political argu-
ments. Biblical symbols and narratives are used by IKV to undergird its basic 
policy outlines, emphasizing the pledge to the victims of injustice and 
militarization, the opposition to the logic of deterrence, and the insistence on 
the need to take risks on the road to disarmament. ICTO stresses the gift-
nature of eschatological peace, the sinfulness of man, Luther's teaching of the 
two empires and Romans 13 on the "sword" of government, as a religious con-
text of meaning undergirding its conservative political standpoints (ICTO 1982; 
1983a). 
As in the use of religious symbols by the church leadership, the church 
peace movements do not make a distinction between types of religious symbols 
in relation to long-term or short-term consensus mobilization. Depending on 
the context, the same symbols are applied to foster fundamental changes of 
values in the long-term, or to provide a background of meaning to concrete 
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political standpoints. 
(с) The influence of the leadership of the church peace movements on the 
members of these movements 
For the effectuation of their instrumental peace goals, the leaderships of the 
church peace movements are highly dependent on the 'working force' of their 
members, who mainly operate at the local level. Therefore, the consensus- and 
action mobilization strategies of the church peace movements are first of all 
directed at their own members. The forms of influence inside the church peace 
movements vary according to the relation of the members to the organization 
of the movement. In IKV this relation is strong, in ICTO and Pax Christi it is 
less strong. To appreciate these differences, a few words must be said first 
about the internal organization of the church peace movements. 
Strictly speaking, individuals cannot become members of IKV. Formally, 
IKV is an umbrella organization in which nine Dutch churches cooperate for 
the promotion of peace. The IKV Council of Church Representatives is the 
highest authority within this formal organization. In addition to the formal 
organization, an informal structure has grown inside IKV. This informal struc­
ture consists of a network of local IKV-groups, of which there were 336 in 
1981, with an average size of 11 members (Everts & Walraven 1987). In the 
last few years, however, both the number and size of IKV-groups have strongly 
decreased. 
Pax Christi and ICTO both have the corporate personality of an association. 
Anyone subscribing to the goals of the association can become a member. The 
ICTO-association is organized in local and regional departments, of which 
there were about 100 in 1983, ranging in size from some tens to some hun­
dreds of members. As with IKV, these numbers have strongly decreased in the 
last couple of years. The Pax Christi association had about 22.500 members in 
1987 (Bos 1988, 100). Pax Christi members are not organized in local groups. 
In the early 1970s, most of the existing Pax Christi-groups merged into IKV-
groups. For local peace actions, Pax Christi relegated its members to the IKV-
groups. As a Roman Catholic peace movement, Pax Christi concentrates its 
activities on the members of the Roman Catholic Church. At the grassroots 
level of the Roman Catholic Church there exists a network of local groups, 
committed to the goal of peace. These are the so-called MOV-groups 
(Mission, Development and Peace groups). These groups, which came into 
existence towards the end of the 1970s, arose from a need to expand the tradi­
tional charity-oriented mission- and development work of the church in the 
direction of the more politically oriented themes of peace and justice. This 
change should be seen in the context of the politisation of the churches' think­
ing about development, as described in section 1.1.1. What happened in fact 
was that national Catholic organizations in the field of mission and develop­
ment sought cooperation with Pax Christi. At the local level, existing groups 
for mission and peace and local church related peace groups were exhorted to 
cooperate. Thus MOV-groups arose at the parish level. From the beginning 
these groups tried to strengthen their identity vis-à-vis the IKV-groups. In their 
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view the peace component of the MOV-work should not focus on security 
issues between East and West, as the IKV strongly tended to do, but should 
concentrate on the North-South dimension of the peace issue. To this end 
MOV-groups focused, among other things, on the conscientization of par-
ishioners with respect to the relationship between armament and underdevel-
opment (Van Lin & Van Engelen 1984; Maassen 1984; Van Iersel & Spanjers-
berg). MOV-groups can be considered as a constituency of local groups for 
Pax Christi. 
A common form of exerting influence on members of peace movements is 
the spread of information, through regularly appearing information magazines 
and through more in-depth background information. These materials contain a 
mix of information, directed at long-term and short-term consensus- and action 
mobilization, dependent on actual political situation and on the political 
actions that the movement is engaged in at any time. The educational 
materials of the church peace movements are not exclusively directed at their 
members. The members are expected to educate church members and the 
general public at the local level, with the help of these materials. The educa-
tional information of the church peace movements therefore has a twofold 
function: influencing the members of the peace movements, and guiding them 
in the exertion of influence on others, in accordance with the movements' 
viewpoints. 
A form of exerting influence which is specifically directed at the members 
of the peace movements takes place at local, regional and national meetings, 
where members can exchange views and experiences, where they can be stimu-
lated in their peace work and where they can be informed about, and con-
vinced of, the standpoints of their movement's organization. 
In addition to the spread of educational materials and the holding of meet-
ings with an influencing goal, IKV and ICTO have also laid down specific 
requirements regarding the peace action of their members, which can be 
referred to as internal short-term action mobilization, when IKV started its 
campaign for the denuclearisation of the Netherlands, one of its objectives was 
the formation of a network of strongly committed supporters. People, both in-
and outside the churches, were asked to sign the Manifest tegen de kernwapens 
(Manifesto Against Nuclear Weapons). Signing it implied a commitment to 
introduce the problem of nuclear weapons everywhere in one's surroundings, 
particularly in political parties, and to make one's voting behaviour dependent 
on the political parties' stand on the denuclearization of the Netherlands. Sign-
ing the manifesto was not only an expression of consent to the goal of nuclear 
disarmament; it also implied a commitment to make certain efforts for this 
goal. Those who signed the manifesto were asked to unite in local groups, 
which formed the network of IKV-groups (IKV 1977). According to IKV, local 
IKV-groups should organize activities at the local and national level. At the 
local level, actions were to be directed at local churches, political parties, local 
governments and schools. At the national level, IKV-groups were to hold them-
selves available for central manifestations and to undertake actions in the 
context of central programmes, such as raising public concern about the prob-
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lem of nuclear weapons (IKV 1984a, 11-12). 
ICTO also attempted to activate its members in a way which can be charac-
terized as internal short-term action mobilization, but the requirements were 
more modest than in the case of IKV. ICTO expected its members to be active 
participants in opinion- and decision-making processes inside their own politi-
cal parties. It also expected its members to spread the opinions of ICTO within 
their local churches (ICTO 1983). 
Only Pax Christi has not engaged in internal short-term action mobilization. 
This is due to the fact that Pax Christi does not have an elaborate group struc-
ture. As there are few local Pax Christi groups, most members of Pax Christi 
have no opportunity to participate in local events under the name of Pax 
Christi. For actions at the local level, Pax Christi is dependent on the cooper-
ation of MOV-groups. These in general support Pax Christi's peace goals, but 
they have a great deal of autonomy and their network is only loosely associ-
ated to the Pax Christi organization. Detailed prescriptions by Pax Christi for 
the peace actions of the members of MOV-groups would not be appropriate in 
this situation. Although empirical research reveals that 44 percent of Pax 
Christi's membership produce Pax Christi ideas in the work situation (Bos 
1988, 106), these actions are spontaneous and not coordinated by the Pax 
Christi secretariat. 
An important conclusion of this section is that the use of religious symbols is 
characteristic of the way in which the leadership of the churches and church 
peace movements attempt to exert influence on the members of the churches 
and church peace movements. Religious symbols feature both in long-term and 
short-term consensus- and action mobilization. They do not function in these 
processes in the same way, however. In long-term consensus- and action mobi-
lization, religious symbols are directly related to the goal of fostering funda-
mental changes of value-patters and action tendencies. In short-term consen-
sus- and action mobilization, religious symbols are indirectly related to the 
goals of changing people's opinions on concrete political issues and persuading 
them to participate in collective actions. In relation to short-term consensus-
and action mobilization, religious symbols are not used as political arguments, 
but as a background of meaning, which adds plausibility to concrete political 
objectives. 
In this study of the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis in relation to peace, the focus will be on concrete peace 
actions, which church members and members of church peace movements 
perform in the here and now. This means that peace action is studied in the 
context of short-term consensus- and action mobilization. One of the questions 
which arise from the literature studied in this chapter, is whether the 
motivational function of religious symbols in relation to peace action is indeed 
an indirect one, as the churches and church peace movements seem to assume, 
or whether the relation is of a direct nature. There are good theological and 
motivation-theoretical reasons to assume that the relation is of an indirect 
nature. In the next chapter, these reasons will be unfolded in detail. The end-
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result of the second chapter will be an elaborate theoretical model of the 
indirect, motivational, effects of religious peace attitudes on peace action. In 
an empirical theological test, the empirical tenability of this model will be 
investigated. 
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2 PEACE ACTION AND RELIGION: 
A THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this chapter, a theoretical model of the relationship between peace action 
and religion will be developed. Section 2.1 gives an account of the state of 
affairs with respect to theological thinking about the motivational function of 
the Christian religion. The section focuses on the use of the concept of motiv-
ation in theological 'ethics of autonomy'. In 2.2 a psychological approach is 
taken to the concept of motivation, which is applied in section 2.3 to provide a 
theoretical model of the effects of religious attitudes regarding peace on peace 
action. For brevity's sake, the term 'religious attitudes regarding peace' will be 
abbreviated to 'religious peace attitudes'. In the subsequent four sections, parts 
of this model are elaborated in greater detail. Section 2.4 gives a concep-
tualization of peace action. Section 2.5 goes deeper into the conceptualization 
of the various components of the motivation to peace action. Section 2.6 gives 
an elaborated conceptualisation of religious peace attitudes. Section 2.7 gives a 
conceptualisation of the social location of peace action. Section 2.8 finally 
contains a number of empirical questions which can be derived from the 
conceptualisation and the theoretical model. 
The conceptualisations in sections 2.4 to 2.7 are visualised in tree-diagrams. 
The numbers in these diagrams refer to the questions in the measuring instru-
ments, included as Appendix E. Together, these references form the intended 
measuring instruments. The factual measuring instruments are extracted from 
the intended measuring instruments by scale construction, which is reported in 
chapter three. In the tree-diagrams of chapter three, the items of the factual 
measuring instruments are indicated. Items not included in the factual measur-
ing instruments are indicated in Appendix E by an asterisk. 
2.1 Motivation in theological ethics 
In Christian theological ethics, an intensive debate has been going on for sev-
eral decades about the moral function of the Christian faith in an age of ratio-
nalization and secularization. Many Catholic and Protestant moral theologians 
have come to accept, and even to affirm, the emancipation of ethics from 
religious tutelage which has taken place as a result of cultural rationalization 
and secularization, and have attempted to reformulate moral theological theory 
in the light of this development. In Roman Catholic theology, this discussion 
centred around the concept of an "ethics of autonomy in a Christian context", 
which was introduced by the German theologian Alfons Auer, in his book 
Autonome Moral und Christlicher Glaube (1971). According to Auer, the primary 
concern of ethics of autonomy is the rationality and communicability of moral 
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judgments. In the context of present modern and secularized Western culture, 
the ability of religious traditions to provide a convincing and communicable 
foundation of morality has been weakened. Their role has been complemented 
or sometimes even been taken over by rational argumentation. Theological 
ethics has to bear witness to this development. It must take the autonomy of 
human reason in moral matters as its fundamental point of departure and it 
must opt for a foundation of morality that is less dependent on the authority 
of religious tradition (Auer 1971, 11-12; for discussions of theological ethics of 
autonomy see Bockle 1984; Bondolfi 1982; Houdijk 1975). 
Although the argument of autonomy ethics has become part of the standard 
view in present Christian moral theology, some theologians contest that human 
reason can provide a solid foundation to moral norms. In Roman Catholic 
theology this school is known as "ethics of faith" ("Glaubensethik": Ratzinger 
1975; Stoeckle 1973). The ability of autonomous human reason to provide a 
foundation of moral norms is questioned by ethics of faith, mainly on the 
grounds of a pessimistic anthropology. Man is not a fully rational being. He is 
a "tragically broken creature", torn between passion and reason. Man is "homo 
absconditus", not transparent to himself and therefore not able to provide 
himself autonomously with a solid foundation of morals. In answer to the 
alleged moral incapability of autonomous human reason, ethics of faith stresses 
the heteronomous character of morals. Only in God's word, which provides an 
encompassing "understanding of human existence" (Daseinsverständnis), can 
moral norms be grounded with certainty and obligation (Stoeckle 1973, 729). 
The position of faith ethics will not be followed here, because the foundation 
of moral norms in religious revelation is rationally untenable. Rationality in 
ethics refers to the ability and preparedness to give arguments, or 'good rea-
sons', for one's moral prescriptions (Baier 1958, 85-106; Habermas 1981, 38). 
Religious arguments, such as "God's will must be done", are not good reasons 
in this sense, because they are morally meaningless. In order to contend that 
religious prescriptions are morally right, one must posses a standard of moral 
Tightness by which to judge religious prescriptions, and this standard must itself 
be independent of religious prescription. Logically, the set of religious pre-
scriptions cannot contain such a moral standard (Shaw & Barry 1989, 9-11). 
The option for a rational foundation of morality in theological ethics imme-
diately raises the problem of the function of the Christian message for moral 
thinking and acting. In ethics of autonomy this problem has been formulated 
as the question of the "proprium" of the Christian ethos: the specific and dis-
tinctive contribution of the Christian faith to ethics (Curran 1971; Fuchs 1970). 
Ethics of autonomy takes up this question by making a distinction between two 
levels of moral reasoning: the level of concrete material norms and the level of 
an all-encompassing framework of meaning (Auer 1984, 212). 
Ethics of autonomy assumes that there are no specifically Christian material 
norms (Auer 1977; Curran 1971; Fuchs 1970; Merks 1987). In a historical and 
exegetical study, Auer has shown that the moral prescriptions of both the Old 
and New Testament - including the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on 
the Mount - do not entail moral norms of which no parallels in other ancient 
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Near Eastern texts can be found (Auer 1971, 55-122). There are no specifically 
Biblical moral norms; the ethos of the Bible is a manifestation of the common 
"worldly ethos" ("Weltethos") of the ancient Near East. The same holds for the 
Christian message as it is handed down to the present day. There is no specifi-
cally Christian moral alphabet; the discovery of moral norms is a matter of 
human reason, in a social and historical context (Auer 1984, 212). The specific 
contribution of the Christian faith to morals lies in the all-encompassing 
framework of meaning which the Christian religion contributes to the disco-
very of moral norms (a) and to moral action (b). Auer stresses that the keryg-
ma should in this respect be taken in its broadest possible sense of God's cre-
ation, salvation and eschatological completion of man and the world (Auer 
1977, 42). 
(a) With respect to the discovery of moral norms, Auer descries a threefold 
function of the Christian religion vis-à-vis the worldly ethos: integration, stimu-
lation and criticism. 
In its integrating function, the Christian kerygma embodies all efforts 
towards a better human existence in the overarching new understanding of 
man as a partner of God the Creator, Redeemer and Completer of the world. 
The Christian understands the kerygma in all its dimensions as a command of 
God to behave in the right way, directed to him personally. Through the Chris-
tian integration, the limitation of morality to the narrow limits of finite inner -
worldly existence is precluded and morality is incorporated in the movement of 
the world towards its absolute future (Auer 1971, 189-192). 
The stimulating function of the Christian religion is located mainly in escha-
tology. Although eschatological hope is ultimately directed at the parousia of 
the Lord and the completion of the world which appears in this event, the 
eschatological vision elicits in the actively hoping believer an impulse of con-
tinuous reorientation in his life and in history. Faith inspires man to a belief in 
his own powers, to a realisation of human potentials, because these are possi-
bilities that are given by God in his grace, to which ultimately no limits are set. 
The Christian religion inspires to moral action, because it gives the assurance 
that man can make his life good and meaningful, in spite of the experiences of 
weakness, failure and absurdity (id., 193). 
In its critical function, Christian religion puts human aspirations before the 
trial of God's word. Even after appropriate demythologization, the Christian 
message about the meaning and goal of human existence provides a critical 
standard to human conduct. It shows that the world as it has historically devel-
oped is not yet the world as Christ has intended and wanted it to be. Christian 
religion unveils that man in all his progress remains subjected to sin, aberra-
tion and alienation. In particular, the Christian religion corrects Utopian inner-
worldly ideologies, which attempt to run ahead of the eschatological wholeness 
and completion of the world through finite human action, and which thereby 
inevitably become totalitarian and violent (id., 194-197). 
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(b) In relation to moral action, Auer contends that the function of the Chris-
tian kerygma is essentially a motivational one. The kerygma of God's creation, 
salvation and completion of the world motivates to moral action, by putting the 
Christian believer in a new context of meaning, which summons him to respon-
sible partnership with God the Creator; which radicalizes commitment to a 
humane world and to the realization of a peaceable society; and which over-
comes resignation and disappointment by placing human history in the per-
spective of its ultimate completion (Auer 1977, 45-46; cf. Fuchs 1970, 109; 
Rotter 1970). Schematically, Auer's view of the double moral function of the 
Christian religion can be presented as follows. 
Figure 2.1 Auer's model of the moral function of the Christian religion 
(derived from Auer 1971) 
As it stands, Auer's model of the moral function of the Christian religion is 
not entirely satisfactory. Auer treats the effect of religious beliefs on the dis-
covery of moral norms and on moral action as distinct processes. Through this 
distinction, the relationship between moral norms and motivation is obscured. 
On the one hand, religious beliefs provide a basis for moral norms in Auer's 
model, but it is not clear how this process relates to moral action. On the 
other hand, religious beliefs motivate to moral action, but it remains unclear 
how this motivational process is related to the discovery of moral norms. 
A solution to the problem in Auer's theory requires a model in which moral 
norms are understood to be part of motivation. The assumption that moral 
norms have a motivational function is grounded on a firm theoretical base. 
Ethical theory conceives of moral norms as 'reasons' for action (Baier 1958, 
85-106). These reasons can either refer to a desired end state (teleological 
ethics), or to a desired quality of the action itself (deontological ethics). It is 
by moral reasons that moral action is motivated. By considering moral norms 
as part of motivation, it can be understood how moral norms elicit moral 
action, and how the motivation to moral action is related to moral norms 
(Brandt 1979, 46-69). It can also be understood how the integrating, stimulat-
ing and critical functions of the Christian religion could be related to motiv-
ation. These functions specify the effects of religious attitudes on the discovery 
of moral norms, which is part of the motivational process. 
As a component of motivation, the conception of moral norms is a necess-
ary condition for moral action. There can be no moral action without the guid-
ance of moral norms. But moral norms are not a sufficient condition to moral 
action. At least two further conditions have to be met, in order that moral 
action is motivated. Firstly, there must be a perception of the situation as 
relLgioua attitude 
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morally insufficient and therefore requiring moral action. Secondly there must 
be a conviction that it is possible to change the situation in the morally desired 
direction, by undertaking action. Religious attitudes can influence these 
motivational components. They can influence the ways in which the situation is 
perceived and interpreted, and they can have an effect on the influence of the 
situation which people attribute to themselves. In the next section, the various 
components of motivation will be elaborated in greater detail, with the help of 
psychological motivation theory. 
2.2 Motivation theory 
The purpose of the study of motivation is to explain "how behaviour gets 
started, is energized, is sustained, is directed, is stopped, and what kind of 
subjective reaction is present in the organism while all this is going on" (Jones 
1955, vii). In the history of motivation theory, a development from "mechanis­
tic" to "cognitive" theories can be observed. The difference between mechanis­
tic and cognitive approaches to motivation pertains to the extent to which 
'higher' mental processes are invoked to account for the initiation, direction, 
intensity and persistence of goal-directed behaviour. Mechanistic theories in 
general conceive of motivation as the result of a direct relationship between an 
instigating stimulus and the responding behaviour. Cognitive theories break up 
the direct mechanistic relationship between the stimulus and the responding 
behaviour, by inserting one or more intervening variables, related to cognitive 
processes. In this conception, it is the intervening cognitive structure which 
directly determines action. On the "mechanism-cognition scale" of motivation 
theories, Weiner distinguishes four basic types of theories: behaviourism, neo-
behaviourism, expectancy χ value theory and extended versions of expectancy χ 
value theory. The first two are mechanistic theories, the latter two are cogni­
tive (Weiner 1972, 1-9). 
For the purpose of studying the effect of religious peace attitudes on peace 
action, use will be made of a motivation theoretical model which belongs to 
the category of extended expectancy χ value theories. The expectancy χ value 
theory of motivation has emerged as a result of several decades of motivation-
theoretical research, from the 1930s onward, in which the mechanistic views of 
behaviourism and neo-behaviourism were gradually replaced by theories which 
allowed for the assumption of cognitive factors in the motivation process. In its 
most elementary form, cognitive motivation theory conceives of motivation as 
the product of the value which the attainment of a certain goal has for an 
actor and the actor's expectancy that a certain act will lead to the attainment 
of the desired goal (Schmalt 1986, 66-74). On the basis of the expectancy χ 
value model, cognitive motivation theory has fanned out in various directions, 
in which many additional cognitive concepts were introduced as intervening 
variables, thus producing a plurality of extended expectancy χ value theories, 
covering different aspects of motivation. There are as yet not integrated in a 
commonly accepted overall theoretical framework, although partially integrat-
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ing theories have been developed (Heckhausen 1980, 619-625). 
One such partially integrating extended expectancy χ value theory of motiv­
ation is Nuttin's theory. Starting point of his theory is the interplay between 
conception and perception. In an action sequence, an actor first of all forms a 
conception: a mental image of a goal situation, which satisfies a need and 
therefore represents a value. In the conception of a goal situation, the actor 
cognitively surpasses the actual world and transports himself, with the help of 
images, symbolic representations and concepts, to a situation that exists only 
"in the mind" (Nuttin 1980, 63). In its most elementary form, the conceived 
goal is simply a desired relationship of the organism to its environment, which 
is relevant to its survival and well-being (the relationship to food, for example). 
At the human level, conception also takes on more complex forms. Man is 
motivated to construct an integral system of references which informs him 
about his place in the ontological order, and he tends to attribute a "value of 
reality" to these conceptions. The dynamism inherent in the human individual 
to enter into a relationship with his world and to develop himself in it, implies 
a tendency to conform to the ontological order. In order to do this, man con­
structs a scale of objective values, based on the proper place of each object in 
the overall picture of reality (id., 214-216). In accordance with the complexity 
of his conceptual cognitions, man is also able to integrate single goals into 
large projects of action, aiming at far-reaching objectives, which are accom­
panied with highly generalized convictions, ideologies and ideas. This provides 
an explanation for the motivational impact of moral convictions. Moral norms, 
such as the idea that "all men are equal", are the expression of encompassing 
goals; they represent a dynamism that is made concrete in a judgment which 
is, at the same time, a project of action (id., 288-291). 
Perception, in Nuttin's view, is not a passive registration of sensorial stimuli. 
On the contrary, it is an activity in which the individual creates a meaningful 
situation, through a selective focusing of his attention on those aspects of the 
environment which are relevant to his well-being and optimal functioning. 
Perception is a cognitive process, in which the processing of information about 
the environment is guided by the functional relationship of physical objects to 
the behaviour of the individual. The meaning of an object is therefore of an 
essentially practical nature: "answering the question 'what is this?', is to indi­
cate the function of the object for some form of behaviour" (id., 56). Nuttin 
stresses that perception is not only a cognitive process, but an affective process 
as well. Affections often serve as information (and are more or less cognitive 
in this respect), in as far as they are the primary guide of the individual's be­
haviour, in a world which is full of risks and dangers (id., 232). 
In the perception of the situation, the conceived goal serves as a standard 
of assessment. In a comparison of conception and perception, the actual situ­
ation is evaluated in terms of its congruence to the goal situation. If congru­
ence is established, no action will be undertaken, or only action directed at the 
continuation of the situation; if incongruence is established, action aimed at a 
change of the perceived situation in the direction of the one conceived is moti­
vated. 
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Conception and perception are interrelated processes. Not only does con-
ception guide perception, but the perception of the actual situation also has a 
bearing upon the conception of goals. The interaction between conception and 
perception, and the resulting incongruence, is also emphasized in theological 
theory, where the "negative experience of contrast" is taken as a heuristic for 
the conception of positive values and as a starting point for social commitment 
from a Christian perspective (Schillebeeckx 1975, 510; Moltmann 1975, 215). 
Conception and perception are the key elements in Nuttin's STOTE-model 
of motivation, which he has developed from the cybernetics of autoregulating 
systems (Nuttin 1980, 259). The model describes a five-step sequence of cogni-
tive and physical operations, through which a human action is motivated and 
brought to its goal. At the first step, a standard (S) is conceived by the actor. 
This standard indicates a goal-situation, which represents a value to the actor. 
Next, this standard is compared with the actual situation, as perceived by the 
actor. This comparison can be considered as a test (T), in which the conceived 
situation functions as a criterion for the evaluation of the perceived situation, 
in terms of congruence and incongruence. Tn the third step, the cognitive 
incongruence created by the application of the standard to the perceived situ-
ation elicits an operation (O), directed at the realization of the goal-situation. 
At this stage, the action is motivated both in the sense that it is orientated by 
the conceived goal and in the sense that it is dynamized by the established 
incongruence; the actor "works his way to the realization of the goal". In the 
fourth stage, the situation which has been created by the operation is again 
compared with the standard (test: T). When the initial incongruence is found 
to have disappeared, or sufficiently reduced, the action is stopped (Exit: E); if 
not, the sequence may be repeated. 
As it stands, the STOTE-model leaves one important element of human 
motivation undiscussed. This element plays a role in the transition from Test 
to Operation. For this transition it is not only necessary to establish 
incongruence between an ideal conceived situation and the actually perceived 
situation, but also to have the expectation that the situation can be controlled 
by the actor and that considered actions will effectively lead to the realization 
of the goal situation. Following Rotter and Weïner, Nuttin makes this expec-
tation dependent on the attribution of the locus of control of the situation (id., 97, 
270). 
J.B. Rotter has introduced a distinction between the internal and external 
attribution of the locus of control of a situation. He considered attributive 
judgments to be founded on highly generalized, culturally determined causal 
attributions, related to whole segments of life, which are expressed in such 
terms as 'destiny', 'luck' and the 'control of the mighty' (J.B. Rotter 1966). In 
his study of achievement motivation, Weiner extended Rotter's one-dimension-
al model of causal attribution into a two-dimensional model (table 2.1). In the 
first dimension, causes of success or failure are located as either internal or 
external; in the second dimension, causes of success or failure are interpreted 
as either stable or unstable. In the combination of both variables, four types of 
causal attribution arise: ability (internal/ stable), effort (internal/ unstable), 
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task difficulty (external/ stable) and luck (external/ unstable). 
Table 2.1 Two-dimensional classification scheme of causes of achievement 
success and failure (Weiner 1974, 107) 
stability locus of control 
Internal external 
ability task difficulty 
stable effort luck 
In a further refinement of his theory, Weiner added the dimension of 
controllability to the previous two dimensions, thus obtaining a three-dimen-
sional model of causal attribution of achievement success and failure. 
Controllability concerns "the possible volitional alteration of a cause - relatively 
controllable or uncontrollable" (Weiner 1986, 294-295). Table 2.2 presents the 
eight categories of Weiner's three-dimensional model of causes of achievement 
success and failure, including, in the second column, illustrative examples of 
causes of failure at a school test, formulated by Weiner himself. In parenth-
eses, the location of the four categories of Weiner's original two-dimensional 
model are indicated. 
Table 2.2 Three-dimensional classification scheme of causes of achievement 
success and failure (Weiner 1986, 294) 
dimension classification examples of 
of causes of achievement causes of 
success and failure failure 
internal-stable-uncontrollable low aptitude (ability) 
Internal-stable-controllable never studies 
internal-unstable-uncontrollable sick on the day of the test 
internal-unstable-controllable did not study for this test (effort) 
external-stable-uncontrollable harsh requirements (task difficulty) 
external-stable-controllable instructor is biased 
external-unstable-uncontrollable bad luck (luck) 
external-unstable-controllable friends failed to help 
The new dimension of controllability in Weiner's enlarged attribution model 
refines the original internal/ external distinction. 'Internal' and 'external' are 
short for 'internal locus of control' and 'external locus of control'. These two 
loci of control are now split up into four subcategories: the controllable within 
and outside, and the uncontrollable within and outside. It is interesting to 
observe that the original two-dimensional model was biased towards the uncon-
trollable. Only effort is a controllable cause of success and failure; ability, task-
difficulty and luck are all uncontrollable. In the new model, this bias has been 
corrected. 
If a motivational tendency has been elicited by the interplay of conception 
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and perception, it is likely that this tendency will be increased by an attribution 
of the locus of control of the situation to controllable factors, such as the per­
sonal effort directed towards the goal, or the help of friends. The motivational 
tendency will be decreased by the attribution of the locus of control to uncon­
trollable factors, like low aptitude or the difficulty of the task. Thus it is the 
assessment of the controllability of a problem which sets the outcome of the 
attribution component of motivation. 
Figure 2.2 shows the resulting model of motivation, based on Nuttin's the­
ory. The model couples attribution to conception and perception, and con­
siders all three as directly influencing action. 




Nuttin's cognitive theory of motivation will be used in this study as the basis of 
a theoretical model of the effect of religious peace attitudes on peace action. 
There are three reasons why Nuttin's model is preferred over other theories of 
motivation in this respect. The first reason concerns the preference of the 
cognitive expectancy χ value model of motivation over (neo)behaviouristic mo­
dels. Expectancy χ value theory is preferred over these theories here, because 
of its cognitive approach. Only cognitive theories are able to give adequate 
explanations of motivation processes at the human level. Behaviouristic 
models, rejecting intervening cognitive concepts, proved to be applicable large­
ly only to motivational processes at the subhuman level, and even there they 
have in part been replaced by cognitive models (Schmalt 1986, 74-83). Peace 
action is clearly a form of behaviour that only human beings engage in. 
Because cognitive models explain human motivation most successfully, one 
may conclude that they will also provide the best explanation of motivation to 
peace action. 
The second reason why Nuttin's motivational model is preferred here con­
cerns its extension of the simple expectancy χ value scheme. The decision to 
engage in peace actions is dependent on several variables, related to the men­
tal representation of action goals (conception), the assessment of the situation 
(perception) and one's influence on it (attribution). An adequate 
conceptualisation of these variables can only be worked out in an extended 
expectancy-value model, in which the effects of several variables can be combi­
ned. 
The third reason why Nuttin's model is opted for pertains to its relatively 
simple structure, in comparison with other extended expectancy χ value the­
ories (cf. Heckhausen 1980, 619-622). This makes it specially suitable for the 
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explorative investigation of the motivational effect of religious hermeneutical-
communicative praxis, which is undertaken here. Empirical-theologically, this 
effect is still largely terra incognita. Approaching it with a detailed theoretical 
model would presuppose an equally detailed framework of theological hypoth-
eses about its nature, which is simply not available at the present level of em-
pirical-theological knowledge about the motivational effects of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis. 
2.3 Motivational effects of religious peace attitudes on peace action 
Peace action is here conceived of as a form of intentional and goal-directed 
behaviour, which is started, sustained and directed by motivational processes. 
Applying Nuttin's motivation model to peace action, it is assumed that the 
motivation to peace action is determined by the three factors of conception, 
perception and attribution. In the context of motivation to peace action, con-
ception pertains to the mental construction of peace goals, to which peace 
actions are directed. This conception is of a moral nature: it refers to values 
and moral norms, which entail a reason for action. Perception relates to the 
actual situation of war and armament in the world, which, through a compari-
son with the conceived peace goals, elicits a 'negative experience of contrast', 
which incites to action. Attribution relates to the actor's assessment of his 
influence on processes of war and armament in the world. The more the 
causes of war and armament in the world are considered as falling within the 
range of the actor's control, the more likely it is that peace actions will be 
engaged in. 
A fundamental hypothesis of this study is that religious peace attitudes have 
a motivational effect on peace action. Religious peace attitudes have an 
indirect effect on peace action via the motivational components of conception, 
perception and attribution. 
In relation to conception, the Christian religion incorporates the goal of 
peace in the overarching understanding of man as a partner in God's creation, 
redemption and completion of the world. Religious peace attitudes attach to 
the goal of peace the urgency of a divine command and the impetus of escha-
tological imagination. The Christian tradition is a "tradition of eschatological 
hope" (Moltmann 1964). Peace is one of the essential characteristics of the 
Christian concept of God's kingdom. Although God's eschatological peace is 
not identical to the peace of the world, but transcends it in all dimensions 
(Pannenberg 1977), the eschatological vision of peace is an inexhaustible 
source of inspiration to the conception of goals of peace for the world (cf. 
Auer 1971, 189-192). 
In relation to perception, which is dialectically linked to conception, the 
Christian religion entails a critical distance from actual situations of war and 
peace in the world. It holds that the world as it has historically developed is 
not yet the world as Christ intended it to be. Christian religion submits the 
wars and armament of the world to the trial of God's word. It maintains that 
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man in his political, social and economic activity remains subjected to sin and 
to the violation of God's command (cf. id., 194). 
In relation to attribution, the Christian religion fosters the belief that the 
inner-worldly evils of war and armament will come to an end. It does so mainly 
through the concept of eschatological hope. Christian hope is directed to the 
"parousia" of the Lord and the completion of peace in this eschatological 
event. The vision of the ultimate gift of peace elicits in the actively hoping 
believer an impulse of continuous effort for peace in personal life and in the 
world. Faith inspires a trust in the personal ability to promote peace; it stimu-
lates the realisation of human peace potentials, as these are possibilities given 
by God's grace, to which no limits are set. The Christian religion inspires 
peace action, in spite of human weakness, failure and absurdity (cf. id., 193). 
Figure 2.3 presents a model of the motivational effects of religious peace 
attitudes on peace action. It must be noted that the religious concepts are 
themselves not considered as motivational factors, but as factors which exert 
influence on the motivation process. Being religious is not the same as being 
motivated; the two attitudes must not be confused. Nonetheless, religion can 
have an impact on motivation. 
Figure 2.3 Theoretical model of the motivational effects of religious peace 
attitudes on peace action 
effect of religion 
on motivation: 
integration, motivation to 








Comparing figure 2.3 and figure 2.1, one can see in which way this model not 
only fits in with, but also corrects and completes Auer's model of the moral 
function of religion. The following three points will make this clear. 
In commenting on Auer's model, in section 2.1, it has been contended, 
firstly, that Auer failed to account for the relationship between moral norms 
and moral action on the one hand, and between motivation and moral norms 
on the other. In the new model these relationships are established, by con-
sidering conceptions of peace as one of the components of motivation. There-
by, the 'conceptions of peace' are understood as a specification of the 'moral 
norms' in figure 2.1, and 'peace action' as a specification of 'moral action'. 
Secondly, Auer's distinction between the functions of integration, stimula-








other has been abandoned in the new model. The first three functions are 
specified as aspects of the motivational function of religion, relating integration 
to the conception-component of motivation, criticism to the component of 
perception and stimulation to the component of attribution. 
Thirdly, the new model avoids establishing a direct motivational relationship 
between religious peace attitudes and peace action. Auer's model would seem 
to imply such a direct relationship, which, however, is untenable in the light of 
modern theological insights, as well as in the light of the main strain of Auer's 
thought. In the debate about political theology, many theologians share the 
view that political decisions cannot directly be inferred from the content of the 
Christian faith. Schillebeeckx states that the Christian faith, with its inherently 
prophetical-critical orientation, serves as a source of inspiration for political 
action and also gives a certain orientation to politics, particularly by excluding 
certain political options. But the Christian faith does not yield a concrete pol-
itical action programme. Such a programme can only be derived form negative 
experiences of contrast and from social analysis, which provide a historical 
mediation between faith and political action (Schillebeeckx 1977, 718-728). 
Schillebeeckx' conclusion that the impact of the Christian faith on politics is 
always indirect supports the thesis that there exists no direct motivational 
relationship between religious peace attitudes and peace action. This thesis is 
also in line with Auer's main line of thought. Auer makes a distinction, already 
mentioned above, between two levels of moral reasoning: the level of concrete 
moral norms and the level of an all encompassing framework of meaning. 
Auer's contention that the contribution of the Christian faith to moral reason-
ing is to be located solely on the second level, supports the thesis that there is 
no direct motivational link between religious concepts and peace action. 
In the model of figure 2.3, peace action is the dependent variable: the vari-
able which is influenced by all other variables in the model, without influencing 
any of these variables itself. Religious peace attitudes constitute the indepen-
dent variable: the variable which influences all other variables of the model, 
without itself being influenced by any of these other variables. Conception, 
perception and attribution are intervening variables: variables through the 
intervention of which peace action is influenced indirectly by religious peace 
attitudes. Because the intervening variables represent motivation theoretical 
concepts, the indirect relationship between religious peace attitudes and peace 
action is understood in the model as a motivational one. 
There is a fundamental theological presumption underlying the decision to 
consider religious peace attitudes as independent variables in an explanatory 
model of peace action. The decision implies the presumption that religion does 
have an effect on moral action; more precisely, that there is a specifically 
Christian framework for moral reasoning. 
This contention has been subjected to severe criticism, since the appearance 
of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. To Kant, the only phenom-
enon to which moral categories can properly be applied is the human will. The 
moral goodness of the will is determined by the agreement of action maxims 
with the apriori categorical imperative: "act only in such a manner that the 
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maxim of your action could be transformed into a universal law" (Kant 1786). 
Religious prescriptions, like any other, are morally acceptable only insofar as 
they pass the moral test of the categorical imperative. Hence, religious pre-
scription cannot provide an independent foundation of morality. Theological 
ethics of autonomy has accepted this thesis on the basis of Kant's ethics, in its 
denial that there are specifically Christian moral norms (Auer 1984, 160-163; 
Schillebeeckx 1977, 718-728). 
It is not the purpose of this study to take a stand against Kant's moral phil-
osophy, or against theological ethics of autonomy. It does not deny that the 
morality of action must be judged by the criteria of universalisability, reciproc-
ity and impartiality, which form the rational basis of the "moral point of view" 
(Baier 1958). What it does deny however, is that morality is exclusively based 
on purely formal arguments. Moral reasoning involves fundamental insights 
with regard to the content of a good life and with regard to virtues and values, 
which no formal deduction can provide (Maclntyre 1984; Williams 1985). 
In this respect Hegel's critique of Kant's moral philosophy is particularly 
revealing. Kant illustrates the working of the categorical imperative by the 
example of the immorality of stealing. Stealing is immoral because it is not 
universalisable. If it were, the thief would have to accept that others steal his 
possessions as well, which he will not accept. Hegel's elucidating critique of 
this Kantian argument is that it would be adequate if there should be possession. 
But the proof of that lies outside the range of the categorical imperative 
(Hegel 1802/1803). To Hegel, moral reflection cannot be executed outside the 
context of a concrete historical ethos, which preestablishes a universe of moral 
values (Hegel 1821). 
It is in the Hegelian tradition that the idea of a Christian framework for 
morality is defended here. The Christian religion provides a concrete historical 
view of the good life, the good man and the good world. These values establish 
a framework of meaning which gives concrete moral guidance to the formal 
moral criteria of universalisability, reciprocity and impartiality. The Christian 
religion provides a framework of reference for the discovery of moral norms. 
This is the central thesis of theological ethics of autonomy, which is affirmed 
here. It implies that there is a specifically Christian framework for the motiv-
ation to peace action. It does not imply that there can be a direct deduction of 
peace action from the Christian kerygma. The relation between the Christian 
kerygma and peace action is mediated by autonomous human reason, in a 
motivational process. 
In the following three sections, the different parts of the model of the 
motivational effects of religious peace attitudes on peace action (figure 2.3) 
will be discussed, following the model from the right to the left. 
2.4 Peace action 
In this section, the concept of peace action will be analyzed theoretically. 
Peace action will be considered as a form of communicative action. First the 
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concept of communicative action will be defined (2.4.1). Next, it will be indi-
cated in which way peace action can be understood as a form of communica-
tive action (2.4.2). 
2.4.1 Communicative action 
Action is intentional, goal-directed behaviour. Max Weber, one of the founders 
of the action theoretical direction of sociology, gave the following definition of 
action (Handeln): "We shall speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour - be it overt or covert, omission 
of acquiescence". The concept of meaning refers to the attitudes and intentions 
of the actor. As meaningful behaviour, action has a teleological structure, 
aimed at the realisation of goals. According to Weber, "action is 'social' insofar 
as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is there-
by oriented in its course" (Weber 1968, 4). 
In his interpretation of Weber, Habermas distinguishes two forms of social 
action: strategic action and communicative action. Strategic action is oriented 
towards success, considered from the aspect of following rules of rational 
choice and the degree of efficacy in influencing the decisions of rational oppo-
nents. Communicative action is oriented towards achieving agreement, based 
on the recognition of validity claims. Communicative agreement cannot be 
strategically imposed by any side. "The communicative action of one party suc-
ceeds only if the other accepts it in a specific way, if he takes a 'yes' or 'no' 
position (however implicitly) to a validity claim which can in principle be criti-
cized" (Habermas 1979, 195-196). The aim of communicative action is to reach 
agreement about a common world definition, which can be divided into three 
dimensions. Firstly the definition of the external world, as the totality of exist-
ing states of affairs. The communication regarding the external world proceeds 
through utterances which make a claim to truth. Secondly the definition of the 
social world, as the totality of normatively regulated interpersonal relations, 
which count as legitimate. The communication about the social world proceeds 
through utterances which make a claim to Tightness. Thirdly the definition of 
the actor's inner world, as the totality of his internal experiences, to which he 
has a privileged access. The communication about the inner world proceeds 
through expressive self-representations, which make a claim to truthfulness. 
Although linguistic utterances are essential to communicative action, not 
every social relationship that is established with linguistic means is an instance 
of communicative action. "By means of linguistic utterances, ego can bring alter 
to a desired behaviour and instrumentalize him for his own success. Again this 
does not mean that communicative actors may not also be oriented subjectively 
each to his own success; but in the framework of communicative action, they 
can attain a sought after goal only through successfully arriving at an under-
standing; reaching understanding is decisive for the coordination of their 
actions" (id., 196). It follows from the conceptual distinction between communi-
cative and strategic action that strategic action is not oriented to achieving a 
common definition of the world in its external, social and inner dimension. 
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In terms of its deficiency regarding communicative agreement, strategic 
action can be divided into openly and covertly strategic action. In openly stra­
tegic action, "claims to subjective truthfulness and normative Tightness are 
suspended. The truth of statements plays a role in the private action orienta­
tions of the individual participants, but it is just as little constitutive of the 
social relationship between them as are the other two validity claims" (ibid.). 
Covertly strategic action can take the form of either conscious or unconscious 
deception. In conscious deception, or manipulation, one of the participants 
behaves strategically, but deceives others regarding his non-fulfilment of the 
presuppositions of communicative action. In unconscious deception, or system­
atically distorted communication, at least one of the participants deceives him­
self concerning his own strategic acting and only sustains the illusion of com­
municative action (ibid.; Habermas 1981, 445). Schematically, Habermas' 
conceptualisation of types of social action is presented in figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 Types of social action (from Habermas 1979, 196) 
Social action 










2.4.2 Peace action as a form of communicative action 
Peace, defined as the process of the prevention of war and the promotion of 
social justice, is fundamentally a social concept. It refers to actions of people 
and the ways in which these actions can be influenced. Peace action (action 
aimed at the promotion of peace) is oriented in its subjective meaning towards 
the action of others and is, therefore, a form of social action. The aim of 
peace action is to intervene in social relations in such a way that the personal 
and structural violence in these relations decreases. Peace action can be either 
communicative or strategic. 
In communicative peace action, social interaction takes place through the 
exchange of validity claims, concerning the objective, social and inner world. 
The goal is to achieve a common definition of peace issues, based on common 
conviction (cf. Habermas 1979, 195). The communicative means by which this 






action- and consensus mobilization which have been specified as the 
instrumental peace goals of the churches and church peace movements 
(section 1.2). In long-term consensus- and action mobilization, people are 
convinced of the necessity of deep changes in their value patterns and action 
tendencies in relation to peace. In short-term consensus- and action 
mobilization, people are convinced of concrete political viewpoints and of the 
need to participate in collective actions to promote them. Hence, the churches' 
and church peace movements' instrumental peace goals of consensus- and 
action mobilization can be characterized as forms of communicative peace 
action. 
This does not mean, however, that churches and church peace movements 
may not also be openly oriented towards strategic successes in their consensus-
and action mobilization. In particular the short-term consensus- and action 
mobilization of the peace movements is often aimed at the goal of putting 
pressure on the government to make a desired political decision. In as far as 
coercion replaces persuasion in these actions, they are openly strategic rather 
than communicative. An openly strategic approach of the churches towards 
political decision-makers would, however, seriously affect the relationship 
between church and politics in the Netherlands, which is based on cooperation 
and deliberation, rather than on coercive forms of interaction. The Churches 
in the Netherlands have always carefully avoided engaging in openly strategic 
peace actions. The church peace movements have been more tempted to turn 
to peace actions which have openly strategic characteristics. In the last few 
decades, small radical peace groups and anti-militarist groups have sometimes 
taken resort to acts of civil disobedience against armament, such as blockades 
of military bases. Civil disobedience acts are partly communicative, partly 
strategic. They aim at eliciting public discussion, but also at putting pressure 
on decision-makers. When the deployment of cruise missiles seemed inevitable, 
in 1984 and 1985, groups within IKV argued for civil disobedience. After 
internal discussion IKV decided against it, however, one of the reasons being 
that it did not want to disrupt existing relationships with the political decision-
centre (see section 2.6.5 for a more extensive discussion of this matter). 
Historically, openly strategic action has been a borderline case of church peace 
action. 
Occasionally in the past, a church peace movement was accused of 
consciously deceiving people in order to attain its peace goals. An attempt to 
promote peace by consciously deceiving people would be a form of covertly 
strategic peace action. This could be done, among other things, by dispersing 
false information about peace issues, or by manipulating people's emotions 
about peace issues. IKV's strategy of short-term consensus- and action 
mobilization against nuclear weapons was sometimes accused of being 
consciously deceptive in the latter sense. ICTO, among others, accused IKV of 
manipulating people's fears of nuclear weapons, thus instrumentalizing people 
for its strategic actions against nuclear deterrence. Although on several 
occasions IKV did express emotions of fear and shame about nuclear weapons 
and appealed to these emotions among the public, it is questionable whether 
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this should be interpreted as covertly strategic action. The expression of fear 
about nuclear weapons can function in communicative action, both as a com-
munication of the perception of threat in the external world, and as an 
expressive self-representation in relation to the speaker's internal world. Only 
if IKV-spokesmen did not really fear nuclear weapons but just feigned to do 
so, would their social action have been manipulative. But there are no indica-
tions which support such a strong accusation. Another issue is whether IKV 
was right to fear nuclear weapons. But even if its fear had been unjustified, 
this would not have made its expression of fear a manipulative act; it would 
have made it a communicative act, based on an invalid claim to truth. 
It can be concluded from these considerations that peace actions in the 
context of churches and church peace movements have been fundamentally of 
a communicative nature. Strategic peace action has only been marginal in the 
peace policy of churches and church peace movements. On the grounds of this 
conclusion, this research will focus on communicative peace action, leaving the 
marginal case of strategic peace action aside. 
Church peace movements play an important role in the peace praxis of the 
churches. Churches delegate part of their communicative peace action to the 
church peace movements, which have originated from within the churches, and 
which sometimes, as in the case of the IKV, are financially supported by the 
churches. For church members who want to make a contribution to peace in 
the context of church peace actions, the membership of a church peace move-
ment is therefore a logical step. Membership of a church peace movement is 
herewith an essential aspect of peace action in a church setting. 
Figure 2.5 Conceptual model of peace action 
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Peace actions in the context of the churches' and church peace movements' 
consensus- and action mobilization are communicative peace actions, in the 
sense that achieving communicative agreement about peace issues is the direct 
or indirect goal of these actions. From an organizational point of view, com-
municative peace actions can be divided into organizational and participatory 
peace actions. In the context of the church peace movement, the former per-
tain among other things to the organization of the annual Peace Week and the 
organization of peace days and peace markets, but also to odd jobs like sprea-
ding pamphlets or putting up posters. The latter pertain among other things to 
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attending religious services for peace, participating in discussion meetings 
about peace issues and visiting a peace day or a peace market. The degree to 
which someone can be counted as "peace-active" depends on the degree to 
which someone has accomplished these actions, as well as on the intensity of 
the involvement in them. Organizational actions require more time and energy, 
and therefore testify to a higher level of peace activity than participation in 
actions which have been organized by others. In figure 2.5, the conceptual 
model of peace action is represented schematically. 
2.5 Conceptual model of motivation to peace action 
To analyze peace action from a motivation theoretical perspective, the three 
components of the motivational system - conception, perception and attribu-
tion - need to be specified in relation to the problem of war and peace. Con-
ceptions of peace will be treated in section 2.5.1, perceptions of armament in 2.5.2 
and attributions regarding armament in 2.5.3. Because the peace goals of the 
churches and church peace movements have, in the period studied in this 
research, in particular been directed to the problem of armament and disarma-
ment, the three components of the motivation to peace action will be 
described here with particular reference to this problem. 
2.5.1 Conceptions of peace 
From a motivational point of view, conceptions can be understood as the 
mental images of a goal situation, which satisfy a need and therefore represent 
a value (cf. section 2.2). Applied to the motivation to peace action, conception 
is understood here as the whole of specific peace goals, as described in section 
1.1: goals pertaining to the promotion of social justice (positive peace) and to 
the prevention of war (negative peace). Because the Dutch churches and 
church peace movement have focused their specific peace goals in particular 
on problems of nuclear armament and disarmament - an aspect of negative 
peace -, these problems will take a central place in the analysis of the concep-
tions of peace. Regarding nuclear deterrence, a distinction is made between 
ideas about the functionality of nuclear deterrence (a), about the way nuclear 
disarmament should be pursued (b), and about the affiliation of the Nether-
lands to NATO, as the institutional context in which the nuclear deterrence 
policy of the Netherlands is imbedded (c). Positive peace will be treated in the 
form of two conceptions in the realm of international relations: development 
aid and civil contacts with Eastern Europe (d). 
(a) Functionality of nuclear deterrence 
The functionality of deterrence is understood here as the degree to which 
nuclear deterrence can contribute to the promotion of stability and security. 
The survey of standpoints of nuclear deterrence in section 1.1.3 showed that 
the ideas among churches and church peace movements were much divided. 
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Although all agreed that one should look for better ways to promote stability 
and security than through nuclear weapons, there was no consensus about the 
functionality of nuclear deterrence in the short term. On the one hand, the 
opinion was held that nuclear weapons are indispensable for the time being, to 
guarantee stability and security, failing an effective international juridical 
order. This was the position of the Vatican, through pope John Paul II, and of 
ICTO. The position was shared by several scholars, who argued that a situ-
ation of 'mutually assured destruction' between nuclear armed antagonists 
leads to a situation of 'mutually assured self-control' (Van Benthem van den 
Bergh & Tromp 1983; Kaiser et al. 1982). In contrast, others contended that 
the modern technical and strategic development of nuclear deterrence towards 
'war-fighting' doctrines, has reduced the stability of deterrence and hence has 
increased the chance of nuclear war. They argued that it is probable that 
weapons which can be used earlier in a war-situation also will be used earlier. 
Also, nuclear weapons with a war-fighting capability increase mutual percep-
tions of threat between parties possessing these weapons. Nuclear deterrence 
is not functional for peace; peace can only be promoted by abolishing these 
weapons. This was the standpoint of the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed 
Church, of IKV and Pax Christi. Scientifically, this viewpoint is supported 
among others by T.S. Schelling's thesis that clear demarcations between levels 
of violence serve the process of tacit bargaining between belligerent parties 
about the limits of the escalation of violence. Differentiation of nuclear 
arsenals makes it more difficult to set limits to escalation when deterrence fails 
(Schelling 1966). 
Because of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the 
subsequent disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the 
conviction that nuclear deterrence must be maintained as a means to secure 
stability has waned in the consciousness of many. But despite a series of far-
reaching disarmament treaties and disarmament proposals, political and 
military leaders both in the West and in the former Soviet Union are still 
convinced that nuclear weapons remain necessary as an ultimate deterrent. 
The belief that nuclear weapons are needed for their peace keeping role in 
international politics is less prominent, but has by no means vanished from the 
minds of political and military leaders (NATO 1989a; 1991). 
In this study, the attitudes of people on the functionality of nuclear 
deterrence have been analyzed by asking them whether they are convinced of 
the importance of nuclear weapons for Western security, or whether they are 
proponents of the abolition of nuclear weapons by the West. 
(b) Approaches to nuclear disarmament 
Opinions among Dutch churches and church peace movements also differed 
with regard to the way in which nuclear disarmament should be pursued. In 
section 1.1.3, a distinction has been made between the positions of gradual 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, which states that the Netherlands (or NATO) 
should make a first step to the road towards nuclear disarmament, and gradual 
bilateral nuclear disarmament, which states that nuclear disarmament can only 
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be pursued through bilateral disarmament negotiations. Gradual unilateralism 
was defended by the organizations which reject nuclear deterrence uncondi-
tionally: the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church, IKV and Pax Christi. 
Gradual bilateralism was defended by the organizations which accept nuclear 
deterrence conditionally: the Roman Catholic Church and ICTO. In the 
empirical research, attitudes regarding nuclear disarmament have been 
analyzed on the basis of the distinction between gradual unilateralism and 
gradual bilateralism. 
(e) Nato affiliation 
Nuclear weapons play a role in the strategy of nuclear deterrence, which was 
(and still is) put into effect by the Netherlands, together with other countries, 
in the context of NATO. Because NATO forms the overall institutional context 
in which Netherlands-based nuclear weapons function, conceptions regarding 
the NATO-affiliation of the Netherlands are an important aspect of the 
conceptions regarding nuclear weapons. With respect to the NATO-affiliation 
of the Netherlands, a short-term and a long-term goal can be distinguished. 
In the short term, the conformity of the Netherlands within NATO has been a 
recurrent subject of political discussion in the Netherlands. Leftist parties 
regularly urged a critical position of the Netherlands towards NATO. In this 
they were supported by the IKV (IKV 1972, 20; 1981b, 15). In the past, this 
critical attitude manifested itself among other things in resistance to the 
deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch territory. Right-wing political parties, 
supported by ICTO, advocated a loyal attitude of the Netherlands vis-à-vis 
NATO, arguing that unanimity of the allies is the basis of the Atlantic Allian-
ce's credibility and effectiveness. The acceptance of the deployment of cruise 
missiles was motivated not least by the felt need to manifest the unity of 
NATO. 
As a goal in the long term, the NATO membership of the Netherlands is a 
point of discussion, although this discussion has always been marginal in Dutch 
politics. Regularly held opinion polls show that a stable large majority of the 
Dutch population is in favour of NATO membership. Retreat from NATO in 
the long term has been urged by smaller leftist parties. IKV and Pax Christi, 
notwithstanding their criticism of NATO decisions, have never formulated 
retreat of the Netherlands from NATO as a goal. ICTO has always shown 
itself a full supporter of the Dutch membership of NATO (ICTO 1983b, 32; 
1984). 
Basing himself on a survey of 1986, Wecke has shown that the attitude 
towards NATO-membership of the Netherlands was explained most strongly by 
the attitude towards NATO (the approval of NATO in terms of its contribu-
tion to the defence of the Netherlands and to the maintenance of peace and 
security in Europe). The attitude towards NATO predicted the attitude 
towards NATO-membership of the Netherlands more strongly than did the 
enemy image of the Soviet Union or the United States, the political left-right 
self rating and the attitude towards pacifism (Wecke 1987, 182, 246). Wecke 
did not measure attitude towards conformity of the Netherlands within NATO, 
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and its relationship to attitude towards NATO-membership, however. In this 
respect, our research can be considered as an addition to Wecke's. 
Figure 2.6 Conceptual model of conceptions of peace 
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(d) International cooperation for peace 
The problem of nuclear deterrence is predominantly related to 'negative 
peace'. The churches and church peace movements, in spite of their intensive 
occupation with the issue of nuclear deterrence, have always taken the position 
that 'positive peace' should be the ultimate goal of all peace efforts. An 
overview of positive peace goals has been presented in section 1.1. In order to 
situate the conceptions regarding nuclear deterrence in a wider context, two 
positive peace goals will be brought to the fore here, namely the promotion of 
development aid, as a precondition to the decrease of violence in the world, and 
the promotion of civil contacts with Eastern Europe, as a contribution to detente 
in Europe. 
There are indications of a relationship between attitudes regarding nuclear 
deterrence on the one side and attitudes regarding development aid and civil 
East-West contacts on the other side. Following pope Paul VTs statement that 
"development is the new name for peace", Pax Christi stressed the importance 
of development in the perspective of peace. IKV emphasised the importance 
of civil East-West contacts for European detente. Pax Christ and IKV were 
both highly critical of nuclear deterrence strategies. ICTO, on the other hand, 
payed only little attention to the significance of development aid and civil 
East-West contacts for peace. ICTO also has a much more positive attitude 
towards nuclear deterrence. It seems, therefore, that an increasingly negative 
attitude towards nuclear deterrence is correlated with an increasingly positive 
79 
attitude towards development aid and East-West contacts, as ways to promote 
peace. 
The total picture of conceptions of peace is represented schematically in 
figure 2.6. 
2.5.2 Perceptions of armament 
In this research, perception pertains to the observation and interpretation of 
the armament situation in the world. In section 2.2 it was stated that percep-
tion is a selective focusing of the attention on those aspects of the environ-
ment which are relevant to the well-being and functioning of the individual. 
The well-being and functioning of the individual which are at stake in the 
situation of armament relate to the individual's security. The perception of the 
armament situation from the perspective of the individual's security will be 
referred to here as the individual's concern about armament. Concern about 
armament was measured by simply asking people to which degree they 
consider themselves concerned about armament. In addition, they were asked 
whether they consider themselves to be more concerned than others. This will 
be referred to as comparative concern about armament. 
On the basis of Nuttin's motivation theory, a distinction has been made in 
2.2 between the cognitive and affective sides of perception, which however are 
narrowly related. Following this distinction, the cognitive and affective dimen-
sions of (comparative) concern about armament will be analyzed separately. 
The affective dimension of the concern about armament has to do with the 
emotions related to the perception of a situation as hazardous and dangerous 
(Nuttin 1980, 232). This is of great importance for the analysis of the percep-
tion of armament, since armament is perceived by many people as a particular-
ly hazardous and dangerous affaire. The affect related to the perception of risk 
and danger will be referred to as the worry about armament. People's worry 
about armament is measured by asking them whether they consider themselves 
worried about armament. In addition, the comparative worry about armament is 
measured, by asking whether one considers oneself as more worried about 
armament than others. 
The perception of armament is not purely affective but also has a cognitive 
component. Cognitively, the perception of armament pertains to the importance 
which is attached to arms problems. In comparative terms, the importance of 
arms problems can be analyzed by asking about the comparative interest in 
arms issues: the taxation of one's own interest, in comparison with others. 
The distinction between cognition and affect within the perception of 
armament has in the past been the subject of discussion in the context of 
peace education by the peace movement. Particularly in the beginning of the 
1980s, fear of nuclear weapons made up a substantial part of the cultural 
climate in the Netherlands, which was then sometimes characterized as "doom 
thinking". IKV gave expression to emotions of fear and shame about nuclear 
weapons in several of its publications. This triggered the response from ICTO 
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that in that way an objective forming of opinion was abandoned in favour of 
playing on emotions. Instead, ICTO propagated a cognitively oriented peace 
education, which it termed "orientation on war and peace" (ICTO 1984a). 
Finally, the relative importance of the armament problem must be added to 
the conceptualization of the perception of armament. This pertains to the 
question whether people consider the problem of armament as the most 
important problem in the world, or whether they think it less serious than 
other problems. The total conceptual model of perceptions of armament is 
schematically indicated in figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7 Conceptual model of perceptions of armament 
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2.5.3 Attributions regarding armament 
With regard to the armament problem, attribution pertains to the whole of an 
actor's expectations about his ability to influence the armament situation in the 
world. In section 2.2, Weiner's three-dimensional attribution model, in which 
eight combinations of three attribution factors are distinguished, has been 
described. Not all of these eight combinations are relevant to the attribution 
problem with respect to armament. Weiner developed his classification of 
attribution factors especially with the help of experimental research about the 
attribution of causes of success and failure in the solution of short-lived 
problems in an experimental setting, like the solving of block design tasks 
(Weiner 1974; 1974a). Some unstable attribution factors, such as luck and 
effort, appear to be relevant in the attribution of success and failure with 
regard to short-lived problems. Sometimes you make an extra effort and 
sometimes you are lucky, and this can influence your performance in relation 
to a short-lived problem. The problem of armament, however, is a long-lived 
problem for those who want to do something about it. One cannot continuous-
ly make an extra effort and one cannot always be lucky. With regard to the 
armament problem, the internal-unstable-controllable factor (effort) and the 
external-unstable-uncontrollable factor (luck) are not relevant. 
Narrowly related to the internal-unstable-controllable attribution factor of 
effort is a factor which equally does not seem to be relevant to the attribution 
problem with respect to the armament problem: the internal-jraWe-controlIable 
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factor. This factor refers to a cause of success or failure which could be 
described as "habitual effort". This is another attribution factor which can only 
be meaningfully applied to short-lived problems. Weiner gives the example of 
the habitual effort of never studying, as a (subjectively) perceived cause of 
failing a school test. However, with long-lived problems, such as the armament 
problem, it is possible to change one's habitual effort. People can be converted 
from an attitude of uninterestedness towards the arms problem to an attitude 
of commitment. The strategy of action-mobilization of the peace movements 
against nuclear weapons in the early 1980s aimed at precisely this goal. And 
not unsuccessfully, for a substantial part of the demonstrators in the big 1981 
and 1983 rally's were debutants on the scene of collective action against 
nuclear weapons (63% and 35% respectively: Schennink a.o. 1982, 16; Kruis-
raketten ongewenst, 91). In spite of their habit never to demonstrate against 
nuclear weapons, the debutants appeared to be convinced of the possibility and 
the need of exerting influence on armament through a demonstration. In other 
words: the controllability of the armament problem is not perceived as affected 
by the internal-stable-controllable factor. Therefore, this factor can be disre-
garded here. 
Narrowly related to the external-unstable-uncontrollable factor of luck is the 
internal-unstable-uncontrollable factor, which refers to causes of success and 
failure like occasional illness (Weiner's example). It is questionable whether it 
is really possible to draw a sharp distinction between external and internal 
unstable-uncontrollable factors, as Weiner does. The validity of the distinction 
depends on the possibility of a sharp demarcation of the 'inner' self vis-à-vis 
the 'outside' world, a delicate philosophical and psychological problem, which 
Weiner does not discuss. In dualistic anthropologies, such as Plato's or Descar-
tes', the physical aspect of man does not belong to the self, which is only the 
intellectual soul. In this dualistic view, an occasional illness would be an 
external-unstable-uncontrollable factor. In monistic anthropologies, such as 
Heidegger's or Merleau Ponty's, the physical nature of man is seen as an 
essential aspect of the self. From the monistic viewpoint, illness would be and 
internal-unstable-uncontrollable attribution factor. As (long as) it is unclear 
how internal- and external-unstable-uncontrollable attribution factors can be 
sharply distinguished, it seems wisest not to push the distinction too far. Like 
the external-unstable-uncontrollable factor of luck, internal-unstable-uncontrol-
lable factors are not relevant to the attribution problem with respect to 
armament and disarmament. The effects of unstable-uncontrollable factors are 
mitigated in the long run, irrespective of whether they are rooted externally or 
internally. 
The remaining attribution factors which are relevant to the armament 
problem are: (a) internal-stable-uncontrollable factors; (b) external-unstable-
controllable factors; (c) external-stable-uncontrollable factors and (d) external-
stable-controllable factors. The question is which effect these factors have on 
the (subjective) influence of an actor on the armament in the world. 
(a) The internal-stable-uncontrollable attribution factor with respect to the 
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armament problem concerns the ability of the individual to exert influence on 
the processes of armament and disarmament in the world. Individuality is 
taken in a radical sense here: the factor pertains to the ability which the 
individual attributes to himself, irrespective of the possible cooperation with 
others, to exert influence on processes of armament and disarmament. In the 
face of the hugeness of the armament problem, this influence will probably be 
considered as very small by most individuals, but there may be differences 
between different groups of people. It is likely, for example, that peace 
activists consider their individual ability to influence armament processes as 
greater than non-activists do. 
(b) The external-unstable-controllable factor is formally the exact opposite of 
the first factor, but from a social perspective the two are narrowly related. 
With respect to the armament problem, the external-unstable-controllable 
factor can be specified as the possible amplification of the individual's ability 
to influence armament processes with the help of partisans: friends and 
comrades in the peace movement, other participants in a demonstration, other 
citizens who reward the favoured party's stand on peace issues with their vote, 
et cetera. The help of partisans is external. It is also unstable, because there 
exists an 'assurance problem' with respect to their cooperation (Olson 1965). 
This, however, can be controlled, at least to some extent, through the com-
municative canvassing of other people's attitudes and through the consensus-
and action-mobilization strategies of the peace movement, which the individual 
can support. The external-unstable-controllable attribution factor can thus be 
specified as the effectiveness of association with others, for the achievement of 
disarmament goals. 
It is useful to draw a distinction here between two levels on which this 
association can be effectuated: the local and the national level. Coordination of 
actions can more easily be achieved at the local than at the national level. 
Moreover, the action goals are more limited at the local level than at the 
national level and therefore more easily attained. A "nuclear free"-declaration 
of a municipality is more easily obtained than a one-sided nuclear disarma-
ment step by the government. The controllability of the external-unstable 
factor is greater at the local than at the national level. In contrast to the 
greater chance of achievement of local action goals there is, however, the 
smaller value of the results, in relation to national goals. As a contribution to 
the reduction of arms in the world, a unilateral disarmament step of the 
government is more substantial than the nuclear free-declaration of a munici-
pality. It is possible that people differ in their preference for local or national 
cooperation for peace. Someone may prefer the quicker results of local actions 
over the greater value of national actions. It is also possible that someone's 
political interest is more oriented to local than to national society. 
(c) The external-stable-uncontrollable attribution factor pertains to the task 
difficulty of influencing armament and disarmament processes in the world. 
The external-stable-uncontrollable factor which makes this task so difficult is 
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the process autonomy of armament. In the past decades, the world's armament 
seemed to unroll as a constellation of autonomous, uncontrollable processes, 
propelled by technological developments which made ever more sophisticated 
and dangerous weapons available to ever more countries, as well as by 
economic forces in the world of arms production and arms trade. Governments 
in arms producing countries often allowed the proliferation of military equip-
ment and technology in irresponsible ways, mainly for economic reasons. 
Sometimes, it seemed as if no one was willing or able to exert any influence on 
this process. 
The concept of the process autonomy of armament is derived partly from 
the theory of the Military Industrial Complex, in which the economic dyna-
mism of armament processes is particularly emphasized (van den Hoogen 
1977; Sarkesian 1972), and partly from Senghaas' theory of the technological 
and political dynamics of deterrence systems. According to this theory, 
deterrence systems produce an ongoing quantitative and qualitative growth of 
armament, due on the one side to the uncontrollability of technological 
developments and on the other side to the political pursuit of military super-
iority vis-à-vis the opponent (Senghaas 1981). 
(d) An external-stable-controllable attribution factor with respect to the arma-
ment problem manifests itself is the foreign policy elite. According to some 
political scientists, the foreign policy even of democratic states has a markedly 
elitist character (Everts 1983, 85). The moulding of foreign policy is deter-
mined by a small group of politically, economically and culturally influentially 
persons. The opportunities of the public in industrial societies to influence the 
political elite has, however, steadily increased over the last few decades. 
Politics is experiencing a shift from elite directed to elite directing processes. 
This change is accounted for by, among other things, rising educational levels, 
greater availability of political information and greater permissiveness towards 
political participation by women. New forms of political participation have 
developed: the action group, the protest meeting, policy advocacy and effective 
exploitation of media attention. For citizens of Western countries, the foreign 
policy elite is still an external and stable factor, but it is certainly not uncon-
trollable (Inglehart 1990, 335-370). 
The conceptual model of attributions regarding armament is completed with 
two characteristics which form an attitudinal background to attribution, and 
which can therefore be considered as conditional characteristics of the attribu-
tion with regard to armament. 
The first conditional characteristic pertains to the very general question of 
whether humanity will ever succeed in solving the problem of armament and in 
establishing an effective global order of peace, as intended in the Charter of 
the United Nations Organization (United Nations 1979, 382-401). This 
expectation will be referred to as optimism about the attainability of world peace. 
The assumption that this expectation can influence the attribution regarding 
armament can be based on J.B. Rotter's thesis that attributive judgements are 
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founded on highly generalized, culturally determined causal attributions, such 
as the concept of destiny (cf. section 2.2). The degree to which people are 
optimistic about the attainability of world peace can be taken as a conditioning 
sense of human destiny, which influences the attribution regarding the more 
specific armament problems. 
The second conditional characteristic pertains to one's ascribed knowledge 
about armament. In section 2.4 it was stated that the peace action of most 
members of the churches and church peace movement takes the form of 
communicative action, in which an attempt is made to influence the opinions 
of others about peace issue by convincing them with arguments. Successful 
argumentation about armament issues requires a sufficient level of knowledge 
about these issues. Not everyone possesses this knowledge by the same degree. 
In the light of the communicative nature of peace action, it can therefore be 
expected that the assessment of one's own knowledge about armament issues 
influences the attribution regarding armament. 
In total, seven characteristics are distinguished with respect to the attribu­
tion regarding armament, the mutual relationships of which are indicated in 
figure 2.8. 
Figure 2.8 Conceptual model of attributions regarding armament 
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2.6 Religious peace attitudes 
In this section, a theological framework of religious peace attitudes is 
85 
developed, which forms a theoretical basis for the empirical research into the 
relationship between religious peace attitudes and peace action. A theological 
framework of religious peace attitudes cannot be created from the scratch, but 
will always develop from certain theological assumptions, which are ultimately 
grounded in a theological paradigm. 
In section 2.6.1, the choice of a theological paradigm which guides the 
construction of a theological framework of religious peace attitudes will be 
accounted for. In 2.6.2, the outlines of the theological framework are sketched, 
on the basis of the chosen paradigm. In 2.6.3 to 2.6.5, this framework will be 
filled in, from the three theological angles of hamartiology, soteriology and 
ecclesiology. 
2.6.1 A theological paradigm for the interpretation of religious peace attitudes 
Like all sciences, theology has a paradigmatic structure. A paradigm is a 
conceptual perspective, or "Weltanschauung", which largely determines the 
domain of a science, how phenomena are viewed, and the criteria for 
acceptability of scientific theories (Kuhn 1962, 11; Suppe 1977, 125-151). In 
order to discern different paradigms in a science it is necessary to have a 
general theoretical concept of the science in question, which makes it possible 
to relate various paradigms to each other and to compare them. There must 
be a common denominator within all paradigms of a certain science, which 
makes it possible to identify them as representatives of one and the same 
scientific tradition. What then is the common denominator of present-day 
theological paradigms? Peukert (1976) proposes to look for this point of unity 
in the task of theology which, since Schleiermacher, can best be referred to as 
"theological hermeneutics". In this, hermeneutics must not merely be taken as 
a philological method, but - in its broadest sense - as a methodical approach to 
the understanding of meaningful expressions of others, hence also of texts 
from earlier cultures, in such a way that their practical meaning can be brought 
to light in the present situation which is shaped by specific social conditions. 
Therewith, the various dimensions of the hermeneutical effort - history, 
society, inter-subjective communication - have already been indicated, but not 
yet their mutual relationship and the fundamental structure of theological 
discourse, on the basis of these relationships. The difference between 
theological paradigms can be understood as a difference between various 
approaches to the fundamental hermeneutical task of theology. 
Peukert distinguishes three central paradigms in present Western theology: 
existential theology, mainly founded in the Protestant theological tradition, 
transcendental theology, mainly founded in the Catholic tradition and political 
theology, with an ecumenical orientation and closely tied to the emancipation 
theologies from the Third World (Borgman 1990). 
The construction of a theological framework of religious peace attitudes is a 
hermeneutical procedure. The purpose is to tie the various aspects of the 
Christian message in with present-day peace issues, in such a way that on the 
one hand the issue of peace is interpreted in the framework of meaning of the 
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Christian tradition, and on the other hand the Christian tradition is 
interpreted in its meaning for the problem of peace. 
A religious interpretation of peace issues first of all requires a definition of 
what is understood by 'peace'. In section 1.1, peace has been defined as the 
process of the reduction of violence, which was specified as the prevention of 
war and the promotion of social justice. In this definition, the macro-dimension 
of peace is the most important. For the churches and church peace 
movements, the reduction of violence is the central peace goal. From the 
assumption that churches and church peace movements form an essential 
institutional context to motivational relationships between religion and peace 
action, this study will accommodate the churches' and church peace 
movements' concept of peace and take the macro-dimension of peace as the 
starting point for a hermeneutical procedure in which the Christian message 
and the actual problems of peace are related to each other. 
This is not to deny that also the social micro-dimension and the individual 
dimensions of peace can be objects of authentic religious interpretation. It is 
likely that a micro-social or individual experience of peace plays a role among 
believers. These dimensions of peace will not be neglected in this study, but to 
analyze them is not its main goal. The main goal is the analysis of the function 
of religion for actions which are directed at the promotion of peace in a 
macro-social sense: the "peace in the world". 
The chosen definition of peace offers a criterion for the selection of the 
theological paradigm in which the investigation of religious peace attitudes is 
to be carried through. The theological paradigm must offer such an 
interpretation of the Christian message that the religious meaning of essential 
characteristics of the process of the reduction of violence can be uncovered. 
The definition of peace as a process of the reduction of violence implies three 
essential characteristics of the peace concept. 
Firstly, peace is a practical concept. Violence is a form of human action, 
either of an institutional or structural nature, through which others are 
influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their 
potential realizations (Galtung 1969, 168). Violence is a practice of people. As 
a process of the reduction of violence, peace is likewise a practice, a certain 
form or characteristic of human action. 
Secondly, peace is a social concept. Reduction of violence implies a change 
in the relations between people, in particular the relations between organized 
groups at the national and international level, as well as a change of the social, 
political and economic structures which determine these relations. The goal of 
peace is of a social nature (id., 167). 
Thirdly, peace is a critical concept. As a "process of reduction of violence", 
peace is defined negatively. What peace means positively is hard to determine. 
The concept of peace refers to a region of potential social orders, rather than 
a fixed point. Within this region, a tremendous amount of variation is still 
possible, making an orientation in favour of peace compatible with a number 
of ideologies outlining different aspects of social orders (id., 168). All different 
conceptions of peace, however, have the negation of violence in common. The 
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concrete experiences of violence form the "negative experiences of contrast", 
form which all concepts of peace on the theoretical level, and all striving for 
peace on the practical level, arise. The theoretical and practical criticism of 
violence is the foundation of the process of peace. 
A religious interpretation of peace must do justice to the practical, social 
and critical nature of the peace concept. These characteristics of the peace 
concept, therefore, form equally many criteria for the selection of a theological 
paradigm within which the religious interpretation of peace is to be carried 
through. With these criteria in mind, the three paradigms of existential, 
transcendental and political theology will hereafter be examined. 
Existential theology 
The origin of the existential theological paradigm lies in the exegetical work of 
Rudolf Bultmann. He maintained that the mythical language, grafted onto 
Jewish apocalypticism and Gnostic religion, in which the proclamation of the 
New Testament is expressed, is incredible to modern, scientifically educated 
man: "one cannot use electric light and a radio, make use of modern medical 
and clinical means in cases of illness and simultaneously believe in the New 
Testament world of spirits and miracles" (Bultmann 1967, 18). Through the 
historical distance between the ancient mythical and modern scientific 
worldviews, present-day Christian proclamation is faced with the hermeneutical 
task of extricating the truth of the New Testament from the original mythical 
context and of interpreting it in the context of meaning which can be 
understood by modern, scientifically oriented man. This is the programme of 
demythologization. According to Bultmann, the authentic meaning of myth is 
not an objective worldview, but an expression of the way in which man 
understands himself in the world. Myth must not be interpreted cosmologically, 
but existentially. The existential meaning which Bultmann envisions in myth is 
the awareness of human heteronomy. Myth gives expression to the belief that 
man does not find his ground within himself, but is dependent on higher 
powers, which continuously limit and threaten his existence (id., 22). 
Bultmann sees the experience of the finiteness and heteronomy of the 
human mode of existence as a universal human experience, which has not only 
been worded in the New Testament, but also in philosophy. With philosophy, 
Bultmann in particular has the existential analysis of the (younger) Heidegger 
in mind (id., 33-34). In Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), Heidegger 
developed a view of authentic human existence, as an attitude in which man is 
radically conscious of the irremovable facticity of his existence and the 
uncontrollable possibilities of his future, in which only death is certain. In 
contrast to this authentic mode of existence, Heidegger posits the "perverted" 
mode of existence, in which man remains captured in the daily concerns of life 
and in the conventions of what "one" (das Mann) does. 
Bultmann takes Heidegger's existential analysis as the anthropological 
foundation of his theological design. Characteristic of unauthentic existence, 
Bultmann maintains, is the attempt to secure existence by means of available 
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things. This produces the "slavery of fear", in which everyone clings to himself 
and to being, in the latent awareness that everything, also one's own life, is 
slipping away. In contrast to this perverted mode of existence, authentic 
existence is characterized by an orientation toward the invisible and 
unavailable, in which all self-created certainties are surrendered. This is life "in 
faith" (Bultmann 1967, 28-29). 
Interpreted theologically, the mode of existence in which man wants to be 
at his own disposal is a situation of sin. It is the sin of "superbia", the desire to 
be like God. Self-willedly, man cannot free himself from this perverted state, 
because every attempt at self-liberation remains irretrievably captured in the 
sinful striving for self-disposal. Man can only be freed from his attachment to 
worldly certainty, by answering to the divine grace and the forgiving of sins, 
which comes to him in the Word Jesus Christ. Existence in submission to 
divine grace is "eschatological existence". It is the entering of a new way of 
being, which has become possible because God has acted and has put an end 
to this world (Bultmann 1952, 39). "The old world has reached its end for the 
believer, he is 'a new creature in Christ'. For the old world has reached its end 
with the fact that he himself as 'the old man' has reached his end and is now 'a 
new man', a free man" (Bultmann 1957, 151). Eschatological existence is not a 
permanent state of which the believer can be assured. Rather it is a permanent 
crisis, an act of decision and obedience which has to be resumed continuously 
(Bultmann 1933, 37). 
In attempting to give a religious interpretation of peace in its practical, social 
and critical nature within the framework of existential theology, one is faced 
with a number of tenacious problems. These are related to the almost 
exclusive attention for the individual problem of faith in existential theology, to 
the temporal focus on the moment of the decision of faith and to the strongly 
other-worldly character of Bultmann's eschatology. Together, these 
characteristics make a religious interpretation of peace as a process of 
reduction of violence impossible. 
Religiously relevant action is narrowed down in existential theology to the 
individual decision of faith, in which man puts his whole life at stake. In the 
act of faith, man turns away from transitory inner-worldly existence and all 
actions related to it. Thus he also turns away from the process of peace, which 
is a praxis within the world and which is characterized by a strong inner-
worldly concern. Bultmann does speak of the "call to love", which is indis-
solubly linked to the decision of faith, but this call mainly implies a micro-
ethical deontology, pertaining to direct relations with others: the "appeal of the 
Thou that encounters me" (Anspruch des mir begegnenden Du, Bultmann 1952, 
17-18). The possibility that macro-ethical choices can also imply a decision for 
or against God's offer of salvation, is not reflected upon. Social processes seem 
to be religiously indifferent in existential theology. What it comes down to in a 
religious sense are the decisions of the individual, which are made within these 
processes. This precludes the possibility of giving a religious interpretation of 
peace as a social process. 
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The impossibility of interpreting the social dimension of peace religiously is 
also related to the radical restriction of the religious experience of time to the 
moment of the faith decision. Only what happens in the intensity of the 
moment is of religious significance. Because of this temporal restriction, 
Christian love cannot function in a broader social context: "Christian love is 
not a matter that can be represented through programmes and be made 
effective in organizations, but is always a matter of the moment, my moment" 
(Bultmann 1952, 14). The social process of peace, however, is extensive in 
time. It requires not only a momentary decision, but also an elaboration of 
goals, organization and implementation. Whoever wants to pursue peace as a 
process of social change needs time. In a religious sense, he is not given this 
time by Bultmann. For in the course of time, the religious intensity of the 
momentary decision of faith resolves and with it the religious significance of 
action. 
In the Christian view of the relationship between man and the world, 
Bultmann descries an ongoing tension. On the one hand, the belief in creation 
allows man a trusty and cheerful approach to the world. On the other hand, 
the eschatological depreciation of the world calls man to a flight from the 
world (Bultmann 1952, 243). In Bultmann's theology, eschatology prevails over 
protology and, with that, world avoidance over the approach to the world. 
Particularly in his interpretation of the Gospel of John, Bultmann states that 
man receives in faith an "eschatological existence", in which the attachment to 
the world has been annihilated. The believers are still "in the world", but they 
are not "of the world" (Bultmann 1980, 430). The strongly other-worldly nature 
of Bultmann's eschatology has its consequences for the religious interpretation 
of peace. As a characteristic of eschatological existence, the Christian peace is 
not a quality of this world. Peace is an eschatological possibility, which lies at 
the other side of inner-worldly possibilities and which cannot realize itself in 
earthly life, but which can only be captured as real in faith (Bultmann 1980, 
430). The eschatological nature of Christian peace does imply a radical 
criticism of the world. But this criticism is a criticism from the outside, of the 
world as a whole (the cosmos) and therefore has no discriminatory power with 
regard to actions and situations within the world. Everything strived for and 
realized within the world implies an attachment to the transitory, and blocks 
the surrender to God's transcendent power. Thus existential theology lacks the 
possibility of formulating a religiously founded criticism of violence within the 
world. 
It must be concluded that neither in its practical, nor in its social and 
critical dimension can peace adequately be interpreted religiously within the 
paradigm of Bultmann's existential theology. Therefore, this paradigm is not 
suitable as a starting point for the construction of a theological framework of 
reference of religious peace attitudes. Although it is very well possible to 
develop a "theology of peace" from Bultmann's theology, it is not possible to 
do this while retaining the meaning of 'peace' as a process aimed at the 
reduction of violence in this world. 
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Transcendental theology 
Rahner responded to the hermeneutical task of theology in his design of "a 
theology which makes use of transcendental philosophy as a method" (Rahner 
1970, 96). Rahner understands a transcendental philosophical question as the 
type of question which pertains to the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
human knowledge and action, within the human subject itself. A transcendental 
approach in theology implies "that in each theological statement, the necessary 
conditions of its knowledge in the theological subject are considered, that in 
each case it is shown that there are such apriori conditions of the knowledge 
of a theological object, that it is shown that these conditions themselves 
already imply and state something about the object and the form, the method 
and the limits of its knowledge". Transcendental theology attempts to indicate 
the apriori conditions of the possibility of religious experience within the 
human subject, and thus to give an anthropological foundation of theology 
(Rahner & Raffelt 1981, 11). 
The starting point of Rahner's transcendental theology is a philosophical 
anthropological reflection on the subject character of man. An analysis of the 
human mode of knowledge shows that man possesses in all knowledge of 
objects an irremovable consciousness of himself, as a knowing subject. In the 
irreducibility of man, who discovers himself as a questioning being behind 
every explanation, the subject character and personhood of man manifests 
itself. This experience of subjectivity is a "transcendental experience": an 
experience which precedes, and is constitutively present in, every concrete 
experience of reality (Rahner 1976, 31). 
Through his ability to put everything into question, man manifests himself 
as the being of an "infinite horizon", as a "being of transcendence" (Rahner & 
Raffelt 1981, 17). In the transcending of every possible theoretical answer and 
every possible practical goal, man's thinking and acting is grounded in an 
"anticipation of the totality of being" (Vorgriff auf das Sein überhaupt, id., 18). 
The movement of transcendence does not imply that the subject himself 
constitutes an infinite world. Human transcendence is made possible by an 
opening of the infinite horizon of being from itself. Therefore, Rahner 
interprets the transcendental experience as the experience of the self-
communication of the infinity of existence, the nature of which he describes as 
a "sacred mystery" (heiliges Geheimnis, Rahner 1976, 69). 
The ultimate perspective of transcendence must be referred to as a mystery, 
because it cannot be encompassed by an anticipation at a higher level. It 
cannot be captured in the available categorical system of concepts, and is 
therefore the "nameless" and "unavailable". This mystery must also be referred 
to as "sacred". Human transcendence is not only the condition of the possibility 
of knowledge, but also of freedom in the realm of action. Freedom is always 
freedom of a subject which is in an interpersonal communication with other 
subjects. The affirming freedom of a subject in relation to another subject is 
called "love". The infinite transcendence which manifests itself in love is 
grounded in the mystery which sends itself, which rules in freedom as the 
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unavailable, nameless and absolute, and which for that reason must be referred 
to as a sacred mystery (id., 74). Rahner introduces the term "sacred mystery" 
as another word for "God". He takes this semantic detour, in order to suspend 
the traditional objectivizing representations which are attached to the concept 
of God (God as "father", as "Lord", as the "heavenly"). God is not a being 
within this world, not even the highest being, which can be distinguished from 
other beings by demarcating designations. As the ultimate perspective of 
transcendence, God is the nameless and infinite: the sacred mystery. 
What are the possibilities of giving a religious interpretation of peace, as a 
practical, social and critical concept, within the paradigm of transcendental 
theology? In the logic of transcendental theology itself, this question requires 
an analysis of the way in which God can be considered a possibility condition 
and ultimate horizon of a transcending movement of the subject, which 
manifests itself in the practical, social and critical dimensions of the peace 
process. 
It is not difficult to give a religious interpretation of the practical and social 
nature of peace, within the transcendental theological paradigm. In contrast to 
existential theology, transcendental theology considers inner-worldly action not 
as theologically irrelevant. The transcendental movement which is constitutive 
of man as a subject is implicitly operational in all man's action, hence also in 
peace activity. Peace activity shares in the religious revelatory nature of human 
action in general, in which God's reality as a transcendental condition of the 
possibility of freedom is implicitly affirmed. Moreover, peace activity has a 
special religious revelatory nature in its social dimension. It is in social 
interaction, initiated by the loving approach to others, that God's reality as the 
mystery of unconditional love is experienced most fully. Love of one's fellow-
man and love of God are one (Rahner 1965, 295; Peukert 1976, 53). In this, 
love of one's fellow-man may not be limited to feelings of benevolence from 
one individual to the other. Love of one's fellow-man is an act which must 
spread itself through all societal dimensions of human existence (Rahner 1970, 
581). 
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the transcendental theological 
paradigm is also able to provide a theological interpretation of the inherently 
critical nature of peace. Here, transcendental theology appears to reach a 
limit. Transcendental theology has a strong critical potential vis-à-vis inner-
worldly history, but as in existential theology, this criticism is of a global 
nature. It does not offer any opportunities, at least not on transcendental 
theological grounds, to come to sharp critical distinctions within the world. 
According to Rahner, the critical potential of the Christian message of 
salvation lies in the absolute hope and absolute future which God Himself is. 
The infinite horizon of God's future relativizes and criticizes all inner-worldly 
goals and gives them the stigma of the provisional and the questionable. The 
position which transcendental theological criticism of human action and human 
history takes is the position of the identity of the love of one's fellow-man and 
that of God, the former being characterized in its social dimension as justice 
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and respect for the freedom of others. If we realize that love of one's fellow-
man must always be accomplished in an ever more sinful world of injustice and 
human self-alienation, then it is clear that the unity of the love of God and the 
love of one's fellow-man implies an "act of societal-critical protest" (Rahner 
1970, 580-581). 
To interpret the critical nature of peace religiously, this transcendental 
foundation of a societal-critical Christianity is too abstract. Peace is not critical 
in the sense of a protesting disposition to act, which forms the practical 
conclusion to an argument which contrasts the requirement of love of one's 
fellow-man with the injustice of society. The critical nature of peace must be 
conceived of much more directly and concretely. The concrete negative 
experience of violence forms the material from which peace, as the striving for 
the reduction of violence, derives its critical meaning. Only on the basis of this 
negative and critical content of the peace concept, do the positive peace-ideals 
of justice, freedom and love of one's fellow-man arise. Giving a religious 
interpretation of peace in its original critically negative nature requires a 
theological framework which takes the protest against the concrete negativity 
of violence and injustice as the starting point of theological reflection. It must 
be a theology which starts with the negative experiences of those who suffer 
from violence, in order to interpret peace religiously from there, in the context 
of the Christian message of salvation and liberation. Transcendental theology 
does not provide this starting point. The concept of experience elaborated in 
transcendental theology has nothing to do with a concrete historical 
experience. Societal contradictions and relationships of violence, which for 
many people are the reality of their daily experiences, have all been already 
metaphysically surmounted in the aprioric structures of transcendental 
experience, before, in a passing manoeuvre, they as yet become subject of a 
societal-critical reflection (Metz 1977, 62). In that way, however, the religious 
meaning-potential of peace's radically critical nature has already been 
irretrievably pushed into the background. Therefore, it is not possible to give 
an adequate religious interpretation of the inherently critical nature of peace 
within the paradigm of transcendental theology. 
Political theology 
Political theology attempts to bridge the hermeneutical distance between the 
biblical tradition and the present situation via the road of political praxis. Metz 
characterizes the present situation as an era of enlightenment, secularization 
and emancipation (Metz 1972, 159). The Enlightenment proclaimed the 
freedom of reason, not only in the theoretical realm but especially in the 
political sphere. Enlightenment, after Kant's dictum, is the project of the 
emancipation of the citizen from his self-imposed immaturity. Kant still 
interpreted emancipation mainly as a matter of individual moral autonomy. 
Marx showed that emancipation is not only a matter of individual moral effort, 
but also of social structures and relations. The praxis of freedom and maturity, 
which the Enlightenment proclaims, must be a societal and political praxis 
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(Metz 1977, 50-51). The praxis which is aimed at the reduction of societally 
caused immaturity is the starting point from which political theology wants to 
interpret the Christian message in the present situation. Not only does political 
theology analyse the meaning potential of the Christian message in the context 
of social-critical political praxis; it also presents, in accordance with the bi-
directional nature of the hermeneutical procedure, an interpretation of the 
socio-critical praxis in the light of the Christian message. 
The practical-critical hermeneutics of the Christian religion requires firstly a 
theological processing of the criticism of religion of the Enlightenment, which 
from the outset has been a criticism of ideologies (Metz 1986, 122; Moltmann 
1984, 13; Xhaufflaire 1972a, 64). Criticism of ideologies unmasks religion as a 
function, a 'superstructure' in Marxian terminology, of certain societal 
relations. Ideological religion is the false consciousness of a society which has 
not yet achieved self-consciousness (Metz 1968, 99-100). A theology which tries 
to answer this criticism must face the societal implications of its images and 
concepts. To political theology, this task has both a negative and a positive side 
(Metz 1969, 1233). 
On the negative side, political theology considers itself to be a critical 
correction of the tendencies of privatization in present-day Western theology. 
A theology is privatized if it retreats from political and societal aspects of 
existence and concentrates on the individual problem of existence and faith. 
Privatization of the Christian faith, Metz maintains, is characteristic of both 
existential and transcendental theology. In these theological paradigms, the 
praxis of faith is reduced to a worldless decision of the individual. The 
dominant categories for the explication of the Christian message in these 
theologies are those of the intimate, the private and the a-political (Metz 1968, 
100-101). Thus, the Christian faith is robbed of its very particular critical and 
liberating power and is no longer able to contribute to true societal changes 
(Metz 1972, 160; 1977, 24). 
On the positive side, political theology wants to express the Christian 
eschatological message within the relationships of the modern age as a form of 
practical-critical thought (Metz 1977, 161). By emphasising the eschatological 
dimension of the Christian religion, political theology seeks the connection 
with the primacy of future, which characterises the modern time. "Immanence 
is no longer experienced as a transient earth below an everlasting heaven, but 
as an open future of life and as the history of a still unknown future". The 
future-directedness of the new time challenges theology to give an account of 
the hope which lives in her and to take eschatology, which formerly has only 
been treated as apocryphal, as the foundation of its reflection (Moltmann 
1984, 154). Political theology stresses that the eschatological promises of the 
biblical tradition - freedom, peace, justice, reconciliation - are not private 
matters, but form a critical-liberating element in society (Metz 1968, 105). The 
political theological hermeneutics of the Christian faith is a practical 
hermeneutics, which attempts to unfold the socio-critical potential of faith 
(Metz 1977, 51; 1968, 104). The fact that hermeneutics is becoming practical 
also implies that the truth-concept of political theology is of a practical nature. 
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The practical-critical meaning of the promise of God's future cannot be 
uncovered in a purely theoretical-hermeneutical manner. Only a critical 
attitude towards the present, and the resulting imperative to change and 
improve it, open the road to the coming truth. Orthopraxis is the criterion of 
truth of political theology (Schillebeeckx 1972, 108; Moltmann 1984, 154). 
As a practical-critical hermeneutics of the Christian tradition, political theology 
makes it possible to interpret peace religiously, in its practical, social and 
critical dimension. More than other theological paradigms, political theology is 
directed to the political-practical and social aspects of life. In political theology, 
only social acting which is guided by a critical solidarity with the victims of 
existing societal structures and relationships is considered as theologically 
relevant (Metz 1977, 69; Schillebeeckx 1989, 26-27). The Christian faith 
articulates itself as "memoria passionis, mortis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi". 
The story of Christ's suffering and resurrection forms the framework within 
which people's concrete experiences of suffering can be interpreted religiously 
in their socio-critical charge (Metz 1977, 97). By taking the critical-cognitive 
nature of human experiences of suffering as the starting point of theology, 
political theology is in line with the critical orientation which is inherent in the 
concept of peace. Therefore, political theology offers a framework for a 
religious interpretation of peace in its critical nature. 
2.6.2 A theological framework of religious peace attitudes 
The choice of political theology as the theological basis for the construction of 
a theological framework of religious peace attitudes implies that the structure 
of political theology forms the starting point for the framework. Instead of 
attempting to distil this structure from the work of a great number of repre-
sentative political theologians, it is preferred here to consider the structure of 
one particular design of political theology - a design which for several reasons 
is particularly suitable to serve as the starting point for the construction of a 
theological framework of religious peace attitudes, namely the critical theology 
of Edward Schillebeeckx. 
In the first place, Schillebeeckx has, more than other political theologians, 
systematically worked out the practical-critical character of political theological 
hermeneutics. What is expressed in seminal insights by Metz, or in numerous 
evocative aphorisms by Moltmann, has in Schillebeeckx' work the shape of a 
broad and meticulously worked out hermeneutical theory. Schillebeeckx has a 
better eye than Metz for the methodological demands connected with the 
definition of theology as a practical-critical hermeneutics. It seems as if Metz 
produces (ortho)praxis all too quickly as the answer to the hermeneutical prob-
lems in theology, for instance where he claims that "the crisis in Christianity 
today is not primarily a crisis of the content of the faith and its promises, but a 
crisis of subjects and institutions which do not measure up to the demands 
made by faith" (Metz 1977, 73). This is nothing less than a licence for the 
95 
neglect of the fundamental hermeneutical task, from which political theology 
cannot escape either, of studying the Christian tradition systematically in its 
significance for the contemporary context of existence. Only a hermeneutics 
with a broad content can guarantee that the entire interpretive potential of the 
Christian tradition with regard to peace can be made to work hermeneutically. 
The theological hermeneutics of Metz lacks such a broad content - it is mainly 
a fundamental practical-critical theological hermeneutics, not an elaboration of 
this hermeneutics into the various main theological themes. The work of 
Schillebeeckx does offer a practical-critical hermeneutics which is worked out 
according to the various central themes of theology. In elaborate studies, 
Schillebeeckx has shown what a practical-critical design of theological 
hermeneutics implies for soteriology, for the interpretation of salvation history, 
for ecclesiology and for the theology of ministry (Schillebeeckx 1972; 1975; 
1977; 1980a; 1989). Thus the practical-critical hermeneutics of Schillebeeckx 
provides a solid base from which the concept of peace in its practical, social 
and critical character can be interpreted religiously. 
A second reason why Schillebeeckx' work is particularly suitable as the 
starting point for the construction of a theological framework of religious 
peace attitudes is the fact that Schillebeeckx has specifically applied his 
hermeneutics to the question of peace in several articles (1981; 1982; 1982a; 
1983). These articles point the way in which peace, in its practical, social and 
critical dimensions, can be interpreted religiously. From Schillebeeckx' views 
on the theology of peace, the thesis can be derived that an authentically 
Christian interpretation of the concept of peace itself leads to a practical, 
social and critical approach to peace issues. Not only does the Gospel message 
of God's rule of peace imply a fundamental criticism of the structures of 
power and violence in this world; the radical Evangelical criticism also exhorts 
the Christian to political action (Schillebeeckx 1983). 
A third argument in favour of Schillebeeckx' critical hermeneutics as the 
theological basis of this study concerns its strong connection with motivation 
theory, as it has been set out in section 2.2. This similarity is important 
because it provides a theoretical starting point for the study of the 
motivational role of religious peace attitudes. A motivational orientation is 
characteristic of all political theology. It is after all the aim of political theology 
to be the theological theory of a critical and liberating social praxis, providing 
not just reflection on this praxis, but also a motivation towards it, in the sense 
of an inspiration and orientation. It is striking that Schillebeeckx often uses the 
motivational terms "inspiration" and "orientation" in order to make the 
connection between the Christian faith and social action (Schillebeeckx 1977, 
36, 717, 721; 1989, 195). In most political theologies this motivational orienta-
tion is however, not, or only just, considered. In the political theology of Metz 
the critical "memoria passionis Jesu" is a religious motivator of critical social 
praxis, and in Moltmann's theology eschatological hope has the same motivat-
ing function. Both authors, however, provide hardly any clue how these 
grandiose religious images (could) become effective in the consciousness of the 
believer, who, thus inspired, dedicates himself to the cause of justice and 
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peace. Practically all political theology lacks any explicit or implicit theory 
concerning the motivational function of religious attitudes. The work of 
Schillebeeckx is an exception to this rule. 
Though Schillebeeckx himself has never explicitly acknowledged this, his 
theological design is based on a starting point which is closely related to 
motivation theory. The implicit motivation theory in Schillebeeckx' theology 
can be found in his reflections on the fundamental hermeneutical significance 
of the negative contrast experience. Particularly in contrast experiences of 
meaninglessness and disaster, of evil and suffering, people come to realise 
what meaningful human existence could positively mean. The negative contrast 
experience creates a feeling of indignation. The person cannot accept the 
situation, and there develops "an openness to another situation which has the 
right to our affirmative 'yes'. One can call it a consensus with 'the unknown', 
the content of which cannot even be defined is a positive way: a better, other 
world, which in fact does not yet exist anywhere" (Schillebeeckx 1989, 25). 
On the one hand, the negative contrast experience forms the starting point 
of a positive experience of meaning in reality and history. Those who believe 
in God give a religious content to the double basic experience of the negative 
in which a positive element is discovered. "For Christians, the experience of 
contrast, with its inherent opposition to injustice and its perspective on 
something better, becomes that in which the unity of history comes about as 
God's gift" (id., 26). The experience of positivity-in-negativity has a theological 
hermeneutical function. It offers a ground of experience for naming the name 
of God. On the other hand, an impulse to action is created in the tension 
between the negative contrast experience and the awareness of a better 
situation which it has generated. Only resistance to all forms of evil and 
suffering is an adequate response to the tension between the concrete experi-
ence of evil and the ideal of a better world (Schillebeeckx 1987, 667; 1989, 
116-117). The experience of positivity-in-negativity has, in other words, a 
motivational function. The motivational impulse to act originates in the 
dialectic between the perceived actual situation and a conceived ideal situation 
(cf. Nuttin 1980, 259). 
The close connection between motivation theory and theological 
hermeneutics in Schillebeeckx' theology has a special theoretical significance. 
Here one finds indications for the development of a theory concerning the way 
in which religious meaning-giving is connected to action. Meaning and action 
are not separate circuits. Religious meaning may provide directions for action, 
offering interpretations of the experience of positivity-in-negativity, which help 
to determine the content of the motivational system. 
In close connection with Schillebeeckx' theology, five theological themes will be 
brought forward here, which serve as the foundation of a theological frame-
work of religious peace attitudes. These are: the sequential priority of 
hamartiology over soteriology (a), the immanent transcendence of evil and 
salvation (b), the coherence of past, present and future in the history of evil 
and salvation (c), the solidarity of people in the realisation of evil and salva-
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tion (d) and orthopraxis as the basis of the church (e). By talcing these five 
themes as a framework in which the religious interpretation of peace can be 
brought under discussion, a theological framework is developed with the help 
of Schillbeeckx' theology, with which the empirical religious peace attitudes, 
present in the consciousness of the believer, can be mapped out. 
(a) The sequential priority of hamartiology over soteriology 
The key role ascribed in Schillebeeckx' hermeneutics to negative contrast 
experiences presents a first indication for the construction of a theological 
framework of religious peace attitudes. Negative contrast experiences can fulfil 
a hermeneutical function because of their productive and critical cognitive 
power. "The hermeneutical principle for the disclosure of reality is not the self 
evident, but the scandal, the stumbling block of the refractoriness of reality" 
(Schillebeeckx 1977, 29). What makes the negative experiences of contrast in 
reality into productive experiences is the meaning that can be found in them if 
people struggle with the pain of the contrast. In the negative contrast experi-
ences of the suffering of people and of the meaninglessness in history, as well 
as in the resistance to suffering and meaninglessness, people can become 
aware of the positive meaning of the sought-after humanum, the well-being 
and happiness of people (Schillebeeckx 1975, 509-513). 
The productive and critical cognitive power of negative contrast experiences 
also lies at the basis of the meaning of the concept of peace. The meaning of 
peace in its positive aspect is not immediately accessible. "No one knows (...) 
how to define peace positively, compared to cold war, or to open war; a 
Christian, too, only has a vision of eschatological peace, which he largely can 
only describe in negative terms" (Schillebeeckx 1972, 161). The call for peace is 
loudest in situations of violence and war. Then, through negative contrast 
experiences, the positive meaning of 'peace' gains most clarity. The effort to 
bring peace positively under discussion leads to a variety of designs for peace, 
which are mutually contradictory, but which have in common the negative 
factor that they all register resistance to the threat to peace from arms, 
violence and war (Schillebeeckx 1981, 238-239). 
The productive and critical meaning of negative contrast experiences for the 
semantics of peace has consequences for the religious interpretation of peace. 
In a religious interpretation which is to do justice to the inherently critical 
character of the concept of peace, the antithesis of peace - the negativity of 
armament, violence and war - must be made a religious theme every bit as 
much as peace itself in its positive aspect. A theological framework of religious 
peace attitudes must therefore be worked out both in a hamartiological and in 
a soteriological dimension. Because of the hermeneutical priority of the 
negative experience of contrast, as well as the negative semantics of the 
concept of peace, the hamartiological dimension will have to take precedence. 
Sequential priority must be conceded to the hamartiological reflection on the 
absence of peace, over the soteriological reflection on the expectation and 
promotion of peace. Sequential priority must however not be confused with 
evaluative priority. Ultimately, the soteriological destiny of human beings, their 
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liberation from the grip of evil and meaninglessness, is the main issue and aim 
of all theology. 
(b) The immanent transcendence of evil and salvation 
The starting point of Schillebeeckx' hermeneutics is the thesis that religious 
language only has meaning when it refers to real experiences in the world. 
"There can be no revelation without experience" (Schillebeeckx 1977, 39). 
Theological language must clarify experience and, in reverse, t;.e experience of 
living in the world must give reality and relevance to theological speech. 
Religious experience of transcendence takes place as "the manifestation of a 
transcendent meaning in the dimension of our historical horizon of experience" 
(id., 41). Hermeneutically speaking, it is therefore possible and necessary to 
define religious experience of transcendence as an experience of the imma-
nence of transcendence (id., 47), or, as will be done here for short, of immanent 
transcendence (cf. Van der Ven & Visscher 1985). 
The hermeneutical-theological concept of immanent transcendence is 
opposed to a traditional metaphysical concept which could be defined as 
absolute transcendence. In this concept, transcendence is pictured as a super-
natural cause of reality (Schillebeeckx 1989, 109; 1989a, 88), and the revelation 
of transcendence as a totality of added, new and super-rational truths 
(Schillebeeckx 1977, 37). From the hermeneutical point of view, the concept of 
absolute transcendence must be considered as a derived modus of immanent 
transcendence. It is a religious interpretation of the experience of reality, of 
which the interpretative moment has been forgotten, as in a metaphor of 
which the natural and social "origin" ("light", "power", "king") has worn out 
(Derrida 1972). Applying the concept of immanent transcendence, the dialectic 
of good and evil which marks the human world experience can be seen as the 
basis of the experience of transcendence, both from the hamartiological and 
from the soteriological aspect. 
Christian theology has gradually purged itself of most ancient 
hypostatisations of the contrast between good and evil. But the world of 
symbolism of Christian religion still has numerous elements which can be 
considered as hamartiological interpretations of transcendence. The inner-
worldly experience of evil lends itself to a religious interpretation which makes 
a transcendence of evil a possible experience. In the concrete forms which this 
takes, one may recognize both immanent transcendent as well as absolute 
transcendent hamartiological images. 
In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant has given an analysis of a 
fundamental human experience of evil, which can be considered as the basis of 
experience of a certain immanent transcendent hamartiological image. The 
long litany of moral barbarisms in human history shows, according to Kant, 
that the human race has a depraved nature. There is "a radical innate evil in 
human nature", a propensity that is "inextirpable", at least by any human 
power. The claim that the human race has an evil predisposition is, in Kant's 
opinion, a necessary transcendental view of the universal human tendency to 
oppose the moral law (Kant 1794; Sullivan 1989, 124-125). In a religious 
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interpretation, the experience of radical and universal immanent evil can be 
interpreted in the perspective of a transcendent reality. The traditional 
Christian expression of this immanent transcendence of universal evil is the 
concept of hereditary sin. In this concept, the universal human propensity 
towards evil is seen as the result of a transcendent origination, related to the 
mythological fall of the first man, which immanently propagates itself in 
history, as a collective evil affecting all human decisions. In present day socio-
political interpretations of the concept of hereditary sin, the focus is on the 
structural and institutional embedment of the radical and collective evil in 
history. The "structural evil" (Galtung 1969) in our social, political and econ-
omic institutions is interpreted as "political sin" (Solle 1971), or "structural sin" 
(John Paul II 1987). In application to the peace issue, the hamartiological 
consciousness can interpret the perseverance of the phenomena of war and 
violence in history in immanent transcendent terms, as the result of hereditary 
sin and it can identify the structural embedment of the evil of arms races, 
deterrence and wars immanent-transcendently, as manifestations of political 
and structural sin. 
The hamartiological interpretation of transcendence can also assume an 
absolute transcendent form. In this view, the inner-worldly manifestations of 
evil and suffering are causally related to a higher transcendent power which 
intervenes from outside in the structures of the world and in history. Particu-
larly among Christians of a more fundamentalist tendency, a causal connection 
between evil and the absolute transcendent God is a real 'croyable disponible'. 
In 1953, when a large part of the Netherlands was inundated in the 'Great 
Flood', in which hundreds of people lost their lives, there were many who 
pointed a warning finger upwards. In an absolute transcendent perspective, 
they saw the disaster as a punishment or at least a warning of God 
(Schillebeeckx 1989, 109). In the same way, the evil of wars which seems to 
afflict people like disasters, can be interpreted in an absolute transcendent 
manner. War is viewed as a punishment or an educative measure by God, or 
as part of God's plan for the world, which was framed before the beginning of 
time and is beyond human understanding. 
In the soteriological field, too, a distinction can be made between immanent 
and absolute transcendence. When discussing the relations between history and 
salvation history, Schillebeeckx seeks formulations which put the immanent 
transcendence of God's salvation into words. In this approach, the relation 
between human history and divine salvation history is a relation of identity and 
difference. On the one hand, salvation in the religious sense cannot be 
experienced outside the context of worldly experiences of wholeness. Worldly 
salvation is the basis of experience for religious salvation (Schillebeeckx 1977, 
696). This indicates a lower limit in the meaning of the concept of salvation 
history. "Only in a secular history in which men and women are liberated for 
true humanity, can God reveal his own being" (Schillebeeckx 1989, 27). On the 
other hand, the worldly experience of salvation does not reveal the full 
meaning of salvation in the religious sense. There is no upper limit to the 
Christian concept of salvation. Divine reality does not allow itself to be tied 
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down by human concepts of salvation. "Certainly God is the source and the 
heart of all truly human movements of liberation and salvation, but He does 
not coincide with any particular historical liberation movement" (id., 30). With 
approval, Schillebeeckx reports Gutierrez' view that eschatological salvation is 
realised in a fragmented fashion in the history of human liberation, but that 
the kingdom of God is not fully realised in human history (Schillebeeckx 1977, 
700; Guttierez 1973). In the model of God's immanent transcendence, speak-
ing about peace in the religious sense is always an interpretation of social and 
political peace which is built up by human effort. The "peace of the world" is 
the basis of experience for the "peace of God" (Schillebeeckx 1977, 695-696; 
Kuitert 1976). 
The search for an equilibrium between identity and difference of divine and 
worldly salvation contains a reaction against the absolute transcendent model of 
a complete separation between "nature" and "grace", between human activity 
and the divine gift of salvation. In an absolute transcendent model of 
soteriology, God's salvation comes about entirely outside human activity. God's 
activity takes place at the expense of man's activity, and human freedom and 
originality are at the expense of God's causality. God is less active when there 
is more human activity, and vice versa (Schoonenberg 1969, 11-12). When 
peace is interpreted in an absolute transcendent framework, the absolute gift-
character of peace comes to the fore. Peace in the absolute transcendent sense 
is a quality or a result of God's majestic and sovereign action, to which there is 
no human contribution. 
(c) The coherence of past, present and future in the history of evil and 
salvation 
Past, present and future are mutually connected dimensions of human exist-
ence. Following Heidegger's analysis of the temporal structure of being-in-the-
world (Heidegger 1979, 231-437), Schillebeeckx interprets an authentic human 
orientation in time as projecting oneself from the past, in the present, into the 
future (Schillebeeckx 1972, 44). The past and the present are the only secure 
base on which people can build a project for the future, if they do not want to 
land in a futuristic phantasy. The past is a fundamental part of human exist-
ence, which, in the present, is directed towards the future (id. 46). In con-
structing a theological framework of religious peace attitudes, the temporal 
differentiation of the human historical mode of existence will have to be 
discounted. Hamartiology and soteriology will have to be differentiated 
according to the temporal dimensions of past, present and future. 
Ricoeur has shown how the original mythical "confessions" of evil are always 
constructed as a story of dénouement in which the beginning and the end of 
evil are told. In myths about evil, the original human confessions of evil appear 
as temporally differentiated interpretations (Ricoeur 1960). In the human 
history of suffering and disaster, the evil spreads from the past, through human 
actions, structures and institutions in the present, until it reaches its 
dénouement in the future. A theological framework of hamartiological atti-
tudes regarding war must preserve this temporal differentiation. The religious 
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experience of the evil of war will have to be analyzed in its protological and 
eschatological projections, and in its interpretation of the actual evil in the 
present. 
The unity of past, present and future is also characteristic of an authentic 
Christian soteriology. In the Old Testament the unity of past, present and 
future is confirmed in the concepts of God's covenant and steadfastness. 
"Israel only came to understand its own history as a divine promise when it 
reflected, from the standpoint of the present, on its history, recognising in it 
God's steadfastness. For the human being standing in history, and thus looking 
to the future, this divine steadfastness is basically an expectation of a future 
filled with salvation" (Schillebeeckx 1972, 47). 
The unbreakable coherence of past, present and future in the human 
temporal mode of existence and in the biblical vision of God's saving activity 
in history, warns us of the obvious pitfall іл our modern future-oriented 
culture, of a one-sided futuristic orientation towards peace, both in an 
immanently historical sense and in the perspective of salvation history. God's 
peace is not only the eschatological gift of His future kingdom with the 
connected task of partnership in God's eschatological peace action. It is also 
the gift of peace in the past, in the goodness of creation, together with the 
connected task to created peace as a form of good stewardship over creation, 
and the gift of peace as a reconciliation between people, made possible by 
Christ - including the task of following Christ in his reconciling peace praxis. 
(d) The solidarity of people in the realisation of evil and salvation 
In a practical-critical hermeneutical theology, praxis is not only the medium of 
religious revelation, but also the touchstone of the belief of the Christian. "The 
deciding factor is not the explicit confirmation or denial of God, but the 
answer to the question: which side do you choose in the struggle between good 
and evil, between oppressors and oppressed?" (Schillebeeckx 1989, 27). The 
criterion of the Christian faith is orthopraxis, because Christianity is not only a 
hermeneutical clarification of existence, but basically a renewal of existence 
(Schillebeeckx 1972, 109). 
The concept of praxis has a plurality of references. There are many forms 
of praxis and similarly there are many religious interpretations of the subject 
of praxis. From Ricoeur's distinction between the symbolism of sin and guilt, 
two views can be derived on human praxis in a hamartiological and 
soteriological sense, each of which expresses a different view on the human 
subject of hamartiology and soteriology. 
In the symbolism of sin, the collective is the primary human subject, in 
hamartiological and soteriological respect. Sin comes about mainly through 
collective ambitions and actions with the implication of a disobedient turning 
away from religious communion with God. Sin is a breaking of the relationship 
with God which originates in the community. For the individual member of the 
community, sin has the character of an exterior environment, in which he is 
submerged and from which there is no escape. In the symbolism of sin, the 
redemption from evil is indicated by the central symbol of the 'return': the 
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collective turning away from the wrong road to rejoin the marked-out plan of 
God's will and decrees (Ricoeur I960, 51-98). 
In the symbolism of guilt, a radical individualisation and internalisation 
takes place. The evil of guilt comes about as a result of individual ambitions 
and actions implying the wrong use of freedom, which is experienced as 
diminution of the value of the self. Guilt is like a burden which weighs on the 
conscience. The redemption of guilt, where human actions are concerned, is 
achieved by opposite actions, implying a reparation of the evil caused, which 
are counted as a neutralising merit for the guilty one (id., 99-144). 
From the distinction between the symbolism of sin and guilt, a distinction 
cen be derived between a social and an individual subject of hamartiology and 
soteriology. In the definition of the human subject of war and violence from a 
hamartiological perspective, it is assumed that peace is a social concept. The 
relationships of violence, which are negated by peace, are also of a social 
character. Through their social character, relationships of violence have a 
conceptual connection with the symbolism of sin. The connection between the 
two terms, their hamartiological point of resemblance, is the solidarity of 
people doing evil. This has been sharply perceived by Dorothée Solle, who 
argues that sin should be understood "politically", that is to say, should be 
related to the sum of suffering caused by humans - what is called the "sin of 
the world" in John 1:29 (Wiersinga 1982, 116). The political interpretation of 
sin puts the structural forms of evil at the centre of hamartiological attention. 
All of us (and here Solle is particularly thinking of citizens of the rich coun-
tries) share responsibility for the structures of domination, violence and terror 
which perpetuate injustice and threaten peace (Solle 1971, 87-96). From Solle's 
analysis of "political sin", the view can be derived that the hamartiological 
subject of war and violence must be seen primarily as a social subject. Solle's 
hamartiology is opposed to an individual, "privatised" approach to the human 
hamartiological subject. The privatised hamartiological consciousness limits the 
reach of hamartiology to the direct relations between individuals, in the family 
or at work, and so is unable to recognise its own involvement in the structures 
of evil which perpetuate the suffering of others. In Solle's view, the privatised 
hamartiological consciousness is legitimised in theology, because sin has been 
removed from its worldly context and reduced to the realm of the personal 
relationship between the person and God: sin as a lack of love for God and 
rebelliousness against the Lord (id., 95). The question may be raised, however, 
whether a closer connection may not be made between the individually and the 
socially oriented hamartiological consciousness than is done by Solle. The 
possibility of feeling guilt at a failure regarding those who are 'near', may also, 
from the point of view of moral development, be seen as a condition of 
experiencing a guilty involvement with the suffering of those who are 'far off. 
The individual experience of guilt has, with regard to social guilt feelings, a 
preliminary character, though it may of course remain in this stage and assume 
a privatised character, as Solle points out. 
In order to promote peace in its social sense, a peace praxis of people 
acting in solidarity with others is required (Schillebeeckx 1983, 103). The 
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soterïological interpretation of peace has this solidary praxis as the basis of its 
experience. From the hermeneutical point of view, human praxis determines 
how God's peace can be experienced in the world: Through the intermediary 
of the liberating conduct of men in quest of salvation-from-God, God reveals 
himself 'indirectly' in history as salvation for men" (Schillebeeckx 1975, 521). 
The human subject of peace in the soteriological sense is the socially oriented 
subject, who, in solidarity, directs his praxis to the promotion of peace and 
liberation for others. Metz has proclaimed the "subject in solidarity" as the 
outstanding subject of theology: "The question of men's ability to become 
subjects in solidarity with each other and that of the religious subject are 
convergent" (Metz 1977, 69; cf. Moltmann 1984, 161-162). 
Schillebeeckx does not accept Metz' rather facile equation of the theologi-
cally irrelevant, because privatised, subject who is not in solidarity with others, 
with the average population of Western industrialised countries. He does, 
however, point to the dangers connected with tendencies within the Christian 
religion and theology as aspects of Western culture. The universal reach of the 
Christian message of salvation, aimed at the liberation of all, must be pro-
tected from distortions inspired by individualistic hopes of salvation. "Some 
Christians are fond of asserting that the Christian Gospel is merely a matter of 
the heart, a personal affair, and that Jesus and the New Testament called men 
to conversion of the heart, to inwardness, but not to the reform of structures. 
In so doing these Christians contrast persons and structures, and speak of the 
priority of the human realm and the merely secondary significance of the 
institutional element in human life". In this "abstract personalism", the pro-
found social involvement of the human person is forgotten. Especially the 
desperate orientation towards one's own inner life is, at the most profound 
level, partly determined by the very dynamics of the highly competitive and 
egoistic society in which we live (Schillebeeckx 1977, 684). 
The contradiction, observed by Schillebeeckx and Metz, between the subject 
in solidarity with others and the privatised subject is important for the 
soteriological interpretation of peace. Peace action, seen as action directed 
towards minimising violence and injustice in the world, is only possible as a 
social praxis which assumes the subject to be socially engaged and in solidarity 
with others. The political-theological criticism of the privatised mode of being-
a-subject does not deny that an individual experience of peace can also be an 
authentic dimension of striving for and experiencing peace. In its full richness 
of meaning, peace in the biblical sense (shalom) points to a state of wholeness 
of existence, which includes both an individual and a social dimension, even 
exceeding it in a transcendent manner Pannenberg 1977a, 146-147). The 
individual dimension of peace is an essential part of shalom, but it can be 
perverted in a privatised way, when it is not related to peace in the all-embrac-
ing context of shalom 'for those who are far' (Schillebeeckx 1981, 243; 1983, 
102). 
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(e) Orthopraxis as the basis of the church 
The church as a institution never exists for itself alone, even though it (...) has 
often forgotten this. This is precisely the reason why we should not speak so 
often directly of the church" (Schillebeeckx 1986, 35). The fact that, in spite of 
this statement, Schillebeeckx has written not a little about the church 
(Schillebeeckx 1966; 1968; 1980a; 1984; 1989) should not be seen as an 
inconsistency. His whole ecclesiology is directed towards demonstrating the 
importance - for the Christian faith and for the world - of a church which does 
not, ecclesiocentrically, exist only for itself. 
The fact that the church does not exist for itself means primarily that the 
church is not salvation, but is a "sacrament" of the salvation which God brings 
about in his created world, through the mediation of people (Schillebeeckx 
1986, 36). The sanctifying significance of the church is not a supernatural 
quality. The church is not an absolute transcendent gift, bequeathed by Christ 
to his followers, which can only be received by the faithful in absolute obedi-
ence and loyalty to the leadership of the church (Schillebeeckx 1989, 205-245). 
For the faithful, the church is both a gift and a task. This is so because the 
church is the "eschatological people of God", gathered as the inner-worldly 
continuation of the eschatological meaning of Jesus' life. The church may be 
considered as a gift from God, who recruits his people in Jesus through the 
Spirit. But this gift confronts the church with the task of proving its quality as 
God's eschatological people, by bearing symbolic witness of the kingdom of 
God in word and sacrament, and by effectively anticipating the coming 
kingdom in its praxis. 
In this ecclesiological approach, the identity of the church is first and 
foremost determined by orthopraxis. It follows from this that the stake for 
peace in the world is not just a subsidiary task of the church. The commitment 
to peace is a concrete way in which the church gives a practical form to its 
affirmation of the kingdom of God, proving itself the eschatological people of 
God. The legitimacy of the peace praxis of the church acquires an 
ecclesiological anchor. Moreover, the character of the church as the eschatol-
ogical community of the faithful also provides an indication for the content of 
the peace praxis of the church. As an eschatological community, the church 
fulfils a critical and Utopian function in society. This function is nourished by 
the stimulating message of the Christian eschatological expectation, as well as 
by the reality of negative contrast experiences, which encourage the church to 
exceed the existing relationships in the world in a critical manner 
(Schillebeeckx 1972, 156-157). The church's function as a critic of society also 
extends to its mandate for peace. Among other things, this imposes conditions 
on the nature of church statements regarding matters of war and peace. The 
church cannot fulfil its critical mandate for peace, by only speaking in general 
principles about peace (id., 155). Neither is it obvious, from this angle, that the 
church should conform to the official government policy regarding war and 
peace, nor that it should remain remote from collective peace actions 
(Schillebeeckx 1983). 
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From the five themes which have be distinguished with the help of 
Schillebeeckx' critical-hermeneutical theology, a number of theological distinc-
tions can be derived which, taken together, allow to delineate the ground-
structure of a theological framework of religious peace attitudes. 
To start with, three large theological domains can be distinguished, in which 
various types of religious peace attitudes can be accommodated: 
hamartiological attitudes regarding war, soteriological peace attitudes and 
ecclesiologica! peace attitudes. 
Hamartiological and soteriological peace attitudes relate to each other as 
mirror images: the vision of evil determines the vision on salvation, and vice 
versa. Further detail of the various parts of hamartiological and soteriological 
attitudes is shown in a parallel manner. However, hamartiological attitudes 
must be granted sequential priority over soteriologial attitudes because of the 
special hermeneutical function of negative contrast experiences, as well as the 
negative meaning structure of the concept of peace (peace as the absence of 
violence). 
Hamartiological and soteriological peace attitudes can both be subdivided 
along various lines. To begin with, a distinction can be made between different 
dimensions of transcendence within hamartiology and soteriology. Is the tran-
scendence of evil and salvation experienced as something which reveals itself 
within human realisations of war and peace, or as something which sends wars 
and brings peace from outside? In the first case there is a matter of immanent 
transcendence, in the second case of absolute transcendence. Secondly, from the 
connection oipast, present ana future in the history of evil and salvation, it can 
be deduced that the hamartiological and soteriological dimensions of transcen-
dence must be analyzed with concentration on each of the three dimensions of 
time. The question is which concrete religious attitudes give expression to the 
various temporal orientations in the various dimensions of transcendence. In 
the third place, the question concerning the human subject of evil and salvation 
constitutes a criterium of distinction between religious peace attitudes. Who is 
being referred to when there is talk about the evil of war and the good of 
peace? The central distinction here is between the social and the individual 
subject of hamartiology and soteriology. 
Even though the church and its presence in the world can be interpreted in 
soteriological terms (and for some in hamartiological terms too), 
ecclesiological attitudes will here be treated as a separate category. They refer 
to the way in which the community of the faithful gives a concrete form to the 
peace which it has received, soteriologically, as a task from God. Within these 
ecclesiological attitudes a distinction is made between attitudes relating to the 
legitimacy, the content and the influence of the peace praxis of the church. 
The resulting structure of the theological framework of religious peace 
attitudes is reproduced schematically in figure 2.9. In the next three sections, 
this diagram will be filled with concrete peace attitudes, starting with 
hamartiology (section 2.6.3), next soteriology (2.6.4) and finally ecclesiology 
(2.6.5). 
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2.6.3 Hamartiologlcal attitudes regarding war 
War and the threat emanating from arms surely belong to the most forceful 
negative contrast experiences which a person can meet in his lifetime, or 
humanity in the course of its history. The negative contrast experiences of war 
and armament are not only the point of departure for an awareness of peace 
in a positive sense, as Schillebeeckx emphasises (1989, 25; 1983, 102); it is also 
the starting point for a reflection concerning the ontology of evil in the world: 
what is evil, where does it come from, and why does it affect some and not 
others? From a hermeneutical point of view, every hamartiology can be seen 
as the illuminating of a transcendent dimension in the experiences with 
concrete evil which people have in the world. Immanent evil is the basis of 
experience of evil in a transcendent sense. 
There are various religious interpretations of the evil of war which express 
an immanent transcendent dimension in hamartiology. The connection between 
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them is the idea that the acting of people in its historical connections creates 
social structures and cultural patterns which awaken the evil of war and 
perpetuate it. Having been created out of the free actions of people, these 
structures and patterns acquire an autonomy and substance which outgrow the 
influence of the individual and impair his freedom. The experience of the 
radical and universal character of evil which is immanent in the world, is 
religiously interpreted in the light of a transcendent reality. A traditional 
religious symbolisation of this immanent transcendence of evil is the concept 
of original sin. 
Over against the immanent transcendent dimension of hamartiology, can be 
put the contrasting figure of an absolute transcendent dimension. In an 
absolutely transcendent approach to hamartiology divine activity excludes 
human activity. The logic of the model of absolute transcendence does not 
admit the recognition of any influence of the freedom of the individual in 
relation to the evil of war. The fate of the mortals is decided in the courts of 
the gods. A classical problem connected with the model of absolute transcen-
dence, is the problem of theodicy. If God is good and all powerful, why should 
there be any evil? (Schillebeeckx 1977, 662). 
Both immanent and absolute transcendent hamartiology can be dis-
tinguished according to the three time dimensions of past, present and future. 
In the past, a radical and universal cause of the evil of war can be situated, in 
which the origin of the evil is part of the origin of the world and of humanity. 
In the present, ad hoc explanations for concrete evil can be given, phrased in 
terms of the relation between God and man at the current moment. In the 
future, a universal end of the evil of war can be projected as part of the 
eschatological denouement of evil in the history of the world. 
Beside this distinction between dimensions of transcendence and the 
connected time dimensions, the definition of the human subject of the evil of 
war also contains a hamartiological criterion of distinction. Central to this is 
the distinction between a social and an individual subject of hamartiology. This 
difference is closely connected with that between the (collective) symbolism of 
sin and the (individual) symbolism of guilt. 
To sum up: the cluster of hamartiological peace attitudes consists of the 
following eight types of images: 
Immanent transcendent hamartiology 
(a) immanent transcendent hamartiology in the past 
(b) immanent transcendent hamartiology in the present 
(c) immanent transcendent hamartiology in the future 
Absolute transcendent hamartiology 
(d) absolute transcendent hamartiology in the past 
(e) absolute transcendent hamartiology in the present 
(f) absolute transcendent hamartiology in the future 
Human subject of hamartiology 
(g) social subject of hamartiology 
(h) individual subject of hamartiology. 
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Each of these types is discussed below under one or more representative cases 
which clearly illustrate their characteristics. 
Immanent transcendent hamartiology 
(a) Immanent transcendent hamartiology in the past 
The traditional doctrine of original sin can be considered as a model of the 
combination of immanent transcendence and a temporal orientation of the 
past. The doctrine of original sin reveals a transcendent dimension of radical 
immanent evil. The transcendent dimension of the immanent evil is here 
localised temporally rather than locally: the transcendent origin of evil is not 
above but before the world, at the beginning of time. Evil has a transcendent 
origin in the mythical pre-history, whence it reproduces itself immanently 
through human history. 
Original sin is understood as the sinful condition in which humanity finds 
itself from its origin. In the Bible the origin of human sinfulness is narrated in 
the myth of the Fall. Adam, the father of all people and, as a corporative 
personality, the personification of the entire human race, detached himself 
from the original integrity of creation by breaking God's command. Thus he 
led humanity into the world of contrasts - between God and man, between 
man and man and between man and nature - which is the fertile soil for sin 
(Schoonenberg 1967, 900). 
No effort is made in the Bible to fathom the mechanism by which Adam's 
original sin is transmitted to his descendants. It was St. Augustine who 
developed, in a metaphysical framework of reference, the theory that Adam's 
original sinfulness had been passed on down the chain of generations by sexual 
reproduction. In St. Augustine's understanding of original sin the human 
predisposition towards evil is objectified, specially because of the close link 
between sin and sexuality (Baumann 1970, 182-184). The tendency towards evil 
is presented as a fate which is inherent in human existence, and which impairs 
human freedom to do what is right. 
Not only does the concept of original sin offer a religious interpretation of 
the experience of the radicalness and universality of evil in the world, it also 
functions as a theodicy. God is justified over against evil by an argument 
'contra hominem': because of the Fall, man has called down upon himself the 
evil under which he suffers. This implies that the concrete evil in the world 
acquires a certain legitimation. The doctrine of original sin legitimizes the 
existing order of violence, oppression and inequality in the world by viewing 
them as a fate which sinful mankind has brought upon itself. In the same way 
the evil of war can be legitimised religiously too, as a misfortune of original sin 
in the process of human history. It is perhaps no accident that the same St. 
Augustine who laid the basis for the doctrine of original sin, was also present 
beside the cradle of the teaching about the just war (Regout 1934, 39-44). St. 
Augustine considered a defeat in war as a "deserved consequence of sin" (Civ. 
Dei XIX, 15), even where the fighting was for a just cause. 
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Contemporary theologians have brought forward numerous objections to 
the traditional concept of original sin. Tillich suggests that the concept should 
be removed from the theological vocabulary, because it is too much encum-
bered with absurd literal interpretation. A new interpretation of the concept 
should give expression to the universal fateful character of human estrange-
ment (Tillich 1957, 46; 54). In present day theology this new interpretation is 
mainly achieved by describing the universality and fatefulness of sin in histori-
cal-social terms. As in the traditional teaching about original sin, the historicity 
of sin plays a central part in this new model, but it is considered as a histori-
cal-social entity rather than a metaphysical one. Human freedom is always 
situated, determined by what preceded it as the result of other people's 
actions, which indicates its potential and its limitations. In the new model sin is 
the result of the socialisation of the individual in the historically developed 
social culture, in which evil has already taken hold (Schoonenberg 1967, 928-
932). 
The historical-social view of the radical nature of evil also offers the 
framework for a hamartiological interpretation of the evil of war. Wars are 
eruptions of the accumulated evil caused by the distorted relationships in the 
world, which have developed in the course of history. 
(b) Immanent transcendent hamartiology in the present 
The word 'present' used here should not be taken as referring to the exact 
'now' of the physical image of the world, but rather to the extended present of 
a subjective experience of time: the present which is orientated towards the 
space of experience of the past and the horizon of the future. The present 
referred to here is that space of time which we consider as 'our time', and 
which may easily include a period of years or even decades (Husserl 1966; 
Ricoeur 1985). 
The present time is the temporal framework for ad hoc explanations of the 
evil in the world. In the immanent transcendent perspective concrete evil is 
interpreted religiously by tracing it back to deeper lying social institutions, both 
structural and cultural, which are considered as characteristic for this period. 
The elusive and inclusive nature of these structural and cultural determinants 
of evil is interpreted by the religious consciousness in the light of a transcen-
dent dimension of evil, which is expressed in images as 'the demonic' or 
'idolatry'. 
A catchword of the hamartiological interpretation of the structural nature 
of evil in the world is the recently introduced term sinful structures. This term 
can be seen as a theological interpretation of the concept of structural or 
institutional violence which was discussed in section 1.1. In the Medellin 
document, the Latin American bishops speak of the situation of economic 
dependence of their continent as a situation of "institutional violence" in which 
the people of Latin America suffer under "structural shortages in industry and 
agriculture, of the national and international economy and of the cultural and 
political life" (Latin American Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops 1968, 
1.2, 16). The Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians asked, in 
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1981, for more theological attention for the "structural aspects of sin" (Fabella 
& Torres 1983, 197). Pope John Paul II spoke of the "structures of sin" as the 
consolidated consequences of individual sinful actions. Specifically he was 
thinking of "certain forms of modern imperialism". With this phrase he 
referred particularly to the sinful character of the economic and political 
power structures in the world today (John Paul II 1987, 36-39). 
The structural characteristics of a society are always connected with certain 
cultural characteristics, as Marx and Weber have shown each in their own way, 
concerning the relation between the economic order and the religion of a 
society (Marx 1844; Weber 1920). John Paul Π too connects structural sin to 
an accompanying cultural pattern. He points to the absolute validity attributed 
to the struggle for advantage and the thirst for power as patterns in our 
culture which conceal "real forms of idolatry: of money, ideology, class, 
technology" (John Paul II 1987, 36-39; cf. Verstraeten 1988). 
The problems connected with war can be related both to the structural and 
to the cultural dimension of the more profound evil in the world. Some see the 
"Military Industrial Complex" as a fundamental structural cause of the evil of 
war and armament. The conspiracy of military power and economic interest in 
the Military Industrial Complex is seen as one of the fundamental causes of 
the absence of peace in the world. In hamartiological terms, this constellation 
of military power and economic interest, which is directed against peace and 
humanity, is sometimes interpreted as a "demonic power" which must be 
"exorcised". In the interpretation of structural sin as demonic, the experience 
of immanent radical evil, is placed in the perspective of the transcendent reality 
(World Council of Churches 1983, 83-91; Duchrow 1984). 
A more profound cultural cause of the evil of war and armament is seen by 
many in the ideology of security, which pervades present day society (Eppler 
1983). The theological criticism of this ideology concentrates on the pseudo-
religious character of the collective expectation that weapons will guarantee 
safety. The ideology of security has the character of a new doctrine of salva­
tion which is built into the absolute value attached to human power and to the 
striving for self-preservation at the cost of others. Such a doctrine is opposed 
to the Christian teaching on salvation which is based on concern and love for 
others (Falcke 1988, 21-23; Netherlands Reformed Church 1981, 19). In 
hamartiological terms this ideology of security can be interpreted as a form of 
sin; as the rejection of the authentic salvation of God, as apostasy and as 
idolatry. "The God of this world is the bomb", said Dorothée Solle (1985, 373). 
(с) Immanent transcendent hamartiology in the future 
In the Jewish-Christian religion the mythology concerning the dénouement of 
evil in the world has mostly taken form of the apocalyptic genre. In the 
imagery of the apocalypse, the dénouement of the world drama is always an 
event of both salvation and disaster, of destructive catastrophe and definitive 
salvation. In the simultaneous projection into the future of human salvation 
and evil, the apocalyptic myth is composed as a plot of global history in which 
the soteriological and hamartiological lines of history meet in a final confronta-
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tion. In apocalyptic literature the negative expectation of the future is always 
accompanied by a moment of hope. The ultimate end of history is seen as a 
final catastrophe through which ultimate salvation will be achieved. In most 
cases there is an expectation that a faithful remnant would survive the catas-
trophe and be glorified. For traditional eschatology there is always some 
positive meaning in the consummating end of history (Kaufmann 1983). 
In the mainstream of contemporary theological thought apocalypticism has 
been pushed very much into the background (Metz 1977, 149-158). In modern 
theology only faint echoes of the apocalyptic double expectation of the future 
have remained (Berkhof 1979, 537; Schillebeeckx 1989, 25). Present Christian 
eschatology mainly has a soteriological direction, oriented towards the course 
and the completion of the line of salvation in the history of the world. Possibly 
one can recognise here a theological expression and legitimation of Western 
progress thinking (Moltmann 1984, 154). As a result of the theological preoc-
cupation with soteriology and salvation history, the traditional hamartiological 
line in the Christian expectation of the future has become very isolated and 
has degenerated into a purely negative image of the future which is turned in 
upon itself. The term 'apocalypticism' has become more and more associated 
with a purely negative, catastrophic expectation for the future. 
This negative apocalypticism expresses an awareness of the overwhelming 
size of the disasters (ecological, demographic, economic) which threaten 
mankind. Traditional transcendent images of an eschatological event of 
gigantic proportions, of a definitive Last Judgement, are used to depict this 
overwhelming negativity. This can be seen as a secularisation of apocalyptic 
thought. In fact, it does seem as if the dimension of religious transcendence 
has completely vanished from the negative, inner-worldly apocalypse. Indeed, 
one can say this is purely immanent apocalypticism. The end of history, which 
many people in the late twentieth century feel forced to face, is conceived 
primarily not as God's doing, but as man's. It is not a part of a grand plan 
bringing about the salvation of humanity; it has no goal, no positive meaning 
whatsoever (Kaufmann 1983). A striking description of the model of a purely 
negative, immanent apocalyptic can be found in a text from the IKV: 
The term 'apocalypticism' has been much used lately by those who have 
become convinced of the impulse towards death and the absence of any 
prospect of the system of security through deterrence. Only the slightest 
mishap need occur and the end of history has arrived. (IKV 1979, 3). 
Of the original religious wealth of meaning of the apocalyptic imagery, there 
only remains the connotation of an ultimate disaster. This is the way in which 
the German writer Enzensberger evoked the inevitability of the end of the 
world in the image of the Titanic driven against the iceberg by the invisible 
hand of recklessness, carelessness and fate. The ship and the iceberg symbolise 
the uncontrollable character of the fatal course of history (Enzensberger 1978). 
Such an image can be called apocalyptic, but only in a purely immanent sense. 
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The model of an immanent transcendent apocalypse ¡s a logical possibility 
which follows from the structure of the theological model of religious peace 
attitudes. But from the point of view of theological contents, the model has no 
foundation. A negative immanent transcendent hamartiology can have no 
meaning in Christian transcendence belief. One can observe the emergence of 
a negative immanent "apocalyptic" consciousness in modern Western culture, but 
this can not be considered a Christian theological concept. 
Absolute transcendent hamartiology 
The most important problem of an absolute transcendent interpretation of evil 
is the problem of theodicy. The term 'theodicy' refers to the attempt in 
philosophy and theology to justify the existence of God in the face of evil and 
suffering in the world (Van der Ven 1989, 7). Already in the beginning of the 
history of philosophy the problem of theodicy was raised. Epicures raised the 
problem in a precise though somewhat complicated manner, as follows: 
Either God wants to remove evil from the world, but cannot. Or he can, but will 
not. Or he will not and cannot. Or he will and can. - If he will and cannot, he is 
impotent. If he can and will not, he docs not love us. If he neither will nor can, he 
is not the good God and is impotent into the bargain. If he will and can - and that 
is the only thing that befits him as God - then where does evil come from and why 
does he not take it away? (Epicures, quoted from Schillcbeeckx 1977, 662). 
Ricoeur sums up the problem of theodicy tersely as the mutually exclusive 
character of the three following assertions: God is omnipotent; God's goodness 
is infinite; evil exists (Ricoeur 1986, 26). The truth of any combination of two 
of these assertions is incompatible with the truth of the remaining one: if God 
is omnipotent and infinitely good, then evil should not exist; if God is omnip-
otent and evil does exist, his goodness is called into question; if God is good 
and evil exists, one must doubt his omnipotence. 
The assertion that evil does exist is the empirical component of the three-
fold problem of theodicy. There is no design of theodicy which can deny the 
reality of evil without overshooting its target. And yet there have been in the 
history of theodicy attempts to solve the problem at least in part by a manipu-
lation of the perception of evil. The most important representative of this line 
of thought is Leibniz. In his Theodicy (1710), Leibniz explains the reality of evil 
as an inevitable by-product of creation, which God does not want, but which 
He nevertheless cannot prevent. One could say that Leibniz's theodicy is based 
on a double effect argument. If a positive effect can only be brought about by 
the simultaneous producing of a negative effect, then the intention to achieve 
the positive effect can by morally justified if the positive value sufficiently 
outweighs the negative value. God's creation, as Leibniz sees it, suffers from a 
double effect problem. 
The good which God produces in the creation is existence. It is better to 
exist than not to exist. Existence is a positive value which is worth the price of 
a certain amount of negative value. This price does indeed have to be paid, in 
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the form of the existence of evil. In creating the world, God wanted it to be 
wholly good. But once created, the creature is necessarily limited in its 
essence, whence it follows that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself 
and commit errors. God could not choose to create without choosing to create 
imperfect beings. God "antecedently" willed the good world and "consequently" 
he willed the best possible one. But even in the best of all possible worlds 
creation must be imperfect and evil must exist (Coppleston 1963, 327). 
In addition to this metaphysical excuse made for God in the light of the 
experience of evil, Leibniz attempts to alleviate the pain by playing down the 
reality of evil in the world. His general contention is that there is incomparably 
more good than evil in the world, and that the evil there is in the world 
belongs to the whole system, which must be taken as a totality (id., 328). The 
reality of innocent suffering, however, resists the speculation about a compen-
sation of evil by good, as Ricoeur remarks (Ricoeur 1986, 28). Historically, this 
objection was expressed particularly by Voltaire. In Candide, ou l'optimisme he 
confronted Leibniz's theodicy of the best possible world with the real suffering 
of the great earthquake in Lisbon in 1755, thus subjecting Leibniz's optimistic 
perception of the evil in the world to a correction which was unavoidable (cf. 
Weinrich 1971). 
If theodicy is to fulfil its function of a religious framework of meaning for 
the experience of evil, it must not belittle the reality of this experience. The 
experience of evil resists any solution of the problem of theodicy based on 
changing the perception of evil. What can be varied are the two speculative 
religious interpretive components of the threefold problem of theodicy: God's 
omnipotence and goodness. Speculatively, the problem of theodicy can be 
approached by reducing God's omnipotence, thus saving his goodness, or by 
sacrificing God's goodness to his omnipotence. Depending on the precedence 
which is accorded to God's omnipotence or goodness, the models of theodicy 
can be divided into two main types (Van de Beek 1984, 26). 
Under the heading of God's omnipotence are grouped those models in 
which evil is in some way connected with God, as a curse, as part of a divine 
plan, as retribution, or as an educative instrument (id., 28-118; Van der Ven 
1989, 10). 
Under the heading of God's goodness are grouped those models in which 
God is connected with the passive undergoing of evil or with the active 
resistance against evil. In the passive acceptance of evil God appears as the 
compassionate God: the God who is present with those who suffer, suffering 
along with them in their suffering (Van der Ven 1989, 12; Pröpper 1983). In 
the resistance against evil, praxis is the medium of theodicy. "Theodicy is only 
possible through praxis in solidarity with others, together with its theory, which 
describes the individual and social solidarity which those who are suffering or 
in need" (Janssen 1982, 32). 
Within the model of absolute transcendence the problem of theodicy can 
only be approached by saving God's omnipotence at the expense of God's 
goodness, for in this model the supernatural omnipotence of God is axiomatic. 
Moreover, beside the image of the curse, the plan, the retribution or the 
114 
educative meaning, there is the dualistic model as a way in which evil can be 
interpreted in an absolute transcendent framework (Van de Beek 1984, 194-
213). This model also fulfils a function of theodicy: the absolute transcendent 
power which brings evil into the world is not God, but a supernatural principle 
which is opposed to God. 
The five absolute transcendent hamartiological attitudes which are discussed 
here can be divided over two dimensions of time. The first three models (the 
curse, the plan and the dualistic one) look for a radical and universal explana-
tion of evil in the mythical past - in the mythical events in which the world has 
its origins. The other two models (retribution and education) attempt to find 
in the present ad hoc formulations about concrete evil in the actual situation. 
The present should here be understood in the broader sense of the 'extended 
present', which contains more than the precise 'now'. In the temporal dimen-
sion of the future, mythical representations about the dénouement of the evil 
in the world are enacted. The best example of this hamartiological image is the 
apocalypse. 
(d) Absolute transcendent hamartiology in the past 
In the curse model of theodicy, the evil in the world is related to the mythical 
fall of man, with man's subsequent damnation by God. In reaction to the 
breaking of His commandment, God punishes man with banishment from the 
original peace of paradise. "Human life in its present form is lived under God's 
judgement, it is an existence of banishment, expulsion and homelessness" 
(Drewermann 1977 I, 87). Discord and murder make an entrance into human 
history (Cain and Abel). The radical and universal nature of the evil of war 
can be understood in this perspective: the phenomenon of war is a symptom of 
the situation of mankind under God's curse. 
In the plan model of theodicy, evil is 'modus ponens' brought into connec-
tion with God, as conclusion from the major premise that everything which 
happens in the world has a place in the Almighty's overarching plan, and the 
minor premise that evil too belongs to the things which take place in the 
world. The concept of a divine plan for the world is protologically based on 
God's providence, which can be seen as a hidden determinism of the creation 
(Schreurs 1985). The evil of war can be connected with a divine necessity in 
this plan theodicy. Wars are part of God's unfathomable plan for the world, 
which people cannot understand, but which they must accept nevertheless. 
Because of the intentionality which is proper to every plan, the plan theodicy 
also has an orientation towards the future. The intentional act in which God's 
plan for the world was established took place in the mythical past, but the 
intention itself will only be completely revealed in the mythical future. 
The dualistic model has its historical origins in the Zoroastric religion of 
ancient Iran, from where it influenced late Judaism and early Christianity via 
Gnosticism and Manicheism. The core of all dualistic thought is the bipartite 
division within the sphere of transcendent power. Beside the good God there 
is an evil transcendent principle: the power of darkness, which in Gnosticism 
and Manicheism is identified with unclean matter (Schnackenburg 1959; Jonas 
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1963). God is not all powerful and the world is not his 'creado ex nihilo'. The 
evil in the world is explained by assuming the unclean transcendent power is 
the creator of the world. Human souls are part of the divine substance which 
has fallen into the unclean matter and is kept captive there (Ricoeur 1986, 22-
23). The church has always, powerfully and even violently, resisted Manicheism 
and the later 'heretical' sects inspired by it, such as the Albigensians. Even so, 
Christianity has known a number of curtailments of the divine omnipotence in 
the form of elements of a dualistic nature (cf. Weber 1972, 318). One example 
are St. Paul's words about the cosmic powers, as is demonology which has 
remained so vital in the whole history of the church. Present day theologians 
too do not reject dualist thought altogether. This is particularly true in relation 
to the attempt of dualism to save God's goodness over against evil. Schille-
beeckx discerns in dualism the theologically correct foundation: namely "that 
'God' can only be pure positivity, the 'first principle' of good, and in no way 
the ground of evil" (Schillebeeckx 1977, 668). According to Kasper, the 
dualistic teaching about Satan gives expression to the cosmic entanglement of 
man in a world which alienates him from himself, and which is hostile to him. 
It is difficult to see how such a world can have been made by a good creator 
(Kasper 1981, 183-184). From the great popularity of Kushner's book Wien 
Bad Things Happen to Good People it is clear that many people today are 
attracted by a dualising immunisation of God with regard to evil. One of the 
basic tenets of this book is that God has simply nothing to do with evil and 
suffering. He is above it and outside it (Schillebeeckx, 1989, 105). The great 
theological objection to dualism is that it is difficult to combine with the 
monistic starting point of the Christian religion, that "God is all in all" (Kasper 
1981, 190). In spite of its heterodox implications, the dualistic model has been 
included in this research, because there are empirical indications that the 
model is still present in the religious consciousness of people. Research in 
1981 showed that more than a quarter of Dutch people over 55 years of age 
believed in the existence of "the devil" (Halman et al. 1987, 38-39). The evil of 
war can, in a dualistic hamartiology, be understood as the work of an evil, 
ungodly power which rules the world and plunges mankind into destruction. 
(e) Absolute transcendent hamartiology in the present 
In the retribution model of theodicy, evil is connected with God by the 
mechanism of the 'lex talionis'. God punishes evil with evil, "an eye for an eye, 
a tooth for a tooth" (Deut. 19:21). The retribution model always relates to the 
evil of today. It offers an ad hoc explanation for the evil suffered today, by 
viewing it as a retaliation for an immediately preceding committed evil, known 
or unknown. The evil of today takes place on the basis of a divine rationale in 
the immediate past (Van de Beek 1984, 56). 
The retribution model has some similarity with the curse model which has 
already been described. There are two differences: the first one concerns the 
extent of the evil. The curse model is directed at universal evil as an object 
(evil as such), while the retribution model always relates to some particular 
evil (this illness, that war, et cetera). The second difference is concerned with 
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the temporal orientation of both models. The curse model looks for the radical 
origin of evil in mythical proto-history. The retribution model on the other 
hand takes place completely within the 'extended present'. This model looks in 
the present day for sequential connections between human moral and religious 
aberrations one the one hand, and occurring evil on the other. Such connec-
tions are then interpreted as divine retribution. In the nature of the case, the 
two models are not mutually exclusive; possibly they belong to the same, 
deeper hamartiological dimension. 
In the retribution model the suffering brought on by war is connected with 
previous moral or religious lapses by the group affected, by the intervention of 
a chastising God. In the Old Testament various examples can be found of such 
an explanation of the evil of war functioning as retribution. When Israel 
indulged in idol worship, God's punishment came as defeat in war and violent 
oppression: 
They provoked the LORD to anger because they forsook him and served Baal and 
the Ashoreths. In his anger against Israel the LORD handed them over to raiders 
who plundered them. He sold them to their enemies all around whom they were 
no longer able to resist (Judges 2:12-14). 
The educative model offers another ad hoc explanation for concrete evil in the 
present, in this case by considering evil as the instrument God uses to correct 
the mistakes made by mankind. Here it is not God's intention to balance evil 
with evil, according to a certain concept of retributive justice, but to educate 
(Van de Beek 1984, 29). Education includes frustration, the word 'no', and, in 
cases of disobedience, punishment as well. In the Bible the image of the 
chastising father is used for the relationship between God and his people: 
"My son, do not despise the LORD's discipline and do not resent his rebuke, 
because the LORD disciplines those he loves as a father the son he delights in" 
(Prov. 3:11, 12; Hebr. 12:5, 6). 
Here, actual evil and suffering are understood in the light of a divine rationale 
in the future. God wants to bring people to repentance by bringing suffering 
upon them, and so change their attitudes. The aim of the change is ethical and 
religious: suffering will help man to deepen his humanity and faithfulness; it 
will purge and purify him. Suffering is the royal way to heaven and spiritual 
perfection. It is the divine way of catharsis, the Christian way of kenosis. 
Peter Berger has pointed to the masochistic character of absolute transcen-
dent models of theodicy, in which the individual humiliates and subjects 
himself before the omnipotent transcendent God (Berger 1969, 53-80). He sees 
theodicy as part of the "world-building enterprise" by which society constitutes 
a meaningful order, a "nomos", on the discrete experiences and intentions of 
individuals (id., 19). "A plausible theodicy (...) permits the individual to 
integrate anomie experiences of his biography into the socially established 
nomos and its subjective correlate in his own consciousness" (id., 58). Theodicy 
gives suffering a meaning. The 'benefit' of theodicy for society is that it 
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permits entire collectivities to integrate anomie events into the nomos estab-
lished in their society. These events are now given 'a place' in the scheme of 
things, which consequently is protected from the threat of chaotic disintegra-
tion that is always implicit in such events". The anomie evils for society not 
only include natural disasters, illness and death, but also the evils which men 
inflict on one another. Theodicy protects the social order against the disrup-
tion of anomie political and economic experiences which are expressed in such 
outcries as: "why does God permit the foreigners to conquer us?", or: "why 
does God permit some people to eat and others to go hungry?" (id., 58-59). 
Masochism - "the attitude in which the individual reduces himself to an 
inert and thinglike object vis-à-vis his fellowmen" (id., 55) - links the experi-
ence of suffering to the social order and its religious nomos. Masochism is an 
intensification of the self-denying surrender which every society, to a greater or 
lesser extent, demands from its members. By encapsulating the masochistic 
attitude in the religious attitude towards God, society establishes a nomisation 
of the self-denying surrender of the individual in society. 
The masochistic tendency of theodicy has developed most strongly in the 
orbit of the biblical religion. For like no other God, the biblical God is 
"radically transcendentalized, that is, posited as totally other (totaliter aliter) 
vis-à-vis man. In this transcendentalization there is implicit from the start the 
masochistic solution par excellence to the problem of theodicy - submission to 
the totally other, who can be neither questioned nor challenged, and who, by 
his very nature, is sovereignly above any human ethical and generally nomic 
standards" (id., 74). 
Aspects of a masochistic theodicy with respect to the anomie events of war 
are observable in all of the absolute transcendent hamartiologies differentiated 
above. The model of God's original curse, the predestination model of God's 
plan, God's retaliation and God's pedagogy all present different examples of a 
theodicy in which man denies himself before the absolute transcendent God, 
and thereby, in masochistic love, devotion and surrender, transcends his own 
suffering. The suffering which war causes is given a religious meaning, by 
interpreting it as the medium through which the masochistic master-slave 
relationship between God and man takes place. 
Human self-denial before the transcendent power is also a central feature 
of the dualistic theodicy model. As the material world is pervaded by the dark 
forces of the cosmos, everything associated with the world, notably the physical 
and historical being of man, is radically devalued (id., 72). In the 
demonological personifications of the evil cosmic principle, the sado-masochis-
tic relationship between man and the evil transcendent reality reaches a 
climax. Satan is the Great Sadist, who enjoys nothing more than inflicting pain 
and suffering on man, and subjecting him to his perverse will. 
(f) Absolute transcendent hamartiology in the future 
Earlier in this section the hamartiological model of immanent transcendent 
apocalypticism was discussed. This was considered as the interpretation of a 
pessimistic, inward expectation of the future, with the help of the apocalyptic 
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world of symbolism. The original, biblical apocalypticism is absolutely transcen-
dent. The dénouement of evil in history has the character of a final divine 
intervention in the world, in which God, who lives and rules spatially beyond 
the world, has taken up position behind the world, from where He makes the 
final judgement over good and evil. Moltmann places the roots of the apoca-
lyptic in the story of the Exodus. Pharaoh and his army are destroyed so that 
Israel can be free. The destruction of the power which is against God belongs 
to the root experiences of Israel. This experience has been projected into the 
future by the apocalyptic scholars. The future, definitive Exodus-struggle in the 
final struggle between God and his enemies. This battle can only end with the 
victory of the good and the downfall of evil. During that time, the world 
becomes the great battlefield of God, where Michael and his angels fight the 
red dragon and its empire. The Saints are God's soldiers. They are in a 
constant state of war and crusade against evil. From such apocalyptic images 
of the ultimate battle, without which there can be no Exodus into freedom, the 
idea of 'total war' is born (Moltmann 1984, 95). 
For some Christians in our time the absolute transcendent apocalypse is a 
credible religious image. Specifically the possibility of a nuclear war bringing 
universal destruction caused certain groups of Christians to draw a parallel 
between the threatening course of history and the Day of Judgement. Apo-
calypticism contains many images which evoke an association with the phe-
nomenon of war: the advancing armies (Rev. 16:13-16; 20:7-8), the fight (Rev. 
6:4), the destruction of the earth (Rev. 8:7; 9:13-18), defeat (Rev. 20:9), and 
victory (Rev. 6:2). During the 1970s and 1980s, in reaction to the nuclear 
threat, absolute transcendent apocalypticism experienced a great revival among 
fundamentalist Christian groups in the United States (Chapman 1987; Schreurs 
1985). Theologians in these circles developed an 'Armageddon theology' with a 
deterministic and fatalistic character, in which God's absolute transcendence 
was strongly underlined. An example of this are the violent apocalyptic 
predictions of Hall Lindsey. His basic assumption was that humanity finds 
itself on the threshold of the seven years of the Tribulation which will end in 
the great Battle of Armageddon (Rev. 16:16), after which the Millennium will 
begin. During the Tribulation, the true faithful will be gathered up by God, 
after which the rest of mankind will fall under God's judgement and be 
decimated (Lindsey 1972; cf. Blei 1986, 22-37). Some fundamentalists believed 
that nuclear weapons would play an important part in the apocalyptic holo-
caust. In consistence with their absolute transcendent image of the deity they 
could not escape considering this nuclear holocaust as part of the purpose of 
God (Kaufmann 1983, 8). 
To sum up this survey of hamartiological dimensions of transcendence, all 
attitudes which were introduced earlier are presented in figure 2.10. 
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Human subject of hamartiology 
The human subject of hamartiology can be either social or individual. With the 
help of Ricoeur's typology of symbols of evil, the social and the individual 
subject of hamartiology can be linked to the respective symbols of and sin and 
guilt. 
(g) The social subject of hamartiology 
One of the cultural-historical origins of the symbolism of sin is Yahwism. 
Characteristic of Israel's experience of sin is its collective character; the human 
subject of sin is a social one. This is related to the collective character of the 
connection between God and man. God does not make his covenant with 
individuals, not with Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, or the seventy 
elders of Israel on Mount Horeb, but with the whole people: "I will take you 
for my people and I will be your God" (Ex. 6:7). The quality of the relationship 
between God and people is in the first place determined by the behaviour of 
the people of Israel and Judea, as a cultic and political community. The 
Prophets in particular contributed to Israel's collective awareness of sin 
(Ricoeur 1960, 66). They accuse the whole of God's people because of aberra-
tions in the official cult and because of the social injustice which has been 
committed, as in Amos: 
Because they have rejected the law of the LORD and have not kept his decrees, 
because they have been led astray by false gods, the gods their ancestors followed, 
I will send fire upon Judah that will consume the fortresses of Jerusalem (Amos 
2:4-5). "They do not know how to do right" declares the LORD, "who board 
plunder and loot in their fortresses". Therefore this is what the sovereign LORD 
says: "An enemy will overrun the land; he will pull down your strongholds and 
plunder your fortresses" (Amos 3:10-11). 
Complementary to its collective character, sin is also external in character. As 
a collective transgression of God's covenant, sin is a situation in which the 
individual is caught: "le pécheur est 'dans' le péché, comme l'hébreu 'dans' la 
servitude; le péché est ainsi un mal 'dans quoi' l'homme est prise" (Ricoeur 
1960, 93). Moreover, in its external character, sin is a monolithic fact; it is a 
situation in which the people either find or do not find themselves, there are 
no gradations. Applying this to the problems connected with war, the symbol-
ism of sin can be related to the social subject of hamartiology. In this model, 
wars are an evil for which the community, as the milieu surrounding the 
individual, bears responsibility. 
(h) The individual subject of hamartiology 
In the symbolism of guilt, the experience of evil becomes simultaneously 
individualised and internalised. The images of a burden and of a legal accusa-
tion replace the images of transgression and error. While sin is real and 
objective, a milieu in which the sinner finds himself even if he is not aware of 
this, guilt is subjective. It only exists in a consciousness in which the individual 
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becomes the author of his own transgression: "l'homme est coupable comme il 
se sent coupable" (Ricoeur 1969, 288). The dialogue in which sin is brought to 
light - as accusation by the prophet and as confession before God - changes 
into an interior monologue of the guilty consciousness which condemns itself. 
In contrast to sin, guilt has many gradations, which form a continuum between 
the extremes of 'malevolent' and 'righteous'. 
Guilt symbolism is extremely susceptible to a privatised, a-political experi-
ence of evil. This trait is the object of criticism from the political theologians, 
specifically Solle, who accuse Western culture and theology of blindness for 
evil in its social and structural nature. Over against the privatisation of the 
hamartiological consciousness Solle would like to arouse the awareness of a 
personal responsibility for social structural evil. In this connection she speaks 
of the "sin of collaboration", which lays upon all of us, the co-responsibility for 
the prevailing structural evil of oppression and exploitation in the world (Solle 
1971, 87-96). For Tillich, who speaks from his experience as a German citizen 
during the Second World War, this co-responsibility can be defined as follows: 
people are not guilty for the misdeeds which others within their community 
have committed; they are guilty because they have contributed to the destiny 
in which such misdeeds could take place (Tillich 1957, 68). 
It would seem that the theological criticism of the privatised hamartiological 
consciousness can be understood as a re-appraisal of the symbolism of sin over 
against the symbolism of guilt. Over against the original collective awareness of 
sin, the interpretation of sin as co-responsibility is however an important 
correction. The sin of co-responsibility is no longer an external milieu in which 
the individual finds himself; it assumes conscious and free action by the 
individual, that is to say, guilt. To confess co-responsibility is therefore a 
confession a sin which has passed through the symbolism of guilt. Co-respon-
sibility connects collective evil to an individual subject. This could be called the 
hamartiological model of the individual in solidarity with others. 
Whereas the individual who is in solidarity with others accepts co-respon-
sibility for the sinful structures in the world, the hamartiological privatised 
individual rejects all such accusations. The guilt for this evil is not "mine" or 
"ours", but "theirs" The most extreme form of this privatised rejection of guilt 
is the concept of the 'evil men'. This idea is extremely popular with regard to 
the cause of wars. According to the theory of evil men, wars are above all 
attributable to the personal ambitions of 'historical' personalities, who, depend-
ing on the point of view, are considered as either 'great men' or 'evil men'. 
Sometimes the evil men variant is hamartiologically connected with war as 
God's punishment for human sinfulness ("Atilla, the scourge of God"). Another 
version of this variant holds the special psychopathology of a leader respon-
sible for the origin of wars (Van der Dennen 1982, 31). Even though it is only 
a folk theory, the theory of the evil men has a certain intellectual attraction, as 
witnesses the genre of psychopathological studies of Hitler, Stalin, Saddam 
Hussein and other monumentally "evil men". For the privatised subject the evil 
men theory offers a moral apology: the accusation of collective guilt is trans-
ferred to the shoulders of one or more strong scape-goats. 
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To sum up, three variants can be distinguished with regard to the hamartio-
logical subject of war (figure 2.11). In the first place, the model of the social 
subject in which the community (the people, humanity) is the primary bearer 
of the moral burden of the evil of war. This model most closely agrees with the 
symbolism of sin. Next, two variants of the individual subject can be distin-
guished, each representing the symbolism of guilt in a different way. On the 
one hand there is the individual subject in solidarity with others, accusing 
himself of being co-responsible for the structural evil in the world. On the 
other hand there is the privatised individual subject, who denies any connec-
tion between his own actions and the evil of war in the world. This model finds 
expression in the 'evil men' theory. The guilt of the few evil men for the 
catastrophe of war relieves the privatised individual of the necessity to search 
for his own share in the evil and to take responsibility for it. 
Figure 2.11 Conceptual model of human subject of hamartiology 
human subject of hamartiology 
I ' I 
social subject: Individual 
collective subject 
sin I 
q. 436, 439, 442 ¡ -1 1 
ι I 
Individual subject privatized Individual 
In solidarity with subject: 'evil men'-
others: guilt of theory 
complicity q. 435, 438, 441 
q. 434, 437, 440 
2.6.4 Soteriological peace attitudes 
In an immanent transcendent soteriology the interpretation of peace is 
characterised by a dialectic of gift and task. Peace in its fullness can only be a 
gift of grace from God, and in that sense is transcendent, but this transcendent 
gift also acts in history as the guarantee that human exertions for the cause of 
peace are not in vain, because they have a meaningful orientation towards the 
ultimate goal of God's transcendent peace. The peace of the world is not the 
same as the peace of God, but nevertheless it has everything to do with that 
peace (Schillebeeckx 1983, 102). In a phrase borrowed from Schoonenberg, 
one could sum up the immanent transcendent perspective on the soteriology of 
peace in the words 'God gives us the task of peace' (cf. Schoonenberg 1969, 
16). 
In the model of immanent transcendence the gift of peace forms the 
foundation for the task of peace in two ways. In the first place the human 
praxis of peace is a task as a condition of the possibility for the experiencing 
and speaking of peace as God's gift. In this case, peace is a task in the 
theological ontological sense: by establishing peace, people verify in a practical 
way the religious hypothesis that God is a God of peace. In the second place, 
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peace praxis is required as a human response to God's initiative of peace. In 
this respect, peace is a task in the theological ethical sense. 
By way of contrast over against the immanent transcendent dimension, we 
will put a number of attitudes defined as absolute transcendent. In the abso-
lute transcendent soteriology of peace the given character of peace comes first. 
Peace is pure grace from a transcendent God. The human role in this model is 
passive: man receives peace. Often this passive role is connected with the 
sinful condition of human existence. Because of his sinfulness, man is unable 
to bring about his own salvation and peace, consequently peace can only come 
from God. This may have the effect that inner-worldly human efforts for peace 
are not considered as soteriologically relevant. God's peace is of a totally 
different order than the peace of the world, and people cannot contribute to it. 
Both the immanent transcendent and the absolute transcendent 
soteriological peace attitudes can be further subdivided according to the three 
dimensions of time: past, present and future. In its immanent transcendent 
meaning peace can be seen as a task founded in the gift of God's creation in 
the past, as part of an answering praxis in imitation of Christ, in the present, 
and as an anticipation of God's eschatological gift of peace in the future. In 
absolute transcendent perspective, peace can be seen as the mark of God's 
sovereign gift of creation, as a mark of God's saving action in the present, or 
as the promise of God's kingdom in the future. 
Finally, soteriological images can be divided according to the human subject 
of peace which can be given a social or an individual contents. 
To sum up, the cluster of soteriological peace attitudes consists of eight 
types, divided over two theoretical domains: 
Soteriological dimensions of transcendence 
(a) immanent transcendent soteriology in the past 
(b) immanent transcendent soteriology in the present 
(c) immanent transcendent soteriology in the future 
(d) absolute transcendent soteriology in the past 
(e) absolute transcendent soteriology in the present 
(f) absolute transcendent soteriology in the future 
Human subject of soteriology 
(g) social subject of soteriology 
(h) individual subject of soteriology 
(a) Immanent transcendent soteriology in the past 
In the dimension of the past, the creation is the main theme for the religious 
interpretation of peace. In an immanent transcendent perspective, the task of 
peace, given with the creation, takes a central position. In contemporary 
theology, the task of peace is mostly related to creation by placing it within the 
context of a larger task, which could be described as an ecological one. In an 
ecological theology of creation the co-responsibility of humankind for the 
preservation of God's creation has a central position. God and man are 
partners in creation. 
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The question whether the Christian religion is really capable of contributing 
to a responsible, non-exploitative relation of man with nature is subject of 
discussion (Manenschijn 1988, 76). Some authors accuse the Christian religion 
as one of the most important historical determinants of the dominant and 
exploitative attitude of Western man towards nature (White 1967). As 'proof 
text' the notorious dominium terrae in the first creation story is often quoted: 
Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish 
of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the 
ground (Gen. 1:28). 
Even though the Jewish-Christian religion is not considered as the only 
historical root of the ecological crisis, the anthropocentric attitude of the 
dominium terrae is nevertheless seen as an important cultural predisposition 
of Western civilisation, which, linked to later developments in technology, 
science and philosophy, has led to a relentless exploitation of nature (Pass-
more 1980; Taylor 1986). Over against this 'despotic' interpretation of the 
Genesis story and the Jewish-Christian tradition, others put a 'conserving' 
interpretation ((Liedke 1979; Attfield 1983). Genesis 2:15 here provides the 
central text: 
The Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it and 
take care of it. 
In Genesis 2:15 man was instructed to protect the earth, not to subdue it. In 
the words of Calvin's exegesis of Genesis 2:15, man is "God's steward" of 
creation (Dei economicus: Calvin 1578, cf. Manenschijn 1988, 83). In this divine 
commission for good stewardship over the earth one could find the starting 
point for an ecological creation theology (Auer 1984a; Moltmann 1985; Solle 
1985). 
The question concerning who is right in the discussion about the ecological 
merits of the Christian creation theology need not delay us further. The only 
important thing to establish is that in theological peace literature there is the 
concept of a task for peace, based on the gift of creation and connected with 
God's commission to man to cultivate the earth and to preserve it. Jiingel 
suggests that mankind's responsibility for peace, based on creation theology, 
gives an "imperative" character to peace. Because the responsibility for peace 
is imposed on man he becomes a "co-worker of God" (Jiingel 1983, 67-68). 
Responsibility for peace as part of the responsibility for the creation 
acquires a special significance in the nuclear era, in which man's ruling power 
has risen to the level of possible self-destruction (id., 69). A striking illustration 
of this intensification of the creational task for peace in the nuclear era is the 
following quotation from a peace sermon published by IKV: 
God has indeed given man incredible power to cultivate the earth and to preserve 
it. Indeed, to preserve it, but surely not to destroy it. That cannot be the reason 
that man is made in God's image, that cannot be his destiny. Where docs man 
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find the arrogance to threaten with the destruction of God's work? (IKV 1981, 
62). 
(b) Immanent transcendent soteriology in the present 
Human actions take place in the present. Nevertheless actions taken today are 
always closely connected with the past and the future. The aim of any action is 
always directed towards changing the present situation, which has come about 
because of actions and events in the past, in the direction of some goal in the 
future. Heidegger has caught this two-sided temporal orientation of action in 
his striking interpretation of the human mode of existence as "geworfener 
Entwurf' (Heidegger 1927). 
The Christian religion too recognizes the two-sided temporal orientation of 
action. The believer finds orientation for his actions in the experience of God's 
saving actions in the past, as well as in the promise of God's eschatological 
actions in the future. Moreover, God's actions in the past and in the future are 
connected by a great arch across the present: the arch stretched between 
memory and hope. Both Schillebeeckx and Metz have pointed towards this 
time-arch in the Christian awareness of time. Schillebeeckx recalls that in the 
Bible the interpretation of a past event always coincides with the affirmation 
of a new expectation. In the memory of the past a new future is opened up 
(Schillebeeckx 1972, 47). Metz interprets the arch between past and future 
mainly in a christological sense. In the memory of the suffering of Jesus Christ, 
the future of freedom is opened up. "What emerges from the memory of 
suffering is a knowledge of the future that does not point to an empty anticipa-
tion, but looks actively for more human ways of life in the light of our experi-
ence of the new creation of man in Christ" (Metz 1977, 98). 
In the immanent transcendent perspective, the connection between God's 
gift of salvation in the past and in the future implies a task for the believer in 
the present. This task is particularly expressed in the image of the imitation of 
Christ. In his readiness to follow Christ the believer gives practical proof of his 
memory of Christ's suffering, in which a new future and new possibilities for 
action are revealed. Such imitation looks forward and backward simultaneous-
ly. Imitation means the placing of fragmentary signs of the kingdom of God in 
this world. Hermeneutically speaking, the praxis of imitation is the basis of 
experience of the connection between God's transcendent salvation in the past 
and in the future. The fact that people in the present, on the basis of the past, 
follow Christ in the light of the future, is the practical verification of the unity 
of God's saving action in the past and in the future (Schillebeeckx 1989, 151). 
In the theological interpretation of peace the concept of imitation appears 
specifically in two radical forms: as love of the enemy and as the readiness to 
suffer for peace. The Christian concept of loving one's enemy has its scriptural 
bases in the antithetical words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount: 
You have heard that it was said, 'Love your neighbour and hate your enemy\ But 
I tell you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may 
be sons of your Father in heaven (Math. 5:43-45). 
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The radical nature of this commandment does not lie in the fact that the circle 
of friends is enlarged to include persons considered as enemies, but in the fact 
that the enemy, as enemy, is defined as lovable. Love for the enemy is also 
radical in that it breaks open the ethos of reciprocity. Loving one's enemy 
encourages to "do more than others" (Math. 5:47), that is to say to take a step 
towards the other in one-sided, asymmetrical actions, which cut through the 
reciprocity of the hostile relationship (Huber 1982, 139; Boerwinkel 1977). 
In Christian literature about war and peace, the opposition between enmity 
and love is often used to elucidate the difference between war, armament and 
deterrence on the one hand, and peace, disarmament and the reduction of 
deterrence on the other. The paper which the Netherlands Reformed Church 
offered as an aid to the discussion on nuclear weapons, argued that enmity is 
the foundation on which nuclear deterrence is based. The enemy must be 
considered as totally evil to justify the threat of total destruction (Netherlands 
Reformed Church 1979, 84). The church peace movements frequently consider 
the relationship between deterrence and the enemy-image from the angle of 
the polemological "autism" theory of Senghaas. According to this theory, the 
deterrence policy generates a self-perpetuating enemy-image which blocks 
possibilities of détente. Although enormous amounts of energy are spent on 
the gathering of information about the opponent, the interpretation of this 
information is distorted by fixed images of the opponent's character and 
intentions. Military strategies are designed on the basis of assumptions about 
what the opponent could do, in theoretical worst cases, not from realistic 
assumptions of what he is likely to do, or what he intends to do. The positive 
assessment of the effectiveness of deterrence is based on self-defined expecta-
tions of conflicts (Senghaas 1981, 185-198; IKV 1972, 7; Pax Christi 1979, 23). 
In response to the connection between enmity and deterrence, the com-
mandment to love one's enemies implies that Christians must look for ways in 
which enmity can be reduced, deterrence be driven back and war be replaced 
by other means of solving conflicts (Huber 1982, 157). In the position taken by 
churches, peace movements and theologians, the interpretation of peace action 
in terms of loving the enemy is frequently related to recommendations of 
unilateral, asymmetrical peace initiatives. A characteristic formulation of this 
connection between loving the enemy and unilateral steps is the following 
pronouncement from bishop Ernst of Breda: 
Making peace in the Christian sense is impossible without reconciliation with the 
enemy. And such reconciliation always requires that you take the first step. It 
means association with the enemy in such a creative way that you deprive him of 
the reasons to remain an enemy. In the nature of the case, the application of this 
principle in the personal sphere varies from its application in the political and 
social plane. But the principle remains the same (quoted in Van Iersel & Van 
Reisen 1987, 54). 
Loving one's enemy is not without risk. It is "the way of Jesus, the way which 
led to the cross" (J. Faber 1979, 11-12). Readiness to run risks for peace is 
shown in the most radical interpretation of following Christ: the readiness to 
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suffer for peace. Schillebeeckx relates this readiness to suffer to the risks 
which are part of taking the first step to break the spiral of the arms race. 
When all other methods have failed, the "hazardous confidence" in unilateral 
steps is the way which the Christian must travel. Unarmed and disarming love 
may provoke aggressive attack, as Christians have learned from the fate of the 
Crucified one. That Christians may share this fate is the ultimate consequence 
of readiness to follow Jesus on the way of love and peace. "I would rather be a 
martyr because I refuse to participate in the preparation of a possible nuclear 
war, than become a victim of a real nuclear war because of neglect to oppose 
it properly" (Schillebeeckx 1983, 104). 
(c) Immanent transcendent soteriology in the future 
In immanent transcendent eschatology, the continuity between the inner-
worldly history and the eschatological completion of the world is of the first 
importance. "The seed of the kingdom of God already germinates and ripens 
here and now on earth. The kingdom of God is not an unearthly other world, 
but the completion of the restoration of this world, our world which is out of 
joint" (Schillebeeckx 1989, 151). The continuity between the present old and 
the eschatological new world implies a relationship between human actions 
aimed at the future and the eschatological actions of God. God's eschatological 
action takes place in an immanent transcendent manner, through the inter-
mediary of liberating and caring human actions directed towards the coming of 
His kingdom (Dutch Bishops' Conference 1983, 8). In the immanent transcen-
dent perspective it becomes possible and meaningful to look for the "salvation 
value of a political peace praxis", with which a specifically theological contribu-
tion to the public discussion about peace problems can be formulated. The 
theologian can understand a specific political praxis in its soteriological 
meaning, namely as salvation or grace, or, as sin and the refusal of grace. 
Crucial here is the question which political praxis may be viewed as a coming 
or approaching of the kingdom of God - a question which can only be 
answered by theologians with extensive cross-disciplinary knowledge of the 
situation (Schillebeeckx 1981). 
In immanent transcendent eschatology of peace, the task of peace is central. 
The human praxis of peace is the medium in which God wants to realise his 
eschatological peace. The immanent transcendent mediation of the divine gift 
of peace and the human task of peace is strikingly expressed in the following 
fragment of an older document from Pax Christi: 
The Christian must not only dare to expect the kingdom of God on earth, he must 
also commit himself to it. The ultimate peace of Christ which he has been 
promised and for which he may hope, he must therefore experience in connection 
with the world. If he does not recognise this connection, or if he looses it, he will 
fail either God or the world (Pax Christi 1965, 10). 
(d) Absolute transcendent soteriology in the past 
If we are looking for an image which expresses, in the time dimension of the 
past, an absolute transcendent soteriology of peace, the image which presents 
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itself particularly is that of creation as an absolute gift of God. In theological 
literature about peace, however, this image occurs only sporadically and 
fragmentarily. It can be constructed theoretically, however, as contrast over 
against an immanent transcendent image of creation. In an absolute transcen-
dent model of creation, peace is interpreted as an absolute gift from God, who 
has created a state of wholeness and peace, in which man may share. Human 
peace action in this model consists in conforming to God's peace order, an 
activity which in itself is not constitutive for the existence of this order. 
A reminiscence of the absolute transcendent model of creation can be 
discerned in a remark by Falcke, that peace (shalom) is a "basic state of 
creation". In its being created, the world is marked by peace, a victory over 
chaos. The concept of peace has "ontological features" (1988, 41). Here, the 
character of the absolute gift of creation is emphasised strongly, while its 
character as task retreats into the background. Falcke's approach to an 
absolute transcendent image of creation has a critical and corrective intention. 
He wants to strengthen an ecological concept of peace, in which peace action 
is seen as conforming with the balance of ecological systems, alongside the 
political understanding of peace. According to Falcke, peace as a way of being 
of creation complements and corrects the activist concept of peace as a 
process. Peace is not only found in the will to change and to emancipate; it is 
also an acceptance of that in creation which is already given as an ordering of 
peace. Peace is "not just going to and working for, it is also dwelling in" (id., 
39). The fact that Falcke's reaction against an activist approach to peace 
(peace as task) goes hand in hand with an approach to absolute transcendent 
images, implies a remarkable confirmation of the conceptual distinction 
between immanent and absolute transcendence. 
(e) Absolute transcendent soteriology in the present 
The absolute transcendent God reveals himself today as Christ who makes 
peace and who has already conquered the power of evil and death by his 
victory over suffering and death on the cross. A characteristic concept here is 
that of christological eschatology, in which the temporal locus of the eschaton 
does not lie in the future but in the present, which, because of the ultimate 
nature of the events in the life and death of Christ, already possesses eschatol-
ogical features. The eschaton is the here-and-now of the world under the aegis 
of Christos pantokrator. The eschatological future will only bring the public 
and universal disclosure of the victory already won by Christ (Moltmann 1984, 
141). 
The concept of christological eschatology is mainly found in the Reformed 
tradition, where the exclusive nature of God's revelation in his Word Jesus 
Christ forms the core of the confession of faith. In an interpretation of the 
christology of Karl Barth and of the Barmen Theological Declaration, which 
was strongly influenced by this christology, Moltmann sums up the contents of 
christological eschatology as follows: 
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AU things and all relationships are already under the liberating and challenging 
Lordship of Christ (...). In Christ, God has humbled himself and taken upon 
himself complete humanity. He has humbled himself unto death on the cross and 
taken upon himself all man's misery and rejection. In Christ, God has however 
also elevated man and brought him into liberty and given him honour. Therefore 
Christ is man's reconciliation, who takes away his sins and damnation. But 
therefore Christ is also the victor over all the authorities and powers. His rising 
from the death and his exaltation to Lordship reveal the triumph of God's mercy 
(ibid.). 
Against the background of Nazi Germany, the Confessing Church (Bekennen-
de Kirche) gave a strong political colouring to the theological image of Christ's 
victory over the principalities and powers. The Pauline image of the cosmic 
powers, which have been unmasked and disarmed by Christ, was applied to the 
political power of the Nazi regime (Dehn 1936; cf. Berkhof 1962). In spite of 
the raging of the secular powers, the whole world is fundamentally already 
subject to the rule of Christ. The battle between the 'regnum Dei' and the 
'regnum diaboli' was fought and won on the cross by Christ. 
In present day theological reflection on peace in the Reformed tradition, 
the political interpretation of the Lordship of Christ is continued. The powers 
which have been unmasked and condemned by Christ are concretely identified 
with the deathly powers of arms, nuclear deterrence and the unjust interna-
tional economic order (World Council of Churches 1983, 72-73), but also as 
the power which each one of us exercises personally in and through these 
institutions. The fact that Christ has dethroned the powers means that their 
power over us has been broken and that we can live in the confidence that 
they will one day be completely defeated (Netherlands Reformed Church 1981, 
18; Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 1985, 90). Typical formulations of 
this theology can specifically be found in the documents of the World Council 
of Churches, whose theology has always had a strong Reformed quality: 
Christ, the life of the world, is our peace (Eph. 2:14). Our hopes for a world 
where life is not threatened by nuclear holocaust, or slow starvation, for a world 
where justice and peace embrace each other, are based in Jesus Christ, the 
Crucified and Risen One who has triumphed over the powers of evil and death, 
and therefore will not allow the ultimate triumph of injustice and war (World 
Council of Churches 1983, 72-73). 
(f) Absolute transcendent soteriology in the future 
In the temporal dimension of the future, the Christian interpretation of peace 
is indissolubly connected with the image of the kingdom of God. In the 
perspective of the absolute transcendent image of God, peace is related to the 
kingdom of God as a gift of absolute grace. This means that eschatology takes 
a discontinuous form. The eschatological peace is not realised in the world, nor 
by human actions; it will come about after this world and independent of the 
actions of men (Liedke 1978a, 29). 
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Various authors have pointed out that discontinuous eschatology inevitably 
leads to the conviction that mankind is incapable of bringing about peace in a 
soteriologically relevant meaning. Discontinuous eschatology "will emphasise 
the surpassing and transcending character of the completion of the world, and 
thus risk that contemporary history and the secular achievements of man are 
rejected as unimportant and trivial" (Wiederkehr 1974, 237). The depreciation 
of inner-worldly peace actions in the model of discontinuous eschatology is 
connected with certain hamartiological themes. The religious interpretation of 
peace as an absolute gift of God is usually accompanied by a strong emphasis 
on human sinfulness and on the impossibility to bring peace about in the world 
which is subject to sin (Logister 1988). The depreciation of inner-worldly peace 
actions in the model of the discontinuous eschatology comes forward particu-
larly in some of the documents of ICTO, as for instance in the following 
phrases: 
The peace of the world is something quite other than the peace of the kingdom of 
God. The peace of the world is peace motivated by fear and calculation (ICTO 
1983a). A world without nuclear weapons is not in itself a step nearer to Jesus 
Christ, the Way, the Truth and the Life, than is our present world (ICTO 1983b, 
23). 
The survey of the dimensions of immanent and absolute transcendence in 
soteriological peace attitudes has thus been completed. Tn figure 2.12 the 
complete conceptual model of soteriological dimensions of transcendence is 
represented schematically. 
Figure 2.12 Conceptual model of soteriological dimensions of transcendence 
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(g) The social subject of soteriology 
The definition of peace as a process of the reduction of violence implies that 
peace is considered as a social category. Violence and its reduction are marks 
of relationships between people and as such social features. The subject of 
peace as the reduction of violence is to be found on the macro-level of the big 
national and international relations between people. The concept of world 
peace - the institutionalised absence of violence embracing all people and 
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nations - constitutes the ultimate horizon of the macro-social concept of peace. 
In the documents of the churches and church peace movements humanity as a 
whole is regularly indicated as the subject of peace: 
The peoples of the world stand in need of peace and justice (World Council of 
Churches 1983, 132). Peace is a value without boundaries, North-South, East-West: 
only one peace (John Paul II, 1984). The peace of the world will not be born 
without the miraculous power of love, which is able to bring about things of which 
no power in the world is capable. This love will have to manifest itself in all 
human relationships, including those across national boundaries, between person 
and person, and between nation and nation (Pax Christi 1965, 94). 
In a biblical-theological sense too, the whole of humanity can be considered as 
the subject of peace. The Christian God is not a God of a certain nation, as in 
the older traditions of the Old Testament, nor is he limited to any one place. 
He is a universal God, whose salvation and peace reach out to all people, to 
"those far and near" (Is. 57:19, Eph. 2:17). 
However, peace in the biblical sense is not exclusively a macro-social 
concept. The Hebrew word 'shalom' points to a condition of wholeness which 
may refer to the body, to individual, the family, the city, the nation, all people 
and even the whole of reality (Westermann 1969, 148; Schmid 1983, 605). 
Everything that is prone to brokenness, illness or failure has need of shalom. 
Simply put, shalom comprises all that the Israelite understood by "good" 
(Pedersen 1946, 313). Peace as shalom can also be related to the micro-level of 
society. At this level too, peace can be related to God. In the integrity of 
personal relations, in the intimacy of friendship or in the happiness of family 
life we may experience a moment of God's shalom. 
In a philosophical perspective, the micro-level of peace has probably 
nowhere been thought through with more concentration and depth than in the 
ethics of Emmanual Lévinas. (Here we follow the interpretation of Lévinas' 
ethics in the light of problems connected with peace by R. Burggraeve, 1986; 
1987). The starting point for the ethics of Lévinas is the basic experience of 
the meeting with the Other. In the encounter, the Other is experienced as the 
one who turns to me as Face, who looks at me and speaks to me. In contrast 
to material objects, the Face does not draw its significance from the meaning 
bestowed by the T. The Face is self expression and appears to the Τ as a 
"revelation" (Lévinas 1961, 27). At its core, the self expression of the Other is 
of an ethical nature. The Face contains an ethical imperative. The first 
wordless word of the Face is "You shall not murder" (id., 173). Because of its 
ethical imperative, the Face arouses in the Τ a feeling of shame about his 
naive imperialist exercise of freedom. In the Face of the Other, the 'I' sudden­
ly discovers his arbitrariness and egoism, and is overcome by a feeling of guilt. 
This makes the inner conversion of the Τ possible, so that he wakes up to his 
responsibility, to solidarity and peace, which in turn really breaks open the 
circle of violence and war for the first time (Burggraeve 1987, 28-29). In the 
ethics of Lévinas the micro- and macro-dimension of peace are connected. The 
ethical relationship with the other at the micro-level is the starting point of all 
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macro ethics. The experience of peace at the micro-level can adopt a 
privatised form, however, if the subject of peace remains confined to the social 
micro-level, and the responsibility for the 'peace to those far' is not recognised. 
(h) The individual subject of soteriology 
Besides the macro- and the micro-dimension, peace can also have an individual 
dimension. At this level too, peace can be placed in a religious perspective. 
God's peace can be experienced as the beneficial effect of an inner conversion 
to God and the beneficence of a bond with God. The individual inner experi-
ence of peace can have an authentic relation to peace on the social level, "for 
there is no peace possible among people if there is no peace in the heart of 
every person" (John XXIII 1963, 165). According to Schillebeeckx, the peace of 
the heart is just as much a manifestation of Christ's peace in this world as is 
political and social peace (Schillebeeckx 1983, 102). However, he also points to 
the privatising a-political tendency which accompanies the individual inner 
experience of peace in many cases. In the last resort the a-political experience 
of inner peace cannot be maintained. Schillebeeckx makes this clear by placing 
the inner peace within the context of a world broken by enmity and violence, 
and by deducing an "inner sadness" from this context of inner peace. Because 
of the complementary inner sadness, "the inner peace points the Christian 
back to the world of our concrete economic, social and political existence, in 
order to change, to save and to reconcile it" (Schillebeeckx 1983, 103). 
Peace at the macro-, micro- and individual level can be put together in a 
hierarchical relation. Within certain currents of peace education, in particular 
in the 'idealistic' and the 'political' current, it is assumed that education about 
peace at the micro-level (family, neighbourhood, school) can function as a 
preparation for peace education at the macro-level. An attitude of tolerance 
and mutual acceptance (the idealistic current) and a critical sensitivity for the 
oppressive nature of power structures (political current) have to be learned 
young, at home and at school, if they are to be ready for use later in the larger 
society (Aspeslagh 1982; Visser 1981, 15). In a single case are the three levels 
of the subject of peace mentioned in one breath, as in the prayer below, from 
IKV circles: 
Lord, God of heaven, 
but also of the earth, 
God of all the nations of this world; 
we want to learn 
what You have to say to us 
about peace, 
peace within ourselves 
with our neighbours, 
but also about living peacefully 
with all other nations (IKV 1981, 37). 
In figure 2.13, the conceptual model of the human subject of soteriology is 
presented in a diagram. 
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Figure 2.13 Conceptual model of human subject of soteriology 
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2.6.5 Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
As the eschatological people of God, the church has a Utopian and critical 
function in society (Schillebeeckx 1972, 156-157). This starting point of Schille-
beeckx' ecclesiology not only provides legitimacy for the peace praxis of the 
church, but also gives an indication as to its contents. Church peace praxis 
must be a politically critical praxis. Schillebeeckx' ecclesiology is a criticism of 
a privatised and a-political way of being the church. A church which is not 
involved in concrete political problems and only concerns itself with the private 
religious problems of people, falls short of its task of being present in the 
world as a visible anticipation of God's kingdom of justice and peace. Besides, 
even an a-political church fulfils a political function, as a de facto legitimation 
of the existing social order (id., 199). Schillebeeckx' criticism of the a-political 
church is criticised in turn by theologians who point to the dangers of the over-
politicisation of the church. According to this counter-criticism, the church, 
because of its eschatological, anticipating function, should keep well away from 
the striving for power, which is inherent in all politics (Kuitert 1985). In this 
counter-critical view of the place of the church in the world, the legitimacy and 
the contents of church peace praxis acquire an entirely different complexion. 
In the following analysis a number of points of view will be formulated 
concerning the legitimacy (a) and the content (b) of church peace praxis, on the 
basis of Schillebeeckx' critical ecclesiology. These points of view will be 
confronted with a number of counter-critical points of view, in which the ideas 
of Kuitert form an important guide. In this way we will acquire an insight into 
a number of issues within the ecclesiological dimensions of peace. A few ideas 
concerning the actual influence of church peace praxis will be added, for only in 
its actual influence will the peace praxis of the church take on a concrete form 
(c). Church peace praxis is not purely "ethics of conviction", disregarding 
consequences. The church is God's eschatological people when its praxis 
effectively anticipates the kingdom of God (Schillebeeckx 1989, 176-177). The 
praxis of the church must, therefore, also be judged in the light of its conse-
quences. In a church peace praxis which is not effective in the sense that the 
stated aims are not achieved, God's salvation cannot manifest itself in an 
immanent transcendent manner. 
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(a) The legitimacy of church peace praxis 
The question about the legitimacy of church peace praxis can be related to 
both the external and the internal relations of the church. The external problem 
of legitimacy is connected with the position of church peace praxis in the 
relations between church and society, in particular church and government. 
The internal problem of legitimacy particularly concerns the risk of internal 
polarisation in the church which may be provoked by concrete forms of church 
peace praxis. Both dimensions of the problem of legitimacy will be discussed 
here. 
The external problem of legitimacy 
The question of the external legitimacy of church peace praxis can again be 
presented in two ways. As an aspect of the relation between church and 
society, the legitimacy of the peace praxis of the church can be questioned 
both from the perspective of the church and from the perspective of society. 
From the perspective of the church, the question of the legitimacy of its 
peace praxis is in the first place a question about the ecclesiological basis of 
such praxis. In Schillebeeckx' ecclesiology the peace task of the church is one 
aspect of its task to be present in the world as "sacrament", as a visible token 
of God's salvation (Schillebeeckx 1986, 36). God's salvation is only accom-
plished through the intermediary of people. Where people bring about good-
ness for the benefit of others - both between subjects and in the socio-political 
sense - there the believer sees the realisation of salvation-from-God (Schille-
beeckx 1977, 729). In its sacramental quality, the church has a special task to 
give form to the mediated accomplishment of God's salvation, by dedicating 
itself to the liberation and healing of people. In the light of this task the 
church can be characterised as "an eschatological freedom movement, the aim 
of which is to bring together all men and women in unity and peace: together 
with one another and all peoples, and with nature. And all this on the basis of 
unity with the living God" (Schillebeeckx 1989, 176). The peace task of the 
church is therefore a constitutive aspect of its quality as sacrament of God's 
salvation. The legitimacy of the peace praxis of the church has its anchor in 
the sacramental nature of the church. 
Schillebeeckx' political view of the mission of the church in the world has to 
contend however with an individualistic view. The individualistic view is 
defended, among others, by Kuitert when he protests against the tendency in 
political theologies to put the quality of human life on a par with the quality of 
the social and economic relations in which the individual finds himself. The 
human individual has an identity which rises above his social and political 
situation and functions: "politics is not everything". In his own personal 
relationship with God, man can experience his identity, which cannot be 
reduced to the social and political. Therefore the first task of the mission of 
the church is to foster the personal relation between man and God, and not 
social and political ideals: "the personal relation with God is the pivot of the 
Christian sermon design" (Kuitert 1985, 210-212). In this individualistic vision 
of the task of the church, it would seem that any legitimacy of church peace 
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praxis, in the sense of a social and political praxis, disappears. Only if peace is 
seen in individual or micro-social terms - or in any case as politically neutral -
can it still be the object of an undertaking of the church. 
A second argument advanced by Kuitert against the 'politicisation' of the 
church concerns the in his eyes inevitably machiavellian character of all 
politics. The rules which count in the game of politics are diametrically 
opposed to those which are assumed to prevail in the church. What counts as a 
virtue in politics is a vice according to the basic principles of Christian ethics. 
What counts in the church is charity, the love of truth, the readiness to forgive 
and to let the other person come first. In politics, the opposites of all the 
principles count. Politics means conflict, self-exaltation and intolerance in the 
service of acquiring or preserving power (id., 183). This consideration under-
mines the legitimacy of church peace praxis. In order to make an effective 
contribution to the reduction of violence in the world, the church will have to 
enter the field of politics. But the inevitable result will be that the church 
conforms to the rules of politics, which are not those of the Gospel, so that its 
Christian identity will be sacrificed (id., 182). 
It is not possible here to consider further whether Kuitert's machiavellian 
analysis of politics is adequate. It must be pointed out, however, that Schille-
beeckx considers politics as a form of "exercise of power", in the service of a 
purposeful design for a future society. He points out, however, that politics in 
a multiform society needs to legitimise itself constantly "in the light of demo-
cratic criteria, of the politically liberating relevance of its content and of the 
burden of suffering and oppression which it can impose on others" (Schille-
beeckx 1977, 719). In democratic societies political power is committed to a 
political ethics supported by society, which can correct the machiavellian 
tendencies of political action. 
From what has been said it must be clear that the legitimation of church 
peace praxis from the perspective of the church itself, which is based on 
Schillebeeckx' ecclesiology, is in question. For the empirical research into 
religious peace motivation this theological separation of the spirits throws up 
an important issue. What do the faithful think of the legitimacy of church 
peace praxis in relation to the religious function of the church, and how does 
their opinion relate to their peace action? 
The external legitimacy problem can also be raised from the perspective of 
society. The core of the problem here concerns the legitimacy of church peace 
praxis within the relation between church and government. In this case the 
deciding factor is: to what extent does the church have the right to exercise 
influence on the government, in a situation where church and state are de jure 
strictly separate. Opinions on this matter are divided. 
Some take the view, on the basis of the separation of church and state, that 
the church in Dutch society has the same rights as any other normative 
organization which attempts to exercise an influence on society. Since the 
church has relinquished its theocratic claims as the result of secularisation, it is 
entirely free to profit from the freedom of religion, the freedom to express 
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opinions, and the freedom of assembly, which are essential achievements of a 
democratic society (De Ruiter 1985). The church has the right to make use of 
every legal means to influence state policies on peace and security, either 
directly through contacts in the political circuit, or indirectly by influencing 
public opinion. In this view the separation of church and state offers an 
opportunity for the politicisation of the church, while political activities of the 
church in the field of peace may be considered as legitimate. 
Others emphasise, on the basis of the separation of church and state, the 
'distinct responsibilities' of church and government. This view is mainly found 
within the tradition of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, where it is 
based on the theory of the sovereignty of the various regions within society 
(Woldring & Kuiper 1980, 40-42). Church and state have different areas of 
work, so that the church should avoid hindering the government with critical 
political stands, while the state should refrain from interfering in the internal 
affairs of the church. Both are "sovereign within their own sphere". A connec-
tion between church and politics can only be made via special organizations 
with a denominational basis, including political parties, where church members, 
on the basis of their religious convictions, can exercise an influence on society. 
Kuitert discerns in the politicisation of the church the danger that politics will 
be conducted directly by the church without any intermediaries. This would 
lead to a degradation of the function of political parties and government, 
which occupy the middle ground between religion and politics. The 
politicisation of the church is therefore a threat to democracy (Kuitert 1985, 
184). From the perspective of society church peace action cannot be legitimate 
in this view, and the opportunity for political action of the church is seriously 
limited. 
The internal problem of legitimacy 
Regarding the internal relations of the church, the question of legitimacy 
concerns primarily the problem of polarisation within the church community, 
which can be evoked because of the peace work of the church. The problem 
can be considered as one of granting priorities, where the value of the peace 
praxis of the church must be discounted against the value of church unity. 
Schillebeeckx sees no problem in putting church peace praxis before church 
unity, because of his view of orthopraxis as the verification of faith and church. 
He does not consider polarisation within the church as by any means the 
greatest danger which can threaten the church. "Every statement by the church 
has brought polarisation in the churches, starting with the New Testament and 
all the great ecumenical councils. The unity of the group cannot be preserved 
at the expense of the Gospel" (Schillebeeckx 1984, 27). In the past, the 
leadership of the church spoke out precisely when there was disunity among 
the faithful. Most of the New Testament would never have seen the light of 
day if there had been no division among the congregation of Christ (Schille-
beeckx 1981, 241). Schillebeeckx' view that church peace praxis is more 
important than church unity is for a large part based on the view that the 
negative value of church division is relatively small. A difference of opinion 
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among the faithful is no disaster; it also has a productive effect. 
There is also a normative answer to the problem of the tension between 
church peace praxis and church unity: church peace actions ought not to be a 
threat to church unity. This is the standpoint taken by the Synod of the 
Netherlands Reformed Church and the IKV, at the time when they adopted 
extreme positions on nuclear weapons. Within the church it ought to be 
possible to handle differences of opinions over peace problems in an atmos-
phere of respect for different views and openness towards criticism, where this 
is impossible in politics. An ecclesiological image which was used often in 
support of this plea was the image of the church as a community of the Lord's 
Supper. Above all possible differences of opinion, the faithful are always 
united by the community round the Lord's table. This is precisely the reason 
why frank discussions ought to be possible in the church, when they cannot be 
conducted elsewhere (Netherlands Reformed Church 1987, 27; IKV 1985, 5). 
The problem of the relative importance of church peace praxis over church 
unity has here been avoided by a normative approach: between the two values 
there ought to be no tension. 
Not everyone agrees that the value of church peace praxis must be put 
before the value of church unity. Kuitert rejects political peace actions of the 
church for the sake of unity. Even though his criticism is not directed explicitly 
against the peace actions of the church, it cannot be denied that the 
polarisation within the church concerning nuclear weapons during the 1980s 
was an important motive behind his criticism of the tendency towards the 
politicisation of the church (Kuitert 1985, 174, 180, 181). With the help of 
Kuiter's argument the objection against church peace activities can be formu-
lated as follows. Church peace action implies above all that the church adopts 
a position in the political discussions about peace. However, the question is 
who speaks when it is said that 'the church' is talking about peace. Meaningful-
ly, this can only imply that all church members speak, but this is never the case 
in practice. In actual fact it is always a small group of leading people who 
speak in the name of the church. Their views and words are presented as 'the 
pronouncement of the church'. Kuitert denies that this is a legitimate state of 
affairs. In view of the variety of views about peace questions among church 
members, the leadership cannot reproduce the views of all the members when 
it adopts a political standpoint regarding peace matters. The church leadership 
which expresses itself on a certain peace matter will always take up a 
standpoint with which many church members do not agree (Kuitert 1985, 176; 
1985a, 23). The result is polarisation in the church. Kuitert does not accept 
Schillebeeckx' optimistic view of the effectiveness of dissent within the church. 
Neither does he follow the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church and 
the IKV in their normative harmonisation of church peace praxis and church 
unity. If the church gets involved in politics, then the machiavellian rules of 
conduct of politics will also penetrate into the church. This can only lead to 
"hatred, envy, jealousy, lack of charity and self-exaltation" within the church. 
The church which enters the political power struggle falls into two parts and 
becomes "a ruin" (id., 183). From this gloomy view of the polarising effects of 
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church peace praxis, it will be clear that Kuitert rates the value of the unity of 
the church above that of church peace praxis, and that he denies the legitimacy 
of church peace praxis, in so far as it is a political praxis. 
In figure 2.14 the conceptual model of the legitimacy of church peace praxis 
has been set out. 
Figure 2.14 Conceptual model of the legitimacy of church peace praxis 
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(b) The content of church peace praxis 
Because it is the function of the church to be the sacrament of God's kingdom 
of peace and justice in the world, the peace praxis of the church should be a 
critical peace praxis (Schillebeeckx 1983, 102). What are the distinguishing 
marks of such a critical praxis? Schillebeeckx' theology offers a number of 
indicators, which relate both to the external and the internal relations of the 
church. 
The external relations of the church 
In its external orientation the critical peace praxis of the church aims to 
expose and to push back situations of violence in the national and interna-
tional society. This requires a readiness of the church to adopt a critical 
position towards government policies on war and peace, if that is necessary. In 
practice there are four marks which are important for a politically critical 
church peace praxis: the resistance of the church against the peace and security 
policies of the government; the explicitness of church statements about war and 
peace; church support for peace demonstrations and, finally, as border case, 
the support of the church for actions of civil disobedience for peace. These four 
marks will be discussed in turn. 
Characteristic of a politically critical church peace praxis is, in the first 
place, the readiness of the church to offer actual opposition to the peace and 
security policy of the government where the situation requires this. If the 
church wants to fulfil its function as a socially critical institution, it cannot look 
on passively when the peace in the world is threatened by war or by excessive 
armament. Orthopraxis, as a touchstone of the church, requires that the church 
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actually opposes the political conduct of the government, if peace is threatened 
by such conduct. In the first place the church can test the official security 
policy theologically against its relation to the approach of the kingdom of God. 
This test may bring it to the conclusion that its engagement in the faith can 
only be expressed in a praxis of resistance (Schillebeeckx 1981, 233-234). In the 
same way the church can and must take a concrete position against the policy 
of deterrence, choosing instead for a policy of unilateral disarmament steps 
(id., 240; 1983, 98). 
Schillebeeckx' view is not shared by everyone. Kuitert believes that it is 
neither the task nor within the competence of the church to entertain its own 
standpoint regarding political and social questions. If the church must not 
adopt any political standpoints, it is in the nature of the case prevented from 
opposing political decisions. According to Kuitert, the church should be 
politically neutral, apart from exceptional situations. These include, in his view, 
situations where the formation of power through political parties is forbidden, 
of where political parties do not even exist. In such situations the church must 
speak for those who have no voice, and actual political resistance by the 
church may be necessary. In Western democratic societies such emergencies 
do however not arise at the moment, so that political opposition by the church 
is superfluous and undesirable (Kuitert 1985, 185). But what the church as an 
institution cannot do, Christians may do. Christians should not shun the 
political power struggle (id., 184). They should oppose government policies 
when justice, the preservation of the environment or the advancement of peace 
are at stake. 
Kuitert's view that in a democratic society the church should not oppose 
political decisions is shared by ICTO. ICTO's plea for a politically neutral 
church seems, however, to be motivated by an anything but politically neutral 
position of ICTO itself. In the past ICTO always wholeheartedly supported the 
peace and security policy of the Dutch government, while attempting in every 
possible way to crush the churches' opposition to this policy. ICTO's position 
illustrates the fundamental dilemma confronting the church when it considers 
whether or not to oppose the official security policy. If the church opposes the 
policy, this can be interpreted as lending moral and religious authority to the 
standpoints of politically critical groups in society. The church allows itself to 
be made use of for the ideological legitimation of political purposes (Kuitert 
1985a, 24). But when it does not resist, the church takes up a political position 
as well. By remaining silent it implicitly lends its authority to an ideological 
legitimation of existing situations and practices (Metz 1968, 99). As long as the 
church remains a significant factor in society, it has a political function, 
whether it wants it or not. A politically neutral church does not exist (Molt-
mann 1984, 153). 
One of the concrete ways in which the church can carry out its politically 
critical peace praxis, and give expression to its opposition to prevailing security 
policies, is by making specific statements about war and peace. In order to be 
specific, three conditions have to be observed. In the first place the statement 
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must refer to a concrete political or military problem and analyze this in such 
way that it is clear in what specific way peace is at stake. Secondly, the 
statement must contain an evaluation of the problem which adheres to certain 
moral standards. The church derives these standards primarily from the 
Gospel message, but in order to apply the Gospel to concrete questions of 
peace, there is always need of an intermediary theoretical framework, derived 
from the ethics of war and peace, or from peace research (Schillebeeckx 1977, 
721-723; 1983, 103). In the third place the statement must contain an indica-
tion for action, both in the negative and in the positive sense. Negatively, 
criticism always contains a condemnation of the action or situation which is 
disapproved of. Criticism is only constructive, however, when it is inspired by 
the conception of a better way of action or a better situation. 
Specific statements by the church about peace always contain a risk. They 
are dependent on a (correct or incorrect) analysis of the contingent political 
topicality, this is why specific church statements always have a hypothetical 
nature. Here, the church cannot speak directly from revelation (Schillebeeckx 
1972, 145). According to Metz the critical peace praxis of the church requires a 
courage to speak both contingently and hypothetically. The church must accept 
that its politically critical statements on peace will also be contradicted in a 
critical manner, and that a certain partiality is unavoidable (Metz 1968, 113). 
Global statements on war and peace cannot form the medium of a critical 
church peace praxis. They lack the connection with the concrete reality which 
is essential for critical pronouncements. By expressing itself in general prin-
ciples, the church will by definition be behindhand in terms of the historical 
situation, as these principles are the outcome of the preceding history (Schille-
beeckx 1972, 155). 
In an anti-critical approach, based on the conviction that the church must 
renounce from exercising political influence for the sake of its own integrity, 
the specific nature of church statements takes on a different hue. If the church 
must not attempt to intervene in the process of political decision-making, then 
it will also have to refrain from specific statements about peace. Kuitert 
accepts this conclusion. According to him, the church should limit itself to the 
proclamation of "the principles of humanity", which form a fundamental 
element in its teaching and preaching. "Oppression, exploitation, discrimination 
are never allowed. Neither are they allowed by the God of the Christian 
church. It is true that this comes down to general statements. Churches cannot 
do more than that, except in exceptional circumstances" (Kuitert 1985, 185). 
Like Schillebeeckx and Metz, Kuitert points to the contingent character of 
political problems. His conclusion is not, however, that the church should have 
the courage to speak hypothetically about these problems. His conclusion is 
that the church desist from making statements on contingent political affairs. 
What yardsticks should be used, where to apply them and what action should 
be taken - all these questions demand discussion in a democratic society, for 
which political channels are the most appropriate. Christians may do their best 
in these matters, but the churches are not equipped to answer such question 
(ibid.). 
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Besides verbal statements there are also forms of expression which are 
partly non-verbal, which the church can use to give form to its politically 
critical peace praxis. This mainly refers to communicative actions with which 
the church can 'suit the action to the word', thus emphasising that it means 
what it says. The most important example of this is support of the church for 
collective actions for peace, for example by calling on church members to 
participate in a peace demonstration. As well as a verbal component (slogans, 
demands), peace demonstrations possess essential non-verbal components, 
such as the gathering of a large crowd or a march through the town. These 
non-verbal components are specially effective at expressing a message that 
cannot easily be put into words: the message that many people are united 
about a certain goal, and that they are committed to it. The church's support 
for peace demonstrations is therefore in addition to any speaking about peace. 
Such support adds commitment to the statements made by the church. In this 
respect there is no division of principle between church statements about 
peace and church support for peace demonstrations. 
Schillebeeckx says nothing specifically about the question whether the 
church should support peace demonstrations. He does however seem to admit 
the possibility when he suggests that the churches can exercise influence on the 
security ideologies of states, "both by acting in accordance with the Gospel of 
peace, as well as through the official statements of the church" (Schillebeeckx 
1983, 96). In addition to the praxis form of speech, the church has other forms 
of praxis at its disposal for the expression of its criticism of official security 
policy. Support for peace demonstrations could be one of them. 
Organizations which mount demonstrations do this usually in order to 
influence the decision-making by the politicians. When the church is involved 
in such actions, it is in fact supporting this aim. Kuitert objects to this. The 
church which takes part in the formation of political power intervenes in the 
political decision-making without any political responsibility on its part. This 
disturbs the functioning of parliamentary democracy (Kuitert 1985, 184). From 
the fact that the larger Dutch denominations have in the past refrained from 
publicly supporting peace demonstrations (cf. section 1.1.2) it can be concluded 
that they are of the opinion that to take part in political power formation is 
not a suitable form of praxis for them. 
A border case of critical church peace praxis is civil disobedience. Here too we 
are concerned with a communicative form of action with an important non-
verbal component. Civil disobedience is the deliberate breaking of the law as 
protest against a situation or a law which is considered as unjust (Schuyt 1972, 
303-332). Forms of civil disobedience against armament and "militarism" which 
have been practised in the Netherlands during the past decades were, among 
other things: blockades of military transports and bases, the destruction of the 
fences surrounding military bases, damaging military equipment, stealing and 
publishing secret government documents and the refusal to pay a part of taxes 
in protest against arms expenditures. 
There is a broad ecumenical consensus about the moral right of Christians 
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to disobey a government which has lost its moral legitimacy. In the Catholic 
theological tradition, the criterion used is whether government action conforms 
with its function to promote the general welfare (Wulf 1965, 1093). Schille-
beeckx points out that as early as in the New Testament there is talk of 
disobedience to the state. In a democratic polity there remains the possibility 
of a conflict between ethics and law. The demand of a higher justice may lead 
to circumstances where Christians feel obliged to act against to law. Such 
action must however remain subject to a number of criteria, in particular that 
of non-violence against persons and to a large extent also against property 
(Schillebeeckx 1983a, 35). In the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, there 
is often reference to a statement by the Reformed Ecumenical Synod at 
Potchefstroom, South Africa, in 1958. This states that modern methods of war 
can lead to such an apocalyptic revelation of sin, that followers of Christ must 
in no way bear any co-responsibility. Then it will be their calling that, instead 
of remaining obedient to a demonised government, they must withdraw all 
cooperation, even though this may have the result that they will have to go the 
way of a martyrs community" (Grandia & Van der Laan 1983, 86). 
At the time of the government decisions regarding the deployment of cruise 
missiles in 1984 and 1985, there was discussion in the IKV about the question 
whether it should call for actions of civil disobedience (Bos & Houdijk 1984, 
16-17). Among the rank and file, opinions were divided. The Campaign 
Council of IKV came to the conclusion that civil disobedience was not the way 
to go. Apart from doubts about the political effectiveness of civil disobedience 
in that particular situation, the anticipated rejection by the churches played an 
important part in that decision (IKV 1985a, 15). It is understandable that 
established churches will not easily risk taking part in actions of civil disobedi-
ence, in view of their position in society. By placing themselves outside the 
legal order, they would marginalise their position in society and disrupt their 
relationship with the government. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 
Netherlands only churches of the sectarian type (in the sociological sense), 
such as the Quakers and the Mennonite Brotherhood supported civil disobedi-
ence against armament (Bos & Houdijk 1984, 49; Council of Churches in the 
Netherlands 1989). 
The internal relations of the church 
When the church gives critical expression to its views on peace matters, it 
cannot always count on an internal consensus, in view of the actual political 
pluralism among its members and the often controversial character of these 
matters. A critical church peace praxis therefore raises the question of the 
conformity of church members to church statements on war and peace. The 
extent to which the faithful support statements of the church can vary from an 
attitude of absolute conformity to one which demands total freedom of thought 
and action. 
Speaking from the angle of psychology of religion, Fortmann links the 
attitude of absolute conformity to church statements and dogmas to a person-
ality structure which he describes as "closed mind" (1974-11, 486-509). A 
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characteristic of the closed mind is the inability to absorb new information on 
the basis of its intrinsic value, from fear of the insecurity which results from 
change. Authority offers security and certainty. For this reason, the person 
with a closed mind is also an authoritarian personality, that is to say someone 
who is inwardly not free over against external authority. 
Over against the figure of a closed and authoritative church, Fortmann 
pleads for an open, non-authoritative church, which allows space for personal 
freedom of thought and action, for a private conscience; a church where the 
faithful do not blindly accept church statements, but either accept or criticise 
them after independent consideration. Fortmann's arguments in favour of such 
a church are of a sociological, moral and exegetical nature. Speaking sociologi-
cally he points to a development in the direction of greater individualisation 
and a striving towards more individual responsibility in society, which has not 
passed church members by. From the moral angle he argues, with Kant, that 
individual freedom and autonomy are essential conditions for the making of 
moral choices. Exegetically, Fortmann bases the freedom of the faithful to 
think and act on Jesus' words: "You have heard that it was said to the people 
long ago ..., but I tell you". These words assume the power of free choice 
among the hearers. Even though the authoritarian claims of the church are 
ultimately traced back to Jesus, Jesus was in no way an authoritative character 
who left his followers no freedom. 
To strive for individual freedom of thought and action in the church does 
not imply the belief that the church should have no authority. Fortmann 
recognises that a non-authoritarian church still needs decision-making struc-
tures (id., 502). The recognition of the 'authority' of church pronouncements 
and decisions remains essential even in a democratically organized church. 
Schillebeeckx has tried to indicate in which way the faithful should recognise 
the authority of church statements concerning political matters. For this 
purpose he develops a classification of grades of authority in church state-
ments. The ministerial words of the church can be "confessional" in nature, 
they can also be words "based on a conviction of the church", or they can be 
spoken because of "an opinion of the church" (Schillebeeckx 1984, 21). State-
ments of the church on matters relating to peace do not belong to the category 
of confessional words, in view of the fact that such statements are not based 
directly on the Gospel message, but always take place with the intervention of 
non-theological expertise (such as peace studies). This type of pronouncements 
therefore belongs either to the category of church conviction, or of church 
opinion. Such pronouncements are however not without authority, even though 
it is not of a formal or official character. "Generally speaking it can be said 
that official pronouncements 'from a conviction of the church' have the nature 
of an appeal, that is to say they make a strong appeal to the conscience of all 
believers, while official pronouncements 'from an opinion of the church' call 
for the serious attention of the faithful for this statement, namely as a point of 
view which should not be ignored in the general discussion: in this case I must, 
as a Christian, consider for myself whether I can identify with this opinion" 
(id., 22). 
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In order to sum up the preceding reflections on the content of church peace 
praxis, the most important concepts have been reproduced in their mutual 
relations in figure 2.15: 
Figure 2.15 Conceptual model of the content of church peace praxis 
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(c) The influence of the church with respect to war and peace 
If the church is to exercise its politically critical peace praxis effectively, it must 
have influence within society. The church's theological Obligation' of socio-
political orthopraxis must have a social and political 'ability' to balance it, if 
the call for a critical church praxis is not to lead to a crisis of church praxis. 
The problems connected with the influence of the church regarding war and 
peace can be analyzed with reference to the specific peace aims of the church 
which were discussed in section 1.2. These aims are directed towards influenc-
ing political decision-making regarding peace questions, whereby a distinction 
can be made between direct influence through contacts with politicians and 
indirect influence through the mobilisation of public opinion. To the norm of 
critical peace praxis, the question about the influence of the church on the 
political elite and on public opinion must therefore be added. The answer to this 
question helps to determine the extent to which the church can be considered 
as an institution which can make an effective contribution to the advancement 
of peace. 
An important condition for the church's influence on political decision-
making on matters of war and peace is its competence in this field. Only if the 
church is adequately competent, will it be able to exercise influence in the 
right direction and in an effective manner on the political treatment of peace 
questions. According to Schillebeeckx, the church has its own theological 
competence regarding peace questions. Theology offers its own perspective on 
peace problems by interpreting the political praxis in this field in its 
soteriological meaning, as salvation or grace, or alternatively as sin and the 
refusal of grace. Theology raises the question to what extent a political praxis 
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may be seen as the coming or the approach of the kingdom of God (Schille-
beeckx 1981, 234-237). In order to be practised meaningfully, however, such a 
specifically theological competence needs the support of a non-theological 
competence in two ways. The theologian who speaks about war and peace 
must first of all listen to the negative contrast experiences of people in this 
field. These experiences contain their own cognitive potential, and as such they 
are a source of competence in the field of peace questions. Secondly, the 
theologian should know something about the causes, the qualities and the 
inner structure of the processes of war and peace. For this he is to a large 
extent dependent on the non-theological sciences which analyze the problems 
of war and peace from various angles. The question whether the church, 
assisted by theologians, is in fact competent in the field of peace issues is not 
answered explicitly by Schillebeeckx, but he does give an indication in the 
direction of a reply. The church can listen to the negative contrast experiences 
of people with respect to to war and armament. These experiences constitute a 
source of knowledge for theology on which it can fall back even without the 
help of other sciences. That the church, in principle, has access to the 'global 
store' of negative contrast experiences in connection with war and peace, 
cannot be doubted. All that is needed is a listening ear for the stories from 
people who suffer from wars and armament. The church therefore has the 
possibility to acquire competence in the field of war and peace, even if its 
specific scientific knowledge falls short. 
Kuitert denies that the church is competent in matters of peace, or indeed 
in any political matter. In his eyes, the church is not equipped to play a 
political role. Church leaders cannot judge better than politicians what political 
steps are useful to bring about ideal of social change. Consequently, what the 
church has to say about political or social change is "either so general that it 
has no meaning, or it has already been said by someone else" (Kuitert 1985, 
180). It seems that Kuitert here identifies the competence of the church 
regarding peace matters with its scientific competence. The latter is no greater 
than that of the politicians, and therefore the church cannot add anything 
authentic to politics, so that it is better to keep silent. He forgets, however, 
that every political praxis is an interpreted praxis. A particular political praxis 
may be interpreted as Christian by the Christians, whereas humanists, for 
instance, consider it as humanistic. There is no political praxis which Christians 
can reserve as their own, even though, as Christians, they can appreciate a 
certain praxis as authentically Christian (Schillebeeckx 1981, 235). In the 
interpretation of a political praxis concerning war and peace in terms of 
salvation in the religious sense, the church has its own competence regarding 
peace matters, which is ignored by Kuitert. Rather, he makes the (absurd) 
demand that the church prove its competence regarding peace matters by 
adopting standpoints which others do not take - something which is impossible 
in view of the convergence in content between Christian ethics and secular 
'human' ethics (ibid.; Auer 1984). 
An outline of the dimensions of church influence discussed above is 
reproduced in figure 2.16. 
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Figure 2.16 Conceptual model of the influence of the church with respect to 
war and peace 
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2.7 Social location of peace action 
The relationship between religious peace attitudes and peace action does not 
exist in an unworldly vacuum. Each individual is situated in a certain social 
location, which has its effect on religious attitudes and the motivational system. 
It is also possible that the social location has a direct effect on peace action, 
independent of the effects of religious peace attitudes. In this section, a 
number of characteristics will be discussed, which serve as indicators of the 
social location of peace action. They are divided into two types: social charac-
teristics (2.7.1) and religious characteristics (2.7.2). 
2.7.1 Social characteristics 
There are a number of social characteristics of which it can be assumed, on 
the grounds of available research-data, that they have an effect on peace 
action. The social characteristics which are taken into consideration can be 
divided into three kinds: demographic (age, gender), socio-economic (educa-
tional level, social class) and political characteristics (political preference, 
political activity). In order to account for the choice of these six characteristics, 
a short description of the results of previous research will be given. 
Demographic characteristics 
Age (q. 701) 
Activities in social movements appear to be connected with a particular 
generational unit, namely the generation which in the 1960s acquired the 
epithet 'protest generation'. The generally young activists of these years have 
by now entered middle age, but they have not given up the protest attitude of 
their youth. Although the protesting 'elders' have found followers among the 
younger generations, the proportion of older people in social movements is 
still very large (Kriesi 1986, 4). Older people are strongly represented in the 
peace movements as well. In a study among 118 members of IKV-cores in 
1985, Oegema found an average age of 44 (Everts & Walraven 1987, 128). 
Only one per cent of Pax Christi-members is under 25, as appears from a 
study of 1987, whereas almost half of them are over 55 (Bos 1988, 108). 
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Gender (q. 702) 
Research results are contradictory with regard to the relationship between 
gender and peace action. Oegema found almost equal numbers of men and 
women among the IKV-members he interviewed. But there are more men 
(65%) than women in the constituency of Pax Christi. On the other hand, 
women signed the petition against the cruise missiles of 1985 considerably 
more often than men (57% of the women, against 46% of the men: Schennink 
1988, 94). These contradictory results induce some caution in the formulation 
of expectations regarding the relationship between gender and peace action. In 
this study, the uncertainty about the effect of gender on peace action is a main 
reason to study the effect of gender more closely. 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Educational level (q. 704) 
It is in particular the higher educated who participate in the actions of the 
peace movement. Of the participants in the peace demonstration at The 
Hague, 1983, 49% had studied or were still studying at a college or university 
(Kruisraketten ongewenst, 87). For the members of Pax Christi, this figure is 
even as high as 64% (Bos 1988, 108). 
Social class (qq. 703-707) 
Many members of social movements are from the middle-class. The middle-
class has increased strongly in size in post-war Western societies, due to, 
among other things, the growth of social and cultural services. It is often the 
workers in these sectors (social workers, teachers, doctors, journalists) who are 
active in social movements (Kriesi 1986, 3). A strong representation of middle-
class groups can also be found in the church peace movements in the Nether-
lands. Research shows that the numerical share of workers in social and 
cultural services in church peace movements is about 50% ((Kriesi & Van 
Praag 1988, 16; Bos 1988, 107). It can, therefore, be expected that profession, 
as an indicator of social class, is an important predictor of peace action. 
Political characteristics 
Political preference (q. 708) 
There is a clear relationship between peace goals and political preference. The 
more someone's political preference is towards the left, the greater is his 
aversion to deterrence-strategies and his support for unilateral disarmament 
initiatives. This appears, among other things, from research into the 1985 
petition. Of the constituency of the Labour Party (PvdA), 93% supported the 
petition, which had a gradual unilateral goal. Among the supporters of small 
radical leftist parties this percentage was even as high as 98%, whereas of the 
constituency of the conservative liberal party (WD) only 20% agreed with the 
goals of the petition (Schennink 1988, 84). There is also a relationship between 
political preference and the membership of a peace movement. Among the 118 
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IKV-members interviewed by Oegema in 1985 there was not a single supporter 
of either the centre-right Christian democratic party (CDA) or the Conserva-
tive Liberals (WD: Everts & Walraven 1987, 128). A very strong under-
representation of rightist voters in peace movements was also found by Kriesi 
and Van Praag, in their survey of some hundreds of IKV-members and other 
peace activists in 1986 (Kriesi & Van Praag 1988, 37). 
Political activity (qq. 709-714) 
There is empirical evidence that the degree to which people are politically 
active also influences peace action. People who are active in church peace 
movements often appear to be active in other politically orientated movements 
and organizations as well (Kriesi & Van Praag 1987). Besides, peace activists 
are politically more active than the average Dutch citizen. An indicator of this 
is the party membership. Of all Dutch registered voters, only 8% were a 
member of a political party in 1986. Of the demonstrators in The Hague, 1983, 
19% were associated with a political party; for Pax Christi-members this 
percentage was 26 in 1987, and for the peace activists interviewed by Kriesi 
and Van Praag even 47 (Kruisraketten ongewenst, 90; Bos 1988, 118; Kriesi & 
Van Praag 1988, 36). It can be concluded from these data that peace activists 
belong to the politically more active part of the Dutch population. Obviously, 
those who are already active in the political realm, for all sorts of reasons, are 
more inclined to participate in peace actions than those who have no experi-
ence with political actions. 
2.7.2 Religious characteristics 
To the social characteristics a set of characteristics is added which pertain to 
denomination, church-relatedness and a number of general religious attitudes. 
In the studies of the Dutch church peace movement which have been held till 
so far, the effects of religious attitudes have never been taken into consider-
ation. For the research into the relationship between religious peace attitudes 
and peace action, religious characteristics are important, however. It can be 
expected that the effect of religious attitudes on peace action is not limited to 
the specific group of religious peace attitudes. Religious peace attitudes are 
always embedded in the context of an encompassing religious worldview and 
churchview. Directly or indirectly, therefore, religious characteristics can have 
an effect on peace action. 
Denomination (q. 801b) 
A dependence of peace action on denomination has been established in the 
research by Schennink et al., into the petition against cruise missiles. It 
appeared that only 34% of the members of the Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands signed the petition, or intended to do so, whereas this number 
was much higher with the members of the Netherlands Reformed Church 
(51%) and the Roman Catholic Church (57%) (Schennink 1988, 100). In this 
research, effects of denomination on religious peace attitudes are expected in 
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particular. The religious teaching of the various denominations is not identical 
and it is likely that these differences have an influence on the religious peace 
attitudes of church members. 
Church-relatedness (qq. 801-804) 
Peace action is positively related to church-relatedness. Members of church 
peace movements in general are active church members. Of Pax Christi-
members, 91% are members of a church. Of the church-related Pax Christi-
members, 61% play an active role in church life, as a pastor (11%), in the 
administration of a parish (11%), as a member of a liturgy-group (12%) or 
MOV-group (20%: Bos 1988, 110). Of the members of IKV, 84% were church 
members in 1981, whereas 53% were active in other church activities, in 
addition to their work for IKV (Everts & Walraven 1987, 127-128). No 
statistical information is available about the church-relatedness of ICTO-
members, but it may be assumed that their church-relatedness is not very 
much different from that of IKV- and MOV-members. ICTO explicitly 
considers itself a church-related peace movement, and the activities of local 
ICTO-groups are strongly focused on the exertion of influence on local 
churches, which suggests that the members of ICTO-groups will themselves be 
closely related to these local churches. 
In order to measure church-relatedness, use was made of a cumulative 
typology, developed by Felling et al., which consists of three types of church 
members and three types of non-members. The church members are divided 
into core members, modal members and marginal members. The non-members 
are divided into non-members of the first and of the second generation. The 
non-members of the first generation are again divided into ex-members and 
those who have never been a church member (Felling et al. 1981, 56-67). The 
characteristics by which these six types are defined can be ordered on a 
cumulative scale, with the help of the cumulative scalogram-analysis of 
Mokken (Mokken 1970). Each higher position on the cumulative scale requires 
an extra criterion to be met. The six types of church-relatedness, together with 
their criteria, are listed in table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Conceptual model of degrees of church-relatedness (Felling et al. 
1981) 
category: 
second generation non-member 
first generation non-member 
(never been church member) 







parents vere church member 
used to be a church member 
consider oneself church member 
regular church attendance 
participation In other church 
activities 
Religious attitudes 
Religious attitudes are divided into three groups: religious worldview, saliency 
of worldview and churchview. 
Religious worldview 
The conceptualisation of religious worldview is based on the conceptual model 
of the SOCON-research (Sociaal-Cultureel Onderzoek in Nederland/ Socio-
Cultural Research in the Netherlands; Felling et al., 1987b). In this model, a 
number of issues in the realm of worldview are distinguished, from which the 
following are selected for this research: the existence of a higher reality, the 
meaning of life and the meaning of good and evil. Three attitudes are 
measured with regard to these three issues. 
The first attitude is referred to in the SOCON-research as "Christian faith" 
or "theism". What is meant by this is the "traditional" view of the historical 
Christian religion, characterized by the belief in a personal and transcendent 
God, who gives meaning to human life and suffering. 
The second attitude, referred to as "general transcendence belief" or 
"deism", concerns a more "enlightened" interpretation of the divine reality and 
its relation to man and the world. The image of God is "depersonalized". God 
is the symbol of the existence of a transcendent, super-worldly order in 
general, which gives life and suffering a meaning. 
The third attitude, referred to as "inner-worldliness" or "immanentism", 
concerns a worldview which does situate human existence, life and death, good 
and evil in a lager framework of meaning, but does so without reference to any 
form of transcendence. The giving of meaning remains within the realm of the 
visible and tangible. Examples of this are the worldviews which are entailed in 
marxist and ecological thinking (Felling et al. 1981, 42; 1986, 41-42; Peters & 
Schreuder 1987, 178). 
Van der Ven has formulated a theological critique of this typology of 
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religious worldviews. On the grounds of a conceptualisation of God-images, he 
questions the content-validity of the three scales of religious worldview. The 
items by which the Christian worldview, general transcendence belief and 
inner-worldliness are supposed to be measured in the SOCON-research, in fact 
measure something different ((Van der Ven 1990, 249-254; 1992). A thorough 
discussion of Van der Ven's critique will be postponed to the last chapter. 
Here, however, it is necessary to go into part of his critique, because it has 
consequences for the designation of the attitudes regarding religious world-
view. 
The designation of the belief in a personal God as "(traditional) Christian 
faith" suggests that the other attitudes do not belong to the Christian tradition. 
One may wonder whether this does not imply an erroneous assumption of 
uniformity in the Christian tradition. The tradition of the Christian faith is 
anything but uniform; it is a plurality of traditions, as every handbook of 
church history shows. Moreover, the distinction between theism and deism, 
which is made by the researchers of SOCON, is obscured by an extremely 
complex metaphysical and epistemological discussion, which took place in 
particular in the era of the Enlightenment (Engert 1959; Keilbach 1965; Gay 
1968). Within the German Enlightenment, Kant referred to deism as the 
position according to which the human intellect can only know the existence of 
a first being, and to theism as the position according to which the human 
intellect is also able to determine the first being more precisely, as a being 
gifted with freedom and reason (Kant 1787, 659 f.). It is questionable whether 
the historical discussion about the relationship between theism and deism, 
coloured as it is by rationalistic and speculative ways of philosophizing, can 
provide an adequate framework for the interpretation of religious attitudes of 
present-day people. In order to avoid this problem, the distinction between the 
belief in a personal God (first attitude) and the belief in the a-personal divine 
(second attitude) will be taken as a starting point in this study, following Van 
der Ven. 
Finally, the interpretation of the third worldview in SOCON can not remain 
free of criticism either. The designations of "inner-worldliness" and 
"immanentism" suggest that what we have here is a non-religious attitude. 
Some items by which this attitude is measured, however, contain unmistakably 
religious elements of meaning, including the name of God (cf. questions 807 
and 810, Appendix E). These questions strongly accentuate God's immanence, 
however. Therefore, the term religious immanentism is preferred here, as a 
designation of the third attitude. In the theological literature, religious 
immanentist theories have been put forward by, among others, Tillich (1948) 
and Robinson (1963). 
The selection of items for the measuring of worldview in this research is 
based on the empirical results of the SOCON 1985-research by Felling, Peters 
and Schreuder (1987a). Religious worldview has been measured in the follow-
ing way: 
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Table 2.3 Conceptual model of religious worldview 
existence 
of a higher 
reality 
belief In a 
personal God 



















q· 815, 817 
q- 812, 816 
q· 814, 818 
Felling, Peters and Schreuder have shown that there is a relationship 
between the belief in a personal God and certain social characteristics and 
political behaviours. People who strongly believe in a personal God are 
strongly opposed to social changes and tend to be socially satisfied. Their 
political commitment in the extra-parliamentary sphere, through actions and 
demonstrations, is low (Felling et al. 1986, 104-105, 109). Because of these 
attitudinal and behavioural characteristics, it is to be expected that those who 
believe in a personal God will not be inclined to participate in peace actions, 
which are mostly of an extra-parliamentary nature and aim at achieving social 
change. It remains to be seen whether belief in the a-personal divine and 
religious immanentism are related to peace action in a more positive way. 
Saliency of worldview 
The saliency of worldview concerns the degree to which worldviews play an 
active part in people's lives (ibid., 31). The higher the saliency of worldview, 
the greater the chance that people will let their thinking and acting be deter-
mined by their worldview. The saliency of worldview in general can be dis-
covered by asking people how important they consider their worldview for 
themselves, whether their worldview has an effect on their everyday lives, on 
the taking of important decisions in life and on their thinking about politics 
(Felling et al. 1985, 77-80). In view of the problem definition of the research, 
the specific saliency of worldview with regard to the problem of war and peace 
is added to this (figure 2.17). 
Figure 2.17 Conceptual model of saliency of worldview 
Saliency of vorldvlev 
Saliency of worldview 
In general 
q. 819, 821, 823 
Specific saliency of vorldvlev, 
vlth regard to Issues of war 
and peace 
q. 820, 822, 824 
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Churchview 
Finally, an extensive set of characteristics is included in this study which 
concern attitudes towards the church. It is likely that peace action not only 
depends on the specific ecclesiological peace attitudes described in section 
2.6.5, but also on a background of general attitudes regarding the organization 
and the tasks of the church. Only in the light of these background attitudes are 
the specific ecclesiological themes in relation to peace thrown into relief and 
do they acquire the urgency which makes understandable why the debate about 
them in the churches has often been so fierce. In ecclesiological peace atti-
tudes there is more at issue than the question what the church should do for 
peace. The ultimate question is how the organization and tasks of the church 
should be defined in today's society. The questions of the specificity of church 
statements about war and peace, of the conformity of church members to 
these statements, of the support of the church for collective actions and civil 
disobedience for peace, all have a bearing on the question of the organization 
of the church in general (a). The problem of the legitimacy of the church peace 
praxis has a bearing on the question what the appropriate tasks of the church 
are (b). 
(a) Organization of the church 
The questions of the specificity of church statements about peace issues and of 
the conformity of church members to these statements automatically lead to a 
discussion of the internal relations of the church. Schillebeeckx' plea for specific 
church statements about peace issues, which, because of their unavoidably 
hypothetical nature, cannot be supported by a strong claim to authority, is 
based on a preference for a democratic, rather than a hierarchical, organiz-
ation of the church. 
In a democratic churchview, the religious community as a whole is the 
primary subject of the speaking of the church. The speaking of the leadership 
of the church must, in a critical way, be at the service of the witness and praxis 
of faith of the church community (Schillebeeckx 1984, 18). The fundamental 
equality of all the faithful in the one "people of God" is matter of first import-
ance here (Schillebeeckx 1989, 225). From this point of view, the church is not 
in the first place an institution or a visibly organized society. Rather, it is a 
community of persons, with God and with each other in Christ (Congar 1965; 
Hamer 1964). This 'communio' model of the church emphasises the immediate 
relationship of all believers with the Holy Spirit, who directs the whole church 
(Dulles 1976, 49; Schillebeeckx 1989, 233-239). This view of the internal 
organization of the church leads in several respects to a relativization of the 
distinction between lay people and ordained ministers. When all the faithful 
share in the gifts of the Spirit, it is not self-evident that ministerial functions, 
such as conducting a service, are reserved only for a separate 'caste' of church 
ministers. The distinction between lay people and ministers in terms of 
priesthood is under discussion. Nor is it self-evident that the leadership in the 
church should exclusively rest with the group of ministers. The working of the 
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Spirit in the church is not only mediated by the leadership of the church, but 
just as much by the faithful people itself. An authoritarian leadership in the 
church, therefore, connot be legitimized by a reference to the support of the 
Holy Spirit. Rather, democratic forms of organization are needed, to mediate 
the working of the Spirit in an institutionally adequate way (Schillebeeckx 
1989, 238). 
In a hierarchical churchview, the qualitative distinction between lay people 
and ordained ministers is strongly accentuated. Lay people are the recipients 
of the salvation which is mediated by the administration of the sacraments, the 
teaching office and the leadership of the ministers. The church is not con-
ceived of as a democratic society, but as one in which the fullness of power is 
concentrated in the hands of an elite which perpetuates itself through cooption 
(Dulles 1976, 35; Schillebeeckx 1989, 235-237). In the Roman Catholic Church, 
this hierarchical view of the church was clearly set forth by the First Vatican 
Council: 
(...) the church of Christ is not a community of equals in which all the faithful 
have the same rights. It is a society of unequals, not only because among the 
faithful some are clerics and some are laymen, but particularly because there is in 
the Church the power from God whereby to some it is given to sanctify, teach and 
govern, and to others not (Neuner and Roos 1958, 369). 
Support of the church for collective actions and actions of civil disobedience 
for peace implies a distancing of the church from the prevailing values and the 
existing order of society. They bring into play the external relations of the 
church to society, which is undoubtedly one of the reasons why they are so 
controversial. The plurality of opinions which exist on this matter can be 
clarified with the help of the church-sect typology which has been developed by 
the sociologist Yinger, in connection with theories of Troeltsch (1912) and 
Weber (1968). Yinger's typology of religious organizations and groups contains 
two criteria which refer to the external relations of the church. First, the 
degree to which the religious group is inclusive of members of a society; the 
theoretical range of this characteristic is from an all-inclusive system to a 
handful of members. Second, the extent to which the group accepts the secular 
values of society; this can range from the attitude that the secular values are 
good or even God-given, to the view that 'the world' is an abomination (Yinger 
1970, 257). There is a close relationship between these two criteria, Yinger 
says, so that they can be considered as two aspects of one underlying dimen-
sion. The more a church attempts to include the members of a society, the 
more it will also accommodate the ruling values of that society (id., 259-260). 
The borders of Yinger's church-sect typology are constituted by the ideal 
types of the "institutional ecclesia" and the "charismatic sect". The more a 
religious organization attempts to include the members of society and adopts 
its values, the more it resembles the institutional ecclesia and the less it 
resembles the charismatic sect. Yinger refers to the churches which occupy a 
more or less established position in Western societies as "denominations". 
They adjoin the type of the ecclesia. Denominations tend to adapt to the 
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conventional ethos of society, but they include only a limited part of the 
members of society. Unlike both the ecclesia and the sect, the denomination is 
tolerant with regard to other religious groups (id., 264-266). 
In figure 2.18, the various attitudes regarding the organization of the church 
in its internal and external dimensions are summarized schematically. 
Figure 2.18 Conceptual model of attitudes regarding the organization of the 
church 
organization of the church 
internal relations external relations 
priesthood of democratic social cultural 
believers decision- inclusiveness adaptation 
q. 823, 833, making q. 828, 832, q. 829, 
837 q. 826, 827 835 836, 839 
830, 831, 
834, 838 
(b) Tasks of the church 
Schillebeeckx considers peace actions of the church as legitimate, on the 
grounds of his interpretation of the church as an "eschatological liberation 
movement", which task it is to promote unity and peace among people (Schille-
beeckx 1989, 176). In this interpretation, the tasks of the church are situated at 
the macro-level of social and political affairs. Concrete tasks which belong to 
this level are, besides peace actions, the promotion of societal and political 
conscientization and the providing of material assistance to the poor in the 
Third World and in the home country (Van Gerwen 1990, 86). 
When Kuitert undercuts the legitimacy of church peace praxis by holding 
against the churches an overrating of politics and a neglect of individual 
religious problems, he emphasizes the tasks of the church at the micro-level. To 
this set of tasks belong in particular the person-directed tasks of the church, 
such as the offering of pastoral help in psychical problems, of providing 
comfort and support to people who are in trouble, of pastoral assistance at 
important events in life, and of pastoral care to the ill, the dying and those in 
mourning (ibid.). 
In between the socio-political macro-tasks and the person-directed micro-
tasks of the church, there is a meso-level of church tasks, which in particular 
concern the social and cultural life within the church itself. In a situation in 
which the church is ever more evolving from a large-scale people's church into 
a small-scale church of volunteers, this tasks is characterized in particular by a 
group-directed orientation: the promotion of church life in active voluntary 
groups, which are directed at goals both inside and outside the church (Hepp 
1971; Wess 1976; 1989). 
In figure 2.19, the conceptualization of attitudes regarding the tasks of the 
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church is presented schematically. 
Figure 2.19 Conceptual model of attitudes towards the tasks of the church 
tasks of the church 
I I I 
micro-level: meso-level: macro-level: 
person-directed group-directed tasks socio-political 
tasks of the church of the church tasks of the church 
q. 842, 844, 846, q. 843, 847, 851 q. 840, 841, 845, 
849 848, 850 
2.8 Empirical questions 
To conclude the theoretical part of this study, a number of empirical questions 
will be formulated which indicate the direction of the empirical research of the 
next chapters. 
The first question concerns the empirical tenability of the conceptualisations 
regarding peace action, motivation to peace action, religious peace attitudes 
and the social location of peace action. Do the conceptual distinctions corre-
spond with the empirical behaviour and attitudes of church members and 
members of church peace movements? This question will be answered in 
chapter three. In this chapter, measuring scales will be developed empirically, 
on the basis of the conceptualisations of sections 2.4 - 2.7. The empirical data 
on which the scale construction is based have been collected by a survey 
among church members and members of church peace movements, held in the 
beginning of 1988. The sampling and data-collection are described in Appendix 
A. 
The second question concerns differences among the sub-populations within 
the research population, regarding peace action, motivation to peace action, 
religious peace attitudes and the social location of peace action. Do the 
members of different church peace movements have different ideas about war 
and peace? Is the structure of the motivation to peace action of those who are 
members of a church peace movement different from that of church members 
who are not a member of a peace movement? Are religious peace attitudes 
dependent on the denomination? In order to answer these and other ques-
tions, a comparison between sub-goups will be made in chapter four, at three 
levels: differences between members of the church peace movements IKV, 
MOV and ICTO; differences between those members of the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Netherlands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands who are not associated with a peace movement; differences 
between the members of the church peace movements on the one hand and 
church members who are not a member of a peace movement on the other. 
The third question concerns the effect of religious peace attitudes on peace 
action. On the basis of Auer's theological 'ethics of autonomy', set out in 
section 2.1, it is expected that the effect of religious peace attitudes is of an 
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indirect nature, working through the motivation to peace action. Figure 2.20 
specifies this expectation in the form of a theoretical explanatory model of 
communicative peace action. The empirical tenability of this model will be 
tested in chapter five. The analysis will focus on the theological hypothesis of 
the model, indicated by the arrows Α-F, that religious peace attitudes have an 
indirect effect on peace action, through the motivational system of conception, 
perception and attribution. 
Figure 2.20 Theoretical model of the motivational effect of religious peace 
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The relationships between the various components of the model can be 
specified as follows. 
Peace action has been divided conceptually into two characteristics: member-
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ship of a peace movement and communicative peace action. It is expected that 
communicative peace action is determined by the membership of a peace 
movement. To begin with, it is to be expected that members of a peace 
movement engage in more peace actions than non-members. Moreover, it is to 
be expected that the members of the various peace movements differ in their 
peace action. Some peace movements, such as the IKV, have an activist 
culture. Others, such as ICTO, have the nature of an association, with many 
'paper' members, who engage in few peace actions. Still others are also 
occupied with other problems than peace, which is at the expense of their 
communicative peace action. An example of this are the MOV-groups within 
the Roman Catholic Church, who also pay attention to problems in the field of 
mission and development. 
It is to be expected that the membership of a peace movement is influenced 
by the three components of the motivation to peace action: conception, percep­
tion and attribution. This expectation is derived from the motivation theory of 
section 2.2, according to which all goal-directed action is grounded on a 
motivational process, in which conceptions, perceptions and attributions play a 
role. Membership of a peace movement is not an action in a direct sense, but 
it is founded on a decision which has the character of an action, namely the 
decision to join a peace movement. The content of the motivation to peace 
action also makes a relationship to the membership of a peace movement 
plausible. Whoever is concerned about the armament in the world (perception) 
or thinks it possible to influence the armament in the world (attribution) is 
more likely to become a member of a peace movement than someone who 
does not have these motivational characteristics. Differences in the concep­
tions of peace can explain why people join a particular peace movement. The 
'ideological' differences between the peace movements are strongly related to 
differing conceptions of peace. The hypothesis about the effect of the motiv­
ation to peace action on the membership of a peace movement is a conjunc­
tion of three sub-hypotheses. The expectation is that the membership of a 
peace movement is determined by conception and perception and attribution 
(arrows D, E and F). 
A further hypothesis concerns the effect of religious peace attitudes -
hamartiology, soteriology and ecclesiology - on the motivation to peace action. 
That religious peace attitudes have this effect is expected on the grounds of 
the theological 'ethics of autonomy'. According to this theory, the Christian 
religion has a motivational function. This hypothesis is a conjunction of three 
sub-hypotheses as well. It is expected that religious peace attitudes have an 
effect on the motivational components of conception and perception and 
attribution (arrows А, В and C). 
From the foregoing, a hypothesis can be deduced with regard to the indirect 
effect of religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action, which reads: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action, 
through their effect on the motivation to peace action. 
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This hypothesis is indicated in figure 2.20 by the arrows Α-F. It is constructed 
as a conjunction of three sub-hypotheses, which are indicated by the couples 
AD, BE and CF. The three sub-hypotheses read: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action, 
through: 
(a) the conceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(b) the perceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(c) the attributive component of the motivation to peace action. 
Finally, it is expected that the motivational system of peace action is not 
only influenced by religious peace attitudes, but also by characteristics which 
relate to the social location of peace action. The expectation is that the social 
location of peace action has direct effects on both communicative peace action 
and the membership of a peace movement. These expectations are based on 
the results of previous research into the effects of the social location on peace 
action, described in section 2.7. It is also expected that the social location of 
peace action has a direct effect on the motivation to peace action. Political 
preference, for example, may have effects on conceptions of peace, which form 
part of the motivation to peace action. 
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3 MEASURING SCALES 
In this chapter, the empirical basis of the conceptualisation in the previous 
chapter is analyzed. Empirical dimensions are indicated in the tree-diagrams of 
this chapter by blocks. The numbers in the diagrams refer to the questions in 
the measuring instruments (Appendix E). The result of the empirical test is a 
number of measuring scales, which serve as input for the analysis of 
differences between subpopulations (chapter four) and the effect of religious 
peace attitudes on peace action (chapter five). 
Information about the empirical corroboration of the theoretical concep­
tualisation, which is acquired through scale construction, is of great importance 
from an empirical-theological perspective. The formal object of empirical 
theology can be defined as "the dialectical relationship between what religious 
practice is and what it should be" (Van der Ven 1988, 18). This dialectic is 
located in the wider context of the relationship between the different 'loci 
theologici', in particular the relationship between official church teaching and 
theological theory on the one hand, and the 'sensus fidei' of the believers on 
the other (Haarsma 1968; Van der Ven & Visser 1985). 
The question what religious practice is and what it should be can be answered 
from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view (figure 3.1). Theoretical 
research produces presumptions about what religious practice is (A); and it 
produces prescriptions of what it should be, through the formulation of 
normative objectives (B). Empirical research describes what religious praxis is 
(C); and what empirical objectives it has (D). The dialectic between A and С 
implies empirical corroboration or criticism of theoretical research; the 
dialectic between В and D implies interpretative reflection upon the relation­
ship between normative and empirical objectives. 
Figure 3.1 Dialectical relationship between what religious praxis is and what it 












Scale construction is one of the instruments to explore the dialectical 
relationship between theological theory and empirical religion. It is a means to 
assess the empirical corroboration of theological presumptions and pre-
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scriptions concerning religious praxis. For example, theoretical research may 
presume that Christians conceive of peace predominantly in terms of the 
kingdom of God. Empirical research may reveal, however, that Christians 
conceive of peace also in terms of creation and in terms of Christ's victory 
over suffering and death on the cross (Α-C). Or, theoretical research may 
prescribe that the church should not participate in actions of civil disobedience 
for the goal of peace, whereas empirical research may show that believers do 
not object to civil disobedience as a form of church peace action (B-D). 
The theoretical model of this research contains two sorts of characteristics: 
actions and attitudes. Actions which are included are communicative peace 
actions and political actions. Attitudes are included in the various aspects of 
the motivation to peace action (conception, perception and attribution), in 
religious peace attitudes (hamartiological, soteriological and ecclesiological) 
and in some characteristics from the domain of the social location of peace 
action (religious worldview, saliency of worldview and churchview). 
An attitude is a system of cognitions, feelings and action tendencies towards 
an object that exists (subjectively) for the individual (Krech et al. 1962, 139). 
Many attitudinal objects in the research-model are of a religious nature (God, 
Christ, creation, God's kingdom, demonic powers). The ontological status of 
these objects may be unclear from a philosophical or scientific point of view, 
but this does not principally affect their ability to serve as objects of attitudes. 
God is an object of attitudes for those who believe in God (cf. Schillebeeckx 
1977, 42-47). 
The cognitive component of an attitude has to do with the beliefs of an 
individual about the object. An important form of cognitions are the evaluative 
beliefs, which involve the attribution to the object of characteristics like 
desirable and undesirable, good and bad, important and unimportant. The 
feeling component of an attitude refers to the emotions connected with the ob­
ject. The object attracts or repulses the individual; it is liked or disliked. The 
action tendency component of an attitude includes all the 'behavioral readiness' 
associated with the attitudinal object. An evaluation of an object as 'good' 
forms a disposition to act in favour of it (to help, reward or support it); an 
evaluation of an object as 'bad' forms a disposition to act to its detriment (to 
hurt, punish or destroy it). The three attitude components are interdependent. 
"The cognitions of an individual about an object are influenced by his feelings 
and action tendencies towards that object. And a change in his cognitions 
about the object will tend to produce changes in his feelings and action 
tendencies towards it" (Krech et al. 1962, 139). Thus, the belief that nuclear 
weapons are instruments of mass destruction may foster feelings of concern 
and anxiety, which again may produce a readiness to participate in an anti-
nuclear demonstration. In turn, the readiness to demonstrate may strengthen 
the negative evaluative belief and feelings about nuclear weapons. 
Attitudes towards an object are variable in two dimensions: multiplexity and 
valence. Multiplexity refers to the degree of differentiation of the attitude. An 
attitude towards an object is multiplex when the individual holds differentiated 
beliefs, feelings and action tendencies related to the object; an attitude is 
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simplex when the cognitions, feelings and action tendencies related to the 
object are undifferentiated. Thus, one person may cognitively discern several 
approaches to disarmament (gradual or immediate, unilateral or bilateral) and 
his feelings and action tendencies towards these forms of disarmament may be 
equally differentiated, whereas to another person disarmament may be a 
cognitively undifferentiated whole, towards which his feelings and action 
tendencies are simplex. To measure the degree of multiplexity of attitudes, we 
apply the conceptual distinctions with respect to peace motivation, religious 
peace attitudes and the social location of peace action, from chapter two. 
These distinctions are based on the scientific literature about the various 
concepts, which entails a high degree of cognitive differentiation. The degree 
to which the theoretical distinctions are reproduced in the answers of the 
respondents informs us about the multiplexity of their attitudes. Factor-analysis 
is used to measure multiplexity. Multiplex attitudes produce factors which clo­
sely follow the branching out of the conceptual trees, whereas simplex attitudes 
produce factors in which theoretical distinctions are merged. 
The valence of an attitude refers to the degree to which an individual has 
the attitude. Someone's attitude towards nuclear deterrence, for example, may 
in some degree be negative or positive, or it may be neutral. For the measur­
ing of attitude-valence, the Likert scale is used, which orders individuals on a 
linear continuum (mostly a five-point scale), which runs from extreme 
unfavourableness, through a neutral middle position, to extreme favourable­
ness. Likert scales have been constructed from items by factor-analysis, after 
which the reliability of the scales was measured by the coefficient alpha (see 
the beginning of Appendix В for the criteria observed in the factor analysis). 
For the interpretation of the Pearson correlations between scales, the following 
criteria have been used: < .20 = weak; .20 - .39 = moderate; .40 - .59 = 
strong; S. 60 = very strong. The presentation of the empirical models in this 
chapter will follow the sequence of the conceptualization: peace action (3.2.1), 
motivation to peace action (3.2.2), religious peace attitudes (3.2.3) and the 
social location of peace action (3.2.4). For the presentation of the empirical 
models, the tree-diagrams of sections 2.4 - 2.7 are used again, but now com­
pleted with boxes which refer to the empirical scales, and with a reference to 
the items of which the measuring scales are composed (Appendix E). A 
theoretical interpretation of the empirical models, in relation to the conceptual 
models, is given in section 6.1.1. The tables for chapter three can be found in 
Appendix B. The frequencies of all measuring scales are listed in table 3.17. 
3.1 Peace action 
In the operationalisation of the concept of peace action, the conceptual 
distinction between membership of a peace movement and communicative peace 
action will be followed. In section 2.4, communicative peace action has been 
divided into organizational and participatory actions, which can be ordered 
hierarchically. Organizational peace actions demand more time and energy 
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than participatory actions and therefore represent a higher degree of peace 
activity. Those who perform organizational peace actions will also perform 
participatory peace actions, but not necessarily the other way around. The 
empirical tenability of this hierarchical ordering has been tested by attempting 
to construct a cumulative scale of communicative peace activity, with the help 
of the stochastic cumulative scaling technique of Mokken (1970). It is possible 
to construct such a scale. This implies that communicative peace actions can 
indeed, as expected, be ordered hierarchically (table 3.1). The constructed 
scale will be referred to as the scale of communicative peace action (PEACE-
ACT). 
However, the hierarchy within the scale of communicative peace action 
does not wholly fit the conceptual distinction between organizational and 
participatory actions. The hierarchy within the scale, in an ordering of increas-
ing 'popularity' and decreasing 'difficulty', is as follows: 
1. I helped in the organization of peace days or peace markets (q. 006) 
2. I attended peace days or peace markets (q. 005) 
3. I have distributed or put up posters for peace (q. 007) 
4. I participated in the preparation of the church peace week (q. 004) 
5. I participated in discussion groups about war and peace (q. 002) 
Items 1, 3 and 4 of the scale pertain to organizational actions, whereas items 2 
and 5 pertain to participatory actions. Item 2 disturbs the hierarchical ordering 
of organizational over participatory actions. The assumption that organiz-
ational actions represent a higher degree of peace activity than participatory 
ones has not received complete empirical support. The relatively high 'diffi-
culty' of the attending of peace days or peace markets shows that this action 
represents a high degree of peace activity. This can, among other things, be 
attributed to the sacrifice of a day off, and to the trouble of travelling. The fact 
that peace days and -markets are not held very frequently can also have played 
a role. In this case, the high 'difficulty' of the action not only depends of the 
high degree of peace activity which it contains, but also of the low opportunity 
to engage in it. The resulting operationalisation of the concept of peace action 
is presented schematically in figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Empirical model of peace action 
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32 Motivation to peace action 
Motivation to peace action has been divided into three components: concep-
tions of peace, perceptions of armament and attributions regarding armament. 
This section gives the empirical differentiation of attitudes in these three 
fields, which have been conceptualized in section 2.5. 
3.2.1 Conceptions of peace 
The items referring to the conceptual component of peace motivation are 
divided into three theoretical domains, for which separate factor analyses have 
been carried out. The first domain concerns the topics which are directly 
related to nuclear weapons: the functionality of nuclear deterrence and the 
approaches to nuclear disarmament (a). The second domain concerns NATO-
affiliation (b). The third domain concerns international cooperation for peace 
(c). The results of the factor-analyses are shown in table 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows 
how the factors are related to the original conceptual model. 
(a) Functionality of nuclear deterrence and approaches to nuclear disarma-
ment 
Factor-analysis shows three dimensions in this domain: the functionality of 
nuclear deterrence (NUCLARM), gradual unilateral nuclear disarmament 
(UNILAT) and gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament (BILAT). This result 
leaves the overall structure of the theoretical domain intact, although one 
distinction appears to have no empirical basis, namely the distinction between 
the importance of nuclear weapons for Western security and the abolition of 
nuclear weapons by the West. 
(b) NATO-affiliation 
All items about NATO converge in one dimension, which will be referred to as 
NATO-affiliation (NATO), in accordance with the conceptual model. The 
conceptual distinction between the Dutch NATO membership and conformity 
of the Netherlands within NATO receives no empirical support. The two 
attitudes are closely related. The more one supports the NATO-membership of 
the Netherlands, the more one supports a conformist position of the Nether-
lands within NATO. The concept of a "critical NATO-membership of the 
Netherlands", sometimes advocated by peace movements, appears to be 
contradictory in the eyes of the research population. Empirically, the only 
alternatives seem to be non-critical membership and critical non-membership. 
This result can be linked to Wecke's finding that the attitude towards the 
NATO-membership of the Netherlands is most strongly predicted by the 
attitude towards NATO (Wecke 1987, 182). The attitude towards NATO-
membership of the Netherlands is not only correlated positively with attitude 
towards NATO, but also with attitude towards the conformity of the 
Netherlands within NATO. 
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(с) International cooperation for peace 
Empirically, the attitudes regarding international cooperation for peace are 
divided into two dimensions, in agreement with the conceptual model. Peace 
through development aid (DEVELOP) and peace through civil contacts with 
Eastern Europe (EASTWEST) are empirically distinct attitudinal objects. 
Figure 3.3 Empirical model of conceptions of peace 
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3.2.2 Perceptions of armament 
Factor-analysis produces a solution in three dimensions (table 3.3), which 
leaves the main distinctions of the conceptual model intact (figure 3.4). The 
expectation that perceptions of armament can be subdivided into concern about 
armament (CONCARM), comparative concern about armament (the assessment 
of one's personal concern in comparison with the concern of others: 
COMPCONC) and the relative importance of the armament problem (RELIMP) 
is corroborated. But there exists no empirical support for the distinction 
between a cognitive and an affective aspect of both concern and comparative 
concern about armament. Cognitions and affects do not manifest themselves as 
empirically distinct dimensions. 
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3.2.3 Attributions regarding armament 
In the measuring instrument, the conditional characteristic of optimism about 
the attainability of world peace has been placed in a separate question. In the 
factor-analysis this question has been treated separately as well (a). The other 
items through which attributions have been measured, referring to the 
controllability of armament and to ascribed knowledge about armament, have 
been factor-analyzed together (b). The results of the factor-analyses can be 
found in table 3.4. The operationalisation of the attributive dimension of the 
motivation to peace action is schematically presented in figure 3.5. 
(a) Optimism about the attainability of world peace 
The items in which this concept is operationalised express both an optimistic 
and a pessimistic view on world peace. Empirically, they all belong to one and 
the same dimension, on which the 'pessimistic' items all have negative 
loadings. We interpret the factor as optimism about the attainability of world 
peace (OPTIMISM). 
(b) Controllability of armament and ascribed knowledge about armament 
Two empirical dimensions are to be discerned here. The first comprises all the 
items which have to do with the controllability of armament (CONTRARM). 
The second concerns the ascribed knowledge about armament (ARMKNOW). 
This outcome supports the conceptual distinction between controllability of 
armament and ascribed knowledge about armament. But within the dimension 
of the controllability of armament, none of the conceptual distinctions are 
empirically supported. Overruling all conceptual distinctions between 
internal/external, stable/unstable and controllable/uncontrollable, the 
attribution regarding the arms problem shows a massive simplexity in empirical 
consciousness. The more someone thinks to have an individual influence on 
armament, the more he has positive expectations about the effect of peace 
actions at the local and national level, the more he thinks politicians who have 
a say about armament can be influenced, and the less he is impressed by the 
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process-autonomy of armament. 
Figure 3.5 Empirical model of attributions regarding armament 
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3.3 Religious peace attitudes 
In section 2.6.2, religious peace attitudes were divided into three groups: 
hamartiological attitudes regarding war, soteriological peace attitudes and 
ecclesiological peace attitudes. These groups will been treated separately below 
(3.3.1 - 3.3.3). 
3.3.1 Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
In the factor-analysis of hamartiological attitudes, separate analyses have been 
carried out for the hamartiological dimensions of transcendence on the one 
hand (a) and the human subject of hamartiology on the other (b). 
(a) Hamartiological dimensions of transcendence 
Hamartiological attitudes regarding war can be divided into an immanent 
transcendent and an absolute transcendent dimension. In an immanent 
transcendent hamartiology, the experience of inner-worldly evil is interpreted 
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in relation to a transcendent reality. Absolute transcendent hamartiology is 
based on a direct relationship between the transcendent power and the evil in 
the world. Inner-worldly evil is not considered as the basis of the experience of 
a hamartiological interpretation, but as the result of the intervention of the 
transcendent power. 
The conceptual distinction between an immanent transcendent and an 
absolute transcendent dimension within hamartiological attitudes receives 
considerable, but not complete, empirical support. Of the five factors found, 
four accommodate this distinction exactly (table 3.5, figure 3.6). The factor 
which disturbs the theoretical expectation is apocalyptic thinking about war 
(HAMAPOC). Here it is clear that the respondents have understood the issue 
of apocalypticism as a hamartiological dimension sui generis, in which the 
temporal characteristic of the future overrules the distinction between an 
immanent and an absolute transcendent concept of the apocalypse. Believers 
do not recognize immanent and absolute transcendent apocalypticism as 
distinct dimensions. 
The contention that both immanent and absolute transcendent hamartiolog-
ical attitudes can be divided according to the three temporal dimensions of 
past, present and future receives considerable, but not full, empirical support. 
Of the five factors found, four correspond to the temporal distinctions. The 
deviating factor is a dimension which collects all theodicy models of war. The 
assumption was that theodicy models are divided into a dimension of the past, 
in which God is seen in a radical relation to the evil of war, and a dimension 
of the present, in which God is seen in an ad hoc relation to war. Empirically, 
the radical and ad hoc theodicies of war are not distinct. The factor obtained 
will therefore be interpreted as the dimension of war in relation to God 
(HAMGOD). 
The other three factors support the distinction between immanent and 
absolute transcendence and that between temporal dimensions. These factors 
are war in radical relation to higher demonic powers (HAMPOWER), war as a 
manifestation of historical sin (HAMHIST) and war as a manifestation of 
institutional sin (HAMINST). The factor of war in radical relation to higher 
demonic powers concerns the dualistic 'solution' to the theodicy problem with 
regard to war, in which not God but transcendent evil powers are seen as the 
origin of the evil of war. This factor combines absolute transcendence with the 
temporal dimension of the past. The factor of war as a manifestation of 
historical sin pertains on the one hand to the traditional concept of hereditary 
sin and on the other hand to the model of historical-social sin, which can be 
considered as a critical reinterpretation of the model of hereditary sin. This 
factor combines immanent transcendence with the temporal dimension of the 
past. The factor of war as a manifestation of institutional sin refers to inner-
worldly structural and cultural causes of war and armament, which can be 
interpreted from a transcendent perspective. The structural cause of war has to 
do with the 'demonic' constellation of military might and economic interest, 
which manifests itself particularly in the 'Military-Industrial Complex'; the 
cultural cause concerns the 'idolatry' of the ideology of security. This factor, 
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like the former, combines immanent transcendence with the temporal dimen-
sion of the past. 
Figure 3.6 shows that the main distinctions of the conceptual model of 
hamartiological dimensions of transcendence are empirically supported to a 
large extent. Only the extreme branches of the model do not recur empirically. 
From this it must be concluded that there is a difference in multiplexity 
between the hamartiological theory of the conceptual model and empirical 
hamartiological consciousness. 
(b) Human subject of hamartiology 
Two theoretical assumptions have been made regarding the human subject of 
hamartiology. The first concerns the distinction between a social and an 
individual subject of hamartiology; the second concerns the distinction, within 
the dimension of the individual subject, between the individual in solidarity 
with others and the privatised individual. Surprisingly, this conceptualisation 
receives no empirical support (table 3.6). Empirically, the social subject and 
the individual subject in solidarity with others form one dimension, whereas 
the privatised individual takes up a separate position. This result necessitates a 
reconsideration of the conceptual model. 
In section 2.6.3, it has been pointed out that there is a conceptual similarity 
between the hamartiological social subject and the individual subject in 
solidarity with others. The model of the social subject represents the symbol-
ism of sin. In this model, the collective, as an environment surrounding and 
permeating the individual, bears the primary responsibility for the evil of war. 
The model of the individual in solidarity with others represents a reprise of 
the model of sin, within the symbolism of guilt. Against the privatisation-
tendencies in the consciousness of guilt, the model of the individual in solidar-
ity with others wants to stimulate the individual's awareness of a 'guilty 
complicity' in the evil of war (Solle 1971). What unites the models of the social 
subject and the individual subject in solidarity with others is the awareness of a 
hamartiological solidarity between people: the evil of war is borne by all 
people together. The model of the social subject situates the foundation of this 
solidarity in particular in the "Gesammtsubjekt" of the collective, whereas the 
model of the individual subject in solidarity with others founds this solidarity 
in particular in the interconnectedness of the acting of individuals. The 
empirical hamartiological consciousness does not recognize this difference, 
however. The overarching dimension will be interpreted as hamartiological 
solidarity (HAMSOLID). This attitude is empirically distinct from the attitude 
of hamartiological privatisation (HAMPRIV), in which the individual does not 
recognize any solidarity with others in relation to the evil of war. A typical 
hamartiological reaction of the privatised individual is the shifting of the 
responsibility for war onto a small group of political or military leaders, who 
are considered 'evil men'. The reconsidered model of the human subject of 
hamartiology is given in figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 Empirical model of human subject of hamartiology 
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3.3.2 Soteriological peace attitudes 
Soteriological peace attitudes are divided into two conceptual domains: 
soteriological dimensions of transcendence (a) and the human subject of 
soteriology (b). 
(a) Soteriological dimensions of transcendence 
The conceptual distinction between the dimensions of immanent and absolute 
transcendence within soteriology is empirically corroborated (table 3.7). 
Factor-analysis produces three dimensions, two of which relate to immanent 
transcendence and one to absolute transcendence. 
The conceptualisation of temporal distinctions within soteriology receives 
no empirical support. Within the dimension of immanent transcendence the 
orientations towards the past and the future form one dimension. The related 
items all refer to peace as a task, imposed by God - either as a task of 
creation in the past, or as an eschatological task from the Kingdom of God in 
the future. This temporal distinction is empirically irrelevant. The attitudes are 
empirically related by the nature of peace as a religious task, a clear character-
istic of immanent transcendence. Temporally, the factor will therefore be 
interpreted in a neutral way, as peace as a task from God (PEATASK). 
The orientation towards the present within immanent transcendent 
soteriology is represented by the image of the imitation of Christ, in its aspects 
of enemy love and the preparedness to accept suffering for the cause of peace. 
The factor will be designated as peace as imitation of Christ (PEACHR). 
Within the dimension of absolute transcendence, empiricism completely 
vitiates the distinction between past, present and future. Peace as God's 
absolute gift of creation in the past, as Christ's victory over suffering and death 
in the present and as an absolute gift of God's future kingdom belong to one 
and the same empirical dimension. Because of the absolute transcendent 
nature of this dimension, it will be interpreted as peace as absolute gift of God 
(PEAGIFT). The resulting empirical model of soteriological dimensions of 




Figure 3.8 Empirical model of soteriological dimensions of transcendence 
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(b) Human subject of soteriology 
With regard to the human subject of soteriology, a conceptual distinction has 
been made between a social and an individual dimension. The social dimen­
sion is again divided into peace at the macro level (God's peace as experi­
enced in the 'peace of the world') and peace at the micro level (God's peace 
as experienced in the harmony of primary social relationship). The individual 
dimension refers to the experience of God's peace in the inner harmony of the 
person (pax animi). This tripartite division is not supported empirically. Peace 
at the micro-level and individual peace form one dimension, distinct from 
peace at the macro-level (table 3.7). Contrary to theoretical expectations, the 
distinction between the social and the individual is not an empirical demarca­
tion for the determination of the human subject of soteriology. The cleavage is 
between the "great" peace of the world and the "small" peace at home, to 
which the intrapsychical dimension of peace belongs as well. This caesura can 
be interpreted political-theologically, by distinguishing between a solidarity-
orientated and a privatised mode of being-a-subject. The orientation towards 
the macro-level of peace expresses a mode of being-a-subject in solidarity with 
others, in which the individual is orientated towards the well-being and 
liberation of others (Metz 1977). The orientation towards the micro- and 
individual dimensions of peace can be interpreted as privatised modes of 
being-a-subject, in which the individual is primarily concerned with the per­
sonal realm of life and considers the political aspect of life of only secondary 
importance (Schillebeeckx 1977, 684). In agreement with this political-theologi­
cal interpretation, the empirical dimensions of the human subject of 
soteriology can be designated as soteriological solidarity (SOTSOLID) and 
soteriological privatisation (SOTPRIV). The reconceptualised model of the 
human subject of soteriology is presented in figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 Empirical model of human subject of soteriology 
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3.3.3 Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes are conceptually divided into three domains, 
which will be analyzed separately here: the legitimacy (a), the nature (b) and 
the actual influence (c) of the peace praxis of the church. 
(a) Legitimacy of church peace praxis 
With regard to the legitimacy of the peace praxis of the church, a conceptual 
distinction has been made between an internal and an external dimension. The 
internal dimension has to do with the prioritation of the value of church peace 
praxis over the value of church unity. The external dimension has been divided 
into the legitimacy of church peace praxis from the perspective of the church 
(legitimacy in terms of the mission of the church in the world) and of society 
(legitimacy in terms of church-state relationships). There is, however, no 
empirical support for these conceptual distinctions. All characteristics are 
gathered into one empirical dimension (table 3.8; figure 3.10). Respondents 
who consider the peace work of the church externally legitimate from a church 
perspective also consider it legitimate from a societal perspective, and those 
who consider the church's peace work externally legitimate, also consider it 
internally legitimate. In agreement with the conceptual model, the factor 
obtained can be interpreted as the attitude regarding the legitimacy of church 
peace praxis (ECCLEGIT). 
(b) Content of church peace praxis 
A conceptual distinction has been made between an external and an internal 
dimension of the content of the peace praxis of the church. The external 
dimension concerns the politically-critical peace praxis of the church; the 
internal dimension concerns the conformity of church members to church 
statements on war and peace. This conceptualisation is empirically corrobor-
ated (table 3.9; figure 3.11). Factor-analysis produced two dimensions, one of 
which is identical to the concept of the politically critical peace praxis of the 
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church (ECCRIT) and the other to the concept of conformity of church members 
to church statements on war and peace (ECCONF). Not empirically supported 
are the subdistinctions within the politically critical peace praxis of the church, 
between church resistance to the official security policy, specificity of church 
statements on war and peace, church support for peace demonstrations and for 
civil disobedience for peace. In the consciousness of believers, the specificity of 
church statements goes hand in hand with the resistance of the church against 
the official security policy and with church support for demonstrations and civil 
disobedience. Believers also do not consider support for civil disobedience, by 
which the church exceeds the bouds of the legal order, as principally different 
from other politically critical actions of the church. 
Figure 3.10 Empirical model of the legitimacy of church peace praxis 
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Figure 3.11 Empirical model of the content of church peace praxis 
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(с) Influence of church peace praxis 
The conceptual model of the influence of church peace praxis is completely 
supported by the empirical results (table 3.10; figure 3.12). Factor-analysis 
produced a solution in three dimensions, which can be interpreted in agree­
ment with the conceptual model as: influence of the church on politicians 
(ECCPOL), influence of the church on public opinion (ECCPUB) and compet­
ence of the church (ECCOMP). 
Figure 3.12 Empirical model of the influence of church peace praxis 
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3.4 Social location of peace action 
The social location of peace action has been measured with the help of a 
number of social and religious characteristics. In the following overview of the 
scale construction which has been applied to these characteristics, the social 
characteristics will be discussed first (3.4.1), followed by the religious charac­
teristics (3.4.2). 
3.4.1 Social characteristics 
Scale construction has been applied to the characteristics of educational level, 
social class, political preference and political activity. 
Educational level 
The respondents' level of education has been measured with the help of a 
classification of levels of education, developed by the Nijmegen Institute for 
Applied Sociology (Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie: ITS). This classifica­
tion distinguishes between seven levels of education, ranging from primary 
school to university (q. 704; Westerlaak et al. 1975). For practical reasons, 
these seven levels have been reduced in this research to four levels, namely: 
primary education (ITS-levels 1, 2), secondary education (ITS-levels 3-5), 
college education (ITS-level 6) and university education (ITS-level 7). 
Social class 
Social class has been measured by establishing the level of professional 
occupation. The level of professional occupation assigned to a respondent was 
the highest level of profession practised at any time by the respondent or 
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his/her partner (qq. 703-707). It was decided not to measure social class on 
the basis of income-level, because questions about income tend to produce a 
high non-response, which affects reliability. The professions have been clas-
sified according to the classification-scheme of the ITS, which distinguishes 
between six professional levels: unschooled labourer, schooled labourer, lower 
employees, small businessmen/-women, middle-class employees and higher 
professions. For practical reasons, these six levels have been reduced to three, 
which are considered as indicators of social class: lower class (ITS-levels 1, 2), 
middle class (ITS-levels 3, 4) and upper class (ITS-levels 5, 6). 
Political preference 
Political preference was measured by asking respondents for which political 
party they would vote, if parliamentary elections were held at the moment of 
the interview (q. 708). The answers were divided into three categories: left, 
centre and right. As belonging to the political left were considered the Labour 
Party (PVDA) and the smaller leftist parties CPN, EVP, PPR PSP and SP, the 
first four of which have been united since 1990 in the Green Left party. As 
belonging to the political centre were considered the Christian Democratic 
Party (CDA) and the Social Liberals (D66). As politically right-wing were 
considered the Conservative Liberal Party (WD), the small right-wing 
religious parties GPV, SGP and RPF, as well as the small racist Centre Party 
(CP). 
Political activity 
Cumulative effects are to be expected in the construction of a scale of political 
activity. Political actions of a high 'difficulty' (such as active involvement with a 
political party) will include actions with a low 'difficulty' (such as reading about 
politics in newspapers). From five of the seven items by which political activity 
was measured (q. 709-715), a cumulative (Mokken-) scale could be constructed 
(table 3.11). This confirms the expectation regarding cumulativity. The hier-
archy in the scale, in order of increasing 'popularity' and decreasing 'difficulty', 
is as follows: 
1. Spend time working for a political party or a candidate (q. 715) 
2. Attend a political meeting or rally (q. 713) 
3. Contact public officials or politicians (q. 714) 
4. Discuss politics with other people (q. 710) 
5. Read about politics in newspapers (q. 709) 
3.4.2 Religious characteristics 
Scale construction has been applied to the religious characteristics of religious 
worldview, saliency of worldview and churchview. In addition, the characteristic 
of church relatedness has been measured, with the help of the church related-
ness-scale from the SOCON-research (cf. table 2.2). Because in particular 
highly church related church members were invited for the survey (cf. Appen-
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dix A), the division of scores on the church relatedness scale in the sample is 
skewed, which is why it is statistically impossible to construct a cumulative 
church relatedness-scale from the data. The SOCON-scale will therefore be 
used as an empirically validated instrument for the measuring of church 
relatedness (CHURCHREL). The frequencies of the various categories of this 
scale are listed in table 3.12. 
Religious worldview 
On the basis of the SOCON-research (Felling et al. 1986), a distinction has 
been made between three domains of religious worldview: the existence of a 
higher reality, the meaning of life and the meaning of good and evil. For each 
of these domains, three religious attitudes were measured: belief in a personal 
God, belief in the a-personal divine and religious immanentism. The instru­
ment used in this study for the measuring of religious worldview was con­
structed by Felling, Peters and Schreuder on the basis of a representative 
national survey in the Netherlands (Felling et al. 1987). The results of our 
research are identical to the results of SOCON (table 3.13). All items which 
pertain to the belief in a personal God (in relation to the existence of a higher 
reality, the meaning of life and the meaning of good and evil) form one 
dimension: belief in a personal God (PERSGOD). The items related to the 
belief in the a-personal divine (measured only in relation to the meaning of a 
higher reality) converge to one dimension: belief in the a-personal divine 
(DIVINE). The items related to a religious immanentist worldview (in relation 
to the existence of a higher reality, the meaning of life and the meaning of 
good and evil) form one dimension, designated as religious immanentism 
(RELIMM). The structure of the resulting empirical model of religious 
worldview is shown in figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.13 Empirical model of religious worldview 
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Religious liimanentism 
(regarding existence of 
higher reality, meaning 
of life and meaning of 
good and evil) 
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ς. 807, 810, 814, 815, 
817, BIS 
Saliency of worldview 
To the measuring instrument of the saliency of worldview in general (Felling et 
al. 1985, 77-80), a number of questions were added which concern the saliency 
of worldview regarding the specific problem of war and peace. The general and 
specific saliency of worldview form one empirical dimension (table 3.14; figure 
3.14). The problem of war and peace is not a realm of life in which the 
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saliency of worldview differs from the saliency of worldview in general. The 
dimension which has been found will shortly be referred to as saliency of 
worldview (SALIENCY). 
Figure 3.14 Empirical model of saliency of worldview 
Saliency of worldview 
SALIENCY 
I I 
Saliency of worldview Specific saliency of worldview, 
In general q. 819, with regard to Issues of war 
821, 823 and peace q. 820, 822, 824 
Churchview 
In section 2.7, churchview has been divided conceptually into attitudes regard-
ing the organization of the church (a) and the tasks of the church (b). Both 
conceptual domains will be analyzed separately here. 
(a) Organization of the church 
It was assumed in section 2.7 that the attitudes regarding the organization of 
the church are divided into attitudes regarding internal and external relations 
of the church. This distinction is empirically supported. Factor-analysis 
produces a solution in three factors, two of which are related to the internal 
relations of the church and one to external relations (table 3.15; figure 3.15). 
Within the internal relations of the church a distinction was made between 
the concepts of the priesthood of believers and democratic decision-making in 
the church. Both concepts were interpreted as elements of a democratic view 
of the church, in which the religious community constitutes the primary subject 
of the church, in contrast to a hierarchical view of the church, in which the 
church leadership is the primary subject of the church. Factor-analysis ident-
ified the attitudes regarding the priesthood of believers (CHURLAY) and 
democratic decision-making in the church (CHURDEM) as separate dimensions. 
They are, however, strongly interrelated (Pearson correlation .62). Priesthood 
of believers and democratic decision-making in the church form distinct 
attitudinal dimensions, but the more positively one will think about the one, 
the more positively one thinks about the other. 
Within the external relations of the church, the attitudes regarding the 
social inclusiveness and cultural adaptation of the church appear to be related, 
as was expected on the basis of Yinger's church-sociological theory. Yinger 
considered these two characteristics as complementary. The more a church 
attempts to include members of society, the more it will accommodate the 
cultural values and norms of society (Yinger 1970). The dimension found will 
be referred to as the openness of the church vis-à-vis society (CHURSOC). 
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Figure 3.15 Empirical model of the organization of the church 
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(b) Tasks of the church 
Conceptually, a distinction was made between tasks of the church at the 
micro-, meso- and macro-level. Tasks at the micro-level have to do with the 
individual pastoral care of people who are in trouble, the ill, the dying and 
those in mourning, as well as with pastoral assistance around important events 
of life. Tasks at the meso-level have to do with the social and cultural life 
within the church itself, in particular the promotion of a structure of active 
volunteer-groups within the church. Tasks at the macro-level have to do in 
particular with the diaconal activities of the church, such as the promotion of 
societal and political consciousness and the relief of the poor. 
The empirical results support the distinction between the three dimensions 
in the tasks of the church (table 3.16; figure 3.16). Tasks of the church are 
empirically divided into the micro-dimension of person-directed tasks of the 
church (TASKPER), the meso-dimension of group-directed tasks of the church 
(TASKGRO) and the macro-dimension of socio-political tasks of the church 
(TASKSOC). 
Figure 3.16 Empirical model of the tasks of the church 
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At the end of the empirical testing of the theoretical conceptualisation, it can e 
concluded that the majority of the conceptual distinctions which have 
beenmade are empirically recognizable. Some of the finest branches of the 
models are empirically indistinguishable, but do fit into a theoretical concept at 
a higher level of abstraction. In addition it can be concluded that the reliability 
and the content validity of the measuring scales are good. Finally, it can be 
remarked that almost all the items which were meant to measure a concept at 
the level of operationalisation are entailed in the final measuring scales. Of 
263 items, only 14 had to be eliminated. 
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4 DESCRIPTION OF SUB-POPULATIONS 
This chapter deals with the differences among the six subgroups of the sample 
with respect to the empirical characteristics described in chapter three. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. In sections 4.1 to 4.3, three different 
comparisons are made between sub-groups, with the help of analysis of 
variance (Blalock 1981, 335-379), multiple comparison and cross-tabulation 
(Norusis 1987). In 4.1, the members of the church peace movements IKV, 
MOV and ICTO will be compared. This comparison will be referred to as the 
members' description. In 4.2, three groups of church members who are not 
simultaneously members of a peace movement will be compared: members of 
the Roman Catholic Church, the Netherlands Reformed Church and the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. Together, these groups will be 
referred to as 'non-members' and their comparison as non-members' description. 
In 4.3, the members of the church peace movements and the non-members will 
be compared. This will be referred to as the overall description. In 4.4, finally, 
the overall description will be represented graphically, with the help of the 
technique of correspondence-analysis (Lammers & Pelzer 1988). 
For the interpretation of the scores on the most often used five-point Likert 
scales, the following criteria are used: 1.00 to 1.50 = strong disapproval; 1.51 
to 2.50 = disapproval; 2.51 to 3.49 = neutral, or doubt; 3.50 to 4.49 = appro-
val; 4.50 to 5.00 = strong approval. In a few instances attitudes have been 
measured by four-point Likert scales. The interpretation of these scales will be 
given ad hoc. For the interpretation of the measure of association eta, the 
following criteria are applied: eta < .25 = weak association; eta .25 to .40 = 
modest association; èta à .40 = strong association. The tables which go with 
this chapter are presented in Appendix С 
4.1 Members ' description 
Members' description will be given for communicative peace action (4.1.1), 
motivation to peace action (4.1.2), religious peace attitudes (4.1.3) and social 
location of peace action (4.1.4). The mean scores of the members of the three 
church peace movements are listed in table 4.3.2. 
4.1.1 Members' description with respect to communicative peace action 
For the measuring of communicative peace action, a five-point cumulative 
scale has been constructed (PEACEACT, table 3.1), which consists of the 
182 
following actions, in a sequence of decreasing 'popularity' and increasing 
'difficulty': 
I participated in discussion groups about war and peace (q. 002) 
I participated in the preparation of the church peace week (q. 004) 
I have distributed or put up posters for peace (q. 007) 
I attended peace days or peace markets (q. 005) 
I helped in the organization of peace days or peace markets (q. 006). 
The communicative peace action of the three peace movements shows very 
strong differences. IKV-members engage in more communicative peace actions 
than members of MOV and ICTO. The average score of IKV on the PEACE-
ACT-scale is 3.66, whereas MOV and ICTO score 2.32 and 1.58 respectively. 
The difference between MOV and ICTO is not significant, according to the 
Scheffé's multiple comparison test, which is applied to this and following 
comparisons (Scheffé 1959, 83-87). 
4.1.2 Members' description with respect to motivation to peace action 
In the conceptualisation of the motivation to peace action, a distinction has 
been made between three motivational components: conceptions of peace (a), 
perceptions of armaments (b) and attributions regarding armaments (с). A 
comparison of the members of the three church peace movements will be 
made here with respect to these three components. 
(a) Conceptions of peace 
Conceptions of peace are empirically divided into six dimensions (table 3.2). 
For each dimension, the item is given which, according to the factor-analysis, 
represents the dimension most strongly. 
- Functionality of nuclear deterrence (NUCLARM): 
"Unfortunately, nuclear weapons are necessary for our security" (q. 113). 
- Gradual unilateral nuclear disarmament (UNILAT): 
"We in the West should make the first step towards gradual reduction of 
nuclear weapons in the world" (q. 111). 
- Gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament (BILAT): 
"The West can only reduce its nuclear armaments, when the East Block has 
signed sound disarmament treaties" (q. 124). 
- NATO-affiUation (NATO): 
"As a loyal member of NATO, the Netherlands should keep in line with the 
other allies" (q. 126). 
- Peace through development aid (DEVELOP): 
"In order to obtain a true world peace, we in the West should help reduce 
poverty in the world" (q. 125). 
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- Peace through civil contacts with Eastern Europe (EASTWEST): 
"Contacts between citizens in East and West are very important for détente 
in Europe" (q. 116). 
The members of the three peace movements differ as to their conceptions of 
peace. ICTO-members in particular have quite different conceptions of peace 
than IKV-members and MOV-members. They are convinced more strongly 
than members of IKV and MOV of the functionality of nuclear deterrence and 
of the need to achieve nuclear disarmament through a gradual process of 
bilateral negotiations. Also, they attach greater importance to NATO-affili-
ation. They are less positive than IKV- and MOV-members with regard to 
unilateral disarmament steps, as well as to development aid and civil contacts 
with Eastern Europe. IKV-members differ from MOV-members as regards two 
points: they have a more negative attitude towards gradual bilateralism and 
towards NATO. 
(b) Perceptions of armament 
Three empirical dimension can be discerned with regard to perceptions of 
armament (table 3.3): 
- Concern about armament (CONCARM): 
"When I think of all the arms in the world, I usually get a very depressed 
feeling" (q. 212). 
- Comparative concern about armament (COMPCONC): 
"I am much more inclined to worry about the arms in the world than other 
people in my environment" (q. 216). 
- Relative importance of armament problem (RELIMP): 
"I think that the threat of armament is a greater problem than all other 
problems in the world" (q. 205). 
The contrast between IKV- and ICTO-members, which can be observed with 
conceptions of peace, recurs at the level of perceptions. IKV-members show 
both a higher concern and a higher comparative concern about armament than 
ICTO-members. IKV-members are also more convinced of the relative 
importance of the armament problem. 
At the perceptual level, MOV-members take a central position. They 
resemble IKV-members in their concern about the world's armaments situ-
ation, but they are like the members of ICTO with respect to comparative 
concern. Their central position with regard to the relative importance of the 
armament problem causes MOV-members not to differ significantly from 
others in this respect. 
(c) Attributions regarding armament 
Attributions regarding armament are divided into three empirical dimensions 
(figure 3.5): 
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- Optimism about the attainability of world peace (OPTIMISM): 
"Ultimately, the people in this world will succeed in attaining peace" (q. 
329). 
- Controllability of armament (CONTRARM): 
"I think that, as an individual, I cannot do anything about the arms 
problem" (q. 306: negative item). 
- Ascribed knowledge about armament (ARMKNOW): 
"People like myself have absolutely no understanding of such complicated 
matters as armament and disarmament" (q. 316: negative item). 
Members of IKV and MOV are more convinced of the controllability of 
armament than members of ICTO. They are also more optimistic about the 
attainability of world peace. IKV-members and MOV-members show no 
significant difference with regard to these characteristics. The situation is 
different for ascribed knowledge about armament. IKV-members have a higher 
assessment of their knowledge about armament than MOV-members. This is 
one of the rare points on which IKV- and MOV-members differ, and on which 
there is no significant difference between IKV and ICTO. 
4.1.3 Members' description with respect to religious peace attitudes 
Differences between the three peace movements will be analyzed with respect 
to hamartiological attitudes regarding war (a), soteriological peace attitudes 
(b) and ecclesiological peace attitudes (c). In the interpretation of the average 
scores it must be taken into consideration that soteriological attitudes have 
been measured with four-point scales and the other attitudes with five-point 
scales. 
(a) Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
Empirically, hamartiological attitudes have been divided into the following 
seven dimensions, the first five of which concern hamartiological dimensions of 
transcendence, the remaining two concerning the human subject of 
hamartiology (table 3.6): 
- War as a manifestation of historical sin (HAMHIST): 
"Wars arise because the evil which people have inflicted upon each other in 
the past leads to new evil today" (q. 413). 
- War as a manifestation of institutional sin (HAMINST): 
"Wars arise because the belief in military security has been perverted 
nowadays into true idolatry" (q. 416). 
- War in relation to God (HAMGOD): 
"War is a punishment of God for the sins of this world" (q. 432). 
- War in radical relation to higher demonic powers (HAMPOWER): 
"Wars arise because higher demonic powers rule the world" (q. 427). 
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- Apocalyptic war (HAMAPOC): 
"One day, God will put an end to the evil in this world by a great final war" 
(q. 424). 
- Hamartiological solidarity (HAMSOLID): 
"The entire human race is guilty of the wars in the world" (q. 439). 
- Hamartiological privatisation (HAMPRIV): 
"All things considered, it is only a handful of evil-minded persons who are 
guilty of wars" (q. 438). 
A striking result is that differences between the three peace movements only 
arise in the hamartiological dimensions of transcendence and not in the human 
subject of hamartiology. On average, members of IKV, MOV and ICTO are all 
neutral or doubtful with regard to the model of hamartiological solidarity and 
negative with regard to the model of hamartiological privatisation. 
All images from the hamartiological dimensions of transcendence show 
differences between the peace movements, which in all cases are differences 
between IKV and MOV on the one hand, and ICTO on the other. ICTO-
members have a more positive attitude than the others towards the image of 
war as a manifestation of historical sin. They also have a greater affinity with 
apocalyptic thinking about war and with the idea that war can be related to 
God and higher demonic powers. ICTO-members have a less positive attitude 
than IKV- and MOV-members towards the image of war as a manifestation of 
institutional sin. There is no significant difference between the hamartiological 
attitudes of IKV- and MOV-members. 
The more positive attitude of ICTO-members towards a number of hamar-
tiological ideas does not imply that their attitude is positive in absolute terms 
as well. On average, the attitudes of ICTO-members towards the hamartio-
logical dimensions of transcendence range from neutrality to doubt, except for 
the model of war as a manifestation of institutional sin, which they reject. 
(b) Soteriological peace attitudes 
In order to measure soteriological peace attitudes, respondents were asked 
how frequently they associated a set of soteriological images with peace. 
Answering categories were: 1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = less often, 4 = 
often. In the interpretation of the scores on this four-point scale, the following 
criteria are applied: 1.00 through 2.50 = weak association; 2.51 through 3.50 
= moderate association; 3.51 through 4.00 = strong association. 
Soteriological peace attitudes are empirically divided into the following five 
dimensions, the first three of which concern soteriological dimensions of 
transcendence and the last two of which concern the human subject of 
soteriology (table 3.7): 
- Peace as imitation of Christ (PEACHR): 
(Peace makes me think of) "Following Jesus' example and even accept 
suffering for peace" (q. 527). 
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- Peace as a task from God (PEATASK): 
(Peace makes me think of) "God's command to man to administer the earth 
well" (q. 510). 
- Peace as an absolute gift of God (PEAGTFT): 
(Peace makes me think of) "The future kingdom, which God will give to us 
one day" (q. 516). 
- Soteriological solidarity (SOTSOLID): 
(Peace makes me think of) "God's salvation for all people" (q. 514). 
- Soteriological privatisation (SOTPRIV): 
(Peace makes me think of) "The divine peace which you experience deep 
within yourself' (q. 519). 
Unlike hamartiological attitudes, soteriological attitudes show few differences 
between the peace movements. A substantial difference only occurs with the 
human subject of soteriology. IKV-members are more negative about 
soteriological privatisation than the other two peace movements. 
(c) Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
Ecclesiological attitudes are empirically divided into six dimensions, which 
refer to the legitimacy, content and influence of the church peace praxis (table 
3.8 - 3.10). The dimensions are: 
- Legitimacy of church peace praxis (ECCLEGIT): 
"You are a member of a church because of your religion, not for matters of 
war and peace" (q. 630, negative item) 
- Politically critical peace praxis of the church (ECCRIT): 
"The church must support actions of civil disobedience against armament" 
(q. 622). 
- Conformity of church members to church statements on war and peace 
(ECCONF): 
"As a believer, you should accept church statements about war and peace" 
(q. 604). 
- Influence of the church on politicians (ECCPOL): 
"Politicians do take into consideration what the churches say about war and 
peace" (q. 606). 
- Influence of the church on public opinion (ECCPUB): 
"The church has a lot of influence on what people think about war and 
peace" (q. 624). 
- Competence of the church (ECCOMP): 
"Unfortunately, the church does not have the knowledge required to say 
something sensible about war and peace" (q. 634, negative item). 
There are differences in attitudes between the three peace movements 
regarding the legitimacy, content and influence of church peace praxis. 
Regarding legitimacy, IKV- and MOV-members have a much more positive 
attitude than ІСГО-members. The first are convinced that church peace praxis 
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is legitimate, whereas members of ICTO have their doubts about this. 
The attitudes regarding the content of the church peace praxis present a 
variable picture. On the one hand, there is unanimity about the conformity of 
church members to church statements about war and peace. The attitudes of 
all groups are in the range of rejection. On the other hand, there is disagree-
ment about the politically critical peace praxis of the church. Members of IKV 
and MOV take a more positive view of this than ICTO-members. IKV- and 
MOV-members agree in their attitudes regarding the politically critical peace 
praxis of the church. 
Concerning the influence of church peace praxis, there is unanimity among 
the peace activists about the influence of the church on politicians and on 
public opinion. They doubt that the church has any influence on politicians and 
are doubtful to affirmative about the influence of the church on public opinion. 
Differences of opinion exist about the competence of the church with regard to 
peace issues. ICTO-members consider the church's competence as lower than 
IKV- and MOV-members do. 
In general, it can be concluded that the members of the three church peace 
movements partly differ and partly agree in their religious peace attitudes. 
4.1.4 Members' description with respect to the social location of peace action 
Members' description is given for social characteristics (a) and religious 
characteristics (b) respectively. 
(a) Social characteristics 
In section 2.7, social characteristics have been divided into three groups: 
demographic characteristics (age, gender), socio-economic characteristics 
(education, social class) and political characteristics (political preference, 
political activity). Below follows the description of the three peace movements 
with regard to these six social characteristics. 
Age 
For the comparison according to age, a distinction has been made between 
three age-categories: under 40; 40 to 65; 65 and older. ICTO-members stand 
out because of their relatively high age (table 4.1.2). 58% of ICTO-members 
are 65 years of age or older (against IKV 16.5% and MOV 17.6%). That 
ICTO-members belong to the seniors among the peace activists also appears 
from a comparison of average ages. For ICTO the average age is 63, against 
52 for MOV and 51 for IKV. 
Gender 
ICTO-members are mainly of the male gender. The proportion of men to 
women in ICTO is exactly 9:1, against about 1.5:1 in IKV and exactly 1:1 in 
MOV (table 4.1.3). 
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Education 
Education has been divided into four categories: primary, secondary, college 
and university education. The three peace movements do not differ significant-
ly in terms of education. For all three, the college level of education is the 
modal category (table 4.1.4). 
Social class 
On the basis of the occupational level, social class has been divided into three 
categories: lower, middle and upper class. IKV-and ICTO-members belong in 
particular to the higher class, whereas MOV-members are particularly form 
the lower and middle classes (table 4.1.5). 
Political preference 
The political preferences of the three peace groups show striking differences 
(table 4.1.6). Among the members of IKV and MOV in the sample, there is 
not a single rightist voter. Among ICTO-members, on the other hand, there is 
not a single leftist voter. For IKV and MOV, the left is the modal category of 
political preference; for ICTO, this is the political centre. 
Political activity 
In order to measure political activity, a five-point hierarchical scale has been 
constructed (POLACT, table 3.11). The scale consists of the following items, in 
a sequence of increasing 'difficulty' and decreasing 'popularity': 
"How often do you: 
- read about politics in newspapers? (q. 709) 
- discuss politics with other people? (q. 710) 
- contact public officials or politicians? (q. 714) 
- attend a political meeting or rally? (q. 713) 
- spend time working for a political party or a candidate? (q. 715) 
The political activity of MOV-members is the lowest. On average they engage 
in somewhat more than two political activities. They differ in this respect from 
IKV- and ICTO-members, both of which groups engage in well over three 
activities (table 4.3.2). 
(b) Religious characteristics 
Religious characteristics refer to denomination, church relatedness, religious 
worldview, saliency of worldview and churchview. 
Denomination 
The comparison of the church peace movements according to denomination 
(table 4.1.7) shows something that had already been inferred from the litera-
ture study: The MOV-members in the sample are nearly all Catholics (97.1%). 
This is obvious, since MOV-groups are organizationally related to Catholic 
parishes. Among the IKV-members interviewed, Catholics are also the largest 
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group, with 41%. In the ICTO-stratum Catholics and members of the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands are numerically equal, with 34% each. 
Compared with the national division according to denomination, the Reformed 
are strongly overrepresented in ICTO. Nationally, the Reformed Churches in 
the Netherlands account for about 10% of the church members (Peters & 
Schreuder 1987, 19). 
Church relatedness 
Church relatedness has been measured with the help of the cumulative church 
relatedness-scale from the SOCON-research (table 2.2). Church relatedness is 
highest with MOV-members and less high with IKV- and ICTO-members 
(table 4.3.2). With a score of CHURCHREL 4.97, MOV-members are clear-
cut core-members of the church, whereas the others are closer to the modal 
type of church member (IKV 4.38; ICTO 4.36). 
Religious worldview 
Empirically, religious worldview is divided into three dimensions (table 3.13): 
- Belief in a personal God (PERSGOD): 
"All the good in the world finally comes from God" (q. 812). 
- Belief in the a-personal divine (DIVINE): 
"I believe in the existence of a supreme being" (q. 811). 
- Religious immanentism (RELIMM): 
"Life only has a meaning if you provide it yourself' (q. 815). 
Members of IKV and ICTO have different attitudes regarding all three 
dimensions of religious worldview. IKV-members are more positive towards 
religious immanentism; ICTO-members are more positive towards the models 
of a personal God and of the a-personal divine. MOV-members take up a 
middle position. They are distinguished from IKV-members by a more positive 
attitude towards the belief in a personal God and from ICTO-members by a 
more positive attitude towards religious immanentism. In their ideas about the 
a-personal divine, MOV-members are not distinguished from the others and 
take up a central position (table 4.3.2). 
Saliency of worldview 
Saliency of worldview has been measured by asking questions about the 
saliency of worldview in general and in relation to the particular problem of 
war and peace. Empirically, saliency of worldview is one dimension 
(SALIENCY, table 3.14). The item which represents this dimension most is: 
"My worldview plays a major role in my ideas about war and peace" (q. 824). 
The saliency of worldview is not the same for the three groups. ICTO-mem-
bers are characterized by a lower saliency of worldview than IKV- and MOV-
members (table 4.3.2). 
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Churchview 
Churchview has been divided into attitudes regarding the organization of the 
church (table 3.15) and the tasks of the church (table 3.16). Attitudes regard-
ing the organization of the church consist of three empirical dimensions: 
- Democratic decision-making in the church (CHURDEM): 
"It is not good that believers have a say in decisions about everything that 
happens in the church" (q. 831, negative item). 
- Priesthood of believers (CHURLAY). 
"Lay persons should also have the right to conduct services in the church" 
(q. 825). 
- Openness of the church vis-à-vis society (CHURSOC): 
"The church should always keep pace with the changing ideas in society" (q. 
829). 
There are differences between the church peace movements regarding all 
dimensions of the organization of the church. IKV-members take a more 
positive view of democratic decision-structures, of the priesthood of believers 
and of the openness of the church vis-à-vis society than ICTO-members. MOV-
members take up a central position. They side with ICTO when democratic 
decision-making in the church is concerned and with IKV as regards the 
priesthood of believers and the openness of the church vis-à-vis society (table 
4.3.2). 
Attitudes regarding the tasks of the church equally consist of three empirical 
dimensions: 
- Person-directed tasks (TASKPER): 
(It is the task of the church to:) "Give comfort to people who are in 
trouble" (q. 846). 
- Group-directed tasks (TASKGRO): 
(It is the task of the church to:) "Stimulate people to form active working 
groups in the church" (q. 847). 
- Socio-political tasks (TASKSOC): 
(It is the task of the church to:) "Take a critical stand in societal issues" (q. 
848). 
Again, the ideas among the church peace movements differ. IKV-members are 
more attached to the socio-political and group-directed tasks of the church 
than ICTO-members, and less to the person-directed tasks. The members of 
MOV form various coalitions. They side with IKV with regard to the socio-
political and group-directed tasks, and with ICTO with regard to the person-
directed tasks (table 4.3.2). 
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4.2 Non-members' description 
The three groups of church members who are not members of a peace 
movement (non-members) are the members of the Roman Catholic Church, 
the Netherlands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Nether-
lands. They are compared with respect to communicative peace action (4.2.1), 
motivation to peace action (4.2.2), religious peace attitudes (4.2.3) and the 
social location of peace action (4.2.4). The mean scores for the three groups 
can be found in table 4.2.1. 
4.2.1 Non-members' description with respect to communicative peace action 
Regarding communicative peace action, there are no significant differences 
between the three groups of non-members (table 4.2.1). In this population, 
there is no relationship between denomination and peace action. On the five-
point scale of communicative peace action, all three groups are near the score 
of .50, which means that on average they engaged in less than one of the five 
peace actions listed on the scale. This result does, however, imply that some 
degree of peace activity is undertaken by church members who are not a 
member of a peace movement. 
4.2.2 Non-members' description with respect to motivation to peace action 
Regarding the motivation to peace action - divided into conceptions of peace, 
perceptions of armament and attributions regarding armament - there is not a 
single significant difference between the three denominations (table 4.2.1). In 
the group of non-members, there is no relationship between denomination and 
motivation to peace action. 
4.2.3 Non-members' description with respect to religious peace attitudes 
As regards religious peace attitudes, the three groups of non-members only 
differ with respect to their hamartiological and ecclesiological attitudes, not 
with respect to their soteriological attitudes. 
With respect to hamartiology, there is a weak effect of apocalyptic thinking 
about war. Members of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands have more 
affinity with this than members of the Netherlands Reformed Church, and 
these in turn more than Catholics. In addition, members of the Reformed 
Churches agree more strongly to the idea of a hamartiological solidarity in the 
evil of war than members of Netherlands Reformed, and these again more 
than Catholics. The other hamartiological attitudes show no significant 
differences. 
The ecclesiological peace attitudes of the non-members show a significant 
difference on two points. Catholics are more convinced than the Netherlands 
Reformed and the members of the Reformed Churches about the necessity of 
conformity of church members to church statements on war and peace. This 
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difference is understandable in the light of the diverging ecclesiological 
traditions of the hierarchical Roman Catholic Church and the synodal-presby-
terian Protestant churches. With a score of ECCONF 2.71, however, Catholics 
cannot be considered as particularly law-abiding church members. It is just that 
they reject conformity to church statements less strongly than the others do. A 
second difference as regards ecclesiological peace attitudes concerns the 
assessment of the influence of the church on public opinion. Catholics are 
more strongly convinced of the public influence of the church than Netherlands 
Reformed, and these in turn more than the members of the Reformed 
Churches. It is no coincidence that this order corresponds to the sizes of the 
three denominations in terms of membership figures. The Roman Catholic 
church in the Netherlands has well over twice as many members as the 
Netherlands Reformed Church, and this in turn has well over four times as 
many members as the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. Church 
members seem to make their assessment of the public influence of 'the' church 
(without specification) dependent on the numerical share of their own church 
in the national population. 
4.2.4 Non-members' description with respect to the social location of peace 
action 
Differences between the three groups of non-members will be given for social 
characteristics (a) and religious characteristics (b) respectively. 
(a) Social characteristics 
The three groups of non-members in the sample do not differ significantly with 
respect to age, gender, social class, political preference and political activity. 
The modal age-category of all three groups is the category of 40 to 65 (table 
4.2.2). The average age of the non-members is 52. In all three groups there are 
more men than women (table 4.2.3). The modal social class for all three is the 
lower class (table 4.2.5). Their political preference is towards the centre and 
right wing of the political spectrum. The number of adherents of rightist 
parties was so small that the categories of 'centre' and 'right' have been 
combined, for statistical reasons (table 4.2.6). The non-members on average 
engage in two to two and a half of the five political actions listed in the 
POLACT-scale (table 4.2.1). A difference exists only with regard to the level of 
education. The Catholics have the highest percentage of both primary and 
college education. The Reformed Churches have the highest percentage of 
members who have received only secondary education and the Netherlands 
Reformed Church has the highest percentage of university-educated members 
(table 4.2.4). 
(b) Religious characteristics 
The three groups differ as to their church relatedness. Catholics are more 
closely related to the church than the Netherlands Reformed and these in turn 
more than the members of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. With a 
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score of 4.55 on the church relatedness scale, the members of the Reformed 
Churches still belong to the category of core-members of the church. 
There are also differences with regard to religious worldview. Catholics are 
less attracted by the concept of a personal God than members of the 
Reformed Churches, and more to religious immanentism. In this last respect, 
Catholics also differ from the Netherlands Reformed. The attitudes regarding 
the belief in the a-personal divine are not different for the three groups. Nor 
are there any differences with regard to the saliency of worldview. 
Finally, Catholics are less positive towards democratic decision-making in 
the church than the Netherlands Reformed. In the other aspects of churchview 
- the ideas about the priesthood of believers, the openness of the church vis-à-
vis society and the tasks of the church - there are no significant differences 
between the three groups of non-members. 
4.3 Overall description 
It can be concluded from the results of section 4.2 that there are only few 
internal differences among the of non-members. In the following description of 
differences between the members of the church peace movements and the 
non-members, the latter will therefore be treated as a single group. The overall 
description thus concerns four groups: members of IKV, MOV and ICTO, and 
non-members. The focus will be on the ways in which the various peace 
movements differ from the non-members. The overall description will be given 
for communicative peace action (4.3.1), motivation to peace action (4.3.2), 
religious peace attitudes (4.3.3) and the social location of peace action (4.3.4). 
The mean scores for the four groups can be found in table 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Overall description with respect to communicative peace action 
When comparing the members of the peace movements with the non-mem-
bers, one sees that all groups of members engage in more communicative 
peace actions than the non-members (table 4.3.2). Clearly, communicative 
peace action is related to the membership of a peace movement, although a 
low degree of peace activity can be found among the non-members as well. 
4.3.2 Overall description with respect to motivation to peace action 
The overall description will be given for conceptions of peace (a), perceptions 
of armament (b) and attributions regarding armament (c). 
(a) Conceptions of peace 
When comparing the peace-conceptions of the four groups, one observes a 
characteristic pattern: IKV-members, often accompanied by MOV-members, 
take up a position at one end of the scale and ICTO-members at the other, 
enclosing the non-members from both sides (table 4.3.2). This recurring 
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pattern will be referred to as the inclusion pattern. 
With regard to the functionality of nuclear deterrence, gradual unilateral 
and bilateral nuclear disarmament, NATO-affiliation and peace through 
development aid, the members of the three peace movements all differ from 
non-members. Members of IKV and MOV have a more positive attitude 
towards gradual unilateralism and peace through development aid than non-
members; ICTO-members have a more negative attitude. The attitudes 
regarding the functionality of nuclear deterrence, gradual bilateralism and 
NATO-affiliation show reverse relationships: ICTO-members have more 
positive attitudes than non-members; IKV- and MOV-members more negative 
ones. Only the attitudes regarding peace through civil contacts with Eastern 
Europe show a different pattern. IKV-members are more positive about this 
than non-members, and ICTO-members more negative; but MOV-members do 
not differ from non-members here. 
(b) Perceptions of armament 
Here, the general pattern is less coherent than with conceptions. The inclusion-
pattern occurs only once: members of IKV and MOV are more concerned 
about the armament in the world than non-members, whereas members of 
ICTO are less concerned. The relationships are different with respect to 
comparative concern about armament and the relative importance of the 
armament problem. All three peace movements differ from the non-members 
in showing a higher degree of comparative concern. More unanimity between 
members and non-members exists with regard to the relative importance of the 
armament problem. Members of MOV and ICTO do not consider the relative 
importance of this problem to be greater than non-members do. Only IKV-
members attach more importance to this problem than non-members. 
For ICTO, the results regarding concern and comparative concern about 
armament are somewhat contradictory. ICTO-members are less concerned 
about armament than non-members, but attribute a higher comparative 
concern to themselves than non-members do. 
(c) Attributions regarding armament 
With regard to the attribution-characteristics, the inclusion-pattern occurs 
once: IKV- and MOV-members are more optimistic about the attainability of 
world peace than non-members, whereas ICTO-members are less optimistic. 
IKV-and MOV-members think more positively about the controllability of 
armament than non-members, whereas ICTO-members feel the same about 
this as non-members. The assessment of personal knowledge about arms-issues 
is higher with all three peace movements than it is with the non-members. 
4.3.3 Overall description with respect to religious peace attitudes 
The overall description will be given for hamartiological attitudes regarding 
war (a), soteriological peace attitudes (b) and ecclesiological peace attitudes 
(c). 
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(a) Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
With respect to the hamartiological characteristics, the inclusion pattern occurs 
twice. ICTO-members show more agreement with the idea that there is a 
relationship between wars and God than non-members do; members of IKV 
and MOV show less agreement here than non-members. On the other hand, 
IKV- and MOV-members show more agreement with the concept of war as a 
manifestation of institutional sin than non-members do, whereas ICTO-
members show less agreement than non-members. With the other hamartio-
logical characteristics there is more unanimity between members and non-
members. Members of IKV and MOV have a more negative attitude towards 
apocalyptic thinking about war, but ICTO-members side with the non-members 
here. Regarding the idea that wars are related to higher demonic powers, only 
the IKV-members are distinguished from the non-members, namely by a more 
negative attitude. The same holds for the concept of hamartiological 
privatisation. With regard to the idea that wars are a manifestation of histori-
cal sin, only ICTO-members are distinguished from the non-members, namely 
by a more positive attitude. There is no difference between the four groups 
with regard to the concept of hamartiological privatisation. 
(b) Soteriological peace attitudes 
The soteriological dimension of peace is as uncontroversial as the hamartio-
logical dimension is controversial. Differences between members and non-
members occur only with two of the five soteriological peace attitudes: 
members of IKV are more negative towards the ideas of peace as an absolute 
gift of God and soteriological privatisation. There are no differences between 
the four groups with regard to peace as a task from God, peace as imitation of 
Christ and soteriological solidarity. 
(c) Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
The inclusion of the non-members by the three groups of members occurs 
twice; once with respect to the legitimacy of church peace praxis and once with 
respect to the politically critical peace praxis of the church. Members of IKV 
and MOV have a more positive attitude towards these ideas and ICTO-
members a more negative one. The ideas about the competence of the church 
in the realm of war and peace show an incomplete inclusion. IKV-members 
are more, and ICTO-members less convinced of the competence of the church 
than non-members, but MOV-members are not distinguished from the non-
members here. No differences between members and non-members exist with 
regard to the conformity of church members to church statements about war 
and peace, the influence of the church on politicians and on public opinion. 
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4.3.4 Overall description with respect to social location of peace action 
The overall description will be given for social characteristics (a) and religious 
characteristics (b). 
(a) Social characteristics 
With respect to age, IKV- and MOV-members resemble the non-members. 
The average age-category of all three groups is the category of 40 to 65. For 
ICTO-members, the category '65 and older' is the modal category (table 4.3.3). 
In their division according to gender, IKV- and MOV-members resemble 
the non-members most. For MOV, the ratio of men and women is 1:1, for 
non-members about 3:2 and for IKV about 7:3. Among ICTO-members, there 
is a ratio of 9:1 (table 4.3.4). 
There are no significant differences between the four groups with regard to 
their level of education (table 4.3.5). 
The four groups are different with regard to social class. For IKV and 
ІСГО, the upper class is the modal category. For MOV this is the middle class 
and for the non-members it is the lower class (table 4.3.6). 
The political preference of most non-members is towards the centre of the 
political spectrum. Most IKV-members have a preference for the political left. 
The political preference of MOV-members is left-to-centre and the political 
preference of ICTO-members is centre-to-right (table 4.3.7). 
As regards political activity, IKV- and ICTO-members are characterized by 
a higher degree of activity than non-members. MOV-members do not differ 
significantly from non-members in this respect (table 4.3.2). 
(b) Religious characteristics 
The overall description will be given for the religious characteristics of church 
relatedness, religious worldview, saliency of worldview and churchview. 
Members of IKV and ICTO are less closely related to the church than the 
non-members. MOV-members are equal to non-members in their church 
relatedness. 
Members of IKV and ICTO are also characterized by a different religious 
worldview than non-members. IKV-members have a more negative attitude 
towards the belief in a personal God and the belief in the a-personal divine 
than non-members. ICTO-members have a more negative attitude towards 
religious immanentism than non-members. MOV-members do not differ from 
non-members in their religious worldview. 
With regard to the saliency of worldview there are no significant differences 
between the four groups. 
Churchview is divided into ideas about the organization and the tasks of the 
church. With the ideas about the organization of the church, an inclusion-
pattern occurs one time: members of IKV and MOV are more positive about 
the priesthood of believers than non-members, whereas ICTO-members are 
more negative about this. With regard to democratic decision-making in the 
church, only IKV-members differ from the non-members, by a stronger 
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affirmation of this idea. With regard to the openness of the church vis-à-vis 
society, only ICTO-members differ from the non-members, by their stronger 
rejection of this idea. With regard to the socio-political and person-directed 
tasks of the church, only IKV-members differ from the non-members. They 
think more positively about the socio-political, and more negative about the 
person-directed tasks of the church than non-members. The group-directed 
tasks of the church lead to no significant difference of opinion among the four 
groups. 
4.4 Graphical presentation of the overall description 
In the previous three sections an analysis has been presented of the way in 
which the members of the three church peace movements and the three 
groups of non-members differ with regard to communicative peace action, 
motivation to peace action, religious peace attitudes and the social location of 
peace action. The result was a inventory of agreements and differences, which 
brought to light many details, but not as yet that many overall trends. In order 
to make the overall trends in the material more visible, the technique of 
correspondence-analysis will be applied (Lammers & Pelzer 1988). This 
technique makes it possible to plot the various groups and characteristics as it 
were in the form of a landscape. The distances in the landscape, between 
groups internally and between groups and characteristics, make the attitudinal 
profiles of the groups visible. 
Four groups will be entered into the correspondence-analysis: members of 
IKV, MOV and ICTO, and non-members. The result of the correspondence-
analysis corresponds, therefore, to the overall description of section 4.3, but 
now in a graphical presentation. 
The choice of the characteristics to be entered in the analysis is determined 
by both a criterion concerning content and a formal criterion. The criterion 
regarding content has to do with the division of characteristics into four 
groups: communicative peace action, motivation to peace action, religious 
peace attitudes and the social location of peace action. The large number and 
the heterogeneity of these characteristics necessitate the making of several 
analyses, for different parts of the material. Three analyses will therefore be 
made: one for the motivation to peace action (4.4.1), one for religious peace 
attitudes (4.4.2) and one for the social location of peace action (4.4.3). Because 
of the importance of the characteristic of communicative peace action, as the 
dependent variable in the research, this characteristic will be entered into all 
three correspondence-analyses. 
For the selection of individual characteristics in the analysis, a formal 
criterion is used. Only those characteristics will be admitted which have a 
relationship with the distinction between the four groups of at least a minimal 
strength. The minima observed are éta .40 and Cramers V .20. This selection 
implies that the correspondence-analyses in particular show the differences 
between the groups, rather than their resemblances. 
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4.4.1 Landscape of motivation to peace action 
The result of the correspondence-analysis with regard to motivation to peace 
action can be seen in figure 4.1. At first sight, the figure shows an irregular 
cloud of dots, with the four groups inside it, indicated by blocks. The dots are 
provided with codes, the meaning of which is given in the legenda to the 
figure. In the interpretation of the figure, three things must be borne in mind 
in particular. 
Firstly, the distances of the four groups to the origin of the figure (indicated 
by a cross) is important. The origin marks the position of the total population 
in relation to the various groups and characteristics. It can be seen that MOV 
is closest to the origin and ICTO the most remote from it. In the various 
aspects of the motivation to peace action, MOV-members resemble the total 
population most and ICTO-members least. 
Secondly, the distances between the groups are important. The greater the 
distance between two groups, the more different is the total structure of their 
motivation to peace action. The greatest distance between any two groups in 
figure 4.1 is that between IKV and ICTO. Of all four groups, they differ most 
as to the structure of their motivation to peace action. The smallest distance is 
that between IKV and MOV. The structure of their motivation to peace action 
is the most similar. IKV and ICTO are both far removed from the non-
members, IKV even somewhat further than ICTO. Also, IKV and ICTO are 
removed from the non-members in different directions. What one sees here 
graphically is the inclusion-pattern which has been observed in section 4.3 with 
most of the characteristics of the motivation to peace action. Of the three 
church peace movements, MOV is closest to the non-members. In the struc-
ture of their motivation to peace action, MOV-members resemble the non-
members most. 
Thirdly, the distances between groups and characteristics are to be 
considered. These distances point to the degree of over- or underrepresenta-
tion of the groups in the characteristics, compared with the total population. 
The stronger a group is represented in a certain characteristic, the closer 
together the two are depicted in the figure. 
Non-members are characterized by a low degree of communicative peace 
activity (act). This involves a number of characteristics which imply a negative 
or neutral attitude with regard to conception, perception and attribution. 
Non-members are characterized by neutral conceptions with regard to 
nuclear weapons. They consider nuclear deterrence neither as functional nor as 
dysfunctional for the promotion of peace (nuc°) and they have a neutral 
attitude towards both gradual unilateralism and -bilateralism (uni0, bil0). 
In their perceptions, non-members show only moderate concern and a low 
comparative concern about armament (ca°, cca). 
The attribution of the non-members is characterized by a low assessment of 
the controllability of armament (etra"1), by pessimism about the attainability of 
world peace (op) and by a low to neutral assessment of their personal know-
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Figure 4.1 Correspondence analysis for motivation to peace action 
act" 
• · cca' 
ak" 
etra" · · bil0 
nue0 • NON- · 
• MEMBERS nue' 
• uni+ · 
uni0 · · bil" 
etra0 · MOV · · op+ 
- { - . • ca+ 
op" · op° · 
• ca° ctra+ • IKV 
cea0 · 
• · ak+ 
bil+ · · ca' act0 act+ 
ICTO 
Legenda for figure 4.1 
act communicative peace action ( +, 0, -) 
conceptions of peace: 
nue functionality of nuclear deterrence ( + , 0, -) 
uni gradual unilateral nuclear disarmament ( + , 0, -) 
bil gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament ( + , 0, -) 
perceptions of armament: 
ca concern about armament ( +, 0, -) 
cca comparative concern about armament (+ , 0, -) 
attributions regarding armament: 
etra controllability of armament ( + , 0, -) 
op optimism about the attainability of world peace ( + , 0, -) 
ak ascribed knowledge about armament ( + , 0/-) 
+ high, positive 
0 middle, neutral 
low, negative 
ledge about armament (ak"'°). 
As has already been said, IKV and ICTO are both far removed from the 
non-members, in different directions. By watching the characteristics in the 
figure which are closest to IKV and ICTO, this divergence can be interpreted. 
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In contrast to non-members, IKV-members show a high degree of com­
municative peace activity (act+). This difference involves remarkable differ­
ences in the structure of the peace motivation of the two groups. 
As far as conceptions are concerned, IKV-members consider nuclear 
deterrence not as functional to the preservation of peace and security (nuc). 
They are in favour of gradual unilateralism in nuclear disarmament and 
against gradual bilateralism (uni\ bil). 
In their perceptions of armament, IKV-members show themselves con­
cerned about armament, both in absolute and in comparative terms (ca+, 
cca
+). 
Regarding attributions, IKV-members are convinced of the possibility of 
controlling the armament in the world (ctra+). They are also optimistic about 
the attainability of world peace (op+) and show a positive assessment of their 
knowledge of arms issues (ak+). 
ICTO-members equally deviate from the non-members, but in a completely 
different way than IKV-members do. Members of ІСГО show a moderate 
communicative peace activity (act0) and their peace motivation has a typical 
structure. 
The conceptions of peace of ICTO-members are strongly oriented towards 
maintaining the strategy of nuclear deterrence. They are convinced of the 
functionality of nuclear deterrence for the preservation of peace (nuc+), they 
reject gradual unilateralism (uni) and favour gradual bilateralism (bil'). In 
their conceptions of peace, the ICTO-members are, in other words, the 
opposites of IKV-members. 
This is also true of perceptions. Compared with IKV-members, ICTO-
members are much less concerned about armament (ca", ca°) and their 
comparative concern about armament is neutral (cca°). 
In their attributions regarding armament, ICTO-members have less positive 
attitudes than IKV-members. They are less convinced of the controllability of 
the world's armament (etra0) and less optimistic about the attainability of 
world peace (op). 
Although MOV-members are closest to IKV-members in figure 4.1, the figure 
does show a few differences between the two groups. 
Members of MOV show a lower degree of communicative peace activity 
than IKV-members. They are closer to act0 (low communicative peace activity) 
and further away from act+ (high communicative peace activity). 
In their perceptions of armament, MOV-members are somewhat more 
moderate than IKV-members. They are closer than IKV-members to a neutral 
comparative concern about armament (cca°). 
There are also differences between IKV and MOV with regard to attribu­
tions. MOV-members are closest to the characteristics ctra+ (controllability of 
armament) and ak+ (ascribed knowledge about armament), but they are also 
closer to the neutral and negative values of these characteristics. Table 4.3.2 
shows in this case that both groups differ significantly only with regard to 
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ascribed knowledge about armament (ARMKNOW): members of IKV are 
more positive about their personal knowledge about armament. 
Although somewhat unclear with regard to some individual characteristics, 
figure 4.1 definitely shows a general tendency in the relationship between IKV-
and MOV-members: members of MOV correspond more closely to the mean 
of the total population. In this respect, the correspondence-analysis illustrates a 
phenomenon that could already be observed in table 4.3.2, namely that IKV-
members in general take up a more extreme position on the scale than MOV-
members, although the differences are not always significant. 
4.4.2 Landscape of religious peace attitudes 
The result of the correspondence-analysis for religious peace attitudes is given 
in figure 4.2. 
It can be seen in the figure that non-members and MOV-members are 
closest to the origin, both at about the same distance. Their religious peace 
attitudes correspond most with those of the total population. ICTO-members 
are the farthest removed from the origin. Their religious peace attitudes are 
the most deviant. 
As in the previous figure, the smallest distance between any two groups is 
the one between MOV and IKV. Their religious peace attitudes show the 
strongest resemblance. The greatest distance between two groups is the one 
between IKV and ICTO. Both are far removed from the non-members, in 
different directions. This implies that the religious peace attitudes of IKV- and 
ICTO-members strongly deviate from those of the non-members, in different 
ways. 
The distances between the four groups can be interpreted with the help of 
the characteristics in figure 4.2. Religious peace attitudes included in the figure 
only pertain to hamartiology and ecclesiology. Soteriological peace attitudes 
were not entered into the analyses, because none of them met the formal 
selection criteria. The four groups differ only little with regard to their 
soteriological peace attitudes (cf. table 4.3.2). 
Non-members show a low degree of communicative peace activity (act) and 
are characterized by a neutral to negative attitude towards the idea that wars 
are a manifestation of institutional sin (wsin0, wsin"). They also show a neutral 
attitude towards the politically critical peace praxis of the church (eccr0). 
The ICTO-members' moderate degree of communicative peace activity 
(act0) is related to a peculiar constellation of religious peace attitudes. ICTO-
members are neutral to positive towards the idea that there is a relationship 
between God and the evil of war (wgod0^) and react negatively to the idea 
that wars are a manifestation of institutional sin (wsin). From an 
ecclesiological point of view, ICTO-members are characterized in particular by 
a negative attitude with regard to the role of the church in peace problems. 
They are neutral to negative towards the legitimacy of church peace praxis 
(ecle0'); reject the idea that the church should take a politically critical 
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Legenda for figure 4.2 
act communicative peace action (+. 0, -) 
hamartiology: 
wgod war in relation to God ( + /0, -) 
wsin war as a manifestation of institutional sin ( + , 0, -) 
ecclesiology: 
ecle legitimacy of church peace praxis ( +, 0/-) 
eccr politically critical peace praxis of the church ( + , 0, -) 
ecco competence of the church ( +, 0/-) 
+ high, positive 
0 middle, neutral 
low, negative 
competence of the church in the realm of peace issues (ecco0'"). 
IKV-members are characterized by a high degree of communicative peace 
activity (act+), which is related to religious peace attitudes that are contrary to 
those of ICTO-members. IKV-members reject the relationship between God 
and the evil of war (wgod) and agree with the idea that wars are a manifes-
tation of institutional sin (wsin+). With regard to ecclesiology, IKV-members 
think positively about the role of the church in matters of peace. They consider 
church peace praxis as legitimate (ecle+) and are in particular proponents of a 
politically critical peace praxis of the church (eccr+). They also take a positive 
view of the competence of the church with regard to peace issues (ecco+). 
In the structure of their religious peace attitudes, members of MOV and 
IKV are highly similar. MOV-members also see wars in particular as a 
manifestation of institutional sin (wsin) and do not connect the evil of war to 
God (wgod). They consider the peace praxis of the church as legitimate 
(ecle+) and believe that the church has competence with regard to peace issues 
(ecco+). MOV-members do, however, show a lower degree of peace activity 
than members of IKV. In addition to with this, MOV-members are less 
positive about the politically critical peace praxis of the church: the characteris-
tic eccr+ is closer to IKV than to MOV. 
4.4.3 Landscape of the social location of peace action 
The results of the correspondence-analysis for the social location of peace 
action are presented in figure 4.3. The distances between the four groups are 
similar to those in the previous figures. With regard to social location too, 
MOV-members are closest to the origin (the position of the total population), 
whereas IKV and ICTO-members are the most remote from it. 
Looking at the distances between the four groups, one sees one difference 
in comparison with the foregoing figures. This time it is not MOV and IKV 
which resemble each other most, but MOV and non-members. The greatest 
distance is again the one between IKV and ICTO. Both are at a great distance 
from the non-members, in different directions. This, for the third time, is an 
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indication of the inclusion of the non-members by IKV on the one side and 
ICTO on the other. 
The characteristics which are entered into the analysis form a miscellaneous 
group. Both social characteristics (age, gender, social class, political preference 
and political activity) and religious characteristics (religious worldview, 
churchview) are included. In the interpretation of the figure, social characteris-
tics (a) and religious characteristics (b) will be discussed separately. 
(a) social characteristics 
Non-members are distinguished from the other groups by a lower degree of 
political activity (pola) and by their preference for the political centre 
(centre). Also, they are strongly represented in the lower social class (clas). 
ICTO-members are notable for their advanced age (age+) and the strong 
overrepresentation of men (male). Also, ICTO-members belong to the upper 
class more frequently than the other groups (clas+). As regards politics, ICTO-
members are characterized by a preference for the right side op the political 
spectrum (right) and by a high degree of political activity (pola+). 
IKV-members are particularly characterized by a leftist political preference 
(left). They also show a high degree of political activity (pola+). 
MOV-members most strongly represent the young and the women in the 
population (age", fern). They also most strongly represent the middle class 
(clas0). 
Figure 4.3 permits the establishment of a dichotomy between the four 
groups in terms of social location. Members of ICTO and IKV differ from 
MOV-members and non-members as to their higher social class and their 
greater political activity. The members of ICTO and IKV are found among the 
well-to-do and politically active citizens; the members of MOV and the non-
members are found among the lower-to-middle classes and the politically less 
active citizens. 
(b) Religious characteristics 
Figure 4.3 contains four religious characteristics, one of which concerns 
religious worldview (belief in a personal God), whereas the others refer to 
churchview. The attitudes concerning churchview have to do with the organiz-
ation of the church (democratic decision-making, priesthood of believers) and 
the tasks of the church (socio-political tasks). The figure shows that there are 
great differences between the groups with regard to religious characteristics. 
Non-members are characterized by an orientation of their religious world-
view towards the belief in a personal God (pgod+). This is coupled with a 
neutral attitude towards the organization of the church, both with regard to 
democratic decision-making and the priesthood of believers (chd°, ckl°), and 
with a neutral to negative attitude towards the socio-political tasks of the 
church (spt07). 
ICTO-members are equally characterized by the belief in a personal God 
(pgod+). Furthermore, they are notable for their strong affirmation of a 








































































































Legenda for figure 4 3 
act communicative peace action ( +, 0, -) 
social characteristics: 
age age (- = < 40; 0 = 40-64; + = >64) 
male male gender 
fern female gender 
clas social class ( + , 0, -) 
left leftist political preference 
centre centre political preference 
nght rightist political preference 
pola political activity (+ , -) 
religious characteristics: 
pgod belief in personal God ( +, 0/-) 
end democratic decision-making in the church ( + , 0, -) 
chi priesthood of believers ( +, 0, -). 
spt social-political tasks of the church (+ , 0, -) 
+ high, positive 
0 middle, neutral 
low, negative 
towards democratic decision-making in the church and the priesthood of belie-
vers (chd", chi). 
IKV-members differ from the two previous groups by a neutral to negative 
attitude towards the belief in a personal God (pgod07) and by their strong 
affirmation of a democratic church organization, which appears from their 
positive attitude towards democratic decision-making in the church (chd+) and 
the priesthood of believers (chl+). IKV-members also attach great importance 
to the socio-political tasks of the church (spt+). 
The religious characteristics of MOV-members most strongly resemble 
those of IKV-members, but MOV-members are somewhat more moderate. In 
their worldview as well as in their churchview, MOV-members are situated 
between IKV-members and non-members. 
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5 EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS PEACE ATTITUDES ON 
COMMUNICATIVE PEACE ACTION 
In this chapter, the predictive power of religious peace attitudes in relation to 
communicative peace action will be analyzed. Is there a 'religious factor' 
(Lenski 1961) which demonstrably influences communicative peace action? In 
section 2.8, a hypothesis has been formulated about the indirect effect of relig-
ious peace attitudes on communicative peace action. On the grounds of this 
hypothesis, a regression model can be formulated (figure 5.1), which is grafted 
onto the theoretical model of figure 2.20. 
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The regression-analysis is set up as follows. First, three partial analyses of 
direct relationships will be made, working through the model from right to left. 
In section 5.1, the direct regression effects on communicative peace action will 
be analyzed. Section 5.2 deals with the direct regression effects on the mem-
bership of a peace movement. Section 5.3 maps the direct regression effects on 
the motivation to peace action. In section 5.4, the partial analyses of the 
foregoing sections will be linked together, to show all direct and indirect 
effects on communicative peace action. In this section, the hypothesis about 
the effect of religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action will be 
tested. The tables for this chapter are in Appendix D. 
The following procedures have been followed in the regression-analysis. 
First it has been examined which characteristics have at least one significant 
regression-effect, either as a dependent or independent variable. Next, a 
second order factor-analysis has been applied to these characteristics. If 
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possible, new measuring scales have been constructed on the basis of this 
second order factor-analysis, at a higher level of abstraction. This way, more 
general assertions can be made about statistical relations. The arrangement of 
the analysis is also improved this way. Below follows a survey of the character-
istics which are entered into the regression-analysis, and of the ways in which, 
if possible, second order scales have been constructed. 
Communicative peace action 
The scores on the scale of communicative peace action have been divided into 
three categories: no communicative peace activity (0 actions), moderate 
communicative peace activity (1-3 actions) and high communicative peace 
activity (4-5 actions). 
Membership of a peace movement 
It appeared in chapter four that non-members differ only little in their 
attitudes and behaviour. Therefore, the non-members will be entered into the 
analysis as a single group. As a result, four categories are discerned with 
regard to the membership of a peace movement: IKV, MOV, ICTO and non-
member. 
Conceptions of peace 
All characteristics concerning conceptions of peace are entered into the 
analysis: 
- Functionality of nuclear deterrence (NUCLARM) 
- Gradual unilateral nuclear disarmament (UNILAT) 
- Gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament (BILAT) 
- NATO-affiliation (NATO) 
- Peace through development aid (DEVELOP) 
- Peace through civil contacts with Eastern Europe (EASTWEST) 
At a higher level of abstraction, these six characteristics can be reduced to one 
dimension (table 5.1). Within this dimension, the characteristics split up into 
two opposite groups. A more positive attitude towards gradual unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, peace through development aid and through civil 
contacts with Eastern Europe is coupled to a more negative attitude towards 
the functionality of nuclear deterrence, gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament 
and NATO. This relationship can be interpreted by characterizing the deeper 
dimension as that of change-oriented conceptions of peace (CHANGE). The 
nature of this change-orientedness must be related here to the political status 
quo at the moment of the data collection, early 1988, one year before the 
democratic revolution in Eastern Europe. At that time, the political relations 
between East and West were still dominated by nuclear deterrence, which was 
executed by the Western countries in the context of NATO. Nuclear disarma-
ment was considered feasible by Western (and Eastern) leaders only as a 
process of bilateral negotiations. A negative attitude towards nuclear 
deterrence, gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament and NATO can therefore be 
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considered as a rejection of the political status quo with regard to nuclear 
weapons at that time. 
Perceptions of armament 
Of the perception characteristics, only the concern and the comparative 
concern about armament (CONCARM, COMPCONC) are qualified for the 
regression-analysis. The correlation between the two characteristics (.44) is too 
low to combine them into one scale. The observed minimum level of correla-
tion for the combination of scales is .60. Both characteristics are therefore 
entered separately into the analysis, under their original labels. 
Attributions regarding armament 
The attributive dimension within the motivation to peace action consists of 
three characteristics: 
- Controllability of armament (CONTRARM) 
- Optimism about the attainability of world peace (OPTIMISM) 
- Knowledge about armament and disarmament (ARMKNOW) 
Second order factor-analysis shows that these characteristics are aspects of one 
underlying dimension (table 5.2). The controllability of armament represents 
this dimension strongest; the other two characteristics have lower factor 
loadings, which is in agreement with their status as conditional characteristics 
(section 2.5.3). In accordance with the dominant position of the concept of 
controllability of armament, the factor will be referred to as control of arma-
ment (CONTROL). 
Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
The following hamartiological characteristics are entered into the analysis: 
- War as a manifestation of institutional sin (HAMINST) 
- War in relation to God (HAMGOD) 
- War in radical relation to higher demonic powers (HAMPOWER) 
- Apocalyptic thinking about war (HAMAPOC) 
The characteristic of war as a manifestation of institutional sin forms a 
separate dimension. The characteristics of war in relation to God, war in 
radical relation to higher demonic powers and apocalyptic thinking about war 
come together in a second dimension (table 5.3). The distinction between the 
two dimensions is interpretable in the light of the theoretical distinction 
between absolute and immanent transcendence. The image of war as a 
manifestation of institutional sin has been considered in 3.2 as a form of an 
immanent transcendent hamartiology. War is connected to the inner-worldly 
demon of armament and the idolatry of the ideology of security, which are 
interpreted from a higher transcendent dimension of evil. At a higher level of 
abstraction, therefore, the idea that war is a manifestation of institutional evil 
can be interpreted as an immanent transcendent hamartiology (ITRHAM). 
The interpretations of war in relation to God and in relation to higher 
demonic powers belong to the absolute transcendent dimension of 
hamartiology. They express the belief that war has a relation to uncontrollable 
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transcendent powers - either the divine reality itself, or anti-divine demonic 
powers. In 2.6.3, apocalyptic images in relation to war have been divided into 
immanent and absolute transcendent images. Empirically, both dimensions 
appeared to form one factor (figure 3.6). The second order factor-analysis now 
shows that apocalypticism is strongly related to absolute transcendent hamar-
tiological images (table 5.3). The found dimension will be referred to as the 
dimension of absolute transcendent hamartiology (ATRHAM). 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes entered into the analysis are: 
- Legitimacy of church peace praxis (ECCLEGIT) 
- Political-critical peace praxis of the church (ECCRIT) 
- Influence of the church on politicians (ECCPOL) 
- Competence of the church (ECCOMP) 
The legitimacy and the political-critical nature of church peace praxis have a 
very strong internal correlation (.79). They can therefore be combined into one 
dimension. Together, they express the ideal of a church which is conscious of 
its task to commit itself to promoting peace in the world, to let the responsibil-
ity for peace prevail over the internal tensions which may be caused by that 
(ECCLEGIT), and to accept the critical confrontation with politics about 
peace issues (ECCRIT). Together, both characteristics will be referred to as a 
critical peace-ecclesiology (CRITECL). 
The attitudes concerning the influence of the church on politicians 
(ECCPOL) and the competence of the church (ECCOMP) remain in the 
analysis as separate characteristics. 
Social location of peace action 
The following characteristics from the domain of the social location of peace 
action are entered into the analysis: 
social characteristics: 
- Age (AGE) 
- Educational level (EDUCATION) 
- Political preference (VOTE) 
- Political activity (POLACT) 
religious characteristics: 
- Denomination (DENOM) 
- Belief in a personal God (PERSGOD) 
- Religious immanentism (RELIMM) 
- Saliency of worldview (SALIENCY) 
- Democratic decision-making in the church (CHURDEM) 
- Socio-political tasks of the church (TASKSOC). 
Because the regression model contains a number of nominal variables, the 
analysis is executed in RENOVA (Regression Nominal Variables: Lammers & 
Pelzer 1988). In the field of the RENOVA tables, the regression coefficients 
are registered. For interval variables, these coefficients mean the increase or 
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decrease of the dependent variable, in terms of percentage, at a standardized 
unit-increase of the dependent variable. For the categories of nominal vari-
ables, they mean the over- or underrepresentation in relation to the general 
proportions of the categories, in terms of percentage. Where no value is 
indicated in the table, the effects are not significant. In each column of the 
tables, all independent variables are controlled for each other. The following 
criteria are used for the interpretation of the regression coefficients: ß < .10 
= low; ß .10 - .24 = moderate; ß .25 - .39= strong; ß ^ .40 = very strong. In 
the discussion of the results of the analysis, the low ß-coefficients are con-
sidered as irrelevant and therefore left aside. 
5.1 Direct effects on communicative peace action 
Theoretically, on the basis of the regression model of figure 5.1, it is expected 
that communicative peace action is influenced directly by the membership of a 
peace movement and by the social location of peace action. It is also expected 
that there are no other effects on communicative peace action. 
The expectation that communicative peace action is dependent on the 
membership of a peace movement is empirically supported. Table 5.4 shows 
significant effects, of a moderate strength, of various membership-categories 
on the categories of no and high communicative peace activity. Members of 
IKV are underrepresented in the category of no communicative peace activity 
and overrepresented in the category of high communicative peace activity. 
MOV-members are underrepresented in the category of no communicative 
peace activity. Non-members are overrepresented in the category of no 
communicative peace activity and underrepresented in the category of high 
communicative peace activity. 
The expectation that communicative peace action is dependent on the social 
location of peace action is empirically supported only for the characteristic of 
political activity. The more people are politically active, the more they are 
represented in the category of moderate communicative peace activity and the 
less they are represented in the category of no communicative peace activity. 
Although these effects are only of a moderate strength, they can be seen as a 
support of the thesis of Kriesi and Van Praag (1987), that the peace move-
ment forms part of a greater network of political and social movements and 
organizations, with a considerable personal overlap. The peace movement 
recruits its members in particular from the network of social and political 
movements, which appears from the fact that people who are more politically 
active are also more active in the peace movement. 
The expectation that communicative peace action is not explained by other 
characteristics than the membership of a peace movement and the social 
location of peace action is not empirically corroborated. Leaving the weak 
relations (β < .10) aside, predictors of communicative peace action can be 
found in the domains of the motivation to peace action and the religious peace 
attitudes. Comparative concern about armament is positively related to a high 
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level of communicative peace activity. Critical peace-ecclesiology is also 
positively related to communicative peace action. A positive attitude towards 
the competence of the church correlates negatively with a moderate level of 
communicative peace activity. In the evaluative chapter, these direct effects of 
religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action will be interpreted 
from a theological point of view (section 6.1.3). 
52 Direct effects on membership of a peace movement 
The theoretical expectation is that the membership of a peace movement is 
influenced directly by the motivation to peace action and the social location of 
peace action, but not by religious peace attitudes (figure 5.1). 
That the motivation to peace action has an effect on the membership of a 
peace movement is one of the central hypotheses of this study. The hypothesis 
consists of three sub-hypotheses (arrows D, E and F in figure 5.1). The 
expectation is that the membership of a peace movement is influenced by 
conceptions and perceptions and attributions. These three sub-hypotheses are 
each empirically supported by significant regression coefficients, although only 
of a moderate strength (table 5.4). The conceptual characteristic of change-
oriented conceptions of peace is positively related to the membership of IKV 
and negatively to the membership of ICTO. The perceptual characteristic of 
comparative concern about armament is positively related to the membership 
of IKV and negatively to being a non-member. Concern about armament has 
no effect on membership. The attributive characteristic of control of armament 
is positively related to the membership of ICTO and negatively to being a non-
member. 
The expectation that the membership of a peace movement is related to the 
social location of peace action receives empirical support. The membership-
characteristic has relations, of moderate strength, with educational level and 
political preference. IKV-members are overrepresented in the category of 
university education, whereas MOV-members are underrepresented in this 
category. IKV-members are also overrepresented in the category of a leftist 
political preference and underrepresented in the category of a central political 
preference. ICTO-members are underrepresented in the category 'political left' 
and overrepresented in the category 'political centre'. 
The existing relationships between denomination and membership are 
theoretically not very interesting. They mirror the fact that MOV-groups 
mainly consist of Roman Catholics, which is not surprising since MOV-groups 
are organizationally related to Roman Catholic parishes. For the non-mem-
bers, the coefficients mirror the numerical proportions between the three 
sample strata of the non-members, which have been manipulated in the 
stratified sampling procedure (cf. Appendix A). 
The expectation that religious peace attitudes do not have direct effects on 
the membership of a peace movement is empirically confirmed. Although 
significant effects of critical peace ecclesiology and immanent transcendent 
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hamartiology on ICTO-membership can be found, these effects are below the 
applied criterion of relevance ß S . 10. 
5.3 Direct effects on motivation to peace action 
The theoretical expectation is that the motivation to peace action is predicted 
by both religious peace attitudes and the social location of peace action. 
The expectation that religious peace attitudes have an effect on the motivation 
to peace action is one of the central research hypotheses. The hypothesis is a 
conjunction of three sub-hypotheses. The expectation is that religious peace 
attitudes exert influence on the conceptual and the perceptual and the attribut-
ive component of motivation (arrows А, В and С in figure 5.1). Empirically, 
these three sub-hypotheses are all corroborated, as can be concluded from the 
following observations. 
Conceptions of peace are represented in the model by the characteristic of 
change oriented conceptions of peace. This characteristic is influenced by three 
religious peace attitudes. Immanent transcendent hamartiology has a moder­
ately positive relation to change oriented conceptions of peace, absolute 
transcendent hamartiology has a strongly negative relation to change oriented 
conception of peace and critical peace-ecclesiology has a very strong positive 
relation to this characteristic. 
Perceptions of armament are represented in the model by the concern and 
the comparative concern about armament. Both are influenced by hamartio-
logical and ecclesiological peace attitudes. Immanent transcendent 
hamartiology has a positive relation to concern about armament. Critical 
peace-ecclesiology has a strong positive relation to concern about armament 
and a very strong positive relation to comparative concern about armament. 
The assessment of the influence of the church on politicians has a positive 
relation to comparative concern. The assessment of the competence of the 
church in matters of war and peace, on the other hand, has a negative relation 
to comparative concern. The last is surprising, when it is compared with table 
4.3.2. There, it appears that IKV-members consider the church as more 
competent than ICTO-members do (ECCOMP), and that they also have more 
comparative concern about armament than ICTO-members (COMPCONC). 
On the grounds of table 4.3.2 one is inclined to concluded that there is a 
positive relationship between competence of the concern and comparative 
concern about armament. When the relationship between competence of the 
church and comparative concern is analyzed independent of the membership 
of a peace movement, however, and when it is also controlled for all effects 
which are listed in the column COMPCONC of table 5.5, the relationship is 
negative. In section 6.1.3, it will be attempted to give an interpretation of this 
curious outcome. 
Attribution regarding armament is represented in the model by the charac­
teristic of control of armament. This characteristic has a strongly negative 
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relation to absolute transcendent hamartiology and a strongly positive relation 
to change-oriented conceptions of peace. 
It is very striking that soteriological peace attitudes do not have a single 
effect on the motivation to peace action. A theological interpretation of this 
outcome will be given in section 6.1.3. 
The expectation that the motivation to peace action is influenced also by the 
social location of peace action receives empirical support. It can be noted in 
this respect that political characteristics have the strongest effect on the 
motivation to peace action. 
Conceptions of peace are influenced by political preference. A preference 
for the political left has a strong positive relation to change-oriented concep-
tions of peace. A preference for the political centre has a moderately negative, 
and a preference for the political right a strongly negative relation to this. 
Perceptions of armament are influenced by political preference, political 
activity and the saliency of worldview. A politically leftist preference has a 
positive relation to concern about armament and a strongly positive relation to 
comparative concern about armament. An orientation towards the political 
centre has a strongly negative relation to comparative concern. Political activity 
has a strongly positive effect on comparative concern. The saliency of world-
view also has a positive effect on comparative concern. 
The attribution regarding armament is influenced by political preference, 
political activity and the attitude towards democratic decision-making in the 
church. A politically leftist orientation has a strongly positive effect on the 
belief in the controllability of armament, whereas an orientation towards the 
political centre has a moderately negative relation to this. Political activity and 
the attitude towards democratic decision-making in the church both have a 
moderately positive effect on the belief in the controllability of armament. 
5.4 Direct and indirect effects on communicative peace action 
In this section, the results of sections 5.1 - 5.3 are forged together into one 
overall-picture. All direct and indirect effects on communicative peace action 
will be charted. In this, the attention will be focused in particular on the ways 
in which religious peace attitudes have an effect on communicative peace 
action. In section 5.4.1, this effect will be analyzed, in the light of the research 
question and central research hypothesis. In section 5.4.2, the direct and 
indirect effects of the social location of peace action on communicative peace 
action will be analyzed, after which the predictive power of the social location 
will be compared with that of religious peace attitudes. 
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5.4.1 Direct and indirect effects of religious peace attitudes on communicative 
peace action 
This section will give an answer to the research question, as it has been 
formulated in the introduction: 
what is the motivational function of the religious hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis in relation to peace action? 
In the foregoing theoretical and empirical research, the concept of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis has been operationalised into a number 
of religious peace attitudes, while the concept of peace action has been 
operationalised as a form of communicative peace action. With these specifica-
tions, a hypothesis about the motivational effect of religious peace attitudes on 
communicative peace action was formulated in section 2.8. This hypothesis 
reads: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action, 
through their effect on the motivation to peace action. 
This hypothesis is constructed as a conjunction of three sub-hypotheses, which 
read: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action, 
through: 
(a) the conceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(b) the perceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(c) the attributive component of the motivation to peace action. 
The hypothesis is falsified, when religious peace attitudes have no effect on 
communicative peace action through conception or perception or attribution. 
The composite hypothesis will be tested by examining the indirect effects via 
the paths of conception, perception and attribution respectively. In the partial 
graph of figure 5.2, all relevant direct and indirect effects of religious peace 
attitudes on communicative peace action are indicated. 
Figure 5.2 entails three conclusions about the empirical support of sub-hypoth-
eses (a) - (c). 
Firstly it can be concluded that religious peace attitudes have an indirect 
effect on communicative peace action, via the conceptual component of the 
motivation to peace action. The characteristics of immanent transcendent 
hamartiology and critical peace-ecclesiology have a positive effect on communi-
cative peace action, via the change-oriented conceptions of peace. The more 
people associate war with the inner-worldly demon of armament and with the 
idolatry of security-ideology, and the more they consider a political-critical 











































































































conceptions of peace. This is to say: the more are they proponents of gradual 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, of development aid and of East-West contacts 
as means to foster peace. Indirectly, this has a positive effect on 
communicative peace action. Absolute transcendent hamartiology, on the other 
hand, has a negative effect of change-oriented conceptions of peace, and via 
this on communicative peace action. With this outcome, sub-hypothesis (a) is 
empirically corroborated. 
Secondly it can be concluded that religious peace attitudes have an indirect 
effect on communicative peace action via the perceptual component of the 
motivation to peace action. This effect runs through the characteristic of 
comparative concern about armament. Via this perceptual characteristic, 
critical peace-ecclesiology and influence of the church on politicians have a 
positive effect on communicative peace action, whereas competence of the 
church has a negative effect. With this outcome, sub-hypothesis (b) is empiri-
cally corroborated. 
Thirdly it can be concluded that religious peace attitudes have an indirect 
effect on communicative peace action through the attributive component of the 
motivation to peace action. Through the attributive characteristic of control of 
armament, critical peace-ecclesiology has a positive, and absolute transcendent 
hamartiology a negative effect on communicative peace action. With this 
outcome, sub-hypothesis (c) is empirically corroborated. 
With the empirical corroboration of sub-hypotheses (a) - (c), the composite 
hypotheses concerning the indirect, motivational effect of religious peace 
attitudes on communicative peace action is empirically corroborated. As an 
answer to the research question of this study, it can be stated with empirical 
support that: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action, 
through their effect on the motivation to peace action. 
Table 5.4 also shows a couple of direct effects of religious peace attitudes on 
communicative peace action. These concern effects of critical peace-
ecclesiology and competence of the church with respect to peace issues. 
Compared with the total indirect effect, the direct effect is relatively strong. 
According to the motivation model of this research, these effects cannot be 
understood as motivational ones, as they go outside the motivational system of 
conception, perception and attribution. The question what the motivation 
status of these direct effects is, and how they are to be interpreted from a 
theological point of view, will be taken up in section 6.1.3. 
5.4.2 Direct and indirect effects of the social location of peace action on 
communicative peace action 
Religious peace attitudes are not the only characteristics predicting communi-
cative peace action. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that the social location of peace 





















































































well. These effects will now be examined. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that political characteristics (political preference 
and political activity) have a great number of effects on communicative peace 
action. In view of an orderly graphical presentation of the effects of the social 
location, the effects of the political characteristics will be presented in a 
separate graph (figure 5.3) and will be discussed separately as well. Next, the 
effects of the other characteristics of the social location will be considered 
(figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.3 shows that the political preference has no direct effect on 
communicative peace action. It has a direct effect, however, on the member-
ship of a peace movement. A leftist political preference has a positive relation 
to IKV-membership; a preference for the political centre has a negative 
relation to IKV-membership and a positive relation to non-membership. 
Political preference has many effects on the motivation to peace action, 
which indirectly influence communicative peace action. A leftist political 
preference is positively related to change-oriented conceptions of peace, to 
concern and comparative concern about armament and to control of arma-
ment. A preference for the political centre is negatively related to change-
oriented conceptions of peace, to comparative concern about armament and to 
control of armament. A rightist political preference has a very strong negative 
relation to change-oriented conceptions of peace. The indirect effects of 
political preference on communicative peace action point to the same direc-
tion: a politically leftist orientation has a positive indirect effect on communi-
cative peace action; an orientation towards the political centre and right has a 
negative indirect effect on communicative peace action. 
The characteristic of political activity has a direct effect on communicative 
peace action. The more people are politically active, the more they are 
represented in the category 'low' and the less in the category 'no' of communi-
cative peace action. This implies that there is a positive direct effect of 
political activity on communicative peace action. In addition, political activity 
has some effects on the motivation to peace action. Political activity is positive-
ly related to comparative concern about armament and control of armament. 
The direct and indirect effects of political activity on communicative peace 
action reinforce each other: political activity has a positive effect on communi-
cative peace action. 
Of the other characteristics from the social location of peace action, only 
educational level, denomination, saliency of worldview and the attitude towards 
democratic decision-making in the church have releyant effects. The effects of 
denomination are of no theoretical interest, however, because they are 
determined by the design of the stratified sample (cf. Appendix A). The partial 
graph of figure 5.4 displays the relevant effects of educational level, saliency of 
worldview and democratic decision-making in the church. The figure shows 
that these characteristics have no direct effects on communicative peace 
action. There are effects on the membership of a peace movement, however: a 
university education is positively related to IKV-membership and negatively to 


























































































action: an increase in the saliency of worldview leads to an increase of the 
comparative concern about armament; a more positive attitude towards 
democratic decision-making in the church leads to greater expectations 
regarding the control of armament. 
From a comparison of figure 5.3 with figure 5.4 it can be concluded that the 
political realm of the social location of peace action has a much stronger 
predictive power in relation to communicative peace action than the other 
social location-characteristics. The social location of peace action is principally 
a political location. 
Through their effects on the motivation to peace action, political characteris-
tics exert an indirect, motivational effect on communicative peace action. In 
relation to the results from 5.4.1, it can be concluded from this outcome that 
religious peace attitudes are not the only characteristics which have a 
motivational effect on communicative peace action. Political preference in 
particular is an important factor which influences the motivation to peace 
action and, through this, communicative peace action. From a cursory examin-
ation of tables 5.4 and 5.5 in can be concluded that the total (direct and 
indirect) effects of religious peace attitudes and of political characteristics on 
communicative peace action are of about equal force. This outcome is not 
dissonant with the basic assumption of this research. Religious peace attitudes 
were not expected to be the only characteristics predicting communicative 
peace action. In the regression model of figure 5.1, effects of the social 
location of peace action (including political characteristics) are included, in 
addition to effects of religious peace attitudes. In the light of the clear evi-
dence of effects of the social location of peace action (cf. section 2.7) it is 
remarkable to find that religious peace attitudes exert an effect which is about 
equally strong. The results of the research allow the conclusion that religious 
peace attitudes are an important element in explaining communicative peace 
action. There is a 'religious factor' which predicts communicative peace action. 
Religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis has a close relationship to 
people's communicative acting in the sphere of peace. 
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6 THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
The empirical-theological cycle of this study is rounded off with a theological 
evaluation of the research results. In section 6.1, an interpretation is given of 
the research results in the light of the theological question which this study 
addresses. In this regard, the theological conceptualisation and the theological 
theoretical model of peace action are evaluated in particular. The research 
results are also interpreted in the light of the peace goals of the churches and 
the church peace movements, as described in chapter 1. Although the theologi-
cal interpretation is oriented primarily to the theological concepts, the not 
specifically theological concepts will be included in the interpretation for 
reasons of coherence. In 6.2, the research results are linked back to the 
theological definition of the problem and aim of the study, in a theological 
reflection. The theological reflection is particularly oriented to an evaluation of 
the theological theories that underlie the problem-definition and aim of the 
research. Theological theories on the transformative power of the 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis are central here. 
6.1 Interpretative evaluation 
The question which this study addresses is: 
what is the motivational function of the religious hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis in relation to peace action? 
On the basis of this question, a conceptualisation was developed of behavioural 
and attitudinal characteristics, as well as a theological theoretical model to 
which questions are linked on three levels (section 2.8). 
The first level concerns the empirical tenability of the conceptual distinc-
tions made. This was tested in Chapter 3. The results are interpreted in 6.1.1. 
The second level concerns differences among sub-populations with respect 
to the characteristics distinguished conceptually. These differences were 
empirically examined in Chapter 4. The results are interpreted in 6.1.2. 
The third level concerns explanatory hypotheses about the motivational 
effect of religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action. These 




A general conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical corroboration of 
the theoretical structure is that the empirical attitudes are marked by a 
relative simplexity in comparison with the conceptualisation. Many conceptual 
distinctions are not present as attitudinal distinctions in the data. In general, 
this is because the conceptualisation is based on theological, sociological, 
motivation-theoretical, and polemological literature, which is the product of 
experts, whose attitudes with respect to their scientific object manifests, ex 
professo, a high degree of multiplexity. The relatively scant scientific expertise 
in these fields in the research population explains part of the relative sim-
plexity of the measured attitudes. In a number of cases, the degree of empiri-
cal multiplexity is, however, of special theoretical significance. It can concern a 
theoretically striking simplexity as well as a striking multiplexity. These cases 
are presented below and discussed in the light of the theory. 
In the evaluation of the empirical results in comparison with the theoretical 
structure, the following are dealt with in turn: (a) peace action (b) motivation 
to peace action, (c) religious peace attitudes, and (d) the social location of 
peace action. 
(a) Peace action 
The conceptualisation of peace action focused on the concept of communicat-
ive peace action. A distinction was made between participatory and organiz-
ational communicative peace activities. A hierarchical relationship was 
expected to exist between these two forms of communicative peace action. 
Organizational peace actions witness to a higher degree of peace activity than 
participatory peace actions because, among other reasons, they require more 
time and effort. In a cumulative scale of communicative peace activity, the 
organizational actions, therefore, include the participatory actions. This 
expectation was not supported empirically. The participatory action of the 
attendance at peace days and markets includes some organizational actions. In 
3.2.1 this unexpected empirical information was interpreted by attributing the 
relatively high "difficulty" of the attendance at peace days and markets partially 
to the limited opportunity for them. Peace days and markets are infrequent, so 
it is difficult to participate in them. One can attach to this the more far-
reaching question of whether the entire cumulative scale of communicative 
peace activity in fact only measures a hierarchy of opportunities for communi-
cative peace actions instead of the intensity of the communicative peace 
activity. This opens the validity of the scale to discussion. Have we indeed 
measured what we intended to measure? The opportunity and the intensity of 
communicative peace activity, however, are intimately related to each other. 
People create their own opportunities in peace work precisely by the intensity 
of their peace activity. For those who want to invest much time and energy 
into peace work, more opportunities for peace action will open than for those 
who want to invest little. Although the chance character of the opportunity for 
communicative peace action cannot be completely excluded, we can, on the 
224 
basis of the relationship between opportunity and intensity of communicative 
peace activity, still assert that the constructed hierarchical scale of communi-
cative peace activity is a valid instrument for the measurement of the degree 
of communicative peace activity. 
(b) Motivation to peace action 
The motivation to peace action is divided theoretically into three components, 
which are examined separately: conceptions of peace, perceptions of arma-
ment, and attributions regarding armament. These components are treated 
separately in the evaluation. 
In the empirical attitudes with respect to the conceptions of peace, an outcome 
occurs that is theoretically very remarkable. This concerns the attitudes with 
respect to the functionality of nuclear deterrence. The functionality of nuclear 
deterrence is conceptually distinguished in the importance of nuclear weapons 
for Western security and the abolition of nuclear weapons by the West. 
Empirically, this distinction is non-existent. From the point of view of the 
theory, this is very remarkable. The attitude with regard to the abolition of 
nuclear weapons by the West is measured by asking the respondents whether 
the West should immediately abolish its nuclear weapons or should not do so 
in any circumstances. Both the immediate abolition and the unconditional 
maintenance of nuclear weapons are extreme positions. It is striking that these 
extreme notions about abolition belong to the same dimension as the concep-
tion of the importance of nuclear deterrence for security. Those who consider 
nuclear weapons important for the preservation of security are unconditionally 
opposed to the abolition of nuclear weapons; those who see nuclear weapons 
as a threat to security want to abolish them immediately. Theoretically, this 
correlation is not at all obvious. Those who consider nuclear weapons import-
ant for security in the present circumstances can still strive for their abolition 
in the longer term. And those who think that nuclear weapons involve a risk 
for security can still be of the opinion that they cannot be immediately 
abolished. The first conception is, for example, that of former American 
president Ronald Reagan, whose Strategic Defense Initiative had the declared 
ultimate objective of making the strategy of nuclear deterrence superfluous 
(Reagan 1983). The second conception is that of Pax Christi (1979, 29), among 
others. 
The measured attitudes with regard to the functionality of nuclear 
deterrence are extremely simplex. The complex problem of the advantages and 
disadvantages of nuclear deterrence is empirically reduced to a simple yes-or-
no problem. During the discussion on nuclear weapons in the first half of the 
1980s, churches and church peace movements offered a large volume of 
educational materials to their members in which the problem of the 
functionality of nuclear deterrence was usually explained with a relatively high 
degree of nuance and attitudinal multiplexity. Within the churches, discussions 
were organized on the national level in which the opportunity was provided to 
study and discuss these materials. On the local level, peace groups organized 
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countless study and discussion meetings, in which the educational materials of 
the churches and the peace movements was discussed. This balanced educa-
tion, however, was overshadowed by a harsh polemic over concrete political 
decisions about nuclear weapons, which was conducted primarily in the media 
with rhetorical means. In the struggle for the political decision making, the 
argumentation lost some of its nuances. In order to mobilize political opinion, 
the peace movements generated simple slogans that expressed simplex atti-
tudes. This seems to have had an effect on the opinion formation of the 
members of the church and of the church peace movements. The attitudinal 
simplexity of the rhetoric in the church on war and peace has largely out-
stripped the attitudinal multiplexity of education in the church on war and 
peace. This can explain the measured simplexity of the attitude toward the 
functionality of nuclear deterrence. 
In the perception of armament, one notes that there is no empirical distinction 
between the cognitive and the affective dimension of both the concern and the 
comparative concern about armament. This implies empirical support for the 
position of Krech et al. that the cognitive and affective components of atti-
tudes are closely related to each other (Krech et al. 1962, 142-144). It also 
corroborates the concept of Nuttin about the close correlation of cognitive and 
affective aspects of perception (Nuttin 1980, 56, 232). 
The result is also relevant to the discussion within the peace movement 
about the cognitive and affective approaches to peace education, noted in 
section 2.5.2. In the light of the strong correlation of the cognitive and 
affective aspects in the perception of the arms problem, peace education 
purely oriented to cognition, as propagated by the ICTO, does not seem 
adequate (cf. Eykmann 1991, 175). Emotions on the level of the perception of 
armament are part of the initial situation of peace education. When they are 
ignored or suppressed in purely cognitively oriented peace education, there is 
the chance that the achievement of cognitive teaching objectives will be 
hindered by emotional barriers. The educational approach of the IKV has 
always been aimed at a combination of cognitive and affective elements. In the 
light of the empirical perception of armament, this seems to be the most 
preferable approach. 
In the attributions regarding armament, a striking simplexity could be noted in 
the attitude with respect to the controllability of armament. From the attribu-
tion theory of Weiner a conceptual distinction between different factors in the 
attribution regarding armament was taken. These factors determine the 
influence of the actor on armament-processes. The factors were distinguished 
with the dimensions of internal/external, stable/unstable, and control-
lable/uncontrollable. Empirically, these distinctions do not appear to exist. The 
attribution factors are not independent of each other. The individual impact on 
armament, the impact through local and national peace actions, the possibility 
of influencing politicians, and the process autonomy of armament are all 
related to each other, in spite of the heterogeneousness of these factors 
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predicted by attribution theory. Empirically, the attribution problem with 
respect to armament comes down to only one question: Does the individual 
have control of armament or not? 
An explanation for the empirical simplexity of the attribution problem with 
regard to armament can be sought in the social character of the armament 
problem. The armament problem is ultimately a problem of the social action 
of people. The individual who has to determine his influence on armament can 
consider his own action as a part, however minor, of the ai.ns problem. In 
principle, an influence on armament as a whole can be attributed to each 
individual action in relation to armament (cf. Solle 1971). The attribution 
problem with respect to armament concentrates on the question of whether or 
not one endorses this concept of influence in principle. The factors distin-
guished by attribution theory which may strengthen or weaken this influence 
turn out to have no effect on the principled standpoint that the individual has 
an influence on armament. 
This explanation implies a reassessment of the original one-dimensional 
attribution theory of Rotter. He formulated a fundamental distinction between 
internal and external attribution on a level of abstraction that also includes the 
attribution with respect to social problems. Rotter considered attributive 
judgements as based on generalized, culturally-determined causal attributions 
related to particular areas of life. This relates attribution to categorical 
'worldviews'. In the attribution problem with respect to armament, the world-
view seems to play a principal role. In its empirical simplexity, the attribution 
problem with respect to armament has the character of a generalized causal 
attribution, which is based on a fundamental position on the role of the 
individual in the social processes that lead to armament and disarmament. 
One striking detail within the attitude towards the controllability of arma-
ment is that local cooperation for disarmament is not distinguished from the 
national cooperation. In 2.5.3, the attributive differences between the two 
levels of cooperation have been pointed out. Local cooperation is easier to 
achieve and sooner successful than national cooperation, but its significance 
for the controllability of armament is less. The expectation that people, 
because of these differences, would have distinct preferences for one of the 
two forms of cooperation does not prove to be correct. Peace actions on the 
local level do not function as a 'simple alternative' for national peace actions. 
(c) Religious peace attitudes 
Religious peace attitudes are conceptually distinguished into three thematic 
areas: hamartiology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. Hamartiological and 
soteriological attitudes are conceptualized with an identical pattern in which a 
distinction is made between dimensions of transcendence, dimensions of time, 
and the question of the human subject. Before interpreting the empirical 
results for the three theological thematic areas separately, a few conclusions 
will first be drawn about the common characteristics of hamartiology and 
soteriology. 
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Dimensions of transcendence 
The distinction between immanent and absolute transcendence obtains strong 
empirical support. With only one exception, all of the hamartiological and 
soteriological attitudes subsumed under the dimensions of transcendence 
conform to the distinction between immanent and absolute transcendence. The 
exception concerns the hamartiological concept of apocalyptic thinking about 
war. Immanent transcendent apocalypticism is empirically not separated from 
absolute transcendent apocalypticism. The theological implications of this will 
be discussed later on. 
The strong empirical support of the distinction between immanent and 
absolute transcendence casts an interesting light on the contemporary theologi-
cal discussion of images of God in which the relationship between God and 
man occupies an important place (Van der Ven 1990, 248-254). In this 
discussion, Schoonenberg and Schillebeeckx, among others, defended the 
notion that the opposition between God and man is a "false dilemma". The 
image of God and man as competitors has led in theology to an absolute 
transcendent image of God in which the divine activity cancels out the human 
activity. One can add that the "false dilemma" between God and man has led 
outside of theology to an atheistic trend that rejects the existence of God 
because of human freedom: God cannot exist if man is free; man is free; 
therefore, God cannot exist (Sartre 1951; Luijpen 1967, 311-343). In this 
atheistic reasoning, human activity cancels out the divine activity. As an 
alternative for the absolute transcendent image of God, Schoonenberg and 
Schillebeeckx formulated the model of God's immanent transcendence. In this 
model, divine activity is conceived as constitutive for human activity and, 
inversely, human activity as constitutive for divine activity. God makes man 
capable of freedom and action (Schoonenberg 1969). It was Schillebeeckx who 
worked out the complementary thesis that action of man is the condition for 
the religious experience of God's action (Schillebeeckx 1977; 1989). 
From the research results, it can be concluded that the theological reaction 
to the absolute transcendent image of God closely fits the empirical religious 
awareness. In religious awareness, the theological models of God's immanent 
and absolute transcendence are present as distinct attitudinal objects. From 
this, it can be concluded that there is a problem awareness with respect to the 
models of God's immanent and absolute transcendence in the religious 
consciousness. 
Time dimensions 
The distinction between religious peace attitudes according to the time 
dimensions of past, present, and future is less strongly supported empirically 
than the distinction between dimensions of transcendence. In the immanent 
transcendent hamartiology a distinction is made by the respondents between 
past, present, and future; within the absolute transcendent hamartiology the 
dimensions of the past and the present cluster. In soteriology the immanent 
transcendent images cluster in the dimensions of the past and the future, 
whereas the absolute transcendent images cluster in all time dimensions. The 
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empirical support for temporal distinctions thus exists only to a limited degree. 
For theology, the conclusion can be drawn from this that temporal distinctions 
are only adequate to a limited degree as the point of departure for theological 
theory formation. Temporal distinctions are strongly emphasized by some 
political theologians. Some political theologies tend towards an "exclusivist 
eschatology", in which the futurity of God's salvation is made into a theological 
category that determines everything (Fierro 1977, 265). Political theology 
considers eschatology as the bearer of the societal-Utopian and emancipatory-
critical character of the Christian faith. On the basis of this eschatological 
preoccupation, theological models that do not stress the future in God's salvific 
activity are criticized. This critique concerns primarily existential theology, 
which takes the actual faith decision in the present as the point of departure 
for theological reflection. In existential theology the eschatological symbolism 
is the interpretament of the all-embracing character of the faith decision that 
places the entire existence at stake (Bultmann 1957). The critique by political 
theology of this non-future-oriented paradigm of theology is that it deprives 
the Christian message of its eschatological-utopian sting and so condemns 
church and theology to an uncritical confirmation of the existing social order 
without a theologically founded prospect of another, better world (Metz 1972, 
75-89; 1977, 153; Moltmann 1964, 304-312; SchiUebeeckx 1972, 36; Solle 1971, 
56-58). 
The empirical observation that religious peace attitudes are distinguished 
only to a limited degree by time dimensions, however, leads to the supposition 
that temporal dimensions are not the separation lines along which the critical 
and emancipatory potential of the Christian message is decided upon. Empiri-
cally distinct are primarily the dimensions of immanent and absolute transcen-
dence: peace as a task from God and peace as an absolute gift of God. The 
theological foundation of an emancipatory and critical Christian religion will 
have to take this distinction as a central starting point, by establishing the 
emancipatory and critical character of the Christian message not primarily on 
the future orientedness of the Christian faith but on an immanent transcen-
dent vision of God's revelation: His revelation in the action of people that is 
aimed at solidarity and liberation in all of human history, in the past, the 
present, and the future (SchiUebeeckx 1972, 46-50; 1989). What must be 
combated from this in theology is not the neglect of the future orientedness of 
the Christian faith but the image of God as absolute transcendence, in which 
the worldly liberation can ultimately be assigned no religious salvific value. 
The political-theological critique of Bultmann's existential theology could be 
reformulated in this light. In this critique, the strongly absolute transcendent 
image of God that Bultmann associates with his existential theology has 
hitherto seldom been pointed out. God is a "super-worldly reality" which is the 
origin and lord of the world and life. He is a "dark power" which sets his limits 
for man and determines his future. Believing is the courage to subject oneself 
to this power and so to cut across the anathema of human conceit (Bultmann 
1952, 1-5). This strong accentuation of human dependence and limitedness vis-
à-vis an absolute transcendent God already declares that political emancipatory 
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objectives are completely alien to Bultmann's theology. 
It must also be noted that an eschatological orientation of theology does not 
guarantee by itself that the absolute transcendent image of God is surpassed. 
An absolute transcendent eschatology is also conceivable that reserves the 
capacity for novelty to God alone, denying that man and the world can 
introduce anything new (Fierro 1977, 267). 
The human subject 
The empirical attitudes towards the human subject of both hamartiology and 
soteriology deviate from the theoretically assumed structure. In the 
conceptualisation, the distinction between a social and an individual subject 
was taken as the starting point. Empirically, this distinction does not turn out 
to be the most important one. Empirically, the attitudes towards the human 
subject are related rather to the distinction between a solidary and privatised 
orientation of the individual. In hamartiology, solidarity relates to a compre-
hension of shared responsibility for the evil of war, whereas privatization 
concerns the rejection of shared responsibility by the ascription of the evil of 
war to a few 'evil men'. In soteriology, solidarity concerns the orientation to 
the macro-dimension of peace: the peace that embraces all people, while 
privatization refers to an orientation to the micro-dimension of peace: peace in 
the inner self and in the primary, everyday social relations. 
The empirical distinction between solidary and privatised attitudes with 
respect to the human subject of hamartiology and soteriology can be inter-
preted in the light of the central thesis of political theology that a society-
critical function of church and theology is only possible when the present 
privatization trends in church and theology are overcome in an effort for peace 
and justice, in solidarity with others. The research results show that solidarity 
and privatization constitute distinct attitudinal objects in the empirical religious 
consciousness. One can conclude from this that there is an awareness among 
believers of the problem of the relationship between a solidary and a 
privatised manner of being subject. The initial situation of the empirical 
religious awareness offers points of contact for a political-theological 
thematization of the opposition between solidarity and privatization. 
Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
Theologically striking results that concern hamartiology specifically occur both 
in the hamartiological dimensions of transcendence and in the human subject 
of hamartiology. 
The first theologically noteworthy result in the hamartiological dimensions 
of transcendence occurs with regard to war as a manifestation of historical sin. 
The conceptual distinction between historical sin as hereditary sin and as 
historical-social sin finds no empirical support. Many contemporary theologians 
have abandoned the traditional original-sin concept. Tillich stated that the 
image of the hereditary sin must be expunged from the theological vocabulary 
because it is overburdened with absurd literal interpretations (Tillich 1957). 
Here, one must consider particularly the linkage of hereditary sin to procre-
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ation which since Augustine has contributed in large measure to the negative 
judgement of sexuality in the Western culture. Alternative interpretations of 
the historical character of sin are generally formulated as critical 
reinterpretations of the concept of hereditary sin (Baumann 1970). The model 
of historical-social sin is also presented as such (Weger 1970). Nevertheless, no 
distinction appears to exist in the empirical religious consciousness between 
the models of hereditary and historical-social sin. This can be interpreted as a 
sign of an erosion of the traditional original-sin concept in the empirical 
religious consciousness. Because the association with quasi-biological, sexual, 
transfer mechanisms has disappeared, the traditional original-sin concept can, 
empirically, go together with an historical-social model of historical sin. 
The second theologically noteworthy result in the hamartiological dimen-
sions of transcendence concerns apocalyptic thinking about war. Conceptually, 
apocalypticism was divided into a purely immanent and an absolute transcen-
dent dimension. Empirically, however, immanent and absolute transcendent 
apocalypticism constitute one single dimension (Figure 3.6). In a second-order 
factor analysis it appeared that apocalyptic thinking about war is strongly 
correlated with absolute transcendent hamartiological concepts (Table 5.3). 
From this, it can be concluded that apocalyptic thinking about war is a form of 
absolute transcendent hamartiology. There is no place in the empirical relig-
ious consciousness for a separate immanent apocalypticism, distinct from an 
absolute transcendent view of the apocalypse. The idea of an immanent 
apocalypse, as is expressed, for example, in the vision of a "nuclear eschatol-
ogy" (Kaufmann 1983), is only a metaphor for absolute transcendent apocalyp-
ticism, which cannot conceal its "original" religious meaning (cf. Derrida 1972). 
This conclusion makes it necessary to reconceptualize apocalyptic thinking 
about war. The concept of immanent apocalypticism must be discarded. Its 
content can be subsumed under absolute transcendent apocalypticism. 
The third theologically noteworthy result in the hamartiological dimensions 
of transcendence is that all conceptually distinct theodicy models relative to 
war (God's damnation, plan, retaliation, and pedagogy) form one empirical 
cluster. First, the respondents distinguish attitudinally the various theodicy 
models from other hamartiological images. They recognize the theodicy 
problem as a separate theme. There is a theodicy awareness in the empirical 
religious consciousness. Second, within the theodicy problem, the respondents 
do not specify individual theodicy models. Apparently, the multiplexity of the 
theological theodicy theory bypasses the theodicy awareness of the faithful. 
This qualifies a number of theoretical assumptions regarding the distinction 
between theodicy models. Weber, from a cultural evolutionary point of view, 
considered the retaliation model as prior to the plan model. As the experience 
of the delay of God's wrath became more powerful, the retaliation model lost 
plausibility and was replaced by the model of the planning-controlling God 
(Weber 1980). The empirical evidence does not support Weber's evolutionary 
view on theodicy models. The symbols of God's retaliation and God's plan are 
simultaneously present in religious consciousness. Van der Ven has suggested 
that the pedagogical theodicy model can be located in a sort of middle ground 
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between immanent and absolute transcendence. Because of God's pedagogical 
involvement with man in this view, it could be placed on the side of the near 
God. On the other hand, God is also distant with a cruelty that sends suffering 
also to those who cannot be considered morally responsible (Van der Ven 
1989, 11). The theoretical intermediateness of the pedagogy model has, 
however, received no empirical corroboration. In his empirical theodicy 
research, Van der Ven found a dimension that unites pedagogical theodicy to 
the absolute transcendent plan theodicy (ibid., 18). Our research findings point 
in the same direction. Pedagogical theodicy and plan theodicy belong to the 
same, absolute transcendent, dimension. There is no empirical ground for 
considering pedagogical theodicy as distinct from other absolute transcendent 
theodicies. 
A theologically noteworthy result with respect to the human subject of 
hamartiology is the empirical clustering of the social subject and the individual 
subject in solidarity with others. In a reconceptualisation, these two concepts 
were brought together in the dimension of hamartiological solidarity. The 
empirical clustering of the social subject and the individual subject in solidarity 
with others qualifies some philosophical and theological assumptions in the 
area of hamartiology. The concept of the social subject of hamartiology is 
taken from the hamartiological symbolism of evil as sin, as distinguished by 
Ricoeur. This symbolism is marked by an external and collective experience of 
evil. The concept of the individual subject in solidarity with others is related to 
the symbolism of evil as guilt. This symbolism is marked by an internal and 
individual experience of evil. The individual experience of evil as guilt can take 
on both a privatised and a solidary form. In its privatised form, the guilt-
experience is limited to the direct relations between individuals, such as those 
in the family and at work, and the individual relationship of the person to 
God. In reaction to the privatised hamartiological awareness, political theology, 
in particular Solle, argued for a politicizing solidary experience of human 
guiltiness as an experience of complicity in the structures of dominance, 
violence, and deterrence, which perpetuate injustice and threaten peace (Solle 
1971, 87-96). In its critique of the privatization tendencies within hamartiology, 
the concept of the individual subject in solidarity with others can be considered 
as a reappreciation of the symbolism of sin, on the basis of the symbolism of 
guilt. With respect to the original collective sin awareness, however, the model 
also contains an important correction. Guilt presumes a conscious and free 
action, thus a personal responsibility, of the individual. This personalistic 
orientation to conscious, free, and responsible action is not present in the 
symbolism of sin as conceptualized by Ricoeur. 
On the basis of the empirical clustering of the social subject and the 
individual subject in solidarity with others, a comment can be made about 
Ricoeur's conceptualisation. Although Ricoeur distinguishes the symbolism of 
sin and guilt typologically, he also strongly emphasizes the linkage between the 
two symbol types. The transition between sin and guilt is "un mouvement de 
rupture et un mouvement de reprise" (Ricoeur 1960, 99). Aspects of 
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externality and collectivity are also still discernable in guilt-like hamartiologies, 
whereas aspects of internality and individuality are already present in sin-like 
hamartiologies (id., 99-106). One could conclude from this that there is a 
continuum between the symbolism of sin and the symbolism of guilt. There is 
no radical paradigmatica! rupture that separates the two hamartiologies and 
the empirical results support this idea of a continuum. The attitudes with 
respect to the sin-like model of the social subject of hamartiology and the 
guilt-like model of the individual subject in solidarity with others are not 
differentiated empirically. The empirical hamartiological awareness is oriented 
to a combination of externality/internality and collectivity/individuality. The 
believer confesses both sin and guilt. This attitudinal combination offers 
believers the opportunity of escaping the heavy psychological burden inherent 
in the model of the hamartiological individual subject in solidarity with others. 
This burden consists of the hamartiological solidary individual knowing himself 
to be personally burdened with the weight of all the structural evil in the world 
to which he is, in Solle's term, "an accomplice". 
Soteriological peace attitudes 
In the discussion of the time dimension as a typological criterion, it has 
already been pointed out that temporal distinctions play only a limited role in 
soteriology. In the empirical soteriological attitudes, temporal distinctions are 
largely overruled by distinctions regarding dimensions of transcendence. This 
provides theological empirical support for Schillebeeckx's position as regards 
the interrelatedness of past, present and future in God's salvific action. The 
unity of past, present, and future is characteristic of an authentic Christian 
eschatology. Protology and eschatology are linked to each other by the experi-
ence of God's faithfulness in the present (Schillebeeckx 1972, 50). This 
theological theory finds support from the side of the 'sensus fidelium'. It 
makes no difference here whether the faithful are oriented to an immanent 
transcendent or an absolute transcendent image of God. In both dimensions of 
transcendence the awareness of the salvation historical arch between past and 
future lies enclosed. Within a situation of attitudinal divergence among 
believers at the point of dimensions of transcendence, the concept of salvation 
history marks a point of convergence. 
A comment regarding peace education can be added to the empirical 
results on the conceptualisation of the human subject of soteriology. Some 
theorists of peace education assume that the learning of peace on the micro-
level promotes attitudes and insights that are important for the ability to 
contribute to peace on the macro-level. This assumption proceeds from a 
certain congruence of peace on the micro-level and peace on the macro-level, 
whereby educational transfer is possible from one level to the other. The data, 
however, show that micro-level and macro-level peace, at least in a religious 
perspective, form distinct dimensions that correlate even negatively (correla-
tion -.41). The orientation on the micro- and the macro-levels of peace are 
partially mutually exclusive attitudes. This implies a weakening of the assumed 
congruence of peace on the two levels. The question can be asked whether the 
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distinction between a privatised and a solidary experience of peace, which 
correlates with the distinction between peace on the micro-level and peace on 
the macro-level, does not constitute a hindrance for the transfer of peace 
education on the micro-level to that on the macro-level. By orienting educandi 
to the micro-dimension of peace, one stimulates in them a privatised experi-
ence of peace. 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes 
With respect to ecclesiological attitudes, a conceptual distinction has been 
made between the dimension of the legitimacy, the content, and the influence 
of the church peace praxis. The empirical corroboration of the theoretical 
structure has been examined for each of these dimensions separately. Theo-
logically noteworthy results occur with respect to the legitimacy and the 
content of the church peace praxis. 
The legitimacy of the church peace praxis 
It is theologically noteworthy that the external and internal legitimacy problem 
of the church peace praxis cannot be empirically distinguished. From this one 
may conclude that the attitude towards the legitimacy of the church peace 
praxis is decided upon on a level that precedes the internal/external distinc-
tion. Tentatively, without support by observed correlations, this preceding level 
can be determined as the attitude with respect to ecclesiastical orthopraxis. 
Related to the empirical distinction between a solidary and a privatised 
attitude towards the human subject of soteriology, a distinction can be made 
between a solidary and a privatised ecclesiology. The relation is established 
through the view of orthopraxis. In a solidary way of being-subject and in a 
solidary ecclesiology, orthopraxis is defined as a solidary political and social 
praxis oriented to the well-being of others, in a readiness to yield one's own 
interests for it. In a privatised way of being-subject and in a privatised 
ecclesiology, orthopraxis is privatised and defined a-politically as concern for 
inner wholeness, in particular concern for the personal relationship to God, as 
well as for the wholeness in primary social relations. One's own interests are 
only yielded insofar as it is in service of the wholeness of the relationship to 
God or the primary social relations. Church peace praxis is only legitimate 
within a solidary ecclesiology. A legitimation of church peace praxis in terms of 
the mission of the church and the relationship between church and politics 
(external legitimacy) can only be achieved when the orthopraxis of the church 
is defined as a solidary political and social praxis. The importance of church 
peace praxis can only be placed above the importance of ecclesiastical unity 
(internal legitimacy) when the orthopraxis of the church is tested against its 
readiness to yield its own interests for the goal of peace. When the orthopraxis 
of the church is privatised and defined a-politically as concern for inner 
wholeness and concern for primary social relations, there is no legitimation of 
church peace praxis in a social mission of the church nor in the relationship 
between church and politics (no external legitimacy). In its orientation to the 
wholeness of primary social relations, the privatised ecclesiology, in particular, 
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is not prepared to put the unity of the church at risk in the interest of a 
church peace praxis (no internal legitimacy). 
Content of the church peace praxis 
It is interesting to note that the specificity of church statements on war and 
peace is not distinguished empirically as a separate dimension. This makes it 
understandable why, in past years, during the church debate on nuclear 
weapons, such an important point was made of the specificity of church 
statements about nuclear weapons. The official church statements about 
nuclear weapons are, as it were, a pars pro toto, a verbal expression of a much 
more comprehensive attitude of the church vis-à-vis the political security 
policy, which also entails the resistance of the church to the official security 
policy, and the support of the church for demonstrations and even civil 
disobedience for peace. The specificity of church statements about nuclear 
weapons was a test case for the critical attitude of the church on the nuclear 
policy of the government. This was what was ultimately at stake in the struggle 
around the church's statements on war and peace. 
It is also noteworthy that support of the church for civil disobedience is not 
distinguished as a separate dimension. This results is especially significant in 
the light of the debate within the IKV in the middle of the 1980s on civil 
disobedience. The result of this debate was that the IKV opted for restraint 
with respect to the use of civil disobedience actions to oppose nuclear 
weapons. Empirically however, the members of the churches and church peace 
movements appear to consider civil disobedience to be an integral component 
of a critical church peace praxis. To the extent that one is more of the opinion 
that the church must oppose armament processes, that it must declare itself 
against it concretely, and has to support peace demonstrations, one is also 
more of the opinion that the church need not stop at the borders of the law to 
enforce its viewpoint. 
(d) The social location of peace action 
The social location of peace action has been distinguished into social and 
religious characteristics. The conceptualisation of the social characteristics 
needs no further evaluation, but that of the religious characteristics does. 
Theologically interesting results occur with the religious worldview and with 
churchview. 
Religious worldview 
The empirical results support the conceptual distinction between three orienta-
tions of the religious worldview: Belief in a personal God, belief in the a-
personal divine, and religious immanentism. These three orientations are 
present as separate dimensions in the religious consciousness of the sample. 
The operationalization of the three religious worldview orientations is taken 
from the SOCON study by Felling, Peters, and Schreuder (section 2.7, table 
2.3). They label the three dimensions differently, however. Belief in a personal 
God they call the "traditional Christian worldview" (or "theism"); belief in the 
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a-personal divine they call "general transcendence belief (or "deism"), and 
religious immanentism they call "innerworldliness" (or "immanentism"). Van 
der Ven has criticized this conceptualisation in two respects (Van der Ven 
1991). 
A specific point of criticism has already been taken into account in the 
designation of the dimensions of the religious woridview in section 2.7. This 
concerns the suggestion raised in the SOCON conceptualisation that the 
general transcendence belief and immanentism are distinct from the traditional 
Christian woridview. Van der Ven shows that elements of a general transcen-
dence belief and of religious immanentism belong to the multiform Christian 
tradition. Historically, it is not justified to consider faith in a personal God as 
the exclusive content of the Christian faith tradition. 
A general criticism concerns the theoretical basis of the conceptualisation of 
the religious woridview in the SOCON study. Van der Ven formulates this 
criticism from his own theological conceptualisation of the religious woridview 
in a three-dimensional model (1991, 250-252). 
The first dimension concerns the relationship of God's transcendence and 
immanence. In addition to the concepts of absolute and immanent transcen-
dence, Van der Ven introduces the concept of God's absolute immanence. In 
this model, God exists solely in and through the experience of self-acceptance, 
humanity, love, justice, and solidarity. The religious experience of God corre-
sponds here, in a reductive manner, to the depth dimension of self-experience 
and the love experience, and the transcendence to individual and social ethics 
and to clinical and social psychology. 
The second dimension concerns the difference between a personal and an 
a-personal God. The image of the personal God lies at the foundation of the 
entire Jewish and Christian tradition. God has a name and a face; he has 
feelings of concern and wrath; and he is called "Father" by Jesus. However, the 
connotation of "individuality" must not be associated with God's personality, 
since this does not concur with the totality and universality that is part of 
God's essence. The image of the a-personal God prevails primarily in Hindu-
ism and Buddhism, although traces of it can also be found in the history of 
Christian mysticism and spirituality. In the Christian tradition, the a-personal 
God is indicated by such symbols as "truth", "goodness", "justice", or in mystic 
symbols such as "abyss", "sun", and "ocean". 
The third dimension concerns the "source of faith": the origin of the images 
of God and the site of faith in God. Here, one may distinguish between a 
deductive and an inductive onset of faith. A deductive onset of faith concerns 
a fixed system of religious concepts, statements, and dogmas, which are applied 
within concrete situations and experiences. One can consider both Biblical 
fundamentalism as well as the 'authority positivism' of certain Roman Catholic 
circles as species of a deductive onset of faith. In an inductive onset of faith, 
concrete experiences and feelings of people are the source of a religious 
interpretation in which the faith in God is understood and explained in its 
meaning for the personal and social life. 
By combining the three dimensions of faith in God, Van der Ven con-
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structed a matrix in which twelve types of faith in God are distinguished. 
Applied to the items of the SOCON instrument for measuring religious 
worldviews that relate to the images of God, this matrix has the effect of a 
prism. The scales labelled "theism", "deism", and "immanentism" are each 
composed of different images of God. On the basis of this theological 
unravelling, Van der Ven contests the validity of the conceptualisation of 
religious worldviews in the SOCON study (id., 252-254). 
It is for further empirical-theological research to demonstrate whether Van 
der Ven's conceptualisation of images of God is empirically tenable. On the 
basis of the results of the present study, we cannot pronounce on Van de 
Ven's theological criticism of the conceptualisation of the religious worldview 
in the SOCON study. The results of the present study are identical with those 
of the SOCON study. If Van der Ven's criticism of the conceptualisation by 
SOCON is correct, then we must admit that validity problems also arise in the 
present study in the measurement of the religious worldview. This problem is 
particularly important for the measurement of religious immanentism. The 
items "to me, God is nothing but the valuable in every human being" and "God 
is not up there, but only in the hearts of men", are expressions of a religious 
worldview that, with Van der Ven, one can label as God's absolute immanence. 
In the theological literature, this image of God is found in the work of Tillich 
(1948) and Robinson (1963), who was influenced strongly by Tillich. Empirical-
ly, we have found that the items that articulate God's absolute immanence go 
together with a number of items that cannot be considered an expression of a 
religious attitude. They are, in the term used by the SOCON study, immanentis-
tic. They are the following four statements: 
"Life only has a meaning if you provide it for yourself'. 
"To me, the meaning of life is trying to make the best of it." 
"Good and evil in the world are entirely the work of man". 
"The problem of good and evil has to be solved by man himself'. 
The total scale, therefore, is a combination of God's absolute immanence and 
of non-religious immanentism. The question is how this empirical scale is now 
to be interpreted. Does it reflect a religious or a non-religious attitude? Both 
interpretations fail to do justice to a portion of the items. The conclusion has 
to be that the scale cannot be interpreted. It brought together with factor-
analytical means what must be distinguished conceptually: the religious image 
of God's absolute immanence and non-religious immanentism. The SOCON 
study labels this entire scale "immanentism" and thus ignores the religious 
dimension in the scale. In the present study, the scale is called "religious 
immanentism", with which the purely immanentistic dimension in the scale is 
actually incorrectly given a religious label. However, this is done to call 
attention to the religious dimension in the scale, which risks being ignored by 
the SOCON researchers. 
Future research will have to reveal how religious and non-religious 
immanentism are related to each other. Van der Ven has pointed out that 
237 
religious immanentism is a theological concept that may not be ignored in the 
study of the religious experience of people. The concept of religious 
immanentism deserves thorough theoretical and empirical analysis based on a 
more extensive and theologically better structured research instrument than 
was used in the SOCON study. 
Churchview 
The results regarding the organization of the church indicate that there is an 
empirical distinction between the attitudes towards the priesthood of the 
believers and towards democratic decision-making in the church. The correla-
tion between the attitudes is, however, very strong (.61). In the conceptual 
distinction of these attitudes, a connection is also present. Both concepts 
concern a democratic churchview. Ecclesiologically, this democratization is 
based on a 'communio' model of the church. In it, the pneumatological concept 
of a direct relationship of all the faithful with the Holy Spirit leading the entire 
church is central (Dulles 1976; Schillebeeckx 1989). From this starting point, 
the distinction between ordained ministers and laity is qualified as regards the 
liturgical and administrative functions in the church. In spite of their strong 
interrelatedness, the liturgical and the administrative aspect of the ecclesiasti-
cal democratization are empirically distinct. The faithful in our research see 
these aspects as separate from each other. This implies that, on the basis of 
the empirical image of the church, a differentiated approach to church democ-
ratization is possible. The faithful do not immediately experience incongruence 
when liturgical and administrative democratization of the church do not 
proceed in parallel. 
The empirical results regarding the tasks of the church indicate that the 
orientation on the meso-level of the group oriented tasks of the church is 
distinct both from the micro-level of the person-oriented tasks and from the 
macro-level of the socio-political tasks. This result supports the increasing 
attention within church development for an organization of the church based 
on active groups of volunteers (Wess 1989). Among the members of churches 
and church peace movements, there is awareness that the group-oriented tasks 
of the Church are a specific issue. The empirical appreciation of the group-
oriented tasks correlates closely, however, with the appreciation of the remain-
ing tasks, as is shown by the correlations between the attitudes (Table 3.16). 
The appreciation of group-oriented tasks has a strong positive correlation with 
the appreciation of socio-political tasks and a weak negative correlation with 
the appreciation of individual tasks. 
6.1.2 Differences between sub-populations 
Six sub-groups within the research population were compared with each other: 
members of the peace movements IKV, MOV and ICTO and members of the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Dutch Reformed Church and the Reformed 
Churches in the Netherlands, insofar as they are not playing an active role in a 
church peace movement. The first three groups were referred to jointly as 
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"members" and the last three as "non-members". Three kinds of comparisons 
were made between these groups: 
- a comparison of the three peace movements (members' description); 
- a comparison of the three denominations (non-members' description); 
- a comparison between the three peace movements and the total group of 
non-members (overall description). 
Finally the results of the overall description were reproduced graphically in the 
form of 'landscapes', using correspondence-analysis. An interpretation will be 
given of the members' description (a), the non-members' description (b) and 
the overall description (c), respectively. Where necessary, the overall picture of 
the correspondence analysis charts will be referred to. 
(a) Members' description 
The most important conclusion which can be drawn from the members' 
description is that there is a clear dichotomy between the three peace move-
ments at the attitudinal level. Members of IKV and MOV have very similar 
attitudes, whereas members of ICTO differ in a number of ways from them. In 
the description of the peace movements' goals in chapter one this dichotomy 
was also found several times. As far as specific peace goals are concerned, 
unilateral disarmament measures were supported by IKV and Pax Christi, but 
opposed by ICTO. Regarding instrumental peace goals, IKV and Pax Christi 
employed a political strategy of action mobilisation which was considered by 
ICTO to be inappropriate for the church. The demarcations between the 
movements at official policy level are reflected in the attitudes of their 
members. Members of IKV and MOV differ from ICTO-members in their 
more positive attitude towards gradual unilateral disarmament and by a more 
negative attitude towards gradual bilateral disarmament. Members of IKV and 
MOV are more favourable than members of ICTO to characteristics related to 
a political strategy of action mobilization, such as the church's politically-
critical peace praxis. 
Although attitudinally the members of MOV closely resemble those of IKV, 
in a number of ways they occupy a position midway between the members of 
IKV and those of ICTO, though leaning more towards IKV. This midway 
position is particularly noticeable in their motivation to peace action. This can 
be seen at a glance in the landscape of figure 4.1. It is striking that the midway 
position of the MOV-members can not be related to a parallel midway 
position of Pax Christi between IKV and ICTO, in terms of the specific peace 
goals at leadership level. In 1.1 it was ascertained that the boards of Pax 
Christi and IKV display strong similarities in their specific peace goals. Among 
the members of MOV and IKV this similarity is less strong. 
The members of MOV and IKV also differ in the way they take action: 
MOV-members show a lower degree in communicative peace activity and 
political activity than IKV-members (table 4.3.2). The differences between the 
members of MOV and IKV at an attitudinal level and at an action level can be 
accounted for by differences in organization and educational strategy. The 
national IKV-organization acts as organizational and policy centre vis-à-vis the 
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local IKV-groups. This position enables it to influence the attitudes of the 
IKV-members. The national Pax Christi organization is only in part an 
organizational and policy centre for the MOV groups. In their organization 
and policy-making MOV groups to a great extent behave autonomously (Van 
Iersel & Spanjersberg). The weak organizational link between the national Pax 
Christi organization and the local MOV groups offers an explanation for the 
contrast between the specific peace goals of Pax Christi and the peace atti-
tudes among MOV-members. It is hard to avoid the impression that the 
leadership of Pax Christi has less influence on the attitudes of its supporters 
than IKV does. 
The difference at an action level between the members of IKV and those of 
MOV can be explained by a difference in educational strategy, which is linked 
to the difference in organization. One part of the IKV-organization's educa-
tional approach to its members is their mobilization for specific peace activ-
ities, for the most part with a political character. The organizational precondi-
tions for the effectiveness of this 'internal action mobilization' are present in 
IKV. In Pax Christi's relationship to the MOV groups these preconditions are 
not present due to the autonomy of the MOV groups. Pax Christi does not 
carry out any internal action mobilization in relation to the MOV groups. This 
can explain the lower activity level of MOV-members. 
The organizational explanation for the difference in peace activity and 
political activity between IKV- and MOV-members contains an interesting 
indication for a possible extension of the theoretical model of this study. In 
accordance with accepted insights from motivation theory, the motivation to 
peace action is understood here as a psychical process, in which attitudes are 
assigned a motivating function. If one wishes to explain the effect of the 
internal organization of the peace movement on peace action in motivational 
terms, the motivation to peace action also needs to be seen as a socio-psycho-
logical process. Motivational impulses can also originate from outside the 
individual. Examples of this are the motivating powers of the leadership, of 
collective decision-making, of feelings of solidarity and of intersubjective 
incitement. Although the scientific value of a psychological motivation model 
has been demonstrated in this study, a socio-psychological motivation model 
can offer an important theoretical supplement. 
(b) Non-members' description 
The most important conclusion which can be drawn from the non-members' 
description is that attitudes and action features of non-members are only 
determined to a limited extent by their denomination. Only a few characteris-
tics are significantly related to denomination (table 4.2.1). These associations 
only occur in the field of ecclesiological peace attitudes and religious world-
view. Strong relations occur with respect to the question of the conformity of 
church members to church statements on war and peace and the worldview of 
religious immanentism. 
Catholics are more convinced of the necessity of conforming to church 
statements on war and peace than members of the Netherlands Reformed 
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Church and of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. The attitudes of 
believers reflect a difference in church order between the hierarchical Catholic 
Church and the synodal-presbyterian Protestant churches. The formal claims to 
authority of the church leadership are stronger in the Roman Catholic Church 
than in the Netherlands Reformed Church and in the Reformed Churches in 
the Netherlands. The difference in attitudes with regard to conformity among 
the members corresponds to the difference in the church leadership's claims to 
authority. 
Catholics are also more in agreement with a religious immanentistic 
worldview than Protestants are. This is interesting in the light of the proposi-
tion of Peters and Schreuder, that for Catholics the Christian faith is intrinsi-
cally challenged. They base this conclusion on the Catholics' preference for 
belief in the a-personal divine rather than belief in a personal God (designated 
by them as "general belief in transcendence" and "typically Christian belief in 
God" respectively: Peters & Schreuder 1987, 179)). However if one assumes 
that belief in the a-personal divine is an element of the Christian religious 
tradition (Van der Ven 1990, 250-254; 1992), this conclusion becomes invalid. 
If religious immanentism is similarly regarded as an element of the Christian 
tradition, it cannot be concluded from the relatively stronger preference of 
Catholics for religious immanentism that their Christian faith is challenged. 
Peters and Schreuder should revise their conclusions in the light of the 
theological theories about belief in the a-personal divine and religious 
immanentism. What they interpret as a challenge to faith can also be seen as a 
change in the content of faith. 
(c) Overall description 
The most important insight from the overall description is that the global 
attitudinal dichotomy between IKV and ICTO in relation to the non-members 
has the character of an inclusion. The two 'camps' within the peace movement 
surround the non-members on opposing sides. MOV-members join IKV-
members in many cases. This inclusion pattern offers a revealing insight into 
the nature of the communication about peace within the Dutch churches in 
recent years. Members of IKV and, to a lesser extent, members of MOV on 
the one hand and members of ICTO on the other, confronted church members 
with opposing ideas about armament and disarmament, but none of them 
seemed able to win the church members over to their side. Neither could any 
one of them lay claim to represent the views of the church members. 
This image of an inclusion must be put into perspective for MOV. In the 
members' description the position of MOV midway between IKV and ICTO 
was pointed out. This midway position implies that the members of MOV 
occupy a position closest to the non-members. The landscapes from the overall 
description show that this close position is* found in the structure of the 
motivation to peace action, as well as in the religious peace attitudes and the 
social location of peace action. It may be concluded that in relation to the non-
members the MOV movement is the least confrontational and the most 
representative. An explanation for the proximity of MOV-members and non-
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members can be found in the relative autonomy of the MOV-groups compared 
to those of IKV and ICTO. MOV-groups are not tied to the policies of a 
national organizing centre. Consequently, they have more opportunity to gear 
their policy to the opinions within the local church communities. 
It is interesting in the light of the general picture of the members' descrip-
tion to discover a number of specific points where the inclusion pattern is 
broken as a result of the fact that the three peace movements share a similar 
standpoint in contrast to the non-members (see table 4.3.2). This break occurs 
first of all in the communicative peace action. Members of church peace 
movements are more active than non-members. This distinction recurs in some 
attitudes. Members are comparatively more concerned about armament than 
non-members and they consider themselves to have a greater knowledge about 
armament than non-members. The higher comparative level of concern about 
armament among members sheds an interesting light on the situation of 
confrontation which existed between IKV and MOV on the one hand and 
ICTO on the other. Despite their ideological confrontation at a fundamental 
level, the church peace movements have in common that their members are 
people who are comparatively more concerned about armament than rank and 
file church members. 
6.1.3 Theoretical model of peace action 
In order to answer the central theological question underlying this study, a 
theoretical model has been formulated where an indirect motivational effect is 
ascribed to the religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis. Having empiri-
cally tested this theoretical model, it is possible, with some conceptual modifi-
cations, to give the following empirically supported reply to the question: 
Religious peace attitudes have an indirect effect on communicative peace action 
through: 
(a) the conceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(b) the perceptual component of the motivation to peace action and 
(c) the attributive component of the motivation to peace action. 
Nonetheless, only part of the conceptually differentiated religious peace 
attitudes have an indirect, motivational effect on action. In a theological 
interpretation the motivating power of the selected religious peace attitudes 
will be examined more closely. In addition, an interpretation will be given of 
the direct effects of religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action 
which were found. 
From five religious peace attitudes an indirect, motivational effect on 
communicative peace action can be determined (figure 5.2). It is remarkable 
that soteriological attitudes are not found among them. From a theological 
point of view this is remarkable, on account of the central position which 
soteriology occupies in the theological discourse on peace. Down to the oldest 
levels of the Jewish-Christian tradition the experience of God's salvation has 
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been linked with the human experience of peace. Salvation and peace are 
linked in the Yahwistic protology and in the prophetic and Johannean eschato-
logies; in the current religious experience they are linked together in the 
pneumatic presence of Christ, who is "our peace". In the theology of peace, 
soteriological images are frequently put in a motivational context, on the basis 
of the close relationship between divine salvation and peace. Peace action is 
theologically motivated by the task of stewardship, by the command to follow 
Christ and by the future gift of the Kingdom of God which involves an 
obligation to anticipatory peace action. This soteriology of peace is described 
in detail in 2.6.4. 
It is, paradoxically, precisely the central position of the identification of 
divine salvation and peace in the Christian religion which can offer an explana-
tion for the lack of effect of soteriological peace attitudes on peace action. The 
relationship between divine salvation and peace is present in the consciousness 
of all believers, irrespective of their peace activity. There is a consensus among 
believers concerning soteriological peace attitudes. A clear indication of this 
can be found in table 4.3.2. The members of the various church peace move-
ments, when compared among themselves, but also the members as compared 
to the non-members, display few differences in soteriological peace attitudes. It 
is inherent in the technique of causal analysis that attitudes which vary little 
within a population also possess little predicting power. However, the con-
clusion cannot be drawn that believers who actively devote themselves to peace 
are not motivated by soteriological attitudes. The only conclusion which can be 
drawn is that no prediction can be made about a person's peace activity from 
the valence of their soteriological peace attitudes. 
The five religious peace attitudes which exert an indirect, motivational 
effect on communicative peace action come from the domain of hamartiology 
and ecclesiology. Three of them exert a positive effect and two a negative 
effect. Characteristics exerting a positive effect are immanent transcendent 
hamartiology, critical peace ecclesiology and the influence of the church on 
politicians. Characteristics exerting a negative effect are absolute transcendent 
hamartiology and the competence of the church with regard to war and peace. 
Three things are striking about these effects. 
The first is that the distinction between an immanent transcendent and an 
absolute transcendent hamartiology is linked with communicative peace action. 
The distinction can be interpreted theologically by means of the 
conceptualisation of hamartiological dimensions of transcendence, in 2.6.3. 
One characteristic of immanent transcendent hamartiology is the idea that free 
action by people, in its historical context, creates evil social structures and 
cultural patterns in which freedom is entangled and perverted. The experience 
of the breadth and depth of evil within the structures of the world evokes in 
the religious consciousness a hamartiological interpretation of a transcendent 
dimension of immanent, radical evil. From a motivational point of view it is 
essential that this hamartiological symbolisation relates to the experience of 
the entanglement and perversion of human freedom. This experience of a 
human lack of freedom forms the contrast experience to an, at least implicitly, 
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experienced possibility of freedom (Schillebeeckx 1989). In the reference to 
possible freedom, within the conquest by evil, the motivating force of imma-
nent transcendent hamartiology is found. Human beings always have the ability 
to see through their structural and cultural entanglement in evil and to free 
themselves from it. Immanent transcendent hamartiology has an exhortatory 
character. In Sölle's hamartiology, which can be seen as a species of immanent 
transcendent hamartiology, this exhortation consists in the call to answer the 
insight into one's own co-responsibility for the structural evil in the world with 
liberating action in solidarity (Solle 1971). 
In an absolute transcendent hamartiology, the reference to human freedom 
is missing. Divine action precludes human action. It is true that human action 
in some absolute transcendent hamartiologies functions as a provocation for 
God's intervention, but divine intervention itself takes place completely 
detached from it. This is the case, for example, in the theodicy models of war 
as a divine curse, as a divine retaliation and as a divine pedagogy, as well as in 
apocalyptic thinking about war. In other absolute transcendent hamartiologies, 
human action functions as a medium for divine intervention, but here too 
human freedom is eliminated by a higher causality. An example is the plan-
theodicy, in which the evil of war is interpreted as a part of a teleology of 
world history unfathomable by mankind. At the action level the elimination of 
human freedom in absolute transcendent hamartiology leads to an acquiescent 
attitude with regard to war and the threat of war. This explains why absolute 
transcendent hamartiology has a negative motivational effect on communicat-
ive peace action. 
A second theologically remarkable result is that ecclesiological peace 
attitudes have opposite motivational effects on communicative peace action. 
The positive effects of critical peace ecclesiology and the influence of the 
church on politicians are theologically easy to interpret. The attitudinal cluster 
of critical peace ecclesiology stands for the ideal of a church where peace 
activities are considered to be both internally and externally legitimate, and 
which challenges politics on peace issues. In the theological literature on the 
subject of peace the plea for church efforts for peace is repeatedly linked to a 
critical peace ecclesiology (Eicher 1982; Schillebeeckx 1981). Believers appear 
to make the same link: approval of a critical peace ecclesiology is correlated 
positively with communicative peace action. 
The positive effect of church influence on politicians can be linked theologi-
cally with the positive effect of critical peace ecclesiology. The influence of the 
church on politicians can be considered as a descriptive counterpart of pre-
scriptive critical peace ecclesiology. They overlap in a joint reference to the 
political sphere. Allowing the church to influence politicians reinforces the 
plausibility of the prescription of a critical peace ecclesiology. On the other 
hand, the plausibility of critical peace ecclesiology requires the imputation of 
political influence to the church. A politically critical peace praxis can only be 
expected from the church if it is also allowed political influence. For believers 
who are active for peace within the church, allowing the church to influence 
politicians is a precondition for their motivation to peace action, in addition to 
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a critical peace ecclesiology. 
The competence of the church in the matter of war and peace is negatively 
connected with communicative peace action. Theologically the competence of 
the church can also be seen as a descriptive counterpart of critical peace 
ecclesiology. A politically critical peace praxis on the part of the church is only 
plausible when the church is also knowledgeable about war and peace. Schille-
beeckx underlines the church's own, theological, competence in the field of war 
and peace, and links this to a critical peace ecclesiology (Schillebeeckx 1981). 
In the multiple comparison it appeared that the groups which give evidence of 
the most communicative peace actions (1KV and MOV) also most strongly 
affirm the competence of the church (table 4.3.2). Considering all these 
indications of a positive connection between the competence of the church and 
communicative peace action, the actual finding of a negative connection is 
extremely surprising. One possible explanation for the indirect negative 
connection between the competence of the church and communicative peace 
action can be derived from their being connected only via the motivational 
(perceptual) characteristic of a comparative concern about armament. When 
controlled for the remaining characteristics which influence comparative 
concern about armament, the effect of the competence of the church is 
negative. The fact that the accurate, controlled effect of the competence of the 
church on comparative concern is negative, could be accounted for by an 
attitude of "institutional trust" with regard to armament which underlies it, but 
which has not been measured. An attitude of trust in institutions which are 
associated with armament (the army, industry, political leadership, but appar-
ently also the church leadership), could lead to both trust in the competence of 
the church about war and peace and trust in the development of arms in the 
world. This could explain the negative connection between the competence of 
the church and the comparative concern about armament. 
A third theologically striking result is the internal reinforcement between 
hamartiological and ecclesiological effects on communicative peace action. 
Particularly interesting is the mutual reinforcement of immanent transcendent 
hamartiology and critical peace ecclesiology. What links these attitudes is their 
social-critical and politically activating religious charge. Immanent transcendent 
hamartiology refers to the interpretation of the evil of war as a manifestation 
of institutional sin - on the one hand as the structural sin of the demoniacal 
power of armament and on the other as the cultural sin of the idolatry of the 
security ideology. A fundamental social-critical orientation is inherent in the 
religious interpretation of armament as possession by demons and idolatry. In 
the theological literature a politically activating aim is always linked to this 
social-critical orientation. Christians must, in a joint and critical praxis, devote 
themselves to unmasking and fighting the demons and idols of this world 
(Duchrow 1984; Falcke 1988; Solle 1971; 1985). The social-critical charge of 
critical peace ecclesiology is contained in particular in the view that the church 
peace praxis ought to be a politically critical peace praxis. 
Finally, the theological interpretation will be focused on the direct effects of 
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religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action. The influence of 
religious attitudes on communicative peace action is treated in this study as a 
motivational influence. This implies the expectation that religious peace 
attitudes will exert no direct effect on communicative peace action. According 
to the theoretical model employed, direct effects take place outside the 
motivational system, and are consequently not motivational effects. Table 5.4, 
however, shows that there are some direct effects exerted by religious peace 
attitudes on communicative peace action. These are the attitudes regarding 
critical peace ecclesiology and competence of the church in the matter of war 
and peace. Two points are important for the theological interpretation of these 
direct effects. First, both characteristics are part of ecclesiological peace 
attitudes. The fact that there are direct effects is somehow connected with the 
church. Second, the characteristics also exert an indirect, motivational effect on 
communicative peace action. Only a part of the effect of these characteristics 
on communicative peace action cannot be placed in the theoretical model 
used. 
If we wish to maintain the theological point of departure of the 
motivational function of religious attitudes, we will also have to allow the 
observed direct effects the theoretical status of motivational effects. To that 
end the theoretical model must be adjusted. This is possible by interpreting 
religious peace attitudes themselves as conceptions, perceptions or attributions. 
The direct effects of religious peace attitudes on communicative peace action 
which were found can be interpreted as effects from the motivational system. 
This implies that some religious attitudes must be regarded as part of the 
motivational system. It is possible to interpret the characteristics of critical 
peace ecclesiology and the competence of the church in this way. 
The concept of critical peace ecclesiology can be considered as a conception 
of peace. The characteristic formulates a mental image of a desired goal 
situation with respect to peace, which differs from other conceptions of peace 
only in the nature of the attitudinal object: a desired goal not with regard to 
nuclear armament and disarmament, development aid or civil East-West 
contacts, but with regard to the situation in the church itself. For church peace 
activists, the way in which the church takes up a position with respect to the 
peace issue is just as much a subject of conceptions of peace as the way in 
which peace in the world is realised. 
The direct effect on communicative peace action of the competence of the 
church in the matter of war and peace is more difficult to interpret. It con-
cerns a moderate negative effect on the category 'low communicative peace 
activity'. If we interpret this link as a negative effect on communicative peace 
action, we can endorse the concept of institutional trust with regard to arma-
ment, which was introduced to explain the indirect negative effect of the 
competence of the church on communicative peace action. As one aspect of 
institutional trust with respect to armament, the competence of the church in 
the matter of war and peace can be seen as a perception of armament. Arms are 
not perceived as a threat, because of the belief that they are being controlled 
by institutions which are to be trusted. Consequently an affirmation of the 
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competence of the church in the matter of war and peace has a negative effect 
on communicative peace action. 
That it is precisely the attitudes with respect to the church which have a 
direct motivational effect on communicative peace action can be explained by 
the thesis that the peace issue has an ecclesiological dimension in the con-
sciousness of believers. In relation to the peace issue, the church constitutes 
partly a separate, religious domain of reality for believers, in relation to which 
they develop religious attitudes (religious conceptions, perceptions and 
attributions), which influence peace action directly. Within this ecclesial 
dimension of the peace issue, religious peace attitudes are identical to 
motivational attitudes. With this, the direct effect of ecclesiological peace 
attitudes on communicative peace action can be explained as a motivational 
effect. From the indirect effects found, it appears that the ecclesial dimension 
of the peace issue is connected with the worldly dimension of the peace issue. 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes also exert an effect on communicative peace 
action via the worldly components of the motivation to peace action. 
6.2 Reflective evaluation 
In a theological reflection the empirical results will first be linked back to the 
theological definition of the problem, in particular to the theological theories 
underlying it: theological theory of religious hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis (6.2.1) and the motivation model of theological ethics of autonomy 
(6.2.2). Next, the results will be linked back to the theological objective of the 
study: the clarification of the promotion of the motivational function of 
religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis (6.2.3). 
6.2.1 Theological theory of religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis 
The central theological problem of this study is: 
what is the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis? 
The assumption underlying this central question is that hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis actually has a motivational function. This assumption is 
inherent in the concept of hermeneutical-communicative praxis itself. The 
Christian religion is not merely "theoria" but also a call to action, to conversion 
in anticipation of the coming of God's "basileia". The paranesis answers to the 
proclamation of God's peace (Van der Ven 1990, 85). Religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis motivates to liberating and renewing 
praxis within the situations and relationships of the world. Van der Ven 
designates the relation between hermeneutical-communicative praxis and 
worldly praxis as a reconstructive relationship. Hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis reconstructs in retrospect the religious significance of the action which 
occurred previously (id., 53). Motivation, however, does not take place after 
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action, but precedes it. In their motivational function religious attitudes 
energize and direct people's actions (Jones 1955). For this reason the 
motivational function of hermeneutical-communicative praxis can also be taken 
as a constructive function. Obviously, the constructive and reconstructive 
function of hermeneutical-communicative praxis are not separate. In a relig-
ious reconstruction an interpretation of completed actions, of realised situ-
ations and relationships takes place which forms the religious basis for concep-
tions, perceptions and attributions which in turn motivate to new actions. 
Reconstructive interpretation and constructive motivation are linked in a 
continuous dialectic. 
Theologically, the motivating function of hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis can be specified using the normative principles of freedom, equality, 
universality and solidarity, towards which it is eschatological-intentionally 
oriented. Hermeneutical-communicative praxis has to thank its transformative, 
motivating function to the orientation which these normative principles give 
(Van der Ven 1990, 76-88). Support for this theological theory can be derived 
from the empirical results of the research. 
Immanent transcendent hamartiology and critical peace ecclesiology support 
each other in their motivating function to communicative peace action. 
Theologically, this connection was interpreted by reference to the politically 
critical and politically activating impact of both characteristics. In a theological 
reflection, the social-critical and politically activating religious attitudes can be 
placed in the paradigm of political theology. The concepts of immanent 
transcendent hamartiology and critical peace ecclesiology can be considered as 
concentrations of the political-theological paradigm on the peace issue. In the 
concept of immanent transcendent hamartiology, the practical-critical 
hermeneutics of political theology is related to the hamartiological dimension 
of the peace issue. The hamartiology of Solle (1971) served as the model for 
this. In the concept of critical peace ecclesiology, the practical critical 
hermeneutics of political theology is related to the ecclesiological dimension of 
the peace issue. The views of Metz and Schillebeeckx regarding the social-
critical function of the church served as a guiding principle here (Metz 1969; 
Schillebeeckx 1972; 1989). 
A motivational aim is involved in the practical-critical character of political 
theory. Political theology is a practical-critical hermeneutics of the Christian 
tradition, oriented towards liberating people from injustice and violence. In 
this connection, political theology bases itself on the eschatological-normative 
principles of hermeneutical-communicative praxis. Political theology can 
accordingly be interpreted as a theological paradigm of the transformative, 
motivating function of hermeneutical-communicative praxis. From this study it 
appears that elements of this paradigm also perform a transformative, motivat-
ing function in the empirical religious consciousness. In the empirical religious 
consciousness elements of the political-theological body of thought have a 
motivating relationship to a social praxis which is aimed at minimising viol-
ence. 
It is nevertheless remarkable that soteriology, which forms the central point 
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of reference both in the theology of hermeneutical-communicative praxis and 
in political theology, empirically demonstrates no link with peace action. To 
account for this lack of soteriological effect it has been suggested that 
soteriological attitudes in the religious consciousness tend to be constants 
rather than variables. Soteriology is such a fundamental aspect of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis that Christians who disagree on other 
points do not differ in their soteriology. This does not mean that soteriology 
has no motivational function to action. The only conclusion which can be 
drawn is that this function could not be determined in this study. We can 
reconcile this research result with the central theological assumption regarding 
the motivating power of soteriological images by formulating the hypothesis 
that the soteriological dimension of hermeneutical-communicative praxis 
functions as a transcendental condition of the possibility of religious motiv-
ation. In addition to the transcendental soteriological constant, a scala of 
variable religious attitudes of a more categorial and regional nature are at 
work in religious motivation. Depending on the area within personal and social 
life these variable religious attitudes are motivationally active. Thus it appears 
from our research into religious motivation to peace action that it is chiefly the 
politically critical and politically activating religious attitudes which have a 
motivating effect. Political criticism and political activation are chiefly based 
upon the hamartiological and ecclesiological dimension of hermeneutical-
communicative praxis. Empirical theological research into other realms of life 
than the political shows that other religious attitudes come to the fore there. 
Thus it is particularly theodicy-attitudes which play a role in a religious 
approach to coming to terms with suffering through sickness (Van der Ven 
1989). 
6.2.2 The motivation model of theological ethics of autonomy 
In this study a choice has been made for a motivation-theoretical approach to 
the relationship between religion and peace action. Theologically this choice is 
founded in the proposition of theological ethics of autonomy, that the function 
of religion with respect to moral action must be considered as a motivational 
one. In section 2.1, a theological motivation model was developed, on the basis 
of Auer's ethics of autonomy (Auer 1971; 1977). Auer's theological motivation 
model has been adjusted on two points. In the first place the two functions of 
religion which Auer differentiates - that of discovering moral norms (integra-
tion, stimulation, criticism) and that of motivating moral action - are integrated 
here. The relationship between moral norms and moral action can be inter-
preted as a motivational relationship (Baier 1958; Brandt 1979; Jensen 1971). 
Following on from this argument, the integrating, stimulating and critical 
functions of religion can be interpreted as aspects of the morally motivating 
function of religion. In the second, place Auer's motivation model has been 
criticised as too monolithic in the light of the multidimensionality of the 
motivation process. For that reason Auer's model has been adjusted with the 
aid of motivation-theoretical insights, by breaking down the motivation-process 
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into three components: conception, perception and attribution. Subsequently, a 
link was established between the integrating, stimulating and critical function 
of religion on the one hand and the motivation-components of conception, 
perception and attribution on the other. The integrating function was linked to 
conception, the stimulating function to attribution and the critical function to 
perception (figure 2.3). The research results provide three conclusions with 
respect to the empirical tenability of Auer's corrected theological motivation-
model. 
First, empirical support can be derived for Auer's fundamental argument 
that the moral meaning of the Christian religion is to be found in its morally 
motivating power. It has been shown by the example of peace action that 
Christian religious attitudes influence moral action and that this influence is of 
a motivational nature. In the introduction it was argued that peace action in 
the churches formed a unique opportunity for research into the motivational 
force of religious hermeneutical-communicative action. Churches, church peace 
movements and theologians have made great efforts to motivate believers to a 
commitment to peace. In the religious communication about peace the 
Christian faith was explored from every angle to discover where its motivating 
power lies. If no motivational effect of religion on peace action had been 
found in this study, there would have been valid reasons to doubt Auer's 
theory about the morally motivating power of the Christian faith. From the 
empirical support for Auer's theory an incentive can be derived to investigate 
the moral motivating power of religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis in 
areas other than that of peace action. It is reasonable to assume that a morally 
motivating power of hermeneutical-communicative praxis can also be found 
with regard to other ethical issues, both of a macro-ethical and micro-ethical 
nature. It might be rewarding to apply the theological motivation model 
developed here to other moral issues, and to examine whether this expectation 
is confirmed. 
A second conclusion concerning the tenability of the theological motivation 
model of ethics of autonomy concerns the direct effects of religion on peace 
action which were found. It concerns in each case the effects of ecclesiological 
attitudes. Above, the conclusion was drawn that the peace problem possesses 
an ecclesial dimension in the consciousness of believers, where the distinction 
between religious peace attitudes and the motivation to peace action is 
removed (section 6.1.3). This conclusion forces to subject the autonomy-ethical 
model of the motivational function of religious attitudes to a critical-theologi-
cal reflection. 
Reflecting upon the direct relationships which were found between religious 
peace attitudes and peace action, we become aware of a conceptual dichotomy 
in the motivation-model of theological ethics of autonomy between religion on 
the one hand and ethical rationality on the other. In ethics of autonomy 
religion and ethics are placed in two separate compartments within the human 
consciousness, which are linked afterwards by the concept of motivation. The 
results of this research give cause to put this compartmentalisation into 
perspective. The ecclesial dimension found within the motivation to peace 
250 
action demonstrates that the church forms a domain of reality for believers in 
which the compartmentalisation of religious attitudes and moral action does 
not exist. However, theologically, the domain of the church is connected with 
the domain of the "saeculum" (Houtepen 1974). The church can be theological-
ly interpreted as the sacrament of God's salvation in the created world 
(Schillebeeckx 1989). In the church as sacrament, the compartmentalisation of 
the Christian faith and autonomous morality has been cut through. 
In connection with this conclusion, the criticism voiced by political theology, 
in particular liberation theology, of the project of ethics of autonomy (Con-
cilium 1984, no. 2) can be placed in a motivational context. According to 
political theology, the demarcation between religion and ethics in ethics of 
autonomy leads to a loss of social relevance of religion. Politics and economics 
are steered through an autonomous, technical rationality (reason of state, 
market forces), on which the religious normative principles of freedom, 
equality, universality and solidarity appear to have no longer any influence. 
From a political-theological point of view, ethics of autonomy can be inter-
preted ideology-critically as a reproduction within the religious consciousness 
of the autonomy of politics and economics. The implication of this ideological 
reproduction is that religion does not motivate believers to a liberating social 
praxis in solidarity with others. Consequently, believers threaten to lapse into a 
depoliticised and privatised religion, which confirms the social irrelevance of 
religion (Metz 1977). This research shows that believers spontaneously break 
through the demarcation between religion and politics in their ecclesiological 
peace attitudes, thereby correcting the tendency towards depoliticisation in 
ethics of autonomy. 
A third conclusion concerns Auer's distinction between the integrating, 
stimulating and critical functions of religion and their relationship to motiv-
ation. These functions have not been operationalised and measured in this 
research, so no direct empirical conclusions can be drawn regarding them. But 
there are some results which put Auer's theory of the three functions into 
sharp perspective. It must be noted that Auer discusses the three functions 
with respect to the Christian message in general, without differentiating 
between individual religious concepts. It remains unclear, because of this, 
whether the three functions must be interpreted as characteristics of each and 
every Christian religious concept, so that every concept has the three functions, 
or whether each function is related to specific religious concepts, so that some 
concepts have an integrating function, others a stimulating and still others a 
critical one. Our research revealed, however, that there are many religious 
peace attitudes which have no motivational effect on peace action at all. Here 
it is a question neither of religious integration of the ethical, nor of stimulation 
or criticism. Auer's contention that the Christian kerygma has an integrating, 
stimulating and critical function with regard to morality asserts too much. Only 
part of the kerygma can be said to have these functions. 
A second empirical observation which puts Auer's theory into perspective is 
the negative motivational effect of some religious peace attitudes. Religious 
peace attitudes which have a negative motivational effect are absolute tran-
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scendent hamartiology and the competence of the church in the matter of war 
and peace. These motivationally negative attitudes form a problem for Auer's 
theory. They show that the Christian religion can also fulfil a morally "disinte-
grating", "de-stimulating" and "de-criticising" function. Auer's theory does not 
take this into account. Rather, his theory of the three ethical functions of the 
Christian faith is based on a selection of Christian religious conceptions which 
correspond to the humanist ethical ideals of the "optimally succeeded human-
ity" (Auer 1977, 33). The motivational functions of integration, stimulation and 
criticism ascribed by Auer to the Christian religion are extracted from an 
eschatologically orientated immanent transcendent soteriology, which Auer 
adopts and on which he concentrates his argument (Auer 1971, 189-197). 
However justifiable this choice may be from a theological standpoint, it 
detracts from the scholarly quality of theological motivation theory. From the 
point of view of scientific clarity and comprehensiveness, it is advisable to 
replace the suggestive terminology of the integrating, stimulating and critical 
function of religion with the motivation-theoretical terminology of a concept-
ual, perceptual and attributive charge. This charge can be positive, neutral or 
negative. A positive motivational charge corresponds to the interrelated 
functions designated by Auer as integration, stimulation and criticism. 
6.2.3 Promoting the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis 
Religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis is regulated from within by the 
normative principles of freedom, equality, universality and solidarity. On the 
basis of these inner norms religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis has a 
transformative, motivating power (Van der Ven 1990, 76-88). Hermeneutical-
communicative praxis motivates believers to renewing praxis within the 
structures and relations of the world. The research into peace action has 
shown how religious peace attitudes contribute to renewal and transformation 
of action, towards promoting peace. The theological aim of this study is 
founded upon the transformative, motivating intentions of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis. The theological aim is: 
the clarification of the promotion of the motivational function of religious 
hermeneutical-communicative praxis, with a view to its transformation in accord-
ance with the normative principles of freedom, equality, universality and solidarity. 
Based on the results of the research three conclusions can be drawn about the 
way in which the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-communicat-
ive praxis, by virtue of its normative principles, can be promoted. These 
conclusions relate on the one hand to the theological structure and on the other 
to the theological content of hermeneutical-communicative praxis. 
With regard to the theological structure of hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis a conclusion can be drawn from the relative simplexity of the religious 
peace attitudes measured. Believers recognise in general the principal distinc-
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tions within the theological structures, but they often miss the nuances of the 
sub-distinctions. Obviously an ability to make precise conceptual distinctions is 
an intellectual virtue for the theologian, as for any scholar, but there is a 
difference between precise conceptualising and losing oneself in hairsplitting. If 
theology, as a practical-critical hermeneutics of the Christian tradition, wishes 
to contribute to the transformative, motivating force of hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis, it must gear its concepts and theories to the relative 
simplexity of the religious attitudes of believers. Empirical-theological research 
can help theology to determine the degree of multiplexity of empirical religious 
attitudes. This does not mean that empiricism dominates theology. As an 
interpretation of faith, theology also has the function of monitoring the quality 
of hermeneutical-communicative praxis, of correcting simplifications, and of 
conducting explorations aimed at the renewal of hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis. Theology, however, can only fulfil these functions when it remains 'on 
speaking terms' with the hermeneutical-communicative praxis of believers. 
As regards theological content, two conclusions can be drawn. In the first 
place the study shows that not all elements of the Christian message have a 
motivational effect on peace action. In relation to the specific character of a 
moral problem area, believers select the most suitable elements from the 
content of the Christian religion in order to derive a motivation to action from 
them. In relation to the social issue of war and peace, in which anxiety and 
abhorrence of war and armament play an important role, it is particularly 
ecclesiological and hamartiological elements which suggest themselves as a 
suitable motivational background. The church is the link between faith and 
society; hamartiology is the theological chapter in which the experience of the 
evils of war and armament are interpreted religiously. From a theological point 
of view it is soteriology in particular which must be considered as an important 
motivational background to peace action. In this study, however, little variance 
among the sub-groups in the field of soteriology could be discovered. 
It is probable that the motivational selection of religious content by 
believers has a chiefly pre-reflective, intuitive character. If the assumption is 
correct that the motivational function of religious hermeneutical-communicat-
ive praxis takes place as an intuitive, problem-steered selection of motivational 
elements from the content of the Christian faith, theology can contribute to 
this motivational function by guiding the intuitions of believers reflectively. By 
means of empirical-theological research theology can gain an insight into the 
way in which believers make choices within the content of the Christian faith. 
It can evaluate these selections in the light of the normative principles of 
religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis, and reinforce or criticise them 
theologically. 
In the second place, the study shows that some religious peace attitudes 
have a positive and others a negative motivational effect on peace action. 
Empirically it appears that especially immanent transcendent hamartiology and 
critical peace ecclesiology contribute to the motivation to peace action, 
whereas absolute transcendent hamartiology reduces the motivation to peace 
action. Guided by the normative principles of freedom, equality, universality 
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and solidarity, peace action is a concrete manifestation of the transformative, 
motivating force which is inherent in religious hermeneutical-communicative 
praxis. As a critical-reflective body within the religious hermeneutical-com-
municative praxis, theology has the task of promoting this transformative, 
motivating force. This means that theology has the task of promoting religious 
attitudes which contribute to the motivation to peace action and of criticising 
attitudes which detract from it. In fact, theology should adopt the line of 
immanent transcendent hamartiology and critical peace ecclesiology. It should 
reflect this line in a critical-hermeneutical way and further elucidate it for 
believers in an adequate conceptualisation. From the viewpoint of the 
transformative orientation of religious hermeneutical-communicative praxis, 
believers should be taught to interpret the evil of war in a religious way as a 
manifestation of institutional sin and to see the church as a social-critical 
institution, which does not avoid its commitment to justice and peace even 
when confrontations with politics and tensions within the church are unavoid-
able. Believers should also be taught not to link the evils of injustice, violence 
and war in absolute transcendent theodicy-constructions with the image of a 
God who intervenes in the world to punish or instruct. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 
The survey population of this research consists of members of three Dutch 
church peace movements and members of three Dutch denominations, not 
active in a church peace movement. As far as the church peace movements are 
concerned, the survey population is defined as the members of the three 
largest Dutch peace movements which have a local group structure: The 
Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad: IKV), The Inter-
church Committee on Bilateral Disarmament (Interkerkelijk Comité Twee-
zijdige Ontwapening: ICTO) and the Mission, Development and Peace groups, 
which exist within the Roman Catholic Church (Missie, Ontwikkeling en 
Vredesgroepen: MOV). Strictly speaking, IKV-activists are not members of the 
IKV. IKV is not an association. IKV-activists are associated with local IKV-
groups, which form an informal structure within the IKV. For the sake of 
brevity, however, the volunteers of local IKV-groups will here be referred to as 
'IKV-members'. As far as the denominations are concerned, the survey 
population is defined as the members of the three largest Christian denomi-
nations in the Netherlands: the Roman Catholic Church, The Netherlands 
Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. Together, 
these churches make up for 94% of the Dutch Christian population (Peters & 
Schreuder 1987, 14). In order to avoid overlap between the two populations, 
the population of church members was limited to those members who were not 
simultaneously a member of a peace movement. This population is referred to 
as the 'non-members'. 
Members of church peace movements are mostly closely related to the 
church (cf. section 2.7). It may be assumed, therefore, that most of the 
members of church peace movements are either modal church members 
(regular church goers) or core members (active volunteers in church life). In 
order to acquire optimal conditions for comparing the groups of church peace 
activists and non-members, it was decided to match the two groups with 
respect to their church relatedness. This means that the population of non-
members was limited to only the modal and core members of the church. An 
overview of the sizes of the six subpopulations (in the year 1988) is presented 
in table A.l. The numbers regarding the members of the church peace 
movement are based on information provided by the secretariats of IKV and 
ICTO, and by Diocesan Mission Secretariats, for MOV. The numbers 
regarding non-members result from a computation of the numbers of core 
members and modal members of the three denominations, based on data of 
the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics and the SOCON-research 
(Centraal bureau voor de Statistiek 1988, 112; Peters & Schreuder 1987, 14), 
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after which the (relatively small) numbers of members of peace movements 
have been substracted from each denomination, on the basis of table 4.1.7 
(Appendix C). 
























At the end of 1987, a procedure for the construction of the sample and the 
approach of respondents was started. The sample had to meet two main 
criteria. Firstly, the sample had to cover all six sub-groups of the research 
population: the members of the IKV, MOV-groups, ICTO and the members of 
the Roman Catholic Church, the Netherlands Reformed Church and the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. Secondly, the sample had to be 
constructed in such a way that statistical comparisons between the six sub-
populations could be made. This required a matching of sample elements from 
the six groups, on certain relevant criteria. 
Both criteria suggested a multi-stage stratified sample as the most appropri-
ate sampling procedure for our research. Stratification is a means of using 
knowledge about the population to increase the precision of a sample (Moser 
& Kalton 1971). It was known that the survey population consisted of the six 
sub-populations mentioned above. To each of these sub-populations a stratum 
was assigned in the sample, that is to say a certain fraction of the total number 
of sample cases. Statistically, it is not necessary that the strata of a sample 
should all be equal in size, nor is it necessary to have equal sampling fractions 
for all strata. In order to be able to discover statistically significant differences 
between the sub-population, the number of cases in each stratum must not, 
however, be too small (at least 30). Besides, financial restrictions limited the 
maximum number of respondents in the sample to about 300. 
The proportion between the number of peace activists and the number of 
non-members was set at 60 : 40%. This unequal division was based on the 
expectation that the strata of the peace activists would be denominationally 
mixed, in a way that could not be fully predicted. In order to be able to 
compare peace activists and non-members on denominational characteristics, 
the various denominations would have to be sufficiently represented in the 
stratum of peace activists as well. To ensure this, the stratum of peace activists 
should not be too small. The same consideration also guided the proportional 
division within the stratum of peace activists, which was set at 4 : 3 : 2, for 
IKV, ICTO and MOV respectively. These proportions reflect the multiformity 
of the peace movements from a denominational point of view. MOV-members 
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are nearly all Roman Catholics; ICTO-members mostly belong to Protestant 
denominations, although in the Catholic South of the country also Catholic 
ICTO-members can be found; IKV-members are of all denominations, but the 
denominational composition of IKV-groups varies according to the geographi­
cal distribution of the denominations over the country. On the side of the non-
members, the denominational characteristics of the strata were fixed in 
advance, so their proportions could be kept equal. There is of course a small 
group of church-related peace activists who do not belong to any of the larger 
three denominations but to one of the many smaller protestant denominations, 
or who have no connenction with a church. Expecting this number to be 
relatively small it was decided not to match for the membership of minor 
protestant denominations or non-denominationality (See table 4.1.7 for the 
proportions in the finally obtained sample of members of a church peace 
movement who are not a member of one of the larger three denominations). 
The final composition of the intended sample which resulted from these 
decisions is indicated in table A.2. 
Table A.2 Intended sample (in rounded percentages) 





























Next, a multi-stage sampling procedure was applied to the six strata. In multi­
stage sampling, the research population is divided into a hierarchy of sampling 
units of different sizes and types. Going down the hierarchy, the population is 
split up into ever smaller units, until finally the level of atomic units, (individ­
ual respondents in our case) is reached. By making a sample at each stage (a 
sample of a sample et cetera), the final result of a multi-stage sample is equal 
to a random selection of sample elements (Moser & Kalton, 106). The crucial 
advantage of multi-stage sampling over random sampling is a concentration of 
sample cases, and consequently a concentration of the fieldwork, which saves 
time and money. In our research, a three-stage sampling procedure was 
followed. To ensure full representativeness, sampling should have been random 
at all three stages. For various reasons, however, it was necessary to 
compromise between the criterion of representativeness and other relevant 
criteria. 
At the first stage, five Dutch provinces (out of fourteen) were selected. 
They were not selected at random, but on the grounds of their proximity to 
Nijmegen, the location of the research, in combination with their denomina-
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tional characteristics. The provinces selected were Gelderland, Utrecht, Zuid-
Holland, Noord-Brabant and Limburg. This is roughly the south, middle and 
west of the Netherlands. 
At the second stage, local peace groups, parishes and congregations were 
selected in the five provinces. At this stage, the matching of peace groups to 
parishes and congregations had to be taken care of. As there are many more 
parishes and congregations in the Netherlands than local peace groups, these 
local peace groups had to be selected first. IKV- and ICTO-groups were 
selected from complete lists, provided by the secretariats of IKV and ICTO. A 
complete list of MOV-groups was not available. MOV-groups were therefore 
selected from incomplete lists, drawn up by the Diocesan Mission Secretariats 
(and the Bureau for International Solidarity, for the Province of Limburg), 
who function as service institutes to the MOV-groups. Because peace groups 
are relatively scarce and small in rural areas, it was decided to limit the scope 
of the research to urban and urbanized rural areas. The selection of 
municipalities on the grounds of their degree of urbanization was carried out 
in conformity with the categorisation of the Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 1983, 9-11). On the grounds of 
the CBS-typology, a distinction was made between urbanized rural 
municipalities (types Bl, B2) and urban municipalities (types CI - C5). Peace 
groups were selected from both types of municipalities, in equal proportions. 
After the local peace groups had been selected, a matching procedure was 
followed for the selection of parishes and congregations. Matching was applied 
to the characteristics of region, degree of urbanization and denomination. 
Matching for region and degree of urbanization was done by selecting parishes 
and congregations from the same municipalities that the previously selected 
peace groups came from. If more than one parish or congregation existed in a 
municipality, a random choice was made. Matching for denomination was done 
by questioning the contact persons of the local peace groups about the denom-
inational characteristics of their group. On the grounds of this information, a 
denominationally matching local church was selected. 
At the third sampling stage, individual members of local peace groups, 
parishes and congregations were selected. Subscription forms were made, by 
means of which respondents could declare themselves willing to participate in 
the research. In the case of the peace movements, the subscription forms were 
distributed among the members of local peace groups by the contact persons 
of the selected groups, mostly the chairman or the secretary. In the case of 
non-members the forms were distributed by the contact persons of the selected 
local churches, mostly a pastor. The selection of non-members was complicated 
by our restriction of the research population to modal and core members of 
the church. For their selection we could not do without the pastors' personal 
acquaintance with individual church members. They were asked to give out 
subscription forms to only those church members which they knew as modal or 
core members. The pastors were also asked to make sure that only church 
members not active in peace movements would be invited for the survey. 
The cooperation of both the contact persons of peace groups and pastors 
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was good. Of the 86 local peace groups that were contacted, 23 did not 
participate. Only in three cases this was due to a lack of interest in the survey. 
In four cases, the selected group appeared to be still in a process of formation 
and in 16 cases the group was already in a state of disintegration. Of the 49 
pastors contacted, six did not participate. Two pastors were not interested in 
the subject and four appeared to have retired. 
In all, 569 subscription forms were sent to local peace groups and 492 to 
pastors. 221 members of peace groups and 187 non-membert, agreed to take 
part in the survey, by returning the subscription form (free of post charge). Of 
these 408 potential respondents, 326 were finally selected for the survey on the 
grounds of stratification- and matching criteria (193 from local peace groups 
and 133 from local churches). 
The addresses of the respondents were divided among 30 interviewers 
(social science students from the universities of Nijmegen, Leiden, Tilburg and 
Utrecht, experienced in interviewing). The interviewers received a two-hour 
training on the specific features of the questionnaire. The interviews were held 
with the respondents at home, in February and March 1988. The average 
duration of the interviews was one hour and a half. 
Of the 326 respondents selected, 306 were interviewed. The mortality was 
composed as follows: seven people were unwilling to participate after all; five 
were unable to participate, for private reasons; in three cases, no contact with 
the respondent could be made by the interviewer; five interviews could not be 
held before the deadline of the fieldwork. 
All incoming questionnaires were immediately checked for errors. When 
necessary, interviewers were corrected on systematic mistakes. As a matter of 
routine, it was also checked samplewise among 30 respondents whether they 
had really been interviewed, which was indeed the case. 
Of the 306 completed questionnaires, 302 were finally admitted to statistical 
analysis. One questionnaire had to be refused because too many data were 
lacking, three had to be left out because the respondents appeared to be peace 
activists outside the range of the survey population. Table A.3 registers the 
numerical composition of the finally obtained sample. 






























In April 1988, the collected data were entered into the computer at the 
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Nijmegen University Computer Centre. A random sample of 60 questionnaires 
was checked for data entry errors. No systematic errors were found. The error 
rate appeared to be satisfactorily low: less than .05%. 
Recapitulating, the following can be said about the sampling. The sample is 
a multi-stage stratified sample, from the non-rural south, middle and west of 
the Netherlands, aimed at the members of the church peace movements IKV, 
MOV and ICTO on the one hand, and members of the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Netherlands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the 
Netherlands on the other. The respondents selected from these six groups are 
matched with regard to their place of residence. Their social-geographic 
context is therefore identical. In the design of the sample, care has been taken 
to mirror region and denomination. No decisive answer can be given as to the 
representativeness of the sample with regard to other characteristics. What is 
important, however, is that after the multi-stage stratified sampling procedure, 
each member of a peace movement and each non-member had the chance to 




TABLES TO CHAPTER 3 
This appendix reports the probabilistic scalogram-analyses and factor-analyses which have 
been conducted. The following criteria have been observed in the factor-analyses: 
- PA2 (SPSSX) has been used; 
- listwise deletion of missing values was applied; 
- for admission to a factor, an item has to meet the following criteria: 
- correlation ä .30 with at least one other item of the factor; 
- communality S .20; 
- factor loading S .40; 
- the item must clearly belong to one factor and not have high factor loadings on 
other factors. 
- the Eigenvalue of the factor must be S 1; 
- oblique rotation was applied when two or more factors correlated S .30, in other 
cases orthogonal rotation was used. 
- Cronbach's alpha was computed for each factor, to assess the reliability (alpha S .60) 
of the scales. 






q. 006 1 
q. 005 1 
q. 007 1 
q. 004 1 
q. 002 1 
Frequencies: 
code value label 
0 no actions 
1 one action 
2 two actions 
3 three actions 
4 four actions 




























Table 3.2 Factor-analysis conceptions of peace 
(a) Factor-analysis functionality of nuclear deterrence and approaches to nuclear 
disarmament 
factors 
1 2 3 h2 
q. 113 .93 .86 
q. 129 .91 .83 
q. 105 .89 .79 
q. 127 .84 .71 
q. 102 .79 .62 
q. 115 -.77 .60 
q. 107 .75 .57 
q. 109 -.74 .56 
q. 123 -.73 .55 
q. 132 .68 .46 
q. 114 .67 .46 
q. Ill .93 .87 
q. 120 .91 .83 
q. 103 .79 .64 
q. 124 .92 .85 
q. 118 .91 .84 
q. 112 .91 .83 
q. 104 .86 .74 
Factor 1 = Functionality of nuclear deterrence (NUCLARM) 
Factor 2 = Gradual unilateral nuclear disarmament (UNILAT) 
Factor 3 = Gradual bilateral nuclear disarmament (BILAT) 
Cumulative explained variance: 70.1% 
Correlations between factors: 
2 -.67 
3 .77 -.63 
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(b) Factor-analysis NATO-affiliation 
factors 
1 h2 
q. 126 .88 .77 
q. 108 .87 .76 
q. 117 .85 .73 
q. 101 .85 .72 
q. 121 .82 .67 
q. 131 -.80 .63 
q. 133 -.65 .43 
Factor 1 = Nato-affiliation (NATO) 
Explained variance: 67.3% 
(c) Factor-analysis international cooperation for peace 
factors 
1 2 h2 
q. 125 .83 .58 
q. 110 .71 .49 
q. 119 -.68 .40 
q. 130 -.63 .39 
q. 116 .83 .52 
q. 106 .73 .45 
q. 122 .66 .37 
q. 128 -.58 .29 
Factor 1 = Peace through development aid (DEVELOP) 
Factor 2 = Peace through civil contacts with Eastern Europe (EASTWEST) 
Cumulative explained variance: 50.9% 
Correlation between factors: .58 
















































Factor 1 = Comparative concern about armament (COMPCONC) 
Factor 2 = Concern about armament (CONCARM) 
Factor 3 = Relative importance of armament problem (RELIMP) 
Cumulative explained variance: 58.0% 
Correlations between factors: 
1 2 
2 .38 
3 .39 .54 
Table 3.4 Factor-analysis attributions regarding armament 




























Factor 1 = Optimism about the attainability of world peace (OPTIMISM) 
Explained variance: 57.1% 










































































Factor 1 = Controllability of armament 
(CONTRARM) 
Factor 2 = Knowlegde about armament 
(ARMKNOW) 
Cumulative explained variance: 53.0% 
Correlations between factors: .54 
Table 3.5 Factor-analysis hamartiological dimensions of transcendence 
factors 
1 2 3 4 5 h2 
q. 432 .84 .72 
q. 407 .81 .69 
q. 404 .80 .75 
q. 426 .76 .80 
q. 403 .74 .71 
q. 423 .74 .66 
q. 402 .72 .66 
q. 419 .72 .77 
q. 420 .69 .55 
q. 414 -.39 .30 
q. 416 .85 .79 
q. 429 .79 .67 
q. 410 .76 .74 
q. 433 .75 .63 
q. 411 .70 .58 
q. 430 -.55 .35 
q. 413 .80 .56 
q. 405 .72 .54 
q. 422 .70 .76 
q. 421 .70 .51 
q. 406 .62 .69 
q. 431 .58 .55 
q. 424 .83 .75 
q. 425 .81 .68 
q. 415 .75 .68 
q. 409 .72 .57 
q. 408 .68 .60 
q. 417 .56 .47 
q. 427 .83 .73 
q. 418 .78 .72 
q. 401 .75 .63 
Factor 1 = War in relation to God (HAMGOD) 
Factor 2 = War as manifestation of institutional sin (HAMINST) 
Factor 3 = War as manifestation of historical sin (HAMHIST) 
Factor 4 = Apocalyptic thinking about war (HAMAPOC) 
Factor 5 = War in radical relation to higher demonic powers (HAMPOWER) 
Cumulative explained variance: 59.3% 
Correlations between factors: 
1 2 3 4 
2 -.23 
3 -.36 -.14 
4 -.53 -.11 .36 
5 -.45 -.02 .36 .40 
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Factor 1 = hamartiological solidarity (HAMSOLID) 
Factor 2 = hamartiological privatization (HAMPRIV) 
Cumulative explained variance: 66.1% 
Correlation between factors: -.45 
Table 3.7 Factor-analysis soteriological dimensions of transcendence and human subject 
of soteriology 
factors 
1 2 3 4 5 h2 
q. 527 .86 .79 
q. 529 .84 .76 
q. 524 .82 .73 
q. 526 .80 .73 
q. 523 .79 .73 
q. 530 .78 .66 
q. 519 .80 .70 
q. 513 .80 .71 
q. 520 .78 .68 
q. 504 .78 .66 
q. 511 .77 .67 
q. 506 .69 .63 
q. 510 .85 .75 
q. 517 .80 .68 
q. 503 .75 .56 
q. 512 .75 .70 
q. 518 .73 .68 
q. 505 .72 .66 
q. 516 .84 .82 
q. 509 .80 .81 
q. 502 .77 .73 
q. 525 .76 .73 
q. 528 .74 .73 
q. 522 .71 .70 
q. 501 .56 .42 
q. 515 .50 .46 
q. 514 .88 .76 
q. 521 .88 .77 
q. 507 .79 .68 
Factor 1 = Peace as imitation of Christ (PEACH R) 
Factor 2 = Soteriological privatization (SOTPRIV) 
Factor 3 = Peace as task from God (PEATASK) 
Factor 4 = Peace as absolute gift of God (PEAGIFT) 
Factor 5 = Soteriological solidarity (SOTSOLID) 
Cumulative explained variance: 64.9% 















Tabic 3.8 Factor-analysis legitimacy of church peace praxis 
factors 
1 h2 
q. 630 -.80 .66 
q. 629 -.79 .65 
q. 601 .78 .63 
q. 602 .75 .57 
q. 614 .74 .55 
q. 615 .73 .53 
q. 603 .72 .64 
q. 631 -.72 .56 
q. 616 .66 .59 
q. 610 -.63 .43 
Factor 1 = Legitimacy of church peace praxis (ECCLEGIT) 
Explained variance: 53.8% 
Table 3.9 Factor-analysis content of church peace praxis 
factors 
1 2 h2 
q. 622 .84 .74 
q. 621 .81 .75 
q. 607 .80 .72 
q. 608 .78 .65 
q. 613 -.77 .59 
q. 611 -.73 .57 
q. 626 .72 .51 
q. 627 -.68 .54 
q. 605 .64 .47 
q. 612 .57 .39 
q. 633 53 .32 
q. 620 -.47 .31 
q. 604 .85 .53 
q. 617 .82 .53 
q. 625 -.41 .22 
Factor 1 = Politically critical peace praxis of the church (ECCRIT) 
Factor 2 = Conformity of church members to church statements on war and peace 
(ECCONF) 
Cumulative explained variance: 50.8% 
Correlation between factors: -.04 
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Table 3.10 Factor-analysis influence of church peace praxis 
factors 
1 2 3 h2 
q. 606 .85 .55 
q. 619 .82 .55 
q. 635 -.59 .36 
q. 634 -.89 .50 
q. 623 .73 .46 
q. 609 -.50 .22 
q. 624 .80 .43 
q. 628 -.63 .33 
q. 632 .62 .31 
Factor 1 = Influence of the church on politicians (ECCPOL) 
Factor 2 = Competence of the church (ECCOMP) 
Factor 3 = Influence of the church on public opinion (ECCPUB) 
Cumulative explained variance: 53.7% 
Correlations between factors: 
1 2 
2 -.21 
3 .48 -.31 
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code value labels cases % 
0 no political actions 6 2.0 
1 one political action 13 4.3 
2 two political actions 119 39.4 
3 three political actions 86 28.5 
4 four political actions 42 13.9 
5 five political actions 36 11.9 
Table 3.12 Frequencies degree of church relatedness (CHURCHREL) 
Category: 
Second generation non-member 
First generation non-member 
(never been church member) 




































































Factor 1 = Belief in a personal God (PERSGOD) 
Factor 2 = Religious immanentism (RELIMM) 
Factor 3 = Belief in the a-personal divine (DIVINE) 
Cumulative explained variance: 47.6% 
Correlations between factors: 
1 2 
2 -.36 
3 -.44 .03 






















Factor 1 = Saliency of worldview (SALIENCY) 
Percentage of explained variance: 52.9 
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Table 3.15 Factor-analysis organization of the church 
factors 
1 2 3 h2 
q. 831 -.74 .55 
q. 834 -.73 .46 
q. 838 -.72 .50 
q. 827 .67 .43 
q. 826 -.59 .34 
q. 830 .47 .22 
q. 829 .70 .41 
q. 835 .65 .33 
q. 836 .61 .39 
q. 828 .52 .27 
q. 825 .91 .69 
q. 837 .89 .71 
q. 833 -.74 .55 
Factor 1 = Democratic decision-making in the church (CHURDEM) 
Factor 2 = Openness of the church vis-à-vis society (CHURSOC) 
Factor 3 = Priesthood of believers (CHURLAY) 
Cumulative explained variance: 49.9% 
Correlations between factors: 
2 .26 
3 .62 34 
Table 3.16 Factor-analysis tasks of the church 
factors 
1 2 3 h2 
q. 847 .79 .46 
q. 851 .63 .35 
q. 843 .56 .33 
q. 846 .78 .51 
q. 844 .76 .52 
q. 843 .75 .48 
q. 849 .69 .44 
q. 848 .76 .55 
q. 840 .75 .50 
q. 850 .67 .44 
q. 841 .54 .32 
q. 845 .44 .31 
Factor 1 = Group-directed tasks of the church (TASKGRO) 
Factor 2 = Person-directed tasks of the church (TASKPER) 
Factor 3 = Socio-political tasks of the church (TASKSOC) 
Cumulative explained variance: 50.4% 
Correlations between factors: 
2 -.31 
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APPENDIX С 
TABLES TO CHAPTER 4 
Tables 4.1 members' description 
Table 4.1.1 Analysis of variance. Independent variable is MEMBER. Groups: IKV, 









weak modest strong 
<.25 .25-.39 >.39 
Communicative peace action 
PEACEACT 175 .00 .55 
Motivation to peace action 




















































Religious peace attitudes 


































weak modest strong 
<.25 .25-39 >.39 
HAMPRIV 174 





























































































Tables 4.1.2 - 4.1.6 Crosstabulations MEMBER (groups: IKV, MOV, ICTO) by AGE, 
GENDER, EDUCATION, CLASS, VOTE, and DENOM 




























































Chi-square: 30.93 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .30 













































Chi-square: 17.08 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .31 
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Chi-square: 5.24 Significance: .51 (ns) 




























































Chi-square: 13.78 Significance: .01 Cramers V: .20 
















































(Chi-square and Cramers V not computable) 


































































Chi-square: 40.20 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .35 
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Tables 4.2 Non-members' description 
Table 4.2.1 Analysis of variance. Independent variable is NON-MEMBER. Groups: 1 = 
Roman Catholic Church, 2 = Netherlands Reformed Church, 3 = Reformed Churches 
in the Netherlands. Significance level = .05. 
criterion 
variable 
number of mean per categorie signifi­
cases (Ν) 1 
Communicative peace action 





weak modest strong 
<.25 .25-.39 >.39 
Motivation to peace action 











































































Religious peace attitudes 













































































Table 4.2.1 continued 
criterion number of mean per categorie 
variable cases (N) 1 2 3 
ecclesiological peace attitudes 
signin- degree of 
canee (Ρ) association (èta): 
weak modest strong 





















































































































Tables 4.2.2 - 4.2.6 Crosstabulations. NON-MEMBER (groups: Roman Catholic Church, 
Netherlands Reformed Church, Reformed Churches in the Netherlands) by AGE, 
GENDER, EDUCATION, CLASS and VOTE. 
































































Chi-square: 4.10 Significance: .39 (ns) 

















































Chi-square: .41 Significance: .81 (ns) 
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Chi-square: 14.90 Significance: .02 Cramers V: .24 
































































Chi-square: 1.55 Significance: .82 (ns) 
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t o t a l 
112 
100.0 
Chi-square: : 3.43 Significance: .18 (ns) 
Tables 4.3 Overall description 
Table 4.3.1 Analysis of variance. Independent variable is SUBGROUP. Groups: IKV, 
MOV, ICTO, non-member. Observed significance level = .05. For means of subgroups, 
see table 4.3.2. 
criterion number of 
variable cases (N) 







weak modest strong 
<.25 .25-.39 >.39 
.72 
Motivation to peace action 



















































Religious peace attitudes 





























Table 4.3.1 continued 
criterion number of 
variable cases (N) 




























weak modest strong 




















































Table 4.3.2 Multiple comparison (Scheffé's test). The independent variable is SUB-
GROUP. Groups: 1 = IKV; 2 = MOV; 3 = ICTO; 4 = NON-MEMBERS 
Legenda: 
# = significant difference between two peace movements 
* = significant difference between a peace movement and non-members 
Communicative peace action 
PEACEACT 
X = 1.85 N = 302 
4 3 2 
1 3.66 * # # 
2 2.32 * 
3 1.58 * 
4 .54 
Motivation to peace action 
Conceptions of peace 
NUCLARM 
X = 2.61 N = 301 
1 2 4 
3 3.80 # # * 




X = 3.71 N = 300 
3 4 
1 4.38 # * 
2 4.08 # * 
4 3.58 * 
3 2.50 
BILAT 
X = 3.00 N = 301 
1 2 4 
3 4.16 # # * 
4 3.23 * 
2 2.77 # 
1 2.13 
NATO 
X = 2.93 N = 299 
1 2 4 
3 4.15 # # * 
4 3.21 * * 
2 2.50 # 
1 2.01 
DEVELOP 
X = 3.86 N = 300 
3 4 
2 4.27 # * 
1 4.26 # * 
4 3.74 * 
3 3.15 
EASTWEST 
X = 4.25 N = 302 
3 4 
1 4.49 # * 
2 4.43 # 
4 4.19 
3 3.87 
Perceptions of armament 
CONCARM 
X = 3.73 N = 300 
3 4 
1 4.12 # * 




X = 2.99 N = 287 
4 3 2 
1 3.69 * # # 
2 3.19 * 
3 3.04 * 
4 2.38 
RELIMP 
X = 2.65 N = 300 
3 4 





Attributions regarding armament 
OPTIMISM 







































Religious peace attitudes 
Hamartiological attitudes regarding war 
HAMHIST 













































































N = 300 
1 
* 
Soteriological peace attitudes 
PEACHR 





N = 301 
PEATASK 





N = = 302 
PEAGIFT 















Ν = = 302 
SOTPRIV 











Ecclcsiological peace attitudes 
ECCLEGIT 
















































































































Χ = 3.05 Ν = 300 
3 
2 3.39 # 
1 3.13 # 
4 3.05 * 
3 2.66 
CHURLAY 
χ = 3.47 Ν = 296 
3 4 
1 4.02 # * 
2 3.95 # * 
4 3.27 * 
3 2.67 
TASKGRO 
Χ = 3.29 Ν = 301 
3 
2 3.47 # 




χ = 4.15 Ν = 300 
3 
2 4.32 # 




Χ = 3.51 Ν = 301 
3 
2 3.79 # 
1 3.64 # 
4 3.56 * 
3 2.98 
TASKPER 
Χ = 3.29 Ν = 301 
1 
2 3.75 # 




Χ = 3.55 Ν = 301 
3 4 2 





Χ = 2.87 Ν = 302 
3 4 
1 3.21 # * 




Tables 4.3.3 - 4.3.7 Crosstabulations. SUBGROUP (groups: IKV, MOV, ІСГО, NON-
MEMBER) by AGE, GENDER, EDUCATION, CLASS and VOTE. 









































































Chi-square: 34.07 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .24 























































Chi-square: 19.88 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .26 
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Chi-square: 16.01 Significance: .07 (ns) 









































































Chi-square: 26.96 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .22 





























































Chi-square: 163.55 Significance: .00 Cramers V: .55 
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APPENDIX D 
TABLES TO CHAPTER 5 























Factor 1 = change oriented conceptions of peace (CHANGE) 
Explained variance = 58.9% 














Factor 1 = Control of armament (CONTROL) 
Explained variance = 53% 














Factor 1 = Absolute transcendent hamartiology (ATRHAM) 
Explained variance = 58.1% 
Tables 5.4 - 5.5 Regression-analysis. Significant direct effects. In the columns the 
dependent, in the rows the independent variables (categories); blank = not significant (p 
2 .05, N = 220). 
Table 5.4 Significant direct effects on membership of a peace movement and on com-










social political activity 
location denomination RCC 










peace eccleslology CR1TECL 
attitudes ECCPOL 
ECCOMF 
motivation conception CHANGE 




of peace MOV 
movement ICTO 
NON-MEMBER 














































































Table 5.5 Significant direct effects on motivation to peace action: conceptions of peace, 
perceptions of armament and attributions regarding armament 










social political activity 
location denomination RCC 










peace «celes lology CRITECL 
attitudes ECCPOL 
ECCOMP 































































The following measuring instrument is an English translation of an originally Dutch 
questionnaire.' The questions are presented here in a logical order, based on the 
regression-model of figure 5.1: 
peace action (001-009) 
conceptions of peace (101-133) 
perceptions of armaments (201-216) 
attributions regarding armaments (301-331) 
hamartiological attitudes regarding war (401-442) 
soteriological peace attitudes (501-530) 
ecclesiological peace attitudes (601-635) 
social location of peace action (701-851) 
Items marked by an asterisk have been kept out of the Final analyses, for statistical 
reasons. 
Peace action (001-009) 
Membership of peace movement (001) 
001a Are you at this moment a member of a working group or organization which is 
engaged in the peace problem? 
Answering alternatives: yes; no (exit 001). 
001b Of which working group or organization are you a member? (more than one 
answer possible) 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = Pax Christi 
2 = Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Interchurch Peace Council) 
3 = Missie- Ontwikkeling- en Vredesgroep (Mission-, Development- and Peace-
Group) 
4 = Interkerkelijk Comité Tweezijdige Ontwapening (Interchurch Cominee for 
Bilateral Disarmament) 
5 = others, namely: ... 
Communicative peace action (002-009) 
Can you indicate in which actions, related to 'war and peace', or 'armament and 
disarmament' you took part during the last year (1987)? 
Answering alternatives: yes; no; don't know (except for 009). 
A copy of the original questionnaire is available on written request from R.J.M. 
Jeurissen, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O.B. 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, 
The Netherlands. 
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002 I participated in discussion groups about war and peace. 
003* I attended religious services for peace. 
004 I participated in the preparation of the church peace week. 
005 I attended peace days or peace markets. 
006 I helped in the organization of peace days or peace markets. 
007 I have distributed or put up posters for peace. 
008* I have spread papers, pamphlets or broadsheets about war and peace. 
009* Other activities, namely: ... 
Motivation to peace action 
Conceptions of peace (101-133) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
101 The Netherlands can only be secure if they, being a member of NATO, conform 
to their bigger allies. 
102 At this moment, it is very unwise for the Western world to abolish their nuclear 
weapons. 
103 We in the West should make the first step towards a gradual reduction of nuclear 
weapons. 
104 The West can reduce its nuclear weapons only when sound disarmament treaties 
with the East Block have been concluded. 
105 Nuclear weapons are very important to our security. 
106 Contacts between citizens in East and West are very important for détente in 
Europe. 
107 We in the West should on no account let ourselves be tempted to abolish all our 
nuclear weapons. 
108 The Netherlands should leave NATO on no account. 
109 We in the West should abolish all our nuclear weapons at short notice. 
110 In order to obtain true peace in the world, we in the West should help the poor 
countries to fight against poverty. 
111 We in the West should make the first step towards gradual reduction of nuclear 
weapons in the world. 
112 The West can only reduce its nuclear weapons, when the East Block has signed 
sound nuclear disarmament treaties. 
113 Unfortunately, nuclear weapons are necessary for our security. 
114 The Western world may under on no account agree to total nuclear disarmament. 
115 In the present circumstances, the West can surely afford to abolish nuclear 
weapons. 
116 Contacts between citizens in East and West are very important for détente in 
Europe. 
117 The Netherlands, being a loyal member of NATO, can only be secure if they 
endorse the decisions of the other member states. 
118 The West can reduce its nuclear arms only after watertight disarmament treaties 
have been concluded with the East Block. 
119 However right Western efforts for the relief of poverty in the world may be, they 
won't bring about a more peaceful world. 
120 The West should make a first step on the road towards gradual abolition of the 
nuclear weapons in the world. 
121 The Netherlands must certainly not resign from NATO. 
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122 Contacts between Eastern and Western European citizens will make a consider-
able contribution to détente in Europe. 
123 Our nuclear weapons unnecessarily endanger our security. 
124 The West can only reduce its nuclear weapons, when the East Block has signed 
sound disarmament treaties. 
125 In order to obtain world peace, we in the West should help to reduce poverty in 
the world. 
126 As a loyal member of NATO, the Netherlands should keep in line with the other 
allies. 
127 Under the present circumstances, we in the West cannot abolish nuclear weapons. 
128 Contacts with citizens in Eastern Europe are not very important for political 
détente between East and West. 
129 Nuclear weapons simply cannot be dispensed with, with a view to our security. 
130 If the West makes greater efforts to reduce poverty, this will not lead to a more 
peaceful world. 
131 In due course, the Netherlands should leave NATO. 
132 The West should under no circumstances agree to total abolition of its nuclear 
weapons. 
133 Being a member of NATO, the Netherlands should simply put aside certain 
decisions of the greater member states. 
Perceptions of armament (201-216) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
201 I am more interested the issue of armament and disarmament than other people 
in my environment. 
202 I find armament and disarmament highly interesting topics. 
203 I don't feel at case in a world in which there are so many weapons. 
204 I am much more worried about all the weapons in the world than other people in 
my environment. 
205 I think that the threat of armament is a greater problem than all other problems 
in the world. 
206 I am more interested in armament and disarmament than most other people in 
the town where I live. 
207 I do not think that the armament in the world is a very serious problem. 
208 All these weapons in the world often give me a very uneasy feeling. 
209* There are many problems which are more serious than the arms issue. 
210 The issue of armament and disarmament appeals to me more than it does to most 
other people of my age. 
211* Many people do not realize how serious the question of armament and disarma-
ment is. 
212 When I think of all the arms in the world, I usually get a very depressed feeling. 
213 I am much more worried about all these weapons in the world than most other 
people of my age. 
214 As far as I'm concerned, the profusion of weapons is the most important problem 
in the world. 
215 People shouldn't upset themselves so much about armament and disarmament. 
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216 I am much more inclined to worry about the arms in the world than other people 
in my environment. 
Attributions regarding armament (301-331) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree, 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
301 Nobody is still able to put a stop to the armament processes in the world. 
302 When you join forces with your fellow-citizens, you can make progress in the 
course towards a world without weapons. 
303 One cannot possibly influence those politicians who make the decisions about 
armament in the world. 
304 Someone like me can have no influence on the number of weapons in the world. 
305 By joining a national peace organization, you can do something about the arms 
problem. 
306 I think that, as an individual, I cannot do anything about the arms problem. 
307 In the end, it will surely be possible to influence the decision-makers in the field 
of armament and disarmament. 
308 To me, the problem of armament and disarmament is totally intransparent. 
309 No one can stop the increase of arms in the world. 
310 In your own residence you can, together with others, make a contribution together 
the solution of the arms problem. 
311 Normally, you never have any hold on those who actually decide about armament 
and disarmament. 
312 By participating in a peace organization, you are able to do something about the 
arms problem. 
313 The increase of arms in the world can scarcely be stopped. 
314 Together with others in your environment you can make a contribution to 
disarmament, in your own modest way. 
315 As an individual, you stand entirely powerless against all these armament pro-
cesses in the world. 
316 People like myself have absolutely no understanding of such complicated matters 
as armament and disarmament. 
317 Even when you are active in a peace organization, there is nothing you can do 
about armament. 
318 Ultimately, you do have the means to influence politicians who decide about 
armament and disarmament. 
319 One shouldn't think that disarmament on a world-wide level can influenced by 
organizing something on the local level. 
320 For people like me, armament and disarmament arc issues too complicated to 
understand. 
321 By becoming a member of a peace organization you can really do something about 
the arms problem. 
322 Personally, I have little understanding of things as difficult as armament and 
disarmament. 
323 There is just nothing you yourself can do about the problems of armament and 
disarmament. 
324 Wars are just not avoidable in this world. 
325 One day, peace will be possible in this world. 
326 Ultimately, man can banish wars. 
327 Total peace is an unattainable goal in this world. 
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328 Mankind will never succeed in banishing wars. 
329 Ultimately, the people in this world will succeed in attaining peace. 
330 True peace will never be attained in this world. 
331 Ultimately, mankind will banish any form of war. 
Religious peace attitudes 
Hamartiological attitudes regarding war (401-442) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally unconvinced; 2 = unconvinced; 3 = not sure; 4 = 
convinced; 5 = totally convinced; 6 = never thought about. 
401 Wars are caused by a higher evil power which has humanity at its mercy. 
402 Wars are the result of a curse which God in the beginning has laid upon all 
mankind. 
403 Wars have a place in God's plan with the world. 
404 Wars are a way of God to make mankind repent. 
405 There are wars because evil, which has been in the world in the past, today still 
has a hold over mankind. 
406 Wars are the result of hereditary sin, which weighs heavily upon mankind. 
407 God punishes people by means of wars, because of the evil they committed. 
408 One day, God will Finally deal with his enemies in an ultimate war. 
409 The evil which is contained in the structure of this world must lead one day to an 
all-destroying war. 
410 Wars arise because faith in military security has turned to true idolatry. 
411 People are brought to war by the demonic power of armament. 
412* It is not right to think that wars Fit into God's plan with mankind. 
413 Wars arise because the evil which people have inflicted upon each other in the 
past leads to new evil today. 
414 Wars are certainly not a punishment of God for the sins of this world. 
415 One day, God will exterminate all evil in this world by means of a Final war. 
416 Wars arise because the belief in military security has been perverted nowadays 
into true idolatry. 
417 As things are in the present condition, a great war, which will destroy the earth, is 
inevitable. 
418 Wars are caused by a higher demonic power, which controls the world. 
419 Wars are the result of a curse which God has laid upon mankind in the beginning. 
420 Even wars take a place in God's great plan for the world. 
421 There are wars because the harm which people have done to each other in the 
past keeps leading to new evil today. 
422 Wars arise from original sin, which is inherited by every new generation. 
423 By means of wars, God wants to make people repent of the evil which they do. 
424 One day, God will put an end to the evil in this world by a great Final war. 
425 There is so much evil enclosed in the structure of this world, that an all-destroying 
war is inevitable. 
426 Wars are the result of a curse which God laid upon mankind in the beginning. 
427* Wars arise because higher demonic powers rule the world. 
428 Wars are certainly not used by God to make people repent. 
429 Mankind is brought to war by the demonic power of armament. 
430 It is not true that wars arise because mankind idolizes military security. 
431 Wars arise from a deeply rooted inclination towards evil, inherited by every new 
generation. 
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432 Wars are a punishment of God for the sins of this world. 
433 Armament is a demonic power, which incites people to war. 
434 Fundamentally, every man is responsible for the evil of war. 
435 In fact, only a few evil men are to blame for wars. 
436 Only mankind as a whole is to blame for wars. 
437 In principle, every man is partly guilty of the wars in the world. 
438 All things considered, it is only a handful of evil-minded persons who are guilty of 
wars. 
439 The entire human race is guilty of the wars in the world. 
440* Not every man is guilty of the evil of war in this world. 
441 Actually, only a few evil-minded instigators are to blame for wars. 
442 The responsibility for wars lies only with mankind as a whole. 
Soteriological peace attitudes (501-530) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = 1 often think about that, in relation to peace; 2 = I do not 
think about that very often, in relation to peace; 3 = 1 sometimes think about that, in 
relation to peace; 4 = 1 never think about that, in relation to peace. 
501 The earthly paradise, which God created for man in the beginning. 
502 The kingdom of God, which will be given to us. 
503 The command which God once gave to us, to take good care of the earth. 
504 God's peace which you experience deep in your heart. 
505 The obligation which we humans have now to help build the kingdom of God. 
506 God's peace which you experience in the daily intercourse with others. 
507 God's grace for all mankind. 
508* The goodness of creation which God gave to us in the beginning. 
509 The future kingdom, which God will give to us one day. 
510 God's command to man to administer the earth well. 
511 God's peace which you experience in the relations with people in your own 
environment. 
512 The task which we people have to dedicate ourselves now to God's kingdom. 
513 Peace with God within yourself. 
514 God's salvation for all people. 
515 The beauty of the world, as God has given it to us in the beginning. 
516 The future kingdom, which God will give to us one day. 
517 The stewardship over this earth, with which has entrusted us. 
518 Our task to work now for God's future kingdom. 
519 The divine peace which you experience deep within yourself. 
520 The warmth of God's peace in the relations with people from your daily environ-
ment. 
521 God's salvation for the whole world. 
522 The victory over suffering and death, which Christ has given to us. 
523 Following Jesus, by loving your enemies. 
524 Following Jesus, by being prepared to suffer for peace yourself. 
525 The salvation which Christ has given to us through his death and resurrection. 
526 Following Jesus, by loving your adversaries. 
527 Following Jesus' example and even accept suffering for peace. 
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528 The salvation which Christ has bestowed on us people, through His victory over 
suffering and death. 
529 The preparedness to suffer for peace, thus following Jesus. 
530 Forgiving and loving your enemies, like Jesus did. 
Ecclesiological peace attitudes (601-635) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
601 The church must occupy itself with war and peace, even if this would endanger the 
unity among the believers. 
602 As a witness of the biblical message, the church must occupy itself with war and 
peace. 
603 The church has the right to occupy itself with the politics of war and peace, on the 
strength of its moral task in society. 
604 As a believer, you should accept church statements about war and peace. 
605 When the church makes statements about war and peace, these must always take 
a clear political stand. 
606 Politicians do take into consideration what the churches say about war and peace. 
607 The church should always support national peace demonstrations. 
608 The church is allowed to do things which are in fact forbidden by the civil laws, 
for the benefit of peace. 
609 The question of war and peace is so complicated, that the church can hardly say 
anything about it. 
610 People who start discussing war and peace in the church unnecessarily bring its 
unity into danger. 
611 When the church speaks about war and peace, it should only give general 
guidelines and not adopt political views. 
612 In principle, the church is allowed to resist political decisions about war and 
peace. 
613 The church should not join in things like peace demonstrations. 
614 Heavy discussions about war and peace can be held in the church, even if they 
might endanger its unity. 
615 Speaking about war and peace belongs to the church's task of proclaiming the 
gospel to the world. 
616 As a guardian of moral principles in society, the church has the right to intervene 
in political discussions about war and peace. 
617 As a believer, you must keep to the church's statements about war and peace. 
618* When the church makes statements about war and peace, these must always be 
elaborated in detail. 
619 Politicians do reckon with the church's pronouncements on war and peace. 
620 When politicians have taken a decision about an issue concerning war and peace, 
then the church should resign itself to that situation. 
621 The church certainly must join in national peace demonstrations. 
622 The church must support actions of civil disobedience against armament. 
623 The church is competent enough to say something reasonable about war and 
peace. 
624 The church has a lot of influence on what people think about war and peace. 
625 When the church makes a certain statement about war and peace, you have, as a 
believer, the right to think the opposite. 
626 The church should protest strongly against certain political decisions about war 
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and peace. 
627 The church must never get involved into legally prohibited actions against arma-
ment. 
628 The church has little influence on what people think about war and peace. 
629 The issue of war and peace evokes so many conflicts in the church, that one had 
better keep silent on it. 
630 You are a member of a church because of your religion, not for matters of war 
and peace. 
631 The church does not have the right to intervene in political decision-making about 
war and peace. 
632 Church statements about war and peace have much influence on the public 
opinion. 
633 When the church intervenes in the discussion about war and peace, it must always 
take a very clear stand. 
634 Unfortunately, the church does not have the knowledge required to say something 
sensible about war and peace. 
635 The church has no influence on the ideas of politicians about war and peace. 
Social location of peace action 
Social characteristics (701-714) 
Age (701) 
What is your date and year of birth? 
Gender (702) 
male; female 
Educational level and social class (703-707) 
703a Do you have a paid job/profession at this moment? 
Answering alternatives: yes (go to 703c); no. 
703b Did you have a paid job/profession in the past? 
Answering alternatives: yes; no (go to 704). 
703c What is (or was) your profession? 
(Interviewer: if several professions, ask for the latest one.) 
Answer: ... 
703d Are/were you an employee of are/were you self-employed? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = employee; 2 = self-employed. 
703e Is or was this profession mainly managerial, managerial and cooperative or non-
managerial? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = mainly mangerial; 2 = managerial and cooperative; 3 
= non-mangerial. 
703f How many hours a week do you (did you) spend on your job/profession? 
Answer: .. hours. 
704 Did you acquire any testimonies after primary school? 
(Interviewer: register only the highest one, exclude courses et cetera.) 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = only primary school 
2 = lower professional training 
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3 = middle general secondary education 
4 = middle professional training 
5 = high school 
6 = college 
7 = university 
705 What is your present marital status? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = married; 2 = living together; 3 = unmarried; 4 = 
divorced; 5 = widow(er) (3-5, skip 706-707). 
706 Does your partner at this moment have a paid job/profession? 
Answering alternatives: yes (go to 706c); no. 
706b Did your partner have a paid job/profession in the past? 
Answering alternatives: yes; no (go to 707). 
706c What is (or was) his/her profession? 
(Interviewer: if several professions, ask for the latest one.) 
Answer: ... 
706d Is or was he/she an employee or self-employed? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = employee; 2 = self-employed. 
706e Is or was this profession mainly managerial, managerial and cooperative or non-
managerial? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = mainly managerial; 2 = managerial and cooperatative; 
3 = non-mangerial. 
706f How many hours a week does (did) your partner spend on this job/profession? 
Answer: .. hours. 
707 Did your partner acquire any testimonies after primary school? 
(Interviewer: register only the highest one, exclude courses et cetera.) 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = only primary school 
2 = lower professional training 
3 = middle general secondary education 
4 = middle professional training 
5 = high school 
6 = college 
7 = university 
Political preference (708) 
If parliamentary elections were held at this moment, for which political party whould you 
vote? 
Answering alternatives: 
01 = Partij van de Arbeid: PVDA (Social Democratic Party) 
02 = Christen-democratisch Appèl: CDA (Christian Democratic Party) 
03 = Volksparty voor Vrijheid en Democratie: VVD (Conservative Liberal Party) 
04 = Democraten '66: D '66 (Social Liberals) 
05 = Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij: PSP (Pacifist Socialist Party) 
06 = Politieke Partij Radicalen: PPR (Political Party of Radicals) 
07 = Comunistische Partij Nederland: CPN (Communist Party) 
08 = Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij: SGP (Reformed Political Party) 
09 = Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond: GPV (Reformed Political Alliance) 
10 = Reformatorische Politieke Federatie: RPF (Reformed Political Federation) 
11 = Evangelische Volkspartij: EVP (Evangelical Peoples Party) 
12 = Socialistische Partij: SP (Socialist Party) 
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13 = Centrum Partij: CP (Center Party) 
Others, namely: ... 
98 = no answer 
99 = don't know 
Political activity (709-715) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = never; 2 = hardly ever; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often. 
How often do you: 
709 Read about politics in newspapers? 
710 Discuss politics with other people? 
711* Try to convince friends or acquaintances to vote in the same way as you do? 
712* Work with other people in your community to solve some local problem? 
713 Attend a political meeting or rally? 
714 Contact public officials or politicians? 
715 Spend time working for a political party or a candidate? 
Religious characteristics (801-851) 
Denomination and church relatedness (801-804) 
801a Do you consider yourself a member of a church or a religious community? 
Answering alternatives: yes; no (go to 801c); don't know (go to 801g). 
801b Which church or religious community is this? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = (Roman) Catholic Church 
2 = Netherlands Reformed Church. 
3 = Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. 
4 = Other, namely: ... 
801c Do you have a special function in this church? 
Answering alternatives: yes, no. 
801 d Are you an active member of church related groups or associations? 
Answering alternatives: yes (go to 802), no (go to 802). 
801 e Have you been a member of a church or a religious community in the past? 
Answering alternatives: yes, no (go to 802). 
801f Which church or religious community was this? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = (Roman) Catholic Church 
2 = Netherlands Reformed Church. 
3 = Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. 
4 = Other, namely: ... 
801g Which church or religious community does this concern? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = (Roman) Catholic Church 
2 = Netherlands Reformed Church. 
3 = Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. 
4 = Other, namely: ... 
802 Do you sometimes attend services of a church or religious community? How 
often? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = Yes, about once a week. 
2 = Yes, about once a month. 
309 
3 = Yes, once or only a few times a year. 
4 = (practically) never. 
803 Do you sometimes listen to services of a church or religious community on radio 
or television? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = yes, often; 2 = yes, sometimes; 3 = no, hardly ever or never. 
804a Is or was your father a member of a church or a religious community? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = yes; 2 = no (go to 804c) ; 3 = don't know (go to 
804c). 
804b Which church is or was this? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = (Roman) Catholic Church 
2 = Netherlands Reformed Church. 
3 = Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. 
4 = Other, namely: ... 
804c Is or was your mother a member of a church or a religious community? 
Answering alternatives: 1 = yes; 2 = no (exit 804); 3 = don't know (exit 804). 
804d Which church is or was this? 
Answering alternatives: 
1 = (Roman) Catholic Church 
2 = Netherlands Reformed Church. 
3 = Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. 
4 = Other, namely: ... 
Religious worldview (805-818) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally unconvinced; 2 = unconvinced; 3 = uncertain; 4 = 
convinced; 5 = totally convinced; 6 = never thought about. 
805 There is a God who occupies Himself with every human being personally. 
806 There's something beyond this world. 
807 To me, God is nothing but the valuable in every human being. 
808 There is a God, who wants to be God for us. 
809 There is a supreme being, which controls life. 
810 God is not up there, but only in the hearts of men. 
811 I believe in the existence of a supreme being. 
812 All the good in the world finally comes from God. 
813 Life is only meaningful to me, because there exists a God. 
814 Good and evil in the world are entirely the work of man. 
815 Life only has a meaning if you provide it yourself. 
816 God sees to it that good will Finally overcome evil. 
817 To me, the meaning of life is trying to make the best of it. 
818 The problem of good and evil has to be solved by man himself. 
Saliency of worldview (819-824) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
819 My worldview has much influence on my daily life. 
820 I am strongly inclined to accomodate my ideas about war and peace to what my 
worldview says about that. 
821 My worldview has much influence on my political ideas. 
822 My worldview is an important key to me, when I think about war and peace. 
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823 My worldview strongly influences important decisions I have to make. 
824 My worldview plays a major role in my ideas about war and peace. 
Organization of the church (825-839) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = totally disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = partly agree, partly 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = totally agree; 6 = never thought about. 
825 Lay persons should also have the right to conduct services in the church. 
826 The church can best be administrated by a few authoritative people, who are able 
to bear responsibilities. 
827 The faithful should be able to decide themselves about what happens in the 
church. 
828 Everyone should be able to become a member of a church. 
829 The church should always keep pace with the changing ideas in society. 
830 The responsibility of what happens in the church may not be put into the hands of 
a small group of administrators. 
831 It is not good that believers have a say in decisions about everything that happens 
in the church. 
832* The church has every right to make certain demands to its members. 
833 In church, services should only be conducted by people who are especially 
appointed for this. 
834 Church policy should only be determined a small group of responsible administra-
tors. 
835 The church should never reject people who want to become members. 
836 The church should keep pace with the new ideas in our modern world as much as 
possible. 
837 Lay persons should also have the right to conduct religious services. 
838 It is not good when every believer can just interfere with all decisions in the 
church. 
839* The church should take a highly reserved position regarding certain ideas in 
modern society. 
Tasks of the church (840-851) 
Answering alternatives: 1 = unimportant; 2 = neither important nor unimportant; 3 = 
important; 4 = very important; 5 = never thought about. 
The church has the task to: 
840 make people aware of societal problems. 
841 give material aid to the third world. 
842 give religious assistance in cases of illness, approaching death or mourning. 
843 see to it that the church is a meeting place of all sorts of active groups of 
believers. 
844 give pastoral help to people in mental distress. 
845 give material aid to people in the Netherlands. 
846 give comfort to people who are in trouble. 
847 stimulate people to form active working groups in the church. 
848 take a critical stand in societal issues. 
849 give religious assistance in relation to important events in life. 
850 make people politically conscious. 
851 promote active groups in the church, operating in the spirit of the Gospel. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Vrede en religie: een empirisch-theologische studie naar de motivatio-
nele effecten van religieuze vredesattitudes op het vredeshandelen 
In de voorbije decennia leek de vrede in de wereld meer dan ooit bedreigd 
door de toenemende nucleaire bewapening in een situatie van gespannen 
verhoudingen tussen de grote atoommachten. Kerken, kerkelijke vredesbewe-
gingen en theologen exploreerden de betekenis van het christelijk geloof voor 
het bevorderen van de vrede en analyseerden de problematiek van bewape-
ning, nucleaire afschrikking en oorlog in het licht van christelijke uitgangspun-
ten. Daarbij stond de betekenis van het geloof voor de motivatie tot vredeshan-
delen centraal. Gelovigen werden op hun christelijke overtuiging aangesproken 
om zich een mening te vormen over de bewapeningsproblematiek en om in 
actie te komen tegen de bewapening. Inzet voor vrede werd religieus geïnter-
preteerd als zorg voor Gods schepping, als navolging van Jezus en als een 
vooruitgrijpend handelen in het licht van Gods koninkrijk van gerechtigheid en 
vrede. Kerkelijke vredesbewegingen, met name het Interkerkelijk Vredesbe-
raad (IKV) en Pax Christi, waren gangmakers achter grote publieke acties 
tegen de bewapeningspolitiek in de jaren tachtig. 
Binnen de kerken was het vredesengagement echter omstreden. Tegenover 
het streven van sommigen naar een politiek-kritische vredespraxis van de kerk 
stond de opvatting van anderen, dat de vrede van Godswege primair een 
individuele en 'innerlijke' categorie is, dat Gods koninkrijk binnen deze zondi-
ge wereld niet naderbij kan worden gebracht, en dat politiek handelen niet tot 
de taken van de kerk behoort. Dat laatste standpunt werd vooral door het 
Interkerkelijk Comité Tweezijdige Ontwapening (ICTO) naar voren gebracht. 
Hoewel de nucleaire dreiging langs de Oost-West as van de wereldpolitiek 
inmiddels grotendeels is verdwenen, door de democratisering in Oost-Europa, 
het uiteenvallen van het Warschau Pact en ingrijpende ontwapeningsovereen-
komsten tussen Oost en West, is de verwachting van een duurzame vrede na 
de Koude Oorlog ijdel gebleken. In de plaats van de dreiging van een wereld-
omvattende kernoorlog is de realiteit van nieuwe conventionele oorlogen en 
burgeroorlogen op talloze plaatsen gekomen. Notoire conflicthaarden zoals het 
Midden-Oosten, de Hoorn van Afrika, Zuid-Afrika en Noord-Ierland blijven 
branden. Racistisch geweld steekt in West-Europa opnieuw de kop op. Prolife-
ratie van kernwapens in de derde wereld vormt een nieuw gevaar voor de 
vrede. Voor kerken en christenen is het ideaal van de vrede vandaag niet 
minder urgent dan tien of twintig jaar geleden, al is de aard van de vredespro-
blematiek in korte tijd sterk veranderd. 
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In deze studie wordt de motivationele betekenis van religieuze vredesattitudes 
voor het vredeshandelen onderzocht. Wordt het vredeshandelen van mensen 
beïnvloed door hun religieuze attitudes met betrekking tot vrede? Zo ja, welke 
religieuze vredesattitudes hebben een effect op het vredeshandelen, en is dit 
effect positief of negatief? Deze vragen worden volgens een empirisch-theolo-
gische methode onderzocht. Gestuurd door een theologische vraagstelling is 
een enquête gehouden onder leden van drie kerkelijke vredesbewegingen: het 
IKV, het ICTO en de zogenaamde Missie, Ontwikkeling en Vredesgroepen 
(MOV), welke als een achterban van de vredesbeweging Pax Christi kunnen 
worden beschouwd. Ook zijn leden van drie denominaties geïnterviewd, voor-
zover zij niet actief zijn in een vredesbeweging: leden van de Rooms-Katholie-
ke Kerk, de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk en de Gereformeerde Kerken in 
Nederland. Hen werden vragen gesteld over onder andere vredeshandelen, 
oorlog en vrede, (kern)bewapening, over religieuze attitudes met betrekking 
tot oorlog en vrede, over religie en kerk in het algemeen en over politiek. Het 
aantal respondenten was 302, waarvan 175 afkomstig uit de vredesbewegingen 
en 127 uit de groep van kerkleden die niet actief waren in een vredesbeweging. 
De enquête werd gehouden in de eerste maanden van 1988. 
De vraag naar de betekenis van religieuze vredesattitudes voor het vredeshan-
delen is een toespitsing van de vraag naar de betekenis van religieuze attitudes 
voor het moreel handelen in het algemeen. Deze vraag vormt een belangrijk 
thema van hedendaags theologisch-ethische reflectie. In een culturele context 
van rationalisering en secularisering, en de daarmee samenhangende emanci-
patie van het ethisch oordelen uit traditionele religieuze en kerkelijke kaders, 
zoeken theologen naar modellen van theologische ethiek die recht doen aan de 
relatieve autonomie van het ethische. In de katholieke theologie is Alfons 
Auers Autonome Moral und christlicher Glaube (1971) richtinggevend geweest in 
deze ontwikkeling. Auer ontkent dat er specifiek christelijke ethische normen 
zijn. Het christelijk geloof heeft een indirecte functie voor het moreel oorde-
len, als een achterliggende "alomvattende betekenishorizon". Auers ontwerp 
van een "autonome ethiek in een christelijke context" vormt het theologisch 
uitgangspunt van deze studie. Op basis van Auers fundamentele theologische 
ethiek wordt een theoretisch model ontworpen waarin het effect van religieuze 
vredesattitudes op het vredeshandelen als een indirect effect wordt opgevat. 
Religie beïnvloedt het vredeshandelen indirect, via een effect op de motivatie 
tot vredeshandelen. 
De studie bestaat uit een inleiding en zes hoofdstukken. In de inleiding wor-
den de probleemstelling, de doelstelling en de toegespitste vraagstelling van 
het onderzoek geformuleerd. Door geloven op te vatten als een hermeneutisch-
communicatieve praxis wordt aangesloten bij de handelingstheoretische oriënta-
tie van de empirische theologie-beoefening in de vakgroep Empirische Theolo-
gie van de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. Religieuze hermeneutisch-com-
municatieve praxis is gericht op het bereiken van intersubjectieve overeenstem-
ming over de betekenis van het christelijk geloof voor het individu en de 
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samenleving, binnen de spanning van de tijdsafstand tussen basisteksten van de 
christelijke traditie en de hedendaagse verstaanshorizon. Voorliggende studie 
wil op fundamentele wijze bijdragen aan het onderzoek naar de religieuze 
hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis, door deze in haar motivationele aspec-
ten te onderzoeken. Een motivationele impuls is in de religieuze hermeneu-
tisch-communicatieve praxis zelf aanwezig. Hermeneutisch-communicatieve 
praxis is niet enkel gericht op het ontdekken van zin in religieuze tradities, en 
de communicatie hierover, maar vooral op de transformatie van het handelen 
volgens morele principes die inherent zijn aan de hermeneutisch-communica-
tieve praxis zelf. Vanuit theologisch én communicatie-theoretisch gezichtspunt 
kunnen deze principes worden gespecificeerd als de principes van vrijheid, 
gelijkheid, universaliteit en solidariteit. 
De theologische probleemstelling van het onderzoek luidt: 
wat is de motivationele functie van de religieuze hermeneutisch-communicatieve 
praxis? 
De theologische doelstelling volgt uit de probleemstelling, in het licht van de 
transformatieve oriëntatie van de religieuze hermeneutisch-communicatieve 
praxis. Zij luidt: 
het verhelderen van de bevordering van de motivationele functie van de religieuze 
hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis, met het oog op de transformatie daarvan, 
volgens de normatieve principes van vrijheid, gelijkheid, universaliteit en solidari-
teit. 
In toespitsing op de problematiek van de vrede kan uit de theologische pro-
bleemstelling de volgende, meer specifieke, theologische vraagstelling worden 
afgeleid: 
wat is de motivationele functie van de religieuze hermeneutisch-communicatieve 
praxis in relatie tot het vredeshandelen? 
Hoofdstuk 1 schetst de kerkelijke context van het vredeshandelen. Het hoofd-
stuk is een literatuurstudie naar de vredesdoelen van Nederlandse kerken en 
kerkelijke vredesbewegingen. De studie is uitgevoerd op basis van officiële 
documenten van de Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieke Bisschoppenconferentie, 
de Generale Synodes van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk en de Gerefor-
meerde Kerken in Nederland, alsmede officiële documenten van de vredesbe-
wegingen IKV, Pax Christi en ICTO. Vanwege de internationale inkadering 
van de Nederlandse kerken zijn ook officiële documenten van het Vaticaan en 
de Wereldraad van Kerken in het onderzoek betrokken. De functie van de 
literatuurstudie is het verkrijgen van oriënterende inzichten in de betekenissen 
die in het onderzoeksveld worden gehecht aan de begrippen vrede, vredeshan-
delen, motivatie tot vredeshandelen en religieuze vredesattitudes. Ook ver-
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schaft dit hoofdstuk een kader voor de interpretatie van de onderzoeksresulta-
ten. 
In de beschrijving van de vredesdoelen van kerken en kerkelijke vredesbe-
wegingen wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen vrede als ultiem doel, specifieke 
vredesdoelen en instrumentele vredesdoelen. Als toestand van de gerealiseerde 
heelheid (shalom) van mens en wereld is vrede, in de optiek van kerken en 
kerkelijke vredesbewegingen, een eschatologisch-transcendent ideaal. De locus 
van de voltooide vrede is het koninkrijk van God, dat een doel-perspectïef 
voor het menselijk vredeshandelen vormt, maar dat niet door binnenwerelds 
handelen tot stand kan worden gebracht. In het perspectief van het ultieme 
doel van de vrede beschouwen kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen de 
binnenwereldse vrede als een proces dat is gericht op het bevorderen van spe-
cifieke vredesdoelen: concrete politieke, economische en culturele doelen op 
het terrein van de vrede (§ 1.1). Vrede is in de ogen van kerken en kerkelijke 
vredesbewegingen meer dan de afwezigheid van oorlog. In het proces van 
vrede kunnen een positieve en een negatieve dimensie worden onderscheiden. 
Positieve vrede heeft betrekking op het bevorderen van sociale rechtvaardigheid; 
negatieve vrede heeft betrekking op het voorkomen van oorlog. 
Sociale rechtvaardigheid betreft met name de billijke verdeling van rijkdom 
en macht in de samenleving. Twee thema's die in dit verband steeds weer door 
kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen aan de orde worden werden zijn de 
rechten van de mens en de ontwikkelingsproblematiek. Ten aanzien van het voor-
komen van oorlog streefden kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen in het 
bijzonder twee doelen na: de ontwikkeling van vreedzame methoden om inter-
nationale conflicten op te lossen en het bereiken van wapenbeheersing en 
ontwapening. Het laatste doel heeft de gemoederen in de voorbije decennia 
het sterkst beziggehouden. Daarbij ging het vooral om nucleaire wapenbeheer-
sing en ontwapening, in een situatie van toenemende nucleaire dreiging. Hier-
over waren de opvattingen verdeeld. Het Vaticaan en de vredesbeweging IC-
TO stelden zich op het standpunt van een conditionele aanvaarding van nucle-
aire afschrikking (voorlopige aanvaarding, binnen randvoorwaarden, als minst 
slechte optie in de gegeven situatie), gekoppeld aan een pleidooi voor gradue-
le, bilaterale kernontwapening. De Wereldraad van Kerken, de Synodes van 
Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk en de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, 
alsmede de vredesbewegingen IKV en Pax Christi, veroordeelden de nucleaire 
afschrikking, hetgeen werd gekoppeld aan een pleidooi voor graduele, unilate-
rale kernontwapening: het zetten van eerste stappen op weg naar tweezijdige 
ontwapening. 
Instrumentele vredesdoelen (§ 1.2) hebben betrekking op de taken die ker-
ken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen voor zichzelf formuleren, als bijdragen aan 
het bevorderen van de vrede. Kenmerkend voor de instrumentele vredesdoelen 
van kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen is hun communicatief karakter. Ze 
zijn gericht op de beïnvloeding van met name twee doelgroepen: de politieke 
leiding en de publieke opinie. In dit onderzoek wordt de aandacht geconcen-
treerd op de communicatieve beïnvloeding van de publieke opinie. Daarnaast 
wordt ingegaan op de beïnvloeding van de leden van de kerken en kerkelijke 
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vredesbewegingen door hun leiding. De beïnvloedingsprocessen worden geana-
lyseerd met behulp van het onderscheid tussen consensus mobilisatie en actie 
mobilisatie. Het eerste is gericht op het veranderen van opvattingen van men-
sen over vrede; het tweede op het bevorderen van de participatie van mensen 
in collectieve acties voor vrede. Beide vormen van mobilisatie kunnen betrek-
king hebben op korte- en lange-termijndoelen. Consensus mobilisatie op de 
korte termijn is gericht op het beïnvloeden van opvattingen over actuele en 
concrete vredesvragen. Consensus mobilisatie op de lange termijn heeft betrek-
king op het veranderen van fundamentele waarden en houdingen van mensen 
ten aanzien van vrede, met het oog op het creëren van een 'vredesklimaat'. 
Actie mobilisatie op de korte termijn is gericht op het bijeenbrengen van men-
sen of uitingen van mensen als protest tegen een concrete politieke beslissing 
op het terrein van de vrede. Actie mobilisatie op de lange termijn betreft het 
bevorderen van fundamentele gedragsverandering in het licht van de vrede. 
Kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen hanteren gedeeltelijk verschillende 
instrumentele vredesdoelen, zowel in relatie tot de publieke opinie als in rela-
tie tot de kerkleden. Het belangrijkste verschil is dat alleen vredesbewegingen 
kiezen voor actie mobilisatie op de korte termijn. Kerken houden zich hier 
verre van, al ontwikkelden de Synodes van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk 
en de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland wel activiteiten op het terrein van 
de korte-termijn consensus mobilisatie, die als een voorwaarde voor de korte-
termijn actie mobilisatie kan worden opgevat. 
In de instrumentele vredesdoelen van kerken en kerkelijke vredesbewegin-
gen spelen religieuze symbolen een rol. Ze zijn direct gerelateerd aan de con-
sensus- en actie mobilisatie op de lange termijn. De noodzaak van een funda-
mentele verandering van attitudes en gedrag wordt op religieuze argumenten 
gebaseerd. In de consensus- en actie mobilisatie op de korte termijn spelen 
religieuze symbolen daarentegen een indirecte rol. Ze worden niet direct als 
politieke argumenten gehanteerd, maar er wordt naar verwezen als een achter-
grond van betekenissen die plausibiliteit verschaft aan de politieke argumenta-
tie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de conceptuele structuren en het theoretisch model van 
het onderzoek ontwikkeld (§ 2.1). Het hoofdstuk begint met een analyse van 
de wijze waarop het motivatie-begrip in de theologische ethiek wordt gehan-
teerd. De analyse is toegespitst op de theologische motivatietheorie van Auer. 
Hij onderscheidt twee morele functies van het christelijk geloof: enerzijds een 
integrerende, stimulerende en kritische functie voor het ontdekken van morele 
normen; anderzijds een motiverende functie voor het moreel handelen. Om 
geschikt te zijn als basis van een theoretisch model van het effect van religieu-
ze vredesattitudes op het vredeshandelen behoeft Auers model enkele correc-
ties. De twee functies die Auer onderscheidt moeten niet parallel maar serieel 
worden verbonden. De conceptie van morele normen staat niet los van de moti-
vatie tot moreel handelen, maar is er een onderdeel van. Daarnaast wordt de 
handelingsmotivatie mede bepaald door twee andere componenten: de percep-
tie van de situatie en de attributie van de 'locus of control' in de situatie. Met 
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behulp van motivatie-theoretische modellen ten aanzien van conceptie, percep-
tie en attributie wordt Auers theologisch motivatie-model getransformeerd tot 
een theoretisch model van het motivationeel effect van religieuze vredesattitu-
des op het vredeshandelen (§ 2.2 en 2.3). 
Vervolgens wordt een conceptualisering ontwikkeld van vier begrippen: 
vredeshandelen, motivatie tot vredeshandelen, religieuze vredesattitudes en de 
sociale locatie van het vredeshandelen (§ 2.7). 
In een handelingstheoretisch kader wordt het vredeshandelen binnen ker-
ken en kerkelijke vredesbewegingen opgevat als een vorm van communicatief 
handelen, dat wil zeggen als handelen dat is gericht op het bereiken van inter-
subjectieve overeenstemming over vrede, door middel van overtuiging (§ 2.4). 
Met betrekking tot de motivatie tot vredeshandelen wordt onderscheid 
gemaakt tussen concepties van vrede, percepties van bewapening en attributies 
met betrekking tot bewapening. Concepties van vrede zijn in dit onderzoek toe-
gespitst op doelen en idealen ten aanzien van kernbewapening en -ontwape-
ning, de NAVO, civiele Oost-West contacten en ontwikkelingshulp. Percepties 
van bewapening hebben betrekking op de waarneming en interpretatie van de 
bewapeningssituatie in de wereld. Daarbij kan tussen een cognitieve en affec-
tieve dimensie worden onderscheiden. Attributies met betrekking tot bewape-
ning betreffen de verwachtingen ten aanzien van de persoonlijke invloed op de 
bewapening in de wereld. In het kader van de attributie-problematiek wordt 
ook aandacht besteed aan het verwachting ten aanzien van de bereikbaarheid 
van wereldvrede en aan de waardering van de eigen kennis over bewapenings-
vragen (§ 2.5). 
De conceptuele analyse van religieuze vredesattitudes (§ 2.6) begint met de 
keuze van een theologisch paradigma waarbinnen deze attitudes adequaat kun-
nen worden geïnterpreteerd. Drie belangrijke paradigma's uit de contemporai-
ne christelijke theologie worden onderzocht op hun geschiktheid als basis voor 
de theologische interpretatie van vrede in zijn praktische, sociale en kritische 
betekenis: de existentiële theologie, de transcendentale theologie en de politie-
ke theologie. Alleen de politieke theologie blijkt de eigenschappen te bezitten 
die vereist zijn om de praktische, sociale en kritische betekenis van vrede theo-
logisch te interpreteren. Het politiek-theologisch paradigma wordt vervolgens 
nader uitgewerkt in het licht van de vredesproblematiek, aan de hand van de 
praktisch kritische hermeneutiek van Schillebeeckx. Met name in de beschou-
wingen over de dialectiek van negatieve contrastervaring en positieve zinerva-
ring vertoont de hermeneutiek van Schillebeeckx overeenkomsten met de in dit 
onderzoek gehanteerde motivatietheorie, zodat zijn hermeneutiek goede moge-
lijkheden biedt om de motivationele betekenis van religieuze vredesattitudes te 
onderzoeken. 
In nauwe aansluiting op de hermeneutiek van Schillebeeckx wordt een theo-
logisch raamwerk van religieuze vredesattitudes geconstrueerd. Het hoofdon-
derscheid binnen dit raamwerk is dat tussen hamartiologische attitudes met 
betrekking tot oorlog, soteriologische vredesattitudes en ecclesiologische vredesatti-
tudes. Hamartiologie en soteriologïe - de theologische traktaten over kwaad en 
verlossing - verhouden zich als spiegelbeelden tot elkaar. In het onderzoek 
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legitimiteit van kerkelijke vredespraxis 
inhoud van kerkelijke vredespraxis 
invloed van kerkelijke vredespraxis 
verloopt de verdere conceptuele geleding van deze begrippen parallel Ten 
aanzien van zowel hamartiologie als soteriologie kan een onderscheid worden 
gemaakt tussen immanente transcendentie en absolute transcendentie. In het mo-
del van de immanente transcendentie wordt transcendentie opgevat als het 
object van een religieuze ervaring, waarin zich een transcendente betekenis in 
de historische ervaringswerkelijkheid manifesteert. In het model van de absolu-
te transcendentie wordt transcendentie opgevat als een bovennatuurlijke causa-
liteit die los van het menselijk verstaan en ervaren bestaat. De dimensies van 
immanente en absolute transcendentie kunnen beide worden onderverdeeld 
langs de drie temporele dimensies van verleden, heden en toekomst. Naast de 
dimensies van transcendentie kunnen hamartiologische en soteriologische 
vredesattitudes ook worden onderscheiden naar de wijze waarop het menselijk 
subject ter sprake komt, als een sociaal of een individueel subject. Ecclesiologi-
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sehe vredesattitudes kunnen worden onderscheiden naar de aspecten van de 
legitimiteit, de inhoud en de invloed van de kerkelijke vredespraxis. 
In figuur 1 is het theologisch raamwerk van religieuze vredesattitudes sche-
matisch weergegeven. Met behulp van dit raamwerk kunnen religieuze vredes-
attitudes worden geclassificeerd. Zo kan de interpretatie van oorlog als een 
straf van God (een van de theodicee-modellen met betrekking tot oorlog) 
worden opgevat als een absoluut transcendente hamartiologie in de tijdsdimen-
sie van het heden. De interpretatie van vrede als een opgave in het licht van 
Gods koninkrijk kan worden gezien als een immanent transcendente soteriolo-
gïe in de tijdsdimensie van de toekomst. De opvatting dat de kerk burgerlijke 
ongehoorzaamheid tegen bewapening moet steunen heeft betrekking op de 
inhoud van de kerkelijke vredespraxis, binnen de ecclesiologische dimensie van 
religieuze vredesattitudes. 
Het resultaat van de uitgevoerde theologische conceptualisering is een uit-
gebreide inventaris die, zonder volledigheid te pretenderen, een groot aantal 
religieuze vredesattitudes op systematische wijze ordent. Het hierdoor verkre-
gen inzicht in de samenhang tussen religieuze vredesattitudes maakt het moge-
lijk om empirische, in het religieus bewustzijn feitelijk aanwezige, religieuze 
vredesattitudes systematisch te onderzoeken. 
De conceptualisering wordt afgerond met een analyse van de sociale locatie 
van het vredeshandelen. Daarbij wordt onderscheiden tussen sociale kenmerken 
(demografisch, sociaal-economisch, politiek) en religieuze kenmerken (denomi-
natie, kerkelijke betrokkenheid, religieuze levensbeschouwing, saillantie van de 
levensbeschouwing en kerkbeeld). Ten aanzien van de religieuze levensbe-
schouwing worden drie opvattingen gemeten: geloof in een persoonlijke God, 
geloof in het onpersoonlijk goddelijke en religieus immanentisme. Het kerk-
beeld bestaat uit attitudes ten aanzien van de organisatie en de taken van de 
kerk. 
Aan het slot van hoofdstuk twee (§ 2.8) worden drie empirische vragen ge-
formuleerd, die de richting van het empirisch onderzoek bepalen: 
1. Wat is de empirische neerslag van de conceptualisering van vredeshandelen, 
motivatie tot vredeshandelen, religieuze vredesattitudes en de sociale loca-
tie van het vredeshandelen? Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 
drie. 
2. Wat zijn de verschillen tussen subpopulaties ten aanzien van vredeshande-
len, motivatie tot vredeshandelen, religieuze vredesattitudes en de sociale 
locatie van het vredeshandelen? Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 
vier. 
3. Wat is het effect van religieuze vredesattitudes op het vredeshandelen? 
Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk vijf. 
In het derde hoofdstuk worden meetschalen geconstrueerd, welke dienen als 
invoer voor de daaropvolgende empirische hoofdstukken. Voor een empirische 
theologie is het proces van schaalconstructie van groot belang. Schaalconstruc-
tie geeft inzicht in de empirische houdbaarheid van de theologische conceptua-
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lisering en van de theologische theorieën waarop deze is gestoeld. In dit onder-
zoek gaat het vooral om de vraag of het religieus bewustzijn van mensen ten 
aanzien van vrede werkelijk zo geordend is als op theologische gronden kan 
worden verondersteld. Belangrijke afwijkingen tussen theorie en empirie kun-
nen aanleiding zijn om de theologische theorievorming te heroverwegen. De 
algemene conclusie uit de empirische toetsing van de conceptualisering is ech-
ter dat de meerderheid van de gemaakte conceptuele distincties empirisch 
terug te vinden zijn. Sommige van de fijnste vertakkingen van de conceptuele 
modellen zijn empirisch niet terug te vinden, maar passen doorgaans wel bin-
nen een empirische dimensie op een hoger abstractieniveau. Zo blijkt binnen 
de hamartiologische en soteriologische dimensies van transcendentie het on-
derscheid tussen immanente en absolute transcendentie een stevige empirische 
basis te hebben, terwijl het onderscheid tussen tijdsdimensies veel minder 
empirische ondersteuning heeft. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk worden zes subpopulaties met elkaar vergeleken, ten 
aanzien van vredeshandelen, motivatie tot vredeshandelen, religieuze vredesat-
titudes en de sociale locatie van het vredeshandelen. De zes subpopulaties zijn 
enerzijds leden van de kerkelijke vredesbewegingen IKV, MOV en ICTO en 
anderzijds leden van Rooms-Katholieke Kerk, de Nederlandse Hervormde 
Kerk en de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, voorzover niet actief in een 
vredesbeweging. De eerste groep wordt in het onderzoek aangeduid als 'leden', 
de tweede als 'niet-leden'. Vergelijkingen tussen subgroepen worden op drie 
niveaus gemaakt. 
Om te beginnen worden de leden van de drie vredesbewegingen onderling 
vergeleken (§ 4.1). De drie bewegingen verschillen van elkaar wat betreft vre-
deshandelen, motivatie tot vredeshandelen, religieuze vredesattitudes en de 
sociale locatie van het vredeshandelen. Het onderzoek bevestigt de stereotiepe 
tegenstellingen tussen ICTO'ers en IKV'ers. ICTO'ers zijn overtuigd van de 
functionaliteit van kernbewapening voor de veiligheid van het Westen; IKV'ers 
niet. IKV'ers zijn voorstander van eenzijdige ontwapeningsstappen; ICTO'ers 
niet. IKV'ers zijn ook meer bezorgd over bewapening dan ICTO'ers en zij zijn 
sterker overtuigd van de mogelijkheid om invloed op bewapeningsprocessen uit 
te oefenen. MOV'ers nemen in de opvattingen over bewapening en ontwape-
ning een middenpositie tussen IKV'ers en ICTO'ers in, hoewel zij met IKV'ers 
het meest overeenkomen. Interessant is dat de verschillen in opvattingen over 
bewapening samengaan met verschillende religieuze vredesattitudes. Vooral de 
hamartiologische attitudes met betrekking tot oorlog en de ecclesiologische 
vredesattitudes laten verschillen tussen de drie vredesbewegingen zien. Ten 
aanzien van de soteriologische vredesattitudes bestaan daarentegen nauwelijks 
verschillen. 
Vervolgens worden de drie groepen niet-leden vergeleken (§ 4.2). Zij ver-
schillen nauwelijks van elkaar wat betreft vredeshandelen, motivatie tot vredes-
handelen, religieuze vredesattitudes en de sociale locatie van het vredeshande-
len. De verschillen die er zijn betreffen vooral de opvattingen over de kerk. 
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Tenslotte worden de leden en de niet-leden met elkaar vergeleken (§ 4.3). 
Omdat de niet-leden in hun gedragskenmerken en attitudes zeer homogeen 
zijn, worden zij in de analyse als één groep behandeld. Een opmerkelijke uit-
komst uit de vergelijking van leden en niet-leden is dat de niet-leden in hun 
attitudes vaak worden omsloten door enerzijds de IKV'ers en anderzijds de 
ICTO'ers. Dit verschijnsel wordt aangeduid als het inclusie-patroon. Binnen dat 
patroon bevinden de MOV'ers zich meestal aan de zijde van de IKV'ers, maar 
niet altijd. Van de drie vredesbewegingen komen de MOV'ers het meest met 
de niet-leden overeen. 
Met behulp van correspondentie-analyse worden de vergelijkingen tussen 
leden en niet-leden nogmaals overzichtelijk grafisch weergeven in enkele 'land-
schappen' (§ 4.4). 
Het empirisch onderzoek wordt afgerond met een analyse van de motivatione-
le effecten van religieuze vredesattitudes op het communicatief vredeshandelen 
(hoofdstuk vijf). Daartoe wordt een regressiemodel van het communicatief 
vredeshandelen ontwikkeld, weergegeven in figuur 2. De structuur van de fi-
guur weerspiegelt de verwachting dat religieuze vredesattitudes een indirect 
effect op het communicatief vredeshandelen uitoefenen, dat verloopt via het 
motivationeel systeem. Ook is in de figuur plaats ingeruimd voor effecten van 
de sociale locatie van het vredeshandelen. 
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De regressie-analyse toont aan dat er inderdaad een indirect, motivationeel, 
effect van religieuze vredesattitudes op het communicatief vredeshandelen 
bestaat. Als antwoord op de theologische vraagstelling kan derhalve met empi-
rische ondersteuning worden gesteld: 
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Religieuze vredesattitudes hebben een indirect effect op het communicatief vredes-
handelen, via hun effect op de motivatie tot vredeshandelen. 
Positieve motivationele effecten gaan uit van de immanent transcendente hamar-
tiologie en de kritische vredesecclesiologie. Het eerste heeft betrekking op de 
interpretatie van het kwaad van de oorlog als een manifestatie van de demonie 
van de bewapening en de verafgoding van de veiligheidsideologie, welke wor-
den geïnterpreteerd vanuit een transcendente dimensie van het kwaad. Het 
tweede heeft betrekking op de opvatting dat kerkelijke vredespraxis legitiem is 
en een politiek-kritïsche praxis behoort te zijn. Een negatief motivationeel 
effect gaat uit van de absoluut transcendente hamartiologie: de idee dat het 
kwaad van de oorlog een relatie heeft tot God, of tot hogere demonische 
machten. Opvallend is dat soteriologische vredesattitudes geen effect op het 
communicatief vredeshandelen hebben. 
Bij de conclusie dat religieuze vredesattitudes een indirect, motivationeel 
effect op het communicatief vredeshandelen hebben moeten twee kanttekenin-
gen worden gemaakt. Op de eerste plaats blijken er ook enkele directe effecten 
van religieuze vredesattitudes op het communicatief vredeshandelen te be-
staan. Deze effecten kunnen, binnen het theoretisch model van figuur 2, niet 
als motivationele effecten worden begrepen, daar ze buiten het motivationeel 
systeem om verlopen. In het evaluatieve slothoofdstuk wordt getracht deze 
directe effecten te interpreteren. Op de tweede plaats blijken religieuze vredes-
attitudes niet de enige factor te zijn die het vredeshandelen beïnvloedt. Ook de 
sociale locatie heeft effecten op het vredeshandelen. Vooral de politieke voor-
keur en de politieke activiteit blijken goede voorspellers van het communica-
tief vredeshandelen te zijn. Naarmate de politieke voorkeur meer uitgaat naar 
'links' en het politiek handelen toeneemt, neemt ook de communicatieve vre-
desactiviteit toe. De totale voorspelkracht van religieuze vredesattitudes en 
politieke kenmerken ten opzichte van het communicatief vredeshandelen is 
ongeveer gelijk. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de differentiële voorspelkracht 
van religieuze vredesattitudes ten opzichte van het communicatief vredeshan-
delen substantieel is. 
In het zesde hoofdstuk worden de empirische resultaten geëvalueerd in het 
licht van de theorie. Daarbij wordt onderscheiden tussen een interpretatieve 
en een reflexieve evaluatie. 
In een interpretatieve evaluatie worden de onderzoeksresultaten teruggekop-
peld naar de vraagstelling van het onderzoek (§ 6.1). De interpretatieve evalu-
atie is geordend volgens de drie empirische vragen welke in § 2.8 uit de vraag-
stelling van het onderzoek zijn afgeleid. Enkele saillante conclusies uit de in-
terpretatieve evaluatie worden hieronder gegeven. 
Uit de empirische neerslag van de conceptualisering van religieuze vredesat-
titudes (hoofdstuk drie) kon worden geconcludeerd dat het onderscheid tussen 
immanente en absolute transcendentie, zowel in hamartiologisch als soteriolo-
gisch opzicht, een veel sterkere empirische basis heeft dan het onderscheid 
tussen de drie tijdsdimensies. Hieruit kan de theologische conclusie worden 
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getrokken dat temporele distincties slechts in beperkte mate adequaat zijn als 
basis voor theologische theorievorming. Met name in politieke theologiëen 
wordt het onderscheid tussen tijdsdimensies sterk beklemtoond. Politieke theo-
logie benadrukt de toekomstgerichte, eschatologische dimensie van het christe-
lijk geloof, als drager van de sociaal-utopische en emancipatorische lading van 
de christelijke heilsboodschap. Vanuit deze eschatologische preoccupatie wor-
den niet-toekomstgerichte theologische paradigma's, met name de sterk 
'presentiseli' georiënteerde existentiële theologie, bekritiseerd. Zonder eschato-
logische oriëntatie op de toekomst zou een emancipatorisch christendom niet 
mogelijk zijn, en zou de theologie vervallen tot een onkritische legitimatie van 
de bestaande maatschappelijke orde. De empirische observatie dat religieuze 
vredesattitudes slechts in beperkte mate volgens tijdsdimensies zijn onderschei-
den leidt echter tot de veronderstelling dat temporele dimensies niet de be-
langrijkste scheidslijnen zijn waarlangs wordt beslist over het emancipatorisch 
en maatschappij-kritisch potentieel van het christelijk geloof. Empirisch distinct 
zijn primair de dimensies van immanente en absolute transcendentie: vrede als 
een door God gegeven opgave versus vrede als een absolute gave van God. 
Het emancipatorisch en kritisch karakter van de christelijk boodschap lijkt niet 
op de eerste plaats af te hangen van de toekomstgerichtheid van het christelijk 
geloof, maar van het beeld van God als immanente transcendentie: Gods open-
baring in het handelen van mensen dat is gericht op solidariteit en bevrijding 
in heel de menselijke geschiedenis, in het verleden, het heden en de toekomst. 
Vanuit dit inzicht zou de politiek-theologische kritiek op de existentiële theolo-
gie van Bultmann kunnen worden geherformuleerd. Wat in Bultmanns theolo-
gie dient te worden bekritiseerd is niet in de eerste plaats de exclusieve focus 
op de temporele dimensie van het heden, maar is het absoluut transcendente 
Godsbeeld dat in Bultmanns teksten prominent naar voren treedt (God als 
"überweltliche Realität", als "dunkele Macht" et cetera). 
De analyse van de verschillen tussen sub-populaties binnen de onderzoeks-
populatie (hoofdstuk vier) bracht onder andere aan het licht dat de niet-leden 
in hun attitudes vaak worden omsloten door enerzijds de IKV'ers en ander-
zijds de ICTO'ers. Dit inclusie-patroon geeft een goed inzicht in de aard van 
de binnenkerkelijke communicatie over vrede gedurende de voorbije jaren. 
IKV'ers en ICTO'ers confronteerden de kerkleden met tegengestelde opvattin-
gen over oorlog en vrede, maar waren geen van beiden in staat de kerkleden 
naar hun positie over te halen. Noch kon een van beide pretenderen de opvat-
tingen van de kerkleden te representeren. 
Uit de regressie-analyse (hoofdstuk vijf) blijkt dat religieuze vredesattitudes 
niet alleen een indirect, motivationeel, effecten op het communicatief vredes-
handelen hebben, maar ook enkele directe effecten. Deze directe effecten 
kunnen, binnen het gehanteerde theoretisch model niet als motivationele effec-
ten worden begrepen, daar ze buiten het motivationeel systeem van conceptie, 
perceptie en attributie om verlopen. De directe effecten kunnen alsnog in een 
motivatie-theoretisch kader worden geïnterpreteerd, door de mogelijkheid toe 
te laten dat religieuze vredesattitudes ook zelf functioneren als concepties, 
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percepties en attributies, en niet slechts als factoren die deze motivationele 
componenten beïnvloeden. 
Het is mogelijk om de gevonden directe effecten in deze zin te interpreteren. 
Daarbij is van belang dat de directe effecten alle betrekking hebben op de rol 
van kerk ten aanzien van vrede. Blijkbaar vormt de kerk een eigen, religieus, 
domein binnen de werkelijkheid, ten aanzien waarvan mensen religieuze con-
cepties, percepties en attributies kunnen ontwikkelen, die het vredeshandelen 
direct beïnvloeden. 
In de regressie-analyse konden geen effecten van soteriologische vredesatti-
tudes op het vredeshandelen worden gemeten. Dat is merkwaardig gezien de 
prominente rol die soteriologische voorstellingen vervullen in het theologisch 
discours over vrede. Dat vrede een kenmerk is van Gods heil en verlossing 
mag wel de centrale stelling van de christelijke theologie van de vrede worden 
genoemd. Het ontbreken van een soteriologisch effect op het vredeshandelen 
kan echter, paradoxaal, precies uit het theologisch belang van de soteriologie 
worden verklaard. Soteriologische attitudes laten vrijwel geen verschillen bin-
nen de onderzoekspopulatie zien. De soteriologie heeft meer het karakter van 
een constante dan van een variabele. Het is inherent aan de techniek van 
regressie-analyse dat kenmerken die binnen een populatie niet discrimineren 
geen regressie-effecten laten zien. Hieruit kan echter niet zonder meer worden 
geconcludeerd dat soteriologische vredesattitudes geen effect op het vredes-
handelen hebben. Het enige dat kan worden vastgesteld is dat een dergelijk 
effect niet is gemeten. 
In een reflexieve evaluatie worden de onderzoeksresultaten teruggekoppeld 
naar de probleem- en doelstelling van het onderzoek, en naar de daarachter 
gelegen theologische theorieën over de hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis 
en de motivationele functie van het christelijk geloof voor het moreel handelen 
(§ 6.2). Het onderzoek biedt empirische ondersteuning voor de stelling dat de 
religieuze hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis een transformatieve, motivati-
onele betekenis voor het handelen heeft, krachtens haar gerichtheid op de 
normatieve principes van vrijheid, gelijkheid, universaliteit en solidariteit. Het 
blijkt dat vooral maatschappij-kritische en politiek activerende religieuze attitu-
des (immanent transcendente hamartiologie en kritische vredesecclesiologie) 
een positief effect op het vredeshandelen hebben. Deze attitudes kunnen wor-
den opgevat als toespitsingen van het politiek-theologisch paradigma op de 
vredesproblematiek. De politieke theologie baseert zich op de eschatologisch-
normatieve principes van de hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis. Politieke 
theologie kan worden opgevat als een theologisch paradigma van de transfor-
matieve, motiverende functie van de hermeneutisch-communicatieve praxis. 
Het onderzoek laat zien dat elementen van dit paradigma in het empirisch 
religieus bewustzijn een transformatieve, motiverende kracht hebben. 
Over de theologische motivatietheorie van Auer kunnen uit het onderzoek 
enkele kritische conclusies worden getrokken. Op de eerste plaats moet echter 
worden vastgesteld dat het onderzoek empirische ondersteuning biedt voor 
Auers fundamentele stelling dat de morele functie van het christelijk geloof is 
gelegen in zijn moreel motiverende kracht. Daarnaast moet evenwel worden 
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geconcludeerd dat de scheiding in Auers theorie tussen enerzijds het auto-
noom moreel handelen en anderzijds de achtergrond van religieuze betekenis-
sen te strikt is. De gevonden directe effecten van ecclesiologische vredesattitu-
des op het vredeshandelen nopen ertoe om religie en ethiek nauwer met el-
kaar te verbinden. In het werkelijkheidsdomein van de kerk, als sacrament van 
Gods heil in de wereld, komen religie en ethiek samen. Ook moet Auers on-
derscheid tussen een integrerende, stimulerende en kritische functie van het 
christelijk geloof op grond van de onderzoeksresultaten sterk worden gerelati-
veerd. In Auers werk wordt niet duidelijk hoe deze drie motivationele functies 
zich tot afzonderlijke christelijke religieuze attitudes verhouden. Vervullen alle 
religieuze attitudes de drie functies, of is elke functie gekoppeld aan specifieke 
religieuze attitudes, zodat sommige een integrerende functie vervullen, andere 
een stimulerende en weer andere een kritische? Wat het antwoord ook moge 
zijn, uit ons onderzoek is gebleken dat er religieuze vredesattitudes zijn die 
geen enkele motivationeel effect op het vredeshandelen bezitten. Hier is noch 
sprake van een religieuze integratie van het ethische, noch van stimulatie of 
kritiek. Auers stelling dat het christelijk kerygma een integrerende, stimuleren-
de en kritische functie voor de moraliteit vervult gaat te ver. Slechts een deel 
van het kerygma vervult deze functies. Bovendien zijn er religieuze attitudes 
met een negatief effect op het vredeshandelen, bijvoorbeeld de absoluut trans-
cendente hamartiologie. Blijkbaar kunnen religieuze attitudes ook een 'desinte-
grerende', 'ontstimulerende' en 'onkritische' rol spelen. Auers theorie houdt 
daar geen rekening mee. 
In relatie tot de theologische doelstelling van het onderzoek - het verhelde-
ren van de bevordering van de motivationele functie van de religieuze herme-
neutisch-communicatieve praxis - kan met name worden geconcludeerd dat het 
vredeshandelen, geleid door de normatieve principes van vrijheid, gelijkheid, 
universaliteit en solidariteit, een concrete manifestatie is van de transformatie-
ve, motiverende kracht van de religieuze hermeneutisch-communicatieve 
praxis. Als kritisch-reflexieve instantie binnen de religieuze hermeneutisch-
communicatieve praxis heeft de theologie de taak om deze transformerende, 
motiverende functie te bevorderen. Dit houdt in dat de theologie religieuze 
vredesattitudes die een positief effect op het vredeshandelen hebben dient te 
bevorderen en attitudes die daaraan afbreuk doen dient te bekritiseren. In 
concreto dient de theologie zich te stellen op de standpunten van een imma-
nent transcendente hamartiologie en een kritische vredesecclesiologie. Zij 
dient deze standpunten op kritisch-hermeneutische wijze te bereflecteren en in 
een adequate conceptualisering voor gelovigen te expliciteren. In het perspec-
tief van de transformatieve gerichtheid van de religieuze hermeneutisch-com-
municatieve praxis dient gelovigen te worden geleerd om het kwaad van de 
oorlog religieus te interpreteren als een manifestatie van institutionele zonde 
en de kerk te zien als een maatschappij-kritische instantie, die haar inzet voor 
gerechtigheid en vrede ook dan niet uit de weg gaat, wanneer confrontaties 
met de politiek en binnenkerkelijke spanningen onvermijdelijk zijn. Ook dient 
gelovigen te worden geleerd om het kwaad van onrecht en geweld in de wereld 
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niet, in absoluut transcendente theodicee-constructies, met een straffend of 
opvoedend ingrijpende God in verband te brengen. 
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Bij het proefschrift van RJ.M. Jeurissen, Peace and Religion - An Empirical-Theologi-
cal Study of the Motivational Effects of Religious Peace Attitudes on Peace Action. 
1 Sommige religieuze attitudes hebben een motivationeel effect op het moreel han-
delen (dit proefschrift). 
2 In de populatie van leden van kerkelijke vredesbewegingen zijn religieuze vredes-
attitudes, naast politieke kenmerken, een belangrijke voorspeller van het vredes-
handelen (dit proefschrift). 
3 In een praktisch relevante theologie van de vrede mag een hoofdstuk over de 
hamartiologie van oorlog en bewapening niet ontbreken, aangezien hamartiologi-
sche attitudes over oorlog en bewapening een aantoonbaar motivationeel effect 
op het vredeshandelen bezitten (dit proefschrift). 
4 Dat kerkleden in het verleden sterk waren ondervertegenwoordigd in politieke 
demonstraties tegen (kern)bewapening kan worden verklaard uit het feit dat de 
kerkelijke leiding zich onthield van actie-mobilisatie op de korte termijn, ten 
behoeve van deze demonstraties. Hieraan kan ondersteuning worden ontleend 
voor de stelling dat de kerkelijke leiding een depolitiserende invloed op kerkleden 
uitoefent (dit proefschrift). 
5 Wat leden van het Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad en het Interkerkelijk Comité 
Tweezijdige Ontwapening tijdens de discussie over kernbewapening verbond was 
dat zij meer 'comparatieve bezorgdheid' over bewapening (inschatting van de 
eigen bezorgdheid over bewapening in vergelijking tot anderen) aan de dag leg-
den dan kerkleden die niet in een vredesbeweging actief waren (dit proefschrift). 
6 Beslissend voor het emanápatorisch-kritisch potentieel van theologie is niet de 
mate waarin de toekomst als centrale theologische categorie wordt gehanteerd, 
zoals sommige politieke theologen en bevrijdingstheologen menen, maar de mate 
waarin God als immanente transcendentie wordt gedacht (dit proefschrift). 
7 Prioritering van medische zorg op basis van het noodzakelijkheidscriterium, zoals 
de 'Commissie Keuzen in de zorg* voorstelt in haar rapport Kiezen en delen 
(1991), is in Nederland ten eerste ongewenst, vanwege het gevaar van een dicta-
tuur van de meerderheid, ten tweede onuitvoerbaar, vanwege onoplosbare waarde-
ringsproblemen, en ten derde onnodig, aangezien de criteria van effectiviteit en 
doelmatigheid reeds voldoende aanknopingspunten voor een medisch priorite-
ringsbeleid bieden. 
8 Bedrijfsethiek dient te worden gefundeerd in een theorie over de interpenetratie 
(bij blijvende differentie) van economische doelrationaliteit enerzijds en moreel-
communicatieve rationaliteit anderzijds. 
9 Een zinvraag is niet een vraag die slechts uit één zin bestaat. 
10 "Alles moest zo zijn, maar begrijpen kon men het niet" (Gerard Revé). 


This book offers a thorough analysis of the meaning and function 
of religion for peace. How can religious beliefs and attitudes in-
duce people to take action for peace? How can views on evil, 
sin, redemption and eschatology lead one towards concrete 
action? Or do these views stand in the way of peace action? 
These questions are first treated historically, then systemati-
cally. Moreover, they are raised in an empirical way. A research 
sample was drawn of members of three church-related peace 
movements as well as members of three Christian denomi-
nations in the Netherlands. They filled out a questionnaire on 
religious beliefs and attitudes and on peace values and peace 
actions. A huge amount of original material came out of the sur-
vey. Members of the peace movement and members of the dif-
ferent denominations were confronted with one another. The 
book concludes with a general reflection on the question 
whether religion actually has a motivational effect on a con-
crete commitment to peace. 
